Bava Metzia 39a (לט.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

“abandoned” means

assets that were abandoned

against their owners’ will,

for they were taken captive; and we find this expression used in the context of the Sabbatical Year as well,

as it is written:

“And the seventh year you shall release it and abandon it.”

Now, the Sabbatical Year

is an expropriation by the King,

and it takes effect against the will of the owner of the field.

“Deserted”

means assets that were abandoned

knowingly

by their owners, as

it is written:

“If she is deserted upon the children,”

meaning that she was abandoned with the consent of her husband.

The tanna

in the beraita states:

And all of them

who took possession of the assets of their relatives

are assessed for them

according to the value of their labor

as an aris.

The Gemara asks:

With regard to which

of the three types of people who take possession of assets, listed in the beraita, does this beraita say that they are assessed as an aris?

If you say that

the one who takes possession of the assets of

captives [

who had heard that they had died], and the beraita means to say that if the owners arrived while he had not yet consumed all the produce that he would previously have consumed, he is nevertheless assessed as an aris for this produce—

this cannot be said, because:

Now, when he heard that the owners were coming and hurried to consume the produce, the beraita said that he was

“

prompt and rewarded”

—he was—

and he need not return anything that he consumed—

if so,

why should the produce that he improved be at issue?

That is to say: It is obvious that in any event they will give him compensation for his labor if he did not consume the produce before the owners arrived; what need is there to teach us this?

Rather,

say that

the

one who takes possession of the assets of

the deserted

is the one concerning whom this beraita says that he is assessed as an aris—

this too cannot be said, because:

But

“

they remove them from his possession,”

it teaches

in the beraita concerning this person who took possession of them.

Rather, the

one who takes possession of the assets of

those abandoned [

captives concerning whom there was no report that they had died] is the one concerning whom this beraita says that he is assessed as an aris for the entire period of his labor.

The Gemara asks:

According to whom,

according to which of the tannaim who disputed the law governing one who takes possession of the assets of the abandoned, does this beraita say that they are assessed as an aris?

If you say that it is according to the Rabbis,

this cannot be said, for

they said—

the Rabbis:

“They remove him from his possession.”

If

it is according to

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

and this beraita says that one who takes possession of the assets of the abandoned is assessed as an aris, this is difficult:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said,

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel:

“I heard that the abandoned are like captives.”

And concerning captives we learned that he is “prompt and rewarded”; so one could say: “

Why should the produce that he improved be at issue?” And we answer: The beraita is indeed according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And regarding what is difficult for you—that their law is like that of captives, as is explained in the beraita—it is not difficult:

When Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that the abandoned are like captives, he did not mean in every respect. Rather, there is one law in which the abandoned

are like captives, and

there is another law in which the abandoned

are not like captives;

this is the distinction:

They are like captives

with regard to the fact

that they are not removed from his possession.

And they are not like captives

with regard to the fact

that whereas there,

in the case of captives,

he is prompt and rewarded, whereas here,

in the case of the abandoned,

he is assessed as an aris.

And we challenge:

What is different

about the law governing one who takes possession of the assets of a captive, that he is assessed as an aris,

from that which we learned

in tractate Ketubot:

One who expends expenses on the assets of

the melog property of

his wife [

property that a woman brings to her husband, whose principal remains hers while he consumes its produce], and he dies or divorces her, and he returns the land to the woman: Whether

he expended

the husband

many

expenses on the land

and consumed

little

produce, or whether he expended

little and consumed

much

produce,

what he expended—

before he divorced his wife—

he expended, and what he consumed—

until then—

he consumed;

and he returns the land to her as it is, and takes nothing.

And what is different about the law governing one who takes possession of the assets of a captive, that he is assessed as an aris?

And we answer:

This—

the one who takes possession of the assets of a captive—

is not analogous; rather, it is analogous to that which Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rav Ḥisda:

One who expends expenses on the assets of his minor wife—

whom her brothers and mother married off, whose betrothal was rabbinic, and concerning whom they said that she may leave the marriage through mere refusal—and she refused him,

is like one who expends

expenses

on another’s assets;

for if he expended money and did not consume enough produce to cover his expenses, he is assessed as an aris.

Evidently,

it is demonstrated that

since

at the time he expended the expenses

he could not rely

on the husband’s expectation that the land would remain in his possession, since he feared that she might refuse him, therefore

the Sages instituted for him

that he should at least take the share of an aris,

so that he would not cause them a loss,

so that he would not cause a loss to the land in his possession by continually sowing it without working it, and without tending it or hoeing the vineyards.

Here,

in the case of one who takes possession of the assets of a captive,

the Sages likewise instituted for him

that he should take the share of an aris,

so that he would not cause them a loss.

The Master said:

“And all of them are assessed as an aris.”

And we explain: “

All of them”

to include what? What does the expression “and all of them” come to include, beyond one who takes possession of the assets of a captive?

To include

that which

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel

—that is, what Rav Naḥman himself said in connection with his statement in the name of Shmuel—concerning one who flees because of murder [a capital crime]: Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel:

A captive who was taken captive: A relative is appointed to manage his assets.

But

one who left willingly, a relative is not appointed to manage his assets,

because since his mind was settled when he left, and he did not instruct anyone to manage his field, it may be inferred that he does not want this.

Rav Naḥman himself said

—this is an addition of his own, and not a statement in the name of Shmuel:

One who flees,

whose mind is not settled because he is frantic,

is like a captive,

and a relative is appointed to manage his assets.

And we explain:

Because of what did he flee

—what caused him to flee?

If you say

that he fled

because of the karga [

the king’s tax], because he had nothing with which to pay his poll tax to the king and fled before the due date—

this cannot be said, because since there is no panic here,

that is

“he

left willingly,”

a ruling that Rav Naḥman had already stated in the name of Shmuel: A relative is not appointed to manage his assets. Rav Naḥman therefore would not have needed to add the law concerning “one who flees.”

Rather, he fled because of murder [

a capital crime; because he killed someone and feared that he would be sentenced to death]. In this case Rav Naḥman said that his law is like that of a captive, and this is what we learned in the beraita: “And all of them are assessed as an aris,” to include one who flees because of murder.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

A captive who was taken captive,

for whom a relative is appointed to manage his assets,

and left standing grain to be harvested,

or

grapes to be harvested,

or

dates to be gathered [

gathering in the case of dates, just as harvesting applies to grapes and gathering applies to olives], or left

olives to be gathered:

The court first takes possession

of

his assets,

the assets of the captive,

and appoints a steward,

one appointed by them who takes nothing as compensation,

and he harvests, gathers grapes, gathers dates, and gathers olives.

And

only

afterward is a relative appointed to manage his assets,

to improve the land and take the share of an aris.

And we challenge:

Why not appoint a steward permanently,

why appoint the relative at all [who takes the share of an aris], rather than appointing a steward [who takes nothing] until the captive returns?

And we answer: Since

we do not appoint a steward over adults

[a steward for people whose beards have fully grown], because people are not willing to accept this role, which entails the considerable effort of working and sowing, but only when it is for the sake of minor orphans, since that is a mitzva.

Rav Huna said:

a.

One may not appoint a minor over the property of a captive

even though he is fit to inherit it; rather, one appoints a stranger, and the Gemara proceeds to explain the reason. b.

Nor

may one appoint

a relative

who is fit to inherit the property of a minor

over the property of a minor

who was taken captive, as the Gemara proceeds to explain the reason.

c.

And

even

not

may one appoint

a relative on account of a relative [

the relative of the minor’s relative, such as the maternal brother of the minor’s paternal half-brother]—

over the property of a minor

as the Gemara proceeds to explain the reason.

And we explain:

One may not appoint a minor over the property of a captive

Why?

Perhaps he will cause it to be lost

[since he is a minor, perhaps he will cause the property to be lost].

Nor

may one appoint

a relative on account of a relative over the property of a minor

What is meant by “a relative on account of a relative”?

A maternal brother

a maternal brother of the minor’s paternal half-brother.

Nor

may one appoint

a relative over the property of a minor

Why?

Since

the minor

cannot protest

[he does not know how to protest],

he may come to establish possession over it

over the land and claim that he is dividing the inheritance that came to him from his father;

and for this reason one likewise may not appoint a relative on account of a relative, lest he establish possession over it for the benefit of his relative, saying: “It is a portion of my relative’s inheritance.”

Rava said: Learn from Rav Huna

as he said: One may not appoint a relative over the property of a minor. It follows that one may appoint a stranger, and we are not concerned that he will claim and say, “The minor’s father sold it to me,” and seek to be believed like one who has established possession of land for three years, who is trusted to say, “I purchased it”: One may not establish possession over the property of a minor

That is, one who consumes its produce for three years in the presence of the minor does not thereby acquire a presumption of ownership in the minor’s presence sufficient to make him credible in claiming, “I purchased it from his father”—