Bava Metzia 67a — the Talmud in English

Rava said: ![](pamud.bmp "

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I was sitting before Rav Naḥman,

when he stated the law mentioned above, concerning one who sells the fruit of a date palm, that if he seizes and eats, we do not take it away from him.

And I sought to raise an objection to him

[I wanted to challenge him concerning this] from a law that we find regarding

overreaching.

The Gemara below explains the objection.

And he looked intently.

[He watched me and saw that I intended to challenge his words].

He showed you

[he preceded me in showing me a proof for his words] from a law that we find regarding

a woman incapable of childbirth.

And the Gemara below explains the proof.

Now the Gemara explains the objection that Rava wished to raise against Rav Naḥman, from a law that we find concerning overreaching.

But in the case of overreaching

in commerce, whether on the seller’s side, when he sold for more than its value, or on the buyer’s side, when he bought for less than its value,

it is forgiveness in error,

because the one who was wronged gave it knowingly, and his intention was that it should belong to the one who wronged him. But this was in error, for he thought that this was its true value.

And it is not forgiveness.

For it is written in the Mishna in the chapter “The Golden One” that there are circumstances in which the one who overreached must return the overcharge to the one who was wronged. And this is difficult against Rav Naḥman, who holds that forgiveness in error is forgiveness?

And he looked intently; he showed you the woman incapable of childbirth.

Now the Gemara explains the proof that Rav Naḥman brings for his words, from a law that we find concerning a woman incapable of childbirth.

Behold, in the case of a woman incapable of childbirth, it is forgiveness in error, and it is forgiveness.

And the proof that it is forgiveness is from this

as we learned: “The minor woman who refuses,”

a minor orphan without a father, whom her mother or brothers married off with a rabbinic marriage, and who left him through refusal, for according to the enactment of the Sages she has the right, while she is a minor, to refuse her husband, and she leaves him without a bill of divorce.

“And the secondary wife,”

a woman who is forbidden to her husband by the law of “secondary” forbidden relations, for the Sages decreed this concerning her in order to distance a person from a forbidden relation in the Torah.

“And the woman incapable of childbirth,”

a woman who by nature is unable to give birth, and she is called thus from the word “ram” [male], because she does not have the signs of a woman. And here it is speaking of a case in which her husband did not know that she was incapable of childbirth when he married her.

“They have neither a marriage contract,”

the minor woman who refuses has no marriage contract, because she was not divorced by her husband, but left against his will. The secondary wife has no marriage contract, because the Sages penalized her. And the woman incapable of childbirth has no marriage contract, because the transaction was a mistaken transaction, since he did not know that she was incapable of childbirth, and she is not his wife.

“Nor produce,”

for the husband does not pay them for the produce that he ate from their property, even though the enactment of the Sages that the husband eats the produce of his wife’s property does not apply here.

“Nor maintenance,”

for he is not obligated to provide them with maintenance.

“Nor worn garments.”

If she brought him garments in her dowry, even if they are still extant, he need not return her worn garments [that became worn through use].

And the reason in the case of the woman incapable of childbirth, that the husband need not return to her what she brought him in her dowry, and need not pay her for the produce that he ate from her property, is that although it is a mistaken transaction, since when she brought it to him her intention was that it should belong to him, there is forgiveness here. And although it is in error, she forgives because she thinks that she is his wife. Forgiveness in error is forgiveness. And from this Rav Naḥman brings proof for his position.

And the Gemara rejects this:

It is not so: overreaching is not a refutation of him

Rav Naḥman,

and the woman incapable of childbirth does not support him

Rav Naḥman.

And the Gemara explains:

Overreaching is not a refutation of him, because the one who was wronged did not know

that he was wronged,

that there was overreaching,

so that we could say

that he forgave him

the one who wronged him. That is to say, there is no forgiveness here at all, because the one who was wronged did not know the reality—that he was paying more than the price.

But in the case of one who sells the fruit of a date palm, the seller knows the reality, that so-and-so is eating the fruit, and he is only mistaken regarding the reason. For he thinks that it is lawfully due to him, whereas the truth is that it is not lawfully due to him. Therefore there is forgiveness here, and forgiveness in error is forgiveness.

And the woman incapable of childbirth does not support him.

For in this case the forgiveness is not in error,

because it is pleasing to her

the woman incapable of childbirth

that the name of marriage should be removed from her,

and even if she knew that her marriage was not a marriage, she wishes to feed him.

Introduction to the discussion of a mortgage

The matter of a mortgage is as follows: the lender receives into his possession and control one of the borrower’s properties, as a pledge and security for repayment of the debt.

During those years in which the mortgage is in the lender’s possession, he treats it as an owner, works it, and eats its produce. It follows that every loan secured by a mortgage is a loan with interest, because besides the principal that the lender is destined to collect from the borrower, he now eats the produce of the field.

And we find that there were different types of mortgages:

There were places where the practice was that the borrower could not remove the lender from the mortgage until the repayment time arrived, and even if he wished to repay the debt within the period, the lender could retain the mortgage in his possession and refuse to accept the repayment. And this is called in the Gemara

“a place where they do not permit removal.”

And there were places where the practice was that whenever the borrower brought the repayment money, he was permitted to remove the lender from the mortgage, and it returned to him. And this is called in the Gemara

“a place where they permit removal.”

Most of the early authorities hold that with regard to interest, a mortgage in “a place where they do not permit removal” is more lenient than a mortgage in “a place where they permit removal.” To the extent that Rashi and Tosafot hold that in a place where they do not permit removal, it is permitted for the lender to eat the produce even when he deducts nothing from the debt.

But the Ramban disagrees with this and holds that it is forbidden for the lender to eat the produce, because this is the dust of interest; nevertheless, he too holds that it is more lenient than in a place where they permit removal. For in a place where they permit removal, when the lender eats the produce of the land and does not deduct it from the debt, this is fixed interest.

And the early authorities wrote the reason that a mortgage in a place where they do not permit removal is subject to a more lenient prohibition: since the borrower cannot remove the lender from the field until a particular time, even after he has already repaid the debt, the matter is considered a sale of the land for a certain period, and not a loan. It is as though the lender purchases the land from the borrower at the time of the loan, and then sells it back to him at the time of repayment.

We also find in the Gemara a mortgage

“with deduction” and a mortgage

and a mortgage

“without deduction.”

A mortgage

“with deduction”

means that the lender and borrower agree between themselves that for every year that the mortgage is under the lender’s control, a certain sum will be deducted from the debt. It follows that the lender does not eat the produce for nothing, but pays for it with this deducted sum. However, this sum of the deduction was very low; sometimes they would deduct one dinar per year for a field that produces produce worth one thousand dinars, as explained by Maimonides.

A mortgage

“without deduction”

means that the lender eats the produce of the field without any deduction, and at the end of the loan period he is destined to receive the repayment of the debt in full.

In a mortgage without deduction, there is a dispute among the early authorities whether this is a prohibition from the Torah or from rabbinic enactment.

In a mortgage with deduction, everyone holds that it is not forbidden by the Torah, and they dispute whether it is forbidden by rabbinic enactment.

We also find in the Gemara a mortgage that is permitted according to all opinions, namely, a mortgage

“of the type called sava.”

For they would write in the document: “When these years are completed, this land shall leave without money.” That is, the lender receives the field into his possession, and after a certain number of years he returns it to the borrower, and the borrower need not repay any money at all. It follows that eating the produce is the repayment, and there is no other repayment here. In this case, even if he deducts a small amount for each year, it is permitted. See below the reason for the permission in this mortgage.

There was an incident involving

a certain woman,

a woman

who said to a certain man,

an agent:

Go, buy me land,

go and buy me land

from my relatives

[from my close relatives].

He went,

the agent went,

he bought it for her,

and bought land for her from her relatives.

He said to him,

the seller said to the agent at the time of the sale: I am selling on the condition that

if I have money

after some time,

you will return it to me,

you will return the land to me, and I will return to you the money that you gave me.

He said to him,

the agent said to the seller: Behold,

you and Venvula

[this was the name of the woman who sent the agent]

are brothers

[you are relatives]. And surely you will come to an arrangement between yourselves.

And the agent’s intention can be explained in two ways. The first is: I am not involving myself in this condition, and I am buying without a condition; rather, afterward you will come to an arrangement between yourselves, since you are relatives. According to this possibility, since the seller was silent, he accepted the agent’s words and sold without a condition.

And the second is that his intention was to say: Behold, you are relatives, and surely the woman who sent me is satisfied with whatever you want, and the sale takes effect with this condition.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Everywhere

that the agent says

“You and Venvula are brothers,” his mind relies

the seller’s mind relies on the fact that the agent agrees with his words,

and he does not fully transfer

the land to him, except on the condition that if afterward he obtains money, he can give it to her and receive the land back.

Therefore, if the seller brings the money afterward, indeed

the land returns,

the land returns to the seller.

But there is a question:

the produce

that the buyer ate until the seller brings him the money,

what

is its law? Does he also have to return it, or not?

And the sides of the question are: Is it that

it was fixed interest,

because when the seller gives him the money that he received, it becomes clear that in fact this was a loan and not a conditional sale, and consequently the produce that the buyer ate was fixed interest,

and it is recovered through the courts.

Or perhaps,

only

it was the dust of interest, and it is not

recovered

through the courts.

And below the Gemara explains the reason for saying that this is only the dust of interest.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: It stands to reason that it was the dust of interest, and it is not recovered through the courts.

And so Rava said: It was the dust of interest, and it is not recovered through the courts.

Abaye said to Rabba: In the case of a mortgage, what

does this mean? If the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender, and as long as he does not repay the debt the lender eats the produce of the field and does not deduct it from the borrower’s debt, is this also only the dust of interest, or is it fixed interest?

And the sides of the question are:

There,

in the incident mentioned,

what is the reason

that this is only the dust of interest?

Because he did not fix it for him,

the borrower did not establish with the lender that he would eat the produce of the field as long as he did not give him the money; rather, he eats the produce of his own accord. And whenever they did not explicitly fix the interest, this is not fixed interest.

And if so,

here too

in a mashkanta, this is not fixed interest, because

he did not fix it for him,

the borrower and the lender did not establish between themselves the consumption of the produce.

Or perhaps, there

the reason that this is not fixed interest is that it is

a sale,

for the consumption of the produce is in the manner of a sale, since the lender entered the field by way of a sale .

And if so,

here

in the mashkanta, this is fixed interest, because this is consumption of produce in the manner of a

loan.

He said to him

Rabba:

There,

in the aforementioned incident,

what is the reason,

what is the reason that the consumption of the produce is considered the dust of interest?

Because he did not fix it for him.

And therefore,

here

in the mashkanta,

also

this is the dust of interest, because

he did not fix it for him.

Rav Pappi said: Ravina performed an act,

when there was an incident resembling the aforementioned incident, in which he said to him, “Go buy land for me,” and so on,

and he calculated

how much produce the buyer had consumed,

and he removed

he took from the buyer the value of the

produce

that he had consumed. For he holds that this is fixed interest and is recoverable through the courts.

Not like Rabbah bar Rav Huna,

who said above that this is the dust of interest.

And by a kal va-chomer to a mashkanta, which is fixed interest .

Mar, son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava: This is the mashkanta,

that the borrower mortgaged [the land] to the lender without specification, and did not

specify to him that he should consume the produce , and he consumes the produce without deduction —

In a place where the borrower may cause the lender to vacate,

if it was the custom of that place that even if the repayment date had not arrived, if the borrower brings the repayment money to the lender, he must accept it and return the mortgage to the borrower . Then, when

the lender consumed

produce

to the value of zuz

of the debt, and the borrower came before us and said, “I do not want him to consume my produce as interest,” they assess the produce that he consumed, apply it to his debt, and

we cause him to vacate

the mashkanta. For the debt is paid through his consumption of the produce.

And even though Rava said above that a mashkanta without deduction, where he did not fix it for him, is the dust of interest, and the dust of interest is not recoverable through the courts, nevertheless here he can demand his money, because he is not considered as one who is demanding from the lender the return of the dust of interest. Rather, his claim is that since the lender consumed the produce of the mashkanta without specification for the sake of the loan, and did not specify that he was consuming it as interest, the borrower may interpret the consumption of the produce as being for the principal .

If he consumed

the lender

more

than the value of the principal,

we do not remove it from him,

because Rava holds that this is the dust of interest, and the dust of interest is not recoverable through the courts.

And we do not calculate from one document to another.

That is to say, if the borrower owes the lender money in another document, we do not calculate what he consumed beyond the value of the principal, saying that this will be repayment for the debt of the other document. For when the lender consumed the produce, he certainly did not consume it for the sake of the other debt. And it is impossible to take the interest from him, because the dust of interest is not recoverable through the courts .

And with orphans,

the lender consumes produce from land that their father mortgaged to him without deduction.

And if

he consumed the value of the zuz, we cause him to vacate him,

as with other people.

If he consumed more, we remove it from him.

For the court of the city is the father of orphans, and they notify everyone who consumes produce without deduction from the field of orphans that after he has consumed the value of the principal, the debt has been paid and he must leave the field; consequently, if he continues to consume produce, this is robbery, and they take it from him according to the law governing a robber.

And we calculate from one document to another,

for the aforementioned reason .

Rav Ashi said: Now that you have said,

if

he consumed more

than the value of the principal,

we do not remove it from him,

because the dust of interest is not recoverable through the courts.

If he consumed the value of the zuz

of the principal,

we likewise do not cause him to vacate

the mashkanta

without money.

Only when he repays him the debt does he return to him the mortgaged field.

What is the reason? —

Causing

the lender to vacate him

without money is taking away

interest

from him!

For it is evident to us that he consumed the produce as interest.

It is the dust of interest, and the dust of interest is not recoverable

through the courts .

And the Gemara brings [proof] that for this reason it is impossible to repay the debt through the lender’s having eaten produce: