Bava Metzia 66a (סו.) — the Talmud in English

Ameimar said:

It is merely empty verbiage,

and there is no condition here. Therefore, if creditors seized the property from the purchaser, the seller need not give him anything.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: What is the reason

that this is merely empty verbiage? Why do we not say that his intention was to make a full-fledged condition?

Because,

since it is the purchaser who needs to stipulate the condition,

as the condition is for his benefit,

whereas here the seller is the one who stipulates it,

and the purchaser did not repeat the condition in order to reinforce it, therefore

you say that it is merely empty verbiage.

And we raise an objection to Ameimar:

Rather, the beraita

that the Gemara cited above,

which teaches

in its latter clause:

“When you have money, I will return it to you”—it is permitted.

And in this case

it is the seller who needs to stipulate the condition,

because the condition is for his benefit, and it is speaking of a case where the

seller did not stipulate, but the purchaser is the one who stipulates.

And we said

above:

“What is different in the first clause, and what is different in the latter clause?” And Rava said: In the latter clause, it is where he said to him,

the purchaser said explicitly to the seller,

“of my own accord”

[of my own will].

It is clear that

the reason is that he said to him,

explicitly,

“of my own accord.”

Had he not said to him explicitly, “of my own accord,” it would be forbidden to do so, because there is a full-fledged condition here: If the seller returns the money, the sale is nullified; and

we do not say that it is merely empty verbiage,

and that there is no condition here?!

And we answer:

He said to him

Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: Rava did not mean that the case is one where he explicitly said to him, “of my own accord.” Rather,

it was stated as though he had said to him, “of my own accord.”

That is, since it is the seller who needs to stipulate the condition, and here the purchaser stipulated it, this is empty verbiage. The purchaser need not return the house to the seller, as he would have had to do if he had explicitly said to him, “I will return it to you of my own accord.”

There was a certain dangerously ill man who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife

[his wife], so that if he died she would not require yibbum.

He groaned and sighed,

[sighed], and

she said to him

his wife, before he divorced her:

“Why are you sighing?”

You need not worry that perhaps you will recover and I will marry another husband, because

“if you recover

[you are healed],

I am yours.”

And afterward he gave her the bill of divorce.

Rav Zevid said: It is merely empty verbiage,

because this was for the husband’s benefit, and he was not the one who stipulated the condition. Therefore, even if he recovered from his illness, she is permitted to marry another man.

And we raise an objection:

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina:

Why do you say that there is no condition in the divorce because this is empty verbiage?

And if it were not empty verbiage, what then?

Would

it be in her power to impose a condition in the bill of divorce?

After all, only

he has the power to impose a condition,

because the woman’s consent is not required for the divorce, and she can be divorced even against her will.

And we answer:

Lest you say that he himself completed and gave the bill of divorce with her condition in mind,

and since he divorced her with the condition she had stated in mind, he made a condition in the divorce.

It teaches us

that there is no condition in the divorce. For even though he gives the bill of divorce with her wishes in mind, here she too did not state a full-fledged condition, because what she said was merely empty verbiage.

Introduction to the sugya of asmachta

A person who stipulates with his fellow that if he does not do such and such, he will penalize himself by undertaking a known obligation—this is called asmachta. For example: One who repaid part of his debt deposited his document with a third party and said to the third party: “If I do not repay the remainder of the debt to the creditor by a certain day, give him his document, and he will collect the entire debt from me.” That is, at the time of the condition, he relies in his heart on the fact that he will be able to pay the remainder when the time arrives, and he penalizes himself that if he does not pay by that time, the third party will give the document to the creditor, who will collect the entire amount written in the document.

The tannaim disagreed in a Mishna in tractate Bava Batra, page 168a, whether the obligation takes effect or not.

Rabbi Yosei says that if the time arrived and he did not pay the remainder, the third party gives the document to the creditor, because asmachta effects acquisition. Rabbi Yehuda holds that asmachta does not effect acquisition, because he did not resolve in his mind to transfer ownership.

Regarding the meaning of the term asmachta, the early authorities disagree. The Rashbam in Bava Batra [168a, s.v. “Asmachta,” and 173b, s.v. “Rabbi Yehuda holds”] explains that he relies on the assumption that the condition upon whose nonfulfillment he made the obligation contingent will be fulfilled, and consequently the obligation will never come to be realized. In the case cited above, at the time of the condition he relies in his heart on the fact that he will be able to repay the remainder when the time arrives.

Rashi [here, 66a, s.v. “I say asmachta effects acquisition,” and above, 48b, s.v. “Asmachta effects acquisition”] explains that he makes his fellow rely on him—that is, he promises him that if his condition is not fulfilled, he will give him such and such, so that the other relies on him. In the case cited above, he makes his fellow rely on the fact that he will repay the remainder of the debt by a certain day.

It is written in our Mishna: “He lent him money against his field, and said to him: ‘If you do not repay me within three years, it is mine’; it is his.” It is clear from the sugya that this condition is an asmachta. The early authorities disagree as to in what manner this is an asmachta. Rashi [s.v. “I say asmachta effects acquisition”] holds that it is an asmachta only when the field is worth more than the loan, and if he does not repay within three

years, he reduces the price of the field for him. The Ramban and the Rashba hold that it is an asmachta even when the field is worth exactly the amount of the loan, because a person does not wish to sell his property. This is also the view of Tosafot, s.v. “And if.”

The latter clause of the Mishna states:

“He lent him money against his field”

and so on.

Rav Huna said: At the time the money is given,

that is, if the lender said to the borrower at the time he gave him the loan: “If you do not repay me within three years, it is mine,”

he acquires everything,

the entire mortgaged field, even though it is worth more than the money he lent him.

But if he said this

after the money was given,

the loan,

he does not acquire

the mortgaged field

except to the extent of his money,

because the borrower did not resolve in his mind to transfer ownership of more than the amount of the loan.

And Rav Naḥman said: Even after the money was given, he acquires everything .

Rav Naḥman carried out a legal ruling concerning the Exilarch,

who had a document in which it was written that they had said to the borrower after the money was given: “If you do not repay by a certain time, the mortgaged field will be acquired by us,” and the borrower did not repay,

in accordance with his ruling,

so that they acquired everything.

Rav Yehuda tore up the Exilarch’s document

because he held that the document was invalid.

The Exilarch said

to Rav Naḥman:

“Rav Yehuda tore up your document,”

the document that you had deemed valid.

Rav Naḥman said to him:

What, was it

a little child

[a person of little wisdom]

who tore it up?!

After all,

a great man tore it up,

and certainly

he saw a reason in it

that the document was invalid, and therefore

he tore it up.

Some say,

He said to him: “A little child tore it up! For everyone in relation to me is like little children in matters of law.”

Subsequently, Rav Naḥman said,

not as he had initially thought, but rather,

“Even at the time the money is given, he acquires nothing at all.”

And we raise an objection:

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman

from our Mishna:

“If you do not give me [the money] from now until three years, it is mine; it is his.”

It is clear that the lender acquires the entire field, which is difficult for Rav Naḥman.

But this is not difficult for Rav Huna, because he will establish the Mishna as referring to a case in which he made the statement at the time the money was given.

He said to him:

“I say”

[I was accustomed to say]

“asmachta effects acquisition,”

and therefore I initially said that even after the money was given he acquires everything. But the amora named

Minyomi said: “Asmachta does not effect acquisition,”

and he caused me to retract my statement. Ask him what he will answer concerning our Mishna.

“But according to Minyomi, the Mishna is difficult?!”

And we answer:

“If you wish, say that our Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that asmachta effects acquisition.”

But I hold in accordance with the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei.