Bava Metzia 62b — the Talmud in English

And

the truth is not so, but

according to our law,

since a mortgage without deduction is only in the category of “dust of interest,”

one does not return [the money] from the lender to the borrower!?

But this contradicts the principle of Rav Safra?

He said to him:

Rav Ashi said to Ravina: There is no proof from here to refute the principle of Rav Safra, because what the gentiles take out—produce from the borrower’s hand to the lender’s hand—they do not collect for him as interest on the debt, but

they,

the judgment of the nations concerning a mortgage without deduction is as though

by way of a sale

[an actual sale]

it came into their possession,

that of the lenders. That is, so long as the borrower does not repay his debt, the vineyard is actually acquired by the lender until the time of repayment, and consequently the produce also belongs to the lender; therefore, according to their law, they take out [the produce] from one lender for another.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But if so,

since both in a loan of a se’a for a se’a and in a mortgage without deduction, in which cases one does not take [the money] out through the courts, Rav Safra’s principle does not apply, since according to their law as well they take out [the money] from one lender for another, for the reasons that the Gemara explained above.

If so,

“Everything that according to their law,” which Rav Safra said—what does it come to teach us?

When does Rav Safra’s principle find expression? What is the interest that according to their law is not regarded legally [as interest], whereas according to our law it is considered prohibited “interest” and is not taken out through the courts?

And we answer:

This is what

Rav Safra

came to teach us:

“Everything which, if according to their law they would not take out, according to our law they do not return.”

And what is it?

When does this find expression?—In

early interest—

interest given before the loan, in order that he lend to him,

and in

late interest—

interest given willingly by the borrower between the loan and the repayment, without the lender having stipulated it for him,

In these cases Rav Safra’s principle applies, for according to the law of the nations there is no legal claim concerning early or late interest, since it is given solely at the borrower’s discretion; for the same reason, according to our law as well, early and late interest is only “dust of interest,” [a prohibition] of the Sages, and therefore the law is that it is not taken out through the courts:

Introduction to the law of fixing a price:

We learned in the Mishna below [on page 72b]: One may not fix a price for produce until the market price has been established. Once the market price has been established, one may fix a price. And even though this one does not have [the produce], that one has [it].

The explanation of the concept of “fixing a price” is as follows: When a person comes to a seller and gives him money so that he will supply him with whatever merchandise it may be, and he does not wish to receive the merchandise now, but rather they “fix” between themselves that the purchase will be for a certain period of time, during which period the merchandise will be supplied, but not at the time the money is given.

And concerning this manner the Mishna says: “One may not fix a price for produce until the market price has been established.” If they came to make a sale by way of fixing a price, such that the seller does not give the merchandise at the time he received the money, but at a time that they established between themselves, and the seller does not currently have the merchandise in his possession,

it is forbidden

to do so. [It is a prohibition of the Sages.] And the reason for this is [this prohibition is because if there is not yet a fixed market price for the merchandise, we are concerned lest the merchandise become more expensive, and merchandise that was worth one hundred at the time of fixing the price will be worth one hundred and twenty at the time of delivery. It will thus be found that the buyer, in return for giving the seller money in advance, received more merchandise than the value of the money he gave. Therefore his money is regarded as a loan, even though they gave it as a purchase between them. [And it is clear that an ordinary reduction in price is permitted; here, however, we are dealing with fixing a price.] The Sages prohibited this because it is “dust of interest”].

Indeed, it is further explained in the Mishna below that this prohibition of fixing a price applies only when “the market price has not been established.”

But once the market price has been established, fixing a price is permitted.

And the reason for this distinction is that the Sages were concerned lest the merchandise become more expensive, and this concern exists only when there is no fixed price for the merchandise. But when there is a fixed price for the merchandise, the seller can immediately obtain the merchandise with the money he received. Since this is the market price, we therefore regard it as though the seller had already purchased the merchandise, and as though the merchandise were already in the seller’s possession, and it is thus as though the seller has the merchandise. It is permitted to fix a price when the seller has the merchandise, as explained in the Mishna on page 72b. And in our Mishna we learned that if fixing the price was done in the permitted manner: “He took wheat from him for this gold dinar per kor, and that was the market price.” The time of repayment arrived, and the buyer requested his wheat because he wished to purchase wine with it. The seller said to him: “Your wheat is reckoned for me at thirty dinars.”

That is, let us make a new fixing of a price from the debt for the wheat, according to what it is worth today [namely, thirty dinars], for wine, and I will supply the wine at a certain time, even if it becomes more expensive.

In this manner, the law is that if “he has wine, it is permitted; if he does not have it, it is forbidden.”

And in our Mishna, at the beginning of the chapter, we learned:

How

is it [the case of] increase, which is prohibited by the Sages?

He took wheat from him for a gold dinar per kor, and that was the market price. The wheat stood at thirty dinars. He said to him

“Give me my wheat, for I wish to sell it and purchase wine with it.” He said to him, “Your wheat is reckoned for me at thirty, and here you have wine with me in exchange for it. And he does not have wine.”

Since he does not have wine, he is forbidden to do so.

And the Gemara discusses:

But if he does not have

the seller currently

wine, what is there?—

What difference does it make?

But we learned

[in the Mishna below, 72b]:

One may not fix a price for produce

to receive it at a later time, until the fixed market price has been established.

But when the fixed market price has already

been established

in the market,

one may fix a price.

For

even though this one does not have,

the seller does not have the merchandise,

that one has,

someone else in the market has it. And the seller can now purchase the merchandise with the money he received.

If so, here, in our Mishna, there is a new fixing of a price between them concerning the wine, and it is discussed that the market price has been established, and it is permitted to fix a price even if the seller does not have the merchandise. Why then does the tan[n]ai say in our Mishna that if he does not have wine, it is forbidden to fix the price in this manner!?

And we answer:

Rabba said: Our Mishna

does not speak of a case in which the seller gave the buyer the money for the wheat, and the buyer then returned it and gave it to the seller, and fixed a price with him for wine.

Rather,

we are dealing with one who comes to create a debt through their value.

The seller, instead of paying him the value of the wheat, “fixes” upon himself a debt . That is, he converts the obligation to supply the wheat into a “debt.” He is obligated to the buyer for the amount of the value of the wheat, and instead of paying him this debt, he takes upon himself the obligation to supply wine.

And Rabba innovates that in such a manner it is forbidden to make the fixing of a price, even though the market price has been established, because the entire permission applies when the buyer actually gives money to the seller. But here, since there is no giving of money, but only fixing a price through a debt, it is forbidden to fix a price in this manner.

And as it was taught,

we have proof of this principle from the beraita, which says:

Behold,

a certain man

who was owed one hundred zuz by his fellow, and he went

the lender

and stood by his granary

of the borrower, and demanded his debt from him.

And he says, “Give me my money”

that you owe me,

“for I wish to purchase with it”

with my money

wheat.

He said to him

the borrower:

“I have wheat, which I am giving you”

—to supply you.

“Go out and fix it for me,

fix with me now the quantity of wheat equal to the size of the debt,

at today’s price,

according to its current value.

And I will raise it for you”

I will supply it to you

every twelve months,

over the course of twelve months.

And even if during this period the price of the wheat rises, and its price becomes higher than the price upon which we agreed now, in any event I will supply you with the entire quantity of merchandise that is currently equal to the value of the debt,

it is forbidden

to do so, because it is

not comparable to “his issar coming into his hand.”

For this is not similar to one who comes to fix a price with the seller when he has a coin [“issar”] in his hand and gives it to the seller for the fixing of the price; rather, here it is fixing a price in exchange for a debt.

And this is proof of Rabba’s answer: if one comes to create a debt through their value, and does not give money, it is forbidden to make such a fixing of a price.

Abיי said to Rabba: If

we rely upon this beraita, and the deficiency is because

it is not like “his issar coming into his hand,”

because the borrower did not place money into the lender’s hand, one can object:

Why specifically “he does not have,”

why is the prohibition in the Mishna only when “the seller does not have wine”? After all,

even if he has

wine,

also

it should be forbidden, since the Mishna speaks of a case in which the seller did not receive money from the buyer in exchange for the wine.

Rather, Abיי said,

the Mishna that prohibits [the transaction] when the seller does not have wine must be established in another manner.

Our Mishna is in accordance with what Rav Safra taught

as Rav Safra taught,

concerning “interest in the study hall of Rabbi Hiyya.”

Concerning the law of interest that was innovated in the teaching of Rabbi Hiyya.

For Rav Safra taught, concerning interest in the study hall of Rabbi Hiyya: There are matters that are permitted

according to the basic law of interest

and forbidden

to perform them

because of an artifice of interest.

Although there is truly no interest here, it appears as though there is hidden interest here.

How

does this prohibition apply?

He said to his fellow, “Lend me one hundred,”

one hundred dinars, worth twenty-five sela.

He said to him

the lender:

“I do not have one hundred”

in cash to give you. But

“I have wheat worth one hundred,”

worth one hundred,

“which I am giving you”

as a loan, and you will sell it and have one hundred. And so it was.

He gave him wheat worth one hundred, and then bought it back from him,

the lender [bought] from the borrower the wheat that he had lent him,

for twenty-four sela [

at a reduction of one sela from the price of the wheat loan]. For the lender says to the borrower: “You now need to look for a buyer. Here I am the buyer; sell them to me more cheaply, and you will not need to look for a buyer, and you will have the money you need.”

It is permitted

according to the basic law to do so, even though the lender now gave the borrower, when he made the sale with him, only twenty-four sela, while the borrower must later return twenty-five sela to him, which is the true value of the wheat that he borrowed from him.

But

it is forbidden to do so because of “an artifice of interest.”

For it appears that the borrower received twenty-four and returns twenty-five.

And according to this,

here too

in our Mishna, we will establish it as referring to a case where

he said

to his fellow:

“Lend me thirty dinars”

[and it is not speaking at all about a sale, but about a loan], and

the lender said to him:

the lender,

“I do not have thirty dinars”

in cash to give you, but

wheat

worth

thirty dinars I have, which I am giving you

so that you will sell it and have thirty dinars from it, and

he gave

the lender to him

wheat worth

thirty

dinars, and he returned

the lender

and took it from him for one gold dinar.

which are only twenty-five silver dinars. That is, the lender now bought them from the borrower at a lower price, because the borrower needed money, and now the lender comes to demand his debt from the borrower in the amount of thirty dinars.

And then,

if the borrower has wine,

that the borrower has wine,

which he gives him for thirty dinars,

which he gives to the lender worth thirty dinars.

This is permitted, because

it is produce that he is taking from him,

the lender is not taking money but produce,

and we have no concern —

there is no prohibition here of a ruse of interest. Because the prohibition is that the lender receives more money than he gave [in the sale].

But here, since the repayment of the loan is produce, even if it is worth thirty dinars, no interest at all appears here, and therefore, when he has wine and returns it, it is permitted.

And if not,

that the borrower does not have wine,

since he does not have wine,

and because he does not have wine he must pay money, then

certainly, taking coins from him,

actual taking of money,

appears

to appear

as interest —

and it is prohibited. For the lender gave twenty-five dinars and received thirty.

Rava said to Abaye

to Abaye:

“If so,

according to your answer, what is the explanation of the words

‘Give me my wheat’?

Does the lender demand wheat?! For according to your words, he demands money. And if so,

‘Give me the value of my wheat’ should have been stated,

the tanna ought to have said!

And Abaye resolves it:

“Teach” —

correct the Mishna, and read in it: “Give me

the value of my wheat.”

And we raise another objection: According to this answer, what is the wording of the Mishna,

“which I am selling”?

For

“which I sold to you” should have been stated,

for he is demanding the money for the value of the wheat that he sold to him.

And Abaye resolves it:

“Teach: ‘which I sold to you.’”

We raise another objection: What is the meaning of the wording,

“Behold, your wheat is established upon me at thirty dinars,”

which the borrower says to the lender? But

initially,

from the beginning of the loan,

also, this is how we established it upon him.

Thus they established the debt between themselves: in exchange for the wheat, the borrower would return thirty dinars.

And we resolve it:

this is what he said to him

the borrower to the lender:

“With the value of your wheat,

the worth of the wheat

that you established upon me

at the beginning, at a value of

thirty dinars, behold, you have with me, in exchange for it, wine worth thirty dinars. And he has no wine.”

And we raise an objection:

But

in the Mishna,

“For one gold dinar per kor, and that was the market price,” it teaches!

And it is explained that the value of the wheat with which they fixed the debt was the value of one gold dinar, which is twenty-five silver dinars. Whereas according to your words, from the outset they were worth thirty dinars, but the lender bought them for twenty-five dinars.

Rather, said Rava,

another answer to the question, “And if he does not have wine, what is the law?”: