Bava Metzia 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

And

therefore there is no migo here, because in truth

this one,

the one who admitted part of the claim,

with regard to the entire amount

wanted to deny it,

he would have preferred to lie further and deny the entire claim,

but the fact that he did not deny it,

and that he did not deny the entire debt, was

because a person does not have the brazenness

to deny everything in the presence of his creditor—

And since he was unable to deny the entire claim, there is no migo here. And he is obligated to take an oath concerning his claim, in which he admitted part of the claim! You might say: If we suspect that he is lying, how can we trust him on the basis of an oath? After all, one who is suspected with regard to money is also suspected with regard to an oath.

The answer is that he is not suspected with regard to the money, because

this one, with regard to the entire amount, wanted to admit it to him,

his true intention being to acknowledge the entire claim,

but the fact that he did not admit it,

and that he did not actually acknowledge it, is because he currently has no money; therefore, in the meantime,

he is merely evading him,

he evades his creditor by denying part of the claim—and

he thinks: Until I have money, and then I will repay him.

His intention is that when he has money, he will repay his debt.

And

therefore,

the Merciful One said: The Torah imposes an oath upon him,

the Torah obligated him to take an oath,

so that he will admit the entire amount,

so that he will acknowledge the entire debt—and he is not considered suspected with regard to money, since he does not intend to steal the money, but rather to return it at a later time.

And since this is the reason for the oath of one who admits part of the claim, it is understandable why one cannot say [were it not for the kal va-homer that will be explained below] that even in a case where he denies the entire claim and witnesses testify that he owes part of it, the defendant should be obligated to take an oath. The one who admits part of the claim is specifically not considered suspected with regard to money, because he is merely evading payment and intends to return the money—

But testimony of witnesses, where this cannot be said,

but in a case where he denied the entire claim and witnesses came and testified that he owed half, he cannot take an oath, since he is suspected with regard to money, and one who is suspected with regard to money is also suspected with regard to an oath. Therefore, one might have thought that even if the witnesses testify that he owes part of the claim,

say no,

he should not take an oath;

it teaches us

that in this case as well, the defendant is obligated to take an oath, because this case is derived by a

kal va-homer

from the case of one who admits part of the claim. [ And as Tosafot explained, from the kal va-homer we learn that even when he denies the entire claim, this too is merely a claim made to evade payment until he has money; he does not intend to steal the money] .

The Gemara now returns to explain the words of Rabbi Chiyya, who derived by means of a kal va-homer that witnesses who testify that the defendant owes part of the claim obligate him to take an oath, just as when the defendant admits part of the claim.

And what is the kal va-homer?

If his own statement,

whose power is limited,

which does not obligate him to pay money,

for a person does not have the power to impose a monetary obligation upon himself through his admission [and below the Gemara challenges this, since a person can impose a monetary obligation upon himself through his own admission]—and nevertheless, his own statement

obligates him to take an oath,

his own statement has the power to obligate him to take an oath, as one who admits part of the claim must do—

A kal va-homer:

witnesses,

whose power is greater than that of his own statement,

who

indeed

obligate him to pay money—

is it not logical that they obligate him to take an oath?

Surely they can obligate him to take an oath.

And we challenge this:

But

if

his own statement does not obligate him to pay money?

Can a person not impose a monetary obligation upon himself through his own admission?

But the admission of a litigant is equivalent to the testimony of one hundred witnesses,

for the law is that when one admits to another that he owes him money, this admission is considered as though one hundred witnesses had testified to that effect.

And we answer:

What do you mean by “money”?

When we said that his own statement cannot obligate him financially, we meant that a person cannot obligate himself through his own statement to pay a

fine,

for one who admits liability for a fine is exempt.

And the kal va-homer is as follows:

If his own statement,

whose power is limited,

which does not obligate him to pay a fine,

and nevertheless it has the power to

obligate him to take an oath

when he admits part of the claim—then by a kal va-homer,

witnesses,

whose power is greater than that of his own statement,

who obligate him to pay a fine—

is it not logical

that they obligate him to take an oath!

And we refute this: It is impossible to derive the case of his own statement from that of witnesses who can obligate him to take an oath, since we find that his own statement is stronger than witnesses. For

what is the case with his own statement? It obligates him to bring a sin-offering,

for he becomes obligated to bring a sin-offering through his own admission [if he admits that he sinned unintentionally], and even if witnesses contradict him and say that he is not obligated to bring a sin-offering—for example, they testify that the piece he ate was not forbidden fat but permitted fat—he is trusted to obligate himself.

Can you say the same with regard to witnesses,

whose power is weaker,

that they do not obligate him to bring a sin-offering—

for if witnesses testify concerning a person that he is obligated to bring a sin-offering and he denies their testimony, he is exempt from the sin-offering! [As it is stated: “Or, when his sin is made known to him,” but not when it is made known to him by others] — and since this is so, if we attempt to derive the case of witnesses from that of his own statement by means of a kal va-homer, we can refute it by saying that the power of his own statement is greater than that of witnesses, since his own statement obligates him to bring a sin-offering; therefore, it can obligate him to take an oath. In contrast, witnesses, whose power is weaker than that of his own statement and who cannot obligate him to bring a sin-offering, cannot obligate him to take an oath.

That is not difficult!

Rabbi Chiyya holds in accordance with the view of Rabbi Meir, who says that witnesses obligate him to bring a sin-offering,

and therefore his own statement has no advantage over witnesses, and it is possible to derive the case of witnesses from that of his own statement by means of a kal va-homer! And this law, innovated by Rabbi Meir—that witnesses can obligate him to bring a sin-offering—is derived

by means of a kal va-homer.

As explained in the Mishna in tractate Keritot [11b]:

As we learned in the Mishna: Two people said to him: You ate forbidden fat

unintentionally, and you are obligated to bring a sin-offering,

and he

denies it and

says: I did not eat.

Rabbi Meir obligates

him to bring a sin-offering, even though he denies the testimony of the witnesses,

and the Sages exempt

him from a sin-offering—and the reasoning of Rabbi Meir and the Sages will be explained below.

Rabbi Meir said

to the Sages:

If two people can bring him to the grave punishment of death,

if we find that witnesses have the power to bring a person to death [when they testify against him that he committed an offense punishable by death],

should they not bring him to the lesser consequence of a sin-offering?

Should they not have the power to make him liable for a sin-offering, which is less severe than death?

They said to him

the Sages said to Rabbi Meir:

What if he wishes to say: I acted intentionally—he would be exempt.

When the witnesses testified that he ate forbidden fat unintentionally, could he not respond and claim that he indeed ate it, but not unintentionally; rather, intentionally? Had he made this claim, he would be exempt from a sin-offering, since one does not bring a sin-offering for an intentional act. If so, he should be trusted when he says, “I did not eat,” on the basis of a migo, since he could have claimed that he ate it intentionally and thereby been exempt from a sin-offering! And we refute this:

Rather, what is the case with his own statement? It obligates him to bring a guilt-offering.

The kal va-homer can still be rejected on another account. For when a person takes an oath and denies a monetary obligation, and afterward admits that he swore falsely, he becomes obligated, on the basis of his own admission, to bring a guilt-offering, as it is stated: “And he shall confess the sin that he committed, and he shall bring his guilt-offering.” In contrast, witnesses cannot obligate him to bring a guilt-offering. It follows that his own statement is more powerful than witnesses: his own statement obligates him to bring a guilt-offering, whereas witnesses cannot obligate him to do so— and therefore, once again, it is impossible to derive the case of witnesses from that of his own statement by means of a kal va-homer.

And we raise an objection:

An asham is an offering!

For we proved above that Rabbi Ḥiyya holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir, that witnesses have the power to obligate a person to bring an offering, and this law applies even to an asham! Consequently, according to his view, his statement does not have greater force than the testimony of witnesses, since witnesses too can obligate him to bring an asham.

Rather,

if the kal va-chomer can be refuted, this is how it can be refuted:

What is the case with his statement,

that its force is stronger,

since it obligates him to pay a fifth,

if he swore that he did not owe money and afterward admitted that he had sworn falsely, he must pay his debt with the addition of a fifth, whereas if witnesses testified that he had lied in his oath, he is not liable for a fifth. It follows that his statement has greater force than the testimony of witnesses.

And we answer:

That is not difficult!

Since

Rabbi Ḥiyya holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

then

just as Rabbi Meir obligates him to bring

an

offering

through the testimony of witnesses

by means of a kal va-chomer,

that witnesses can obligate him to receive the death penalty, so

they obligate him to pay a fifth from

that

kal va-chomer,

for if witnesses can bring him to the more severe punishment of death, all the more so can they obligate him to pay the less severe payment of a fifth. If so, his statement is not superior to the testimony of witnesses, and it is indeed possible to derive by a kal va-chomer from his statement to witnesses!

Rather,

if the kal va-chomer is to be rejected, it should be rejected as follows—

What is the case with his statement, since it is not subject to denial or disproof,

if he admitted to another person that he owed him money, and two witnesses came and contradicted him, saying that he did not owe him anything, the testimony of the witnesses does not exempt him from what he became liable for through his admission, because the admission of a litigant is equivalent to the testimony of one hundred witnesses—

You can say with regard to witnesses, who are subject to denial and disproof,

for if other witnesses came and contradicted or disproved their testimony, he is exempt from payment. It follows that his statement has greater force than the testimony of witnesses: His verbal admission cannot be denied or disproved, whereas the testimony of witnesses who were contradicted or disproved is invalidated.

Therefore, the Gemara rejects this and says that the kal va-chomer taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya is not derived from a verbal admission— \

Rather,

the law of Rabbi Ḥiyya [that when witnesses testify regarding part of the claim, the defendant must take an oath concerning the remainder, as in the case of one who admits to part of a claim],

is derived

by means of a kal va-chomer

from one witness—

And if one witness, who does not obligate him to pay money

through his testimony, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 19:15], “One witness shall not rise up against a person for any iniquity or for any sin”—nevertheless, one witness

obligates him to take an oath,

for if he denied everything and one witness contradicted him, the defendant must take an oath and contradict the witness who supports the plaintiff—

And if so, since one witness obligates him to take an oath, all the more so should two

witnesses

whose force is greater than that of one witness

should

indeed

obligate him to pay money—

is it not logical that they should obligate him to take an oath?

And we reject this: The principle derived cannot be compared in every respect to the source from which it is derived—for

what is the case with one witness? He takes an oath concerning that which he testifies.

For the oath imposed by one witness is an oath to deny what the witness testifies.