Bava Metzia 32b — the Talmud in English

Rava said: ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

From the words of both,

the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon, who hold that the obligation of unloading takes precedence over the obligation of loading,

it is learned

that the prohibition of

causing suffering to living creatures—

the prohibition

of Torah origin—

is so.

For the Sages hold that we could have learned the mitzva of unloading from loading by means of a kal va-chomer.

And even Rabbi Shimon did not say

that unloading had to be written, and that it was impossible to write only loading and learn unloading from it by means of a kal va-chomer—

except because the verses are not conclusive.

But

if they had been

conclusive—

we would have

expounded a kal va-chomer,

and learned unloading from loading.

And

for what reason

can the law of unloading be learned by means of a kal va-chomer from the law of loading? In what way is unloading more stringent?

Is it not

because unloading has a stringent aspect

because of causing suffering to living creatures—

we expound

in this manner!

And the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

the teaching of a kal va-chomer from loading to unloading is not because unloading has the stringency of causing suffering to living creatures. Rather, the stringency is

because there is

in unloading

financial loss,

monetary loss to the owner of the animal, lest it collapse completely and die beneath its load.

And this is what he is saying: If loading, which has no financial loss,

for there is no concern that the animal will be lost through death, nevertheless

he is obligated

to help its owner load the burden.

Unloading, which has financial loss—

is it not all the more so

that he is obligated to help him unload its burden from it!

And we raise an objection:

And

when it comes to

loading—

is there no financial loss

for the owner of the animal?

Are we not dealing [with a case]

also in which the owner of the animal was on his way to trade, and then the animal fell and its load became disassembled and fell from it,

in the meantime [A0056]]while he is delayed because the load fell from the donkey—

[during the time he is delayed because the load fell from the donkey]—

he is deprived of his market [A0058]]and loses his business?

[and suffers a loss]?

Alternatively,

he suffers a loss in that, while he is delayed on the road,

thieves come and take everything that he has with him [A0062]]when he is on the road with his disassembled merchandise, thieves can come and take his merchandise from him.

[while he is on the road with the merchandise unloaded, thieves may come and take his merchandise].

Rather, it is necessarily the case that the stringency found in the mitzva of unloading more than in loading is only because of the prohibition of causing suffering to living creatures, which is of Torah origin; and therefore it would have been possible to learn unloading from loading by means of a kal va-chomer.

And the Gemara brings another proof for this:

Know that causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin,

according to the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon:

For it teaches

in the

conclusion

of our Mishna,

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says: If the load upon it was greater than its burden—

he is not required to attend to it

to unload it

. As it is stated: “Beneath its burden,”

indicating that specifically when it was carrying

a burden that it can bear.

Is it not, by inference, that the first tanna

of Rabbi Yosei—the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon—

holds

that even in such a case

he is required to attend to it!

What is the reason?

After all, such a case is not included in the mitzva of unloading, since it is written “beneath its burden,” indicating specifically a burden that it can bear!

Rather,

is it not because causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin!

And the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

indeed all hold that the prohibition of causing suffering to living creatures is not of Torah origin, and here

they disagree

over the exposition that they expound from what is stated

“beneath its burden.”

For Rabbi Yosei holds: We expound

from

“beneath its burden”—

specifically

a burden that it can bear.

And the Rabbis hold: We do not expound

from

“beneath its burden”

that he is obligated to unload specifically a burden suitable for it, because they hold that “beneath its burden” means every burden that is upon it, even if it was loaded with a burden that it cannot bear.

And now the Gemara brings proof to the contrary:

Know

that it is so, as we rejected,

that causing suffering to living creatures is not of Torah origin, for it teaches at the beginning: He went and sat down, and said to him, “Since the mitzva to unload is upon you,”—

unload; he is exempt, as it is stated, “with him.”

And if it enters your mind

that

causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin, what difference is there whether its owner is with him [A0109]]or whether the owner is with him,

[whether the owner is with him],

and what difference is there if its owner is not with him?

In the end, the animal is suffering beneath the burden! And the Gemara rejects this:

Actually,

it is possible to say that

causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin.

For

do you suppose

that the law which we learned, that if the owner is not with him, he is

exempt,

means that he is

completely exempt

from unloading?

Perhaps he is exempt

from doing this

without payment, and obligated

to unload

for payment,

because of causing suffering to living creatures.

And this is what the Merciful One said: When its owner is with him—

work with him [A0130]]do it with him

[do it with him]

without payment. And when its owner is not with him—

work with him,

because of causing suffering to living creatures, and

for payment [A0135]]which the owner of the animal will give him as his payment against his will.

[which the animal's owner must give him against his will].

And indeed, causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin.

Mnemonic: Animal, animal, lover, hater, crouching

Let us say that it supports him

Rava, who said that causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin, from a baraita.

This is what we learned in a baraita: One who sees

the animal of a gentile

lying beneath its burden

attends to it

to unload its burden—

as

he attends to

the animal of an Israelite.

If you say it makes sense

that

causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin, that is why he attends to it as to the animal of an Israelite,

for in the end there is suffering to living creatures here .

Rather, if you say that causing suffering to living creatures is not of Torah origin, why does he attend to it as to the animal of an Israelite?

And the Gemara rejects this:

There,

the fact that he attends to it to unload even a gentile’s animal is

because of enmity.

So that the gentile will not have enmity toward him.

And the Gemara proves this:

This too is reasonably so,

that causing suffering to living creatures is not of Torah origin, and the reason is because of enmity,

for it teaches

in the conclusion of the baraita:

If

the gentile’s animal

was carrying wine of idolatrous libation—

he is not required to attend to it.

If you say it makes sense

that causing suffering to living creatures

is not of Torah origin,

and the reason is because of enmity—

that is why

in such a case

he is not required to attend to it,

because he can evade the gentile and say: It is a forbidden substance for us.

But if you say

that causing suffering to living creatures

is of Torah origin—

why is he not required to attend to it?

In the end, there is suffering to living creatures here!

And the Gemara rejects this: There is no proof from here, because it is possible to say that the conclusion speaks of loading, and

this is what it is saying: And to load it with wine of idolatrous libation—

he is not required to attend to it,

for there is no suffering to living creatures here, and there is no enmity here either.

Whereas the beginning, where we learned that he attends to it, speaks both of unloading and of loading. For unloading, it is because of causing suffering to living creatures; and for loading, it is because of enmity.

Come and hear

that causing suffering to living creatures is not of Torah origin, from what we learned in a baraita: For it was taught: If the animal that fell beneath its burden was

the animal of a gentile, and

the

burden

upon it was that of

an Israelite,

concerning this we expound what is written in the passage concerning the mitzva of unloading—

“And you shall refrain

from abandoning it to him.” He need not help him.

And if you say that causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin, why “and you shall refrain”?

After all, there is suffering to the animal in the end; and if so, the mitzva of

“You shall surely help

him”

is required of him

to fulfill, and he must help him!

And the Gemara rejects this:

Actually,

it is possible to say that

causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin,

and

there

the baraita speaks

of loading,

where there is no suffering to the animal.

And we raise an objection:

If so, say the conclusion

of the baraita: If the animal was

the animal of an Israelite, and

the

burden

was that of

a gentile,

he must fulfill what is stated,

“You shall surely help,”

to assist him.

And if

it speaks

of loading, why

must he fulfill

“You shall surely help”?

After all, the loss belongs to the gentile!

And the Gemara explains: The reason that he must assist him is

because of the suffering of the Israelite.

Since he cannot raise the animal, he is forced to remain there.

And we raise an objection:

If so, even

in the

beginning,

where the donkey belongs to a gentile and the burden belongs to an Israelite,

also

he should be obligated to load it, because the Israelite remains there! And the Gemara explains: In the

beginning

it speaks

of a gentile

[the person leading the donkey]

driver,

and the Israelite who owns the burden is not there; thus loading is imposed upon the gentile driver, and therefore there is no mitzva to assist him.

Whereas in the

conclusion

it speaks

of an Israelite driver.

And we ask:

How have you determined this?

How did you establish this matter, that in every case the driver of a gentile’s animal is a gentile, and the driver of an Israelite’s animal is an Israelite?!

And the Gemara explains:

Ordinarily,

as a rule,

a person goes after his driver [A0257]]a person follows his donkey and does not entrust it to others. Therefore, in the beginning, where it speaks of a gentile’s donkey, it is reasonable that the driver is also a gentile. Whereas in the conclusion, where it speaks of an Israelite’s donkey, it is reasonable that the driver too is an Israelite.

[a person goes with his own donkey and does not entrust it to others]. Therefore, in the beginning, where the donkey belongs to a gentile, it is reasonable that the driver is also a gentile. In the conclusion, where the donkey belongs to a Jew, it is reasonable that the driver is also a Jew.

And we raise an objection: How did you establish the baraita as referring to loading?

But

the verses

“and you shall refrain” and “you shall surely help”—

in

the matter of

unloading are they written!

For it is written there: “When you see the donkey of your enemy lying beneath its burden, and you shall refrain”!

He said to him:

Indeed, it is impossible to reconcile the baraita according to the one who says that causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin.

And

whose is this

baraita?

It is Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, who says

in our Mishna that if there was upon it more than its burden, he is not obligated to unload; and it is demonstrated that he holds that

causing suffering to living creatures is not of Torah origin.

Come and hear:

If there was before him the donkey of one who

loves

whom he loves, which needed

to unload, and

there was also before him the donkey of one whom he

hates

which needed

to load, it is a mitzva

to attend

to

the donkey of the

one he hates—

in order to subdue his inclination,

for certainly his inclination tells him to assist the one he loves, and not the one he hates.

And if it enters your mind

that

causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin, then

to unload the donkey of the one he loves

is preferable for him,

because of causing suffering to living creatures!

And the Gemara rejects this:

Even so,

despite the fact that there is causing suffering to living creatures here,

in order to subdue his inclination—

is preferable.

Come and hear: “The one he hates” that they said—

a Jewish hater, and not a gentile hater.

The Gemara now assumes that what the baraita says, “the one he hates that they said,” refers to the hater mentioned in the verse, as it is stated: “When you see the donkey of your enemy lying beneath its burden, and so forth.” If so, it concerns unloading. And concerning this the baraita says that if the one he hates is a gentile, he need not assist him.

And

if you say

that

causing suffering to living creatures is of Torah origin—

what difference is there whether he hates an Israelite, and what difference is there whether he hates a gentile?

In the end, there is causing suffering to living creatures here!

And the Gemara rejects this:

Do you suppose

that what is stated in the baraita, “the one he hates that they said,”

refers to the hater of the verse [A0314]]the hater of the verse?

[that is, the hater mentioned in the verse]?

It is not so. Rather,

it refers to the hater of the Mishna [A0317]]the hater mentioned in the earlier baraita: “one he loves for unloading and one he hates for loading,” meaning that it concerns loading. Therefore, if the one he hates is a gentile, he is not required to attend to him.

[the hater mentioned in the earlier beraita: “the one he loves—to unload, and the one he hates—to load”], which is a case of loading. Therefore, if the one who hates him is a gentile, he is not required to attend to him.