Bava Metzia 3b — the Talmud in English

And

therefore there is no migo here, because in truth

this one,

the one who admitted to part,

with regard to the whole

he wanted to deny it,

he wanted to lie further and deny everything,

but the fact that he did not deny it,

and that he did not deny the entire debt, is

because a person does not have the brazenness

before his creditor to deny everything—

And since he was unable to deny everything, there is no migo here . And he is obligated to take an oath concerning his claim, in which he admitted to part! If you will say: if we suspect him of lying, how can we trust him with an oath? Is not one who is suspected concerning money also suspected concerning an oath —

The answer to this is that he is not suspected concerning the money, because

and this one, with regard to the whole, wanted to admit it to him,

his true desire is to admit the entire claim,

but the fact that he did not admit it,

and that he did not actually admit it, is because at present he has no money, and therefore, in the meantime,

he is merely evading him,

he is evading his creditor by denying part—and

he thinks: until I have money and repay it to him.

His intention is that when he has money, he will repay his debt.

And

therefore

the Merciful One said: place an oath upon him,

the Torah obligated him to take an oath,

so that he will admit it to him in its entirety,

so that he will admit the entire debt—and he is not considered suspected concerning the money, since he does not intend to steal the money, but to return it later.

And since this is the reason for the oath of one who admits to part, it is understandable why one cannot say [were it not for the kal va-chomer that will be explained below] that also in a case where he denies everything and witnesses testify that he owes part, the defendant is obligated to take an oath. This is because specifically one who admits to part is not considered suspected concerning the money, since he is evading payment and intends to return the money—

But the testimony of witnesses, where this cannot be said,

but in a case where he denied everything and witnesses came and testified that he owes half, he cannot take an oath, since he is suspected concerning the money, and one who is suspected concerning money is also suspected concerning an oath — and therefore we might have said that even if the witnesses testify that he owes part,

say that he should not

take an oath;

it teaches us

that even in this case the defendant is obligated to take an oath, because this case is learned by a

kal va-chomer

from one who admits to part . [And as Tosafot explained, from the kal va-chomer we learn that even when he denies everything, this is only a claim of evasion until he has money, but he does not intend to steal the money.]

And now the Gemara returns to explain Rabbi Chiyya’s words, who learned by a kal va-chomer that witnesses who testify that he owes part obligate the defendant to take an oath, just as in the case where the defendant admitted to part.

And what is the kal va-chomer?

What of his own mouth

whose power is lesser,

which does not obligate him in money,

for a person has no power to obligate himself in money through his admission [and below the Gemara challenges this, for a person can obligate himself in money through the admission of his mouth]—and nevertheless his own mouth

obligates him to take an oath,

his mouth has the power to obligate him to take an oath, for one who admits to part is obligated to take an oath.

A kal va-chomer:

witnesses,

whose power is greater than that of his mouth,

which

after all

obligate him in money—

is it not logically so that they obligate him to take an oath,

surely they can obligate him to take an oath.

And we challenge:

And

if

does his own mouth not obligate him in money?

Is a person unable to obligate himself in money through the admission of his mouth?

But the admission of a litigant is considered like one hundred witnesses,

and the law is that one who admits to his fellow that he owes him money—this admission is considered as though one hundred witnesses testified so.

And we answer:

What do we mean by money,

when we said that his mouth cannot obligate him in money, the intention is that a person cannot obligate himself through his mouth in a

penalty,

for one who admits to a penalty is exempt.

And the kal va-chomer is:

What of his own mouth,

whose power is lesser,

which does not obligate him in a penalty,

and nevertheless it has the power and

obligates him to take an oath

in the case of one who admits to part—a kal va-chomer:

witnesses,

whose power is greater than that of his mouth,

which obligate him in a penalty—

is it not logically so

that they obligate him to take an oath!

And we reject this: it is impossible to learn from his mouth to witnesses that they can obligate him to take an oath. For we find that his mouth is stronger than witnesses. For

what is the case with his mouth? It obligates him to bring an offering,

for he becomes obligated to bring an offering through the admission of his mouth [if he admitted that he sinned unintentionally], and even if witnesses contradict him and say that he is not obligated to bring an offering, [for example, they testify that the piece he ate was not forbidden fat but permitted fat,] he is trusted to obligate himself —

can you say the same concerning witnesses,

whose power is weaker,

that they do not obligate him to bring an offering—

for if witnesses testified concerning a person that he is obligated to bring an offering and he contradicts them, he is exempt from an offering! [As it is stated: “or it becomes known to him his sin,” but not that others make it known to him ]— and since this is so, if we come to learn by a kal va-chomer from his mouth to witnesses, it can be refuted by saying that the power of his mouth is stronger than that of witnesses, since his mouth obligates him to bring an offering—and therefore it can obligate him to take an oath. In contrast, witnesses, whose power is weaker than that of his mouth, since they cannot obligate him to bring an offering, cannot obligate him to take an oath.

That is not difficult!

Rabbi Chiyya holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that witnesses obligate him to bring an offering,

and therefore his mouth has no advantage over witnesses, and it is possible to learn a kal va-chomer from his mouth to witnesses!—And this law, innovated by Rabbi Meir, that witnesses can obligate him to bring an offering, is learned

by a kal va-chomer.

And as is explained in the Mishna in tractate Keritot [11b]:

For we learned: Two said to him: You ate forbidden fat

unintentionally and you are obligated to bring an offering,

and he

denied it and

said: I did not eat.

Rabbi Meir obligates

him to bring an offering, even though he denies the words of the witnesses,

and the Sages exempt

him from an offering—and the reasoning of Rabbi Meir and the Sages will be explained below.

Rabbi Meir said

to the Sages:

If two bring him to a severe death,

if we find that witnesses have the power to bring a person to death [when they testify against him that he committed an offense punishable by death]—

will they not bring him to the lesser offering?

Will they not have the power to bring him to an obligation to bring an offering, which is lesser than death?—

They said to him,

the Sages to Rabbi Meir:

What if he wishes to say, “I acted intentionally”? He would be exempt.

After all, when the witnesses testified against him that he ate forbidden fat unintentionally, he could answer them and claim that he did indeed eat it, but not unintentionally—instead, intentionally. And if he had made this claim, he would be exempt from bringing an offering, since one does not bring an offering for an intentional act. If so, we should trust him concerning what he says, “I did not eat,” by virtue of a migo, since he could have claimed that he ate it intentionally and thereby be exempt from bringing an offering! And we reject this:

Rather, what is the case with his mouth? It obligates him to bring a guilt-offering.

The kal va-chomer can still be rejected for another reason. For a person who swore and denied money, and afterward admitted that he had sworn falsely, becomes obligated, on the basis of his own admission, to bring a guilt-offering, as it is stated: “And he shall confess that in which he sinned, and he shall bring his guilt-offering.” In contrast, witnesses cannot obligate him to bring a guilt-offering. It follows that the power of his mouth is greater than the power of witnesses: his mouth obligates him to bring a guilt-offering, whereas witnesses cannot obligate him , and if so, once again it is impossible to learn a kal va-chomer from his mouth to witnesses.

And we raise the difficulty:

An asham—that is an offering!

For we proved above that Rabbi Hiyya holds like Rabbi Meir, that witnesses have the power to make a person liable for an offering, and this law applies even to an asham! And consequently, according to his view, the force of his mouth is not greater than that of witnesses, for witnesses too can make him liable for an asham.

Rather,

if the kal va-chomer can be refuted, this is how it can be refuted:

As for his mouth,

whose force is stronger,

for it makes him liable for a fifth,

if he swore that he did not owe money, and afterward confessed that he had sworn falsely, he must pay his debt with the addition of a fifth, whereas if witnesses testified that he had lied in his oath, he is not liable for a fifth—it emerges that the force of his mouth is superior to the force of witnesses.

And we answer:

That is not difficult!

Since

Rabbi Hiyya holds like Rabbi Meir,

automatically,

just as he makes him liable

Rabbi Meir

for an offering

through witnesses

by a kal va-chomer

that they can make him liable to death, so

they make him liable for a fifth from

that

kal va-chomer,

for if the witnesses can bring him to the grave matter of death, a kal va-chomer they can make him liable for the lesser payment of a fifth. — If so, there is no superiority of his mouth over witnesses, and it is properly possible to derive a kal va-chomer from his mouth to witnesses!

Rather,

if the kal va-chomer is to be rejected, this is how it should be rejected—

As for his mouth, for it is not subject to denial or disqualification,

if he confessed to his fellow concerning money, and two witnesses came and denied him and said that he did not owe it, the testimony of the witnesses does not exempt him from what he became liable for through his confession, because the admission of a litigant is like one hundred witnesses —

You can say concerning witnesses, that they are subject to denial and disqualification,

for if other witnesses came and denied or disqualified their testimony, he is exempt from paying—it emerges that the force of his mouth is superior to the force of witnesses, for the admission of his mouth cannot be denied or disqualified, whereas witnesses whose testimony was denied or disqualified have their testimony annulled. —

And therefore the Gemara rejects and says that the kal va-chomer that Rabbi Hiyya derived is not from the admission of his mouth— \

Rather,

the law of Rabbi Hiyya [that when witnesses testify concerning part of the claim, the defendant must swear concerning the remainder, according to the law of one who admits to part of the claim],

is derived

by a kal va-chomer

from one witness—

And if one witness, who does not make him liable for money

through his testimony, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 19:15], “One witness shall not arise against a man for any iniquity or for any sin”—and nevertheless one witness

makes him liable for an oath,

for if he denied everything and one witness contradicted him, the defendant must swear and contradict the witness who supports the claimant—

And if so, since one witness makes him liable for an oath, kal va-chomer two

witnesses

whose force is greater than that of one witness

that

surely

make him liable for money—

is it not logical that they make him liable for an oath!

And we reject: the general rule derived from the source is not comparable to that which is derived from it—for

as for one witness, since concerning what he testifies, he swears.

For the oath of one witness is an oath to contradict what the witness testifies.