Bava Metzia 56a — the Talmud in English

And therefore they compelled him to do all this: first to redeem the sela in copper coins, and then to redeem the coins in the better sela, and they did not say that he should immediately take the better sela among them and say: “If this is [the sela] of second tithe, all is well; and if this is [the sela] of unconsecrated produce, behold, the [second tithe] is redeemed upon this sela.”

Because they said

the Sages:

“One redeems it—silver upon copper—in a time of duress”—

in a time of duress, when he has no other way, it is permitted to redeem silver upon copper; but silver upon silver is not redeemed even in a time of duress, for this is not the manner of redemption.

Therefore he first redeems the sela in the mixture upon copper coins, and since they permitted redeeming silver coins upon copper coins only in a time of duress, therefore

he should not maintain this

—to leave the copper coins to be second tithe,

but he returns and redeems them

—the copper coins—

upon the silver,

for leaving the copper coins as second tithe is a disgrace to second tithe; and, furthermore, the small coins become rusty.

Thus far are the words of the Mishna.

In any event, it teaches

with regard to definite [second] tithe: that

one redeems

silver coins upon copper coins

in a time of duress.

It implies that only

in a time of duress—

no

[indeed], one redeems; but

not in a time of duress—

one does not

redeem even upon copper coins.

But with regard to demai, it was explained that the method of Rabbi Meir is that one redeems silver coins even upon silver coins. If so, it is evident that Rabbi Meir is lenient with regard to the second tithe of demai, which is only rabbinic, and he does not hold that the Sages reinforced their words as [though they were] a matter of Torah law.

Rav Yosef said: Even though Rabbi Meir is lenient in its redemption

of the second tithe of demai, nevertheless

he is stringent in its eating

—to require him to add a fifth, as with one who eats second tithe by Torah law; and our Mishna speaks only with regard to eating.

And the proof that Rabbi Meir is stringent with regard to the tithe of demai in the matter of eating is this:

as it was taught

They did not permit

one who purchases grain and produce from an am ha-aretz

to sell demai

without tithing the grain and produce

except to a wholesaler

[a wholesaler who is a chaver and sells in large quantities to shopkeepers; only to him]

alone

did they permit selling without tithing the demai, and the one who purchases from him separates his tithes, because everyone knows that the wholesaler purchases from several ammei ha-aretz, for it is the wholesaler’s practice to purchase much produce from many owners of fields.

But

a householder

who is a chaver and also has produce of his own, if he purchases from an am ha-aretz,

in either case—

whether he comes to sell in large quantities to shopkeepers like the wholesaler, or whether he comes to sell in small quantities like a shopkeeper—

must tithe

the demai before he sells, because those who purchase from him assume that they are from the produce of his land; and since he is a chaver, they presume him to have the status of one who has tithed, and they eat without tithing,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Whether the wholesaler or the householder

who comes to sell in large quantities in the manner of wholesalers

may sell, send to his fellow, and give to him as a gift, and need not be concerned,

for there is a presumption concerning all sellers and givers in large quantities that they have the status of those who have not tithed demai, and the one who purchases from them or receives from them tithes and eats.

It is evident from the beraita that Rabbi Meir is stringent with regard to eating, for a householder must separate tithe from demai, as with a tithe by Torah law, even if he sells in large quantities, out of concern lest those who purchase eat without tithing.

He raises an objection

—he challenges—

Ravina:

We learned in the Mishna of Demai [5:3]:

One who purchases from a baker

loaves of demai,

tithes—

he separates the tithes of demai

from

the hot loaf

upon

the cold loaf,

and from the cold upon the hot,

that is, from bread baked today upon bread baked yesterday,

and from the cold upon the hot,

and from bread baked yesterday upon bread baked today. And although it is forbidden to separate teruma from the inferior upon the superior, that applies initially; but after the fact the tanna holds that one who separates from the inferior upon the superior—his teruma is teruma [as the Gemara will explain below]. And with regard to demai, they permitted even initially separating from the inferior upon the superior.

And even

if the loaves that he tithes one upon the other were made

from many molds,

in different forms, and there is room for concern lest the baker purchased the loaves from different people, with one having tithed and one not having tithed, and it follows that he is tithing from exempt produce upon obligated produce or from obligated produce upon exempt produce, and the status of tithe does not take effect upon what he separated, nevertheless there is no concern for this with regard to demai, and we attribute it to the possibility that the baker purchased all the wheat from one person,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And if we say that according to Rabbi Meir the Sages reinforced their words as [though they were] a matter of Torah law [with regard to eating], then

it is understandable

with regard to one who separates the tithes of demai

from

the bread

that is cold

that was baked yesterday

upon

the bread

that is hot

that was baked today: even though the hot bread is superior to the cold, we are not concerned about this,

in accordance with Rabbi Ilaai.

For Rabbi Ilaai said: From where [do we know] that one who separates from the inferior upon the superior—his teruma is teruma—

as it is stated

Numbers 18:32]:

“And you shall not bear sin because of it when you raise up its best part from it,”

and “its best part” refers to the superior [as explained in Temura 5a]. That is, if you raise up from the superior, you will not bear sin; but if you raise up from the inferior upon the superior, you will bear sin. And

if

what he raised as teruma from the inferior upon the superior

is not sacred

and the teruma did not take effect, then

why bearing sin?

From here we learn

with regard to one who separates from the inferior upon the superior

that although it is forbidden to separate in this manner,

his teruma is teruma.

Rather

what Rabbi Meir said, that

even

if the loaves were made

from many molds,

he may tithe one from the other, is difficult; for if in his view the Sages reinforced their words as [though they were] a matter of Torah law,

let us be concerned lest he come to separate

—let us be concerned lest he come to separate

from the obligated upon the exempt, and from the exempt upon the obligated,

and in such a case the status of tithe does not take effect upon what he separated. Why was Rabbi Meir not concerned about this with regard to demai, as we are concerned about it with regard to definite [tithe]?

Abaye said: Rabbi Elazar

ben Pedat, who raised the difficulty above concerning the Mishna, which obligated one who eats terumat maaser of demai to add a fifth—although it is teruma only by rabbinic law—and [asked] whether the Sages reinforced their words as [though they were] a matter of Torah law,

raised a proper difficulty.

But Shmuel,

who answered him that our Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the Sages reinforced their words as [though they were] a matter of Torah law, and brought proof from an agent who delivered the bill of divorce but did not say to her, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” as the Sages ordained—that according to Rabbi Meir the bill of divorce does not take effect and she is still considered a married woman,

did not answer him properly;

he did not give a good answer to the difficulty raised by Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat.

Because

it was difficult for him

—it was difficult

for Rabbi Elazar

—that is, did the Sages reinforce the matter with regard to terumat maaser of demai, which is lenient, for even with definite teruma, if a non-koen eats it, he is punished only with

death at the hands of Heaven; and Shmuel answered him,

and Shmuel answered him that the Sages reinforced their words with regard to a married woman, for regarding the Torah prohibition involved in it she is liable to

court-imposed death,

and it is severe.

And how did Shmuel prove from what the Sages reinforced with regard to a married woman that the Sages also reinforced [their words] with regard to terumat maaser of demai?

Perhaps it is different

—perhaps a married woman is different, for the Sages were stringent with regard to her since the prohibition involved in her includes liability for

court-imposed death, which is severe.

And Rav Sheshet,

who raised a difficulty to Shmuel from the redemption of second tithe of demai, for we find that Rabbi Meir was lenient in redeeming a silver coin upon a silver coin, even though with regard to definite second tithe one does not redeem a silver coin even upon a copper coin except in a time of duress, and the Sages did not reinforce [their words] with regard to the redemption of demai,

did not raise a proper objection to him;

he did not challenge him properly.

For they said, “death,”

for they [Rabbi Elazar and Shmuel], who said that according to Rabbi Meir the Sages reinforced their words as [though they were] a matter of Torah law, spoke about cases whose punishment by Torah law is death [Rabbi Elazar spoke about a non-koen who eats teruma, whose punishment is death at the hands of Heaven; and Shmuel spoke about a bill of divorce that permits a married woman, regarding whose Torah prohibition there is liability for death].

And he raised an objection

and challenged

Rav Sheshet

from the redemption of second tithe [according to Rabbi Meir, the Sages did not reinforce it as [though it were] a matter of Torah law], whose prohibition is a negative commandment—for if he did not redeem it properly, one who eats it outside Jerusalem transgresses only the prohibition of

a negative commandment, as it is written [

Deuteronomy 12:17]:

“You may not eat within your gates.”

And there is room to distinguish and say that only with regard to matters whose punishment by Torah law is death did the Sages reinforce their words.

And according to what he challenged

and according to what

Rav Sheshet

challenged from the redemption of second tithe, that the Sages did not reinforce it as [though it were] a matter of Torah law—

Rav Yosef answered him properly,

he answered him well, that although Rabbi Meir was lenient in the redemption of the second tithe of demai, he was stringent in its eating, to require him to add a fifth, as with second tithe by Torah law.

Rather, Ravina,

who raised a difficulty from what Rabbi Meir said, that the baker may tithe from one loaf of demai upon the other even when they were made from many molds, and the Sages did not reinforce [their words] as [though they were] a matter of Torah law, to be concerned lest the loaves be from different people, with one having tithed and one not having tithed, and he separates from the exempt upon the obligated in the tithe—

His words are difficult, for

before he raises an objection

—when he challenges

[the case of] a baker,

that according to Rabbi Meir the Sages did not reinforce it as [though it were] a matter of Torah law,

he should assist him

—he should bring him proof that the Sages did reinforce their words as [though they were] a matter of Torah law—from the Mishna following the Mishna of the baker,

[the case of] a bread-dealer,

who is a wholesaler of loaves, who purchases large quantities of loaves and sells them to shopkeepers and bakers.

For we learned

there [Demai 5:4]:

One who purchases

demai bread

from the bread-dealer—

if he purchased loaves from different molds,

tithes

he

from each mold and each mold

separately,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

It is explained that Rabbi Meir is concerned with regard to the tithe of demai lest he come to separate from the obligated upon the exempt, as with a tithe by Torah law.

Rather, what can you say?

Rather, what do you have to say as to why Rabbi Meir is concerned in the case of the bread-dealer lest he come to separate from the exempt upon the obligated? Because

a bread-dealer

purchases from two or three men;

he purchases from two or three people.

If so,

a baker as well

with regard to whom Rabbi Meir was not concerned that he would separate from the exempt upon the obligated—the difficulty is not present, for one can say that Rabbi Meir holds that a baker, since he does not purchase a great amount at once, we attribute it to the possibility that

he purchases from one man;

he purchased from one person, and that person from whom he purchased made loaves in different molds.

Rava said: Shmuel answered him properly,

he answered Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat well by proving from a bill of divorce and from a non-koen who eats teruma of demai that the Sages reinforced their words as [though they were] a matter of Torah law. And although in the case of a bill of divorce there is the prohibition of a married woman, whose liability is death at the hands of man, whereas with teruma, a non-koen who eats it is liable to death only at the hands of Heaven, nevertheless

there is death in the world,

and if we find that the Sages reinforced their words with regard to a matter whose Torah prohibition entails death, one can say that they reinforced [their words] in all matters whose Torah prohibition entails death, even in a matter whose death is only at the hands of Heaven.

Mishna:

These are matters for which there is no

law of

overreaching

in their sale; and if the seller or the purchaser was subject to overreaching, even by more than a sixth of the sale, they cannot claim the overreaching.

And these are they:

slaves, documents, land, and consecrated property

—a treasurer who sells consecrated property, or one who sells his burnt-offering in which a blemish occurred.

And in the Gemara it will be explained from where it is learned that with regard to these matters there is no overreaching.

They do not have

—slaves, documents, land, and consecrated property—

double payment

if they were stolen.

Nor fourfold and fivefold payments,

if one stole an ox or a sheep belonging to consecrated property and slaughtered or sold it, he is not liable to pay four sheep in place of the sheep and five cattle in place of the ox. Since he is exempt from double payment, there are here only threefold and fourfold payments, whereas the Torah said “fourfold and fivefold,” and not “threefold and fourfold.” [And with regard to slaves, documents, and land, fourfold and fivefold payments are not applicable at all, for this payment was stated only with regard to an ox and a sheep that one stole and slaughtered or sold.]

An unpaid bailee

to whom slaves, documents, or an animal of consecrated property were delivered for safekeeping and they were lost, or to whom land was delivered for safekeeping and it was damaged,

does not swear

concerning them that he was not negligent in their safekeeping,

and a paid bailee,

and a paid guardian

does not pay

if they were stolen or lost.

Rabbi Shimon says: