Bava Metzia 63a (סג.) — the Talmud in English

And so he said:

“When I die,”

when I pass away,

Rabbi Oshaya will go out to meet me,

he will come out to greet me. Why?

Because I explain,

because I am always accustomed to explain

the baraita in accordance with his view.

So that his baraitot will not be difficult in light of the Mishna.

As he taught,

as Rabbi Oshaya taught in a baraita:

Behold,

a certain person

who was owed money by another,

as his fellow owed him one hundred dinars,

went and stood by his granary,

he came to collect his debt,

and said to him: Give me my money,

give me what I am owed,

as I wish to purchase wheat with it,

I wish to use the money of the debt to purchase wheat.

And he said to him,

the borrower said to him:

I have wheat, which I will give you;

I can supply you with wheat worth the amount of the debt.

Go out and establish it as a debt owed to me at the current market price,

and I will supply it to you at a later time; your profit will be the increase in the price of the wheat, according to how much more it will be worth when I repay you with it.

The time came to sell wheat,

the price of wheat rose.

And he said to him,

the lender said to the borrower:

Give me my wheat, as I wish to purchase wine with it,

since its price has risen, I want the profit and wish to purchase wine with it.

He said to him,

the borrower said to him:

I have wine, which I will give you. Go out

and establish it as a debt owed to me at the current market price. The time came to sell wine,

as its price rose.

And he said to him,

the lender said to the borrower:

Give me my wine, as I wish to sell it and purchase oil with it. He said to him: I have oil, which I will give you. Go out and establish it as a debt owed to me at the current market price.

And the baraita concludes:

All

the transactions mentioned,

if he has

the commodity concerning which they establish the debt,

it is permitted,

but if he does not have it, it is prohibited .

And the reason is that when he has the commodity, it is considered his, as though the commodity increased in value in the lender’s domain. But when the borrower does not have the commodity and the lender receives more, this is similar to interest.

And the resolution of the Mishna is:

And what does “purchased” mean?

The phrase in the Mishna, “He purchased from him with this gold dinar,”

means: He purchased with his loan,

the case is that his fellow owed him a gold dinar, and they established wheat as the object of the transaction against it. Afterwards, they came to establish wine against the wheat. In that case, if he does not have wine, it is prohibited to establish the transaction, because if its price increases, this resembles interest.

Rava said: Learn from Rabbi Oshaya —

it emerges from his words

three

innovations.

Learn from it

that one may convert a loan,

that is, exchange the monetary debt of the lender

for produce,

so that the borrower becomes obligated to provide produce in place of the money.

And we do not say

that there is a deficiency here on account of

“not like his money that has come into his possession,”

since he did not receive money from the lender. Rather, whenever the borrower has produce, he may undertake to provide it in place of his debt [and this is unlike the baraita above, 62b, which always requires the giving of money].

And

another

learn from it,

a second innovation:

namely, that he has it.

The possibility of establishing a transaction without giving money applies specifically when the borrower has produce; but when he does not have it, this can be done only through the giving of money.

And

another

learn from it,

a third innovation:

that Rabbi Yannai’s ruling applies,

as we uphold the statement of Rabbi Yannai.

For Rabbi Yannai said: What difference is there to me whether it is this or its value,

Rabbi Yannai innovated that in every transaction, if the time of payment arrives and the seller does not have the merchandise to give the buyer, he may give him the value of the merchandise in money, even though this is more money than he received from the buyer.

Rabbi Yannai holds that once the Sages permitted giving the produce, they also permitted giving its value. In Rabbi Oshaya’s baraita as well, we see this same innovation. For when the time comes to repay the wheat, the borrower says, “I do not have wheat,” and instead of giving the wheat, he assesses the current value of the wheat, and in exchange for that value he establishes wine as the commodity of the transaction. This assessment of the value of the wheat is the “value” mentioned by Rabbi Yannai: instead of giving the merchandise, its value is appraised. And it is with this current value that the subsequent transactions are established.

The Gemara cites the source of Rabbi Yannai’s statement:

As it was stated: Rav said: One may establish an “amana” transaction for produce.

That is, an ordinary transaction for produce,

but one may not establish an “amana” transaction for money.

But one may not give money for produce in such a manner that the seller undertakes to repay money according to the value of the produce at the time of repayment.

And Rabbi Yannai said: What difference is there to me whether it is this

the produce itself,

or its value,

the value of the produce.

Whenever establishing a transaction was permitted with regard to the produce, it is likewise permitted to receive its value, and we are not concerned that this appears as interest.

Meytivi

we raise an objection against Rav from what is stated in Rabbi Oshaya’s baraita:

All of them, if he has it, it is permitted.

If the borrower has the produce against which they wish to establish the debt,

it is permitted

to do so.

Although when they exchange wheat for wine, they assess the value of the wheat, and according to its value the borrower undertakes to provide wine, this assessment is essentially its “value,” whereas Rav said that one may not establish an amana transaction for money. If so, this supports Rabbi Yannai and not Rav.

And we answer:

Rav Huna said that Rav said: The case is when he took possession.

Initially, when they established the transaction for the wheat, the lender took possession of the wheat and acquired it, and it was his. The increase in value therefore occurred in his domain, and the loan was concluded. When they then come to establish wine as a transaction in exchange for the wheat, this is an appraisal of the lender’s property [and not of the borrower’s property]. The same was done each time a transaction was established: the lender took possession and acquired the commodity.

And we challenge this:

If

the case is

when he took possession, is it necessary to say so!?

It is obvious and there is no need for the baraita to teach this.

And we answer:

Rather,

let us establish the baraita differently,

for example, when he designated a corner for him,

there was no actual taking of possession here; rather, the borrower designated a place for the lender’s wheat.

And it teaches us

that the innovation is

that designation is legally significant.

It renders the merchandise as though it increased in value in the lender’s domain, so that there is no problem of interest here.

And Shmuel said

to offer another resolution to the difficulty against Rav.

This

Rabbi Oshaya’s baraita —

whose view is it?

It follows the view of

Rabbi Yehuda, who said: One aspect

of interest is permitted.

When it is uncertain whether there will ultimately be interest or not, as in Rabbi Oshaya’s case: if the wheat to which the seller became obligated is delivered at the appointed time, there is no aspect of interest whatsoever. The problem arises only in the other possibility, when he does not have the wheat; this is “one aspect of interest,” and Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is permitted to establish a transaction in such a case.

The Gemara cites the source of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement:

As it was taught

in a baraita:

There was a case in which

a certain lender

was owed money by another,

and he came to collect from his fellow

one hundred dinars

that he owed him.

And the borrower made

his

field a sale

for him. He said to him: If I do not repay my debt to you by a certain date, the field that I own will be sold to you and will pass into your possession. The money that you gave me as a loan will become purchase money.

The law is as follows:

When the seller,

who is the borrower,

eats

the

produce

that grows in the field [the reference is to eating the produce before the date they set for the field to pass to the lender], it is

permitted

to do so, because there is no concern of interest here.

But when the

buyer,

who is the lender,

eats the produce, it is prohibited

to do so, because perhaps the borrower will return the money to the lender, in which case it will become clear that this was not a sale at all, but merely loan money. The lender would then be eating produce from the borrower’s land in return for waiting for repayment of the money, and this is interest.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even when the buyer eats the produce, it is permitted.

Rabbi Yehuda brings proof for his words:

Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Beitous ben Zunin, who made his field a sale on the authority of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. The buyer was eating the produce. They said to him: Is that a proof!? The seller was eating the produce, not the buyer.

What is the difference between them?

In what case do the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda disagree?

Abaye said: One-sided interest is the difference between them.

The Sages hold that one-sided interest is prohibited. Therefore, even though there is a possibility that the loan will become a sale, it is prohibited. But Rabbi Yehuda holds that when there is one possibility that it will involve interest and another possibility that it will not involve interest, it is permitted.

But

Rava said:

Rabbi Yehuda agrees that one-sided interest is prohibited, and the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda is regarding

interest on condition of returning.

That is, when the buyer consumed the produce, they agreed between themselves that if ultimately it would not become a sale, the buyer would return what he had consumed. Nevertheless, the Sages prohibit it, because at the time of consumption it is interest. And what benefit is there in his returning afterward the interest that he took? But Rabbi Yehuda holds that such a condition is effective, even though one possibility will be prohibited.

Rava said: Now

after Rabbi

Yannai’s novel interpretation, as Rabbi Yannai said,