Bava Metzia 32a — the Talmud in English

The one who brought

two out of three

[two out of the three, who would testify that they had been three at the time of the division],

Alternatively,

the one who brought

two other witnesses

who would testify

that you divided in the presence of three.

And since Rav Safra divided in the presence of two, and not in the presence of three, the division did not take effect.

He said to him

Rav Safra:

From where do you have this

that one must divide specifically in the presence of three, and two witnesses are insufficient?

He said to him

Rabba:

As we learned: If there is a court—

he stipulates before them. If there is no court there, before whom should he stipulate? His own [property] takes precedence.

And an unspecified court consists of three people. It is proven from here that there is no power to transfer money from one person to another with fewer than three.

He said to him

Rav Safra:

Is it comparable

[is the case here comparable] to our Mishna?

There,

in the matter of returning a lost item,

where he removes money from this one and places it with that one,

that is, they stipulate that the finder may take from the owner of the lost item the wage for caring for the lost item—

we require

for this purpose

a court.

But here,

in the act of division, what,

did I take what belongs to him

[did I take anything from Issur]?! After all, each one takes his portion! And the reason this matter must be done in the presence of others is only for

mere disclosure of the matter,

so that they will know that I divided the merchandise equally! And for this purpose,

two suffice for him

[two witnesses are sufficient, like any testimony].

Know [that this is so]:

a proof of this

as we learned: A widow sells

from the property of orphans for her sustenance

without [selling] in the presence of a court,

provided that two see that she is not selling cheaply, so that there will not be a loss to the orphans.

Abaye said to him: Was it not stated concerning it

[concerning that Mishna]:

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said:

Indeed,

a widow does not require a court of experts, but

nevertheless

she requires

a

court of ordinary people!?

And if so, the same law applies here, that at least a court of ordinary people is required! And since three were not there, the division was nullified.

Mishna:

a.

If she found it

[the cow]

in a stable—

he is not obligated

to care for

it.

But if she found it

in the public domain—

he is obligated

to care for

it.

And the Gemara will explain what the novelty in the Mishna’s words is.

b.

And if the lost item was

the lost item

in a cemetery,

and the finder was a kohen, a member of the priestly family who serves in the Temple, he

he shall not become impure for it

[he shall not violate the prohibition of priestly impurity in order to return the lost item].

And likewise,

if his father said to him,

:

Become impure

in order to return the lost item!

Or if

the lost item was in a place from which he is permitted to take it, and

his father said to him,

his father:

Do not return it!

He shall not obey him.

c.

He unloaded

the load from an animal that had fallen under its load,

and loaded

the load onto it again, and the animal again fell under its load, and again he

and the animal again fell under its load,

even if

the matter happened and was repeated

four or five times—

he is obligated

to continue unloading and loading.

As it is stated: “You shall surely unload.”

And from the repetition of the wording it is understood that he must return to unload and load even many times. But if

the owner of the animal went

the owner of the animal

and sat down, and said: Since the mitzva is upon you, if you wish to unload—

unload! He is exempt

the one who sees it from unloading by himself,

as it is stated, “

You shall surely unload

with him.”

And from the wording “with him” it is understood that he is commanded to unload specifically together with the owner of the animal. But if the owner of the animal does not assist in unloading, he is exempt.

d.

If the owner of the animal was

the owner of the animal

old, or

was

ill,

so that he cannot assist with unloading and loading —

he is obligated

the one who sees it to do this by himself.

e.

It is a mitzva from the Torah to unload.

But there is no mitzva from the Torah

to load

[the matters will be explained below in the Gemara].

Rabbi Shimon says: There is also

a mitzva from the Torah

to load.

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says: If there was upon it,

upon the donkey,

more than its load

that it can carry—

he is not required

to assist it in loading.

As it is stated: “Under its load,”

which implies specifically

a load that it can

the donkey

bear.

Gemara:

The words of the first clause of our Mishna, “If he found it in a stable, he is not obligated to care for it,” are apparently puzzling. For either way, if it is speaking of a locked stable, certainly he is not obligated to care for it, since this is not a lost item! And if it is speaking of an unlocked stable, why should he not be obligated to concern himself with it in order to prevent its loss? After all, it may leave and become lost, and by the law of returning a lost item a person is obligated to save his fellow’s property from going to waste even before the property has become lost from him.

Rava came to explain the matter:

Rava said: “

‘If he found it in a

stable,’ as they said

in our Mishna, refers to a stable that

does not lead astray,

does not cause the animal within it to leave and run away.

And

on the other hand, it

does not guard

the animal, because it is not locked. If the animal wishes to leave, it leaves.”

And from where do we know this?

That it is speaking of a stable that

does not lead astray—

it is proven

from the fact that it teaches “

he is not obligated to care for it”

to return it to its owners. For if the stable led it astray, the one who saw it would be obligated to return it.

And th

at which we said, that it is speaking of a stable that

does not guard—

it is proven

from the fact that it was necessary to teach “

he is not obligated to care for it.” If you should consider that

it is speaking of a stable that

guards,

it is obvious that he is not obligated to care for it!

For

now,

if he

found it outside—

he would bring it inside

[if he found it outside, he would bring it into the guarding stable, and thereby fulfill returning it]!

Now, when he

finds it inside

[when he found it inside the stable]—

is it necessary

for us to say that he is not obligated to care for it?!

Rather, learn from it

that it is speaking of a stable that

does not guard.

And we conclude:

Learn from it.

We learned in our Mishna:

If he found it in a stable, he is not obligated.

In the public domain, he is obligated to care for it.

Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

What we learned, that he is not obligated when he found it in a stable, refers to a case

and this is when it stands

the stable

within the city limits,

for in this way it is a guarded place.

And the Gemara infers from Rabbi Yitzḥak’s words:

By implication

you learn this from these matters,

that when he found it

it

in the public domain, even

if it was

within the city limits, he is likewise obligated

to return it.

Some teach it

the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak

with regard to the latter clause

of our Mishna, in which we learned:

In the public domain—

he is obligated to care for it.

And concerning this

Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

What we learned, that he is obligated to care for it—

and this is when it stands outside the city limits.

And concerning this the Gemara infers:

By implication

you learn from these words of Rabbi Yitzḥak,

that when he found it

it

in a stable, even

if it is

standing outside the city limits—

he is likewise not obligated to care for it.

We learned in our Mishna:

In a cemetery—

he shall not become impure for it.

The Sages taught: From where [do we know] that if his father said to him

the son, who is a kohen:

Become impure

in the cemetery in order to return a lost item found there!

Or if he said to him: Do not return

a lost item! [And even a lost item found in a place from which he is permitted to return it] ,

that he should not obey him?

As it is stated: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord.”

The verse juxtaposed the mitzva of honoring father and mother with the observance of Shabbat, and concluded: “I am the Lord.”

And the juxtaposition of the verse indicates that even though I said to you, “Fear your father,” nevertheless: “I am the Lord”!

all of you,

both you and your father,

are obligated in My honor.

Therefore, if your father tells you to transgress My words and desecrate Shabbat, or if he tells you not to return a lost article—you must not listen to him.

And we raised an objection against it:

The reason

that he must not listen to his father is because

the Merciful One wrote, “You shall observe My Shabbatot,

I am the Lord.”

Had it not been so,

were it not for this verse,

I would have said: He should obey him,

the father, not to return a lost article!

And why?

For

this

fear of the father is only a mitzva of

positive

commandment: “Honor your father and your mother.”

And

whereas

this

mitzva of returning a lost article

is a negative commandment and a positive commandment,

for it is written concerning it, “You shall surely return them,” which is a positive commandment, and it is also written concerning it, “You may not ignore it,” which is a negative commandment.

And

since

a positive commandment does not come

cannot come

and override a negative commandment and a positive commandment!

And the Gemara explains: Nevertheless,

it was necessary

to have the verse “I am the Lord,” to derive that he is obligated to return the lost article when his father commands him not to return it.

For

it might enter your mind to say: Since the

through a gzera shava,

honor of father and mother

was equated with the honor of

the Omnipresent

, as it is stated here,

in the matter of honoring one’s father,

“Honor your father and your mother,” and it is stated there,

in the Book of Proverbs,

“Honor the Lord with your wealth.” Therefore

I would have said

that he should obey him,

the son his father, even to transgress a prohibition!

It comes to teach us

the verse, “I am the Lord”—

that he must not listen to him.

We learned in our Mishna:

There is a Torah mitzva to unload, but not to load.

And we raised an objection against it:

What

is the explanation of what we learned,

“but not to load”?

If you say

that the meaning is literally that he is obligated only to unload,

but not

obligated

to load at all,

this cannot be!

For

what difference is there between unloading,

for which he is obligated, because

it is written, “You shall surely unload with him,”

that is, help him unload,

and loading as well, for it is written, “You shall surely load with him,”

the meaning of which is: help him load!

Rather,

this is the meaning of our Mishna:

There is a Torah mitzva to unload for free,

because of the suffering of living creatures.

And not

obligated by Torah law

to load for free, but

only

for payment.

Rabbi Shimon says: Also to load

he is obligated

for free.

And the Gemara brings proof for this, that the distinction between unloading and loading is whether he is obligated to do it for free or only for payment—from a beraita.

We learned this

in a beraita.

For the Sages taught: Unloading

he is obligated to perform

for free. Loading

only

for payment.

Rabbi Shimon says: Both this and that,

both unloading and loading, he is obligated to perform

for free.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of the Rabbis?

For if it enters your mind to say in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

that he is obligated to perform loading for free as well,

let the Merciful One write

only the mitzva of

loading, and not require

and there would be no need to write the mitzva of

unloading, and I would say

[I would already derive it on my own, by means of a kal va-chomer]:

And if loading, which does not involve the suffering of living creatures

if he does not load, for the animal does not suffer when the load is not upon it,

and

there is also no

financial deprivation

for the owners if he does not load, for the animal is not damaged when the load is not upon it, nevertheless

he is obligated

in it.

Unloading, which involves the suffering of living creatures,

when it is collapsing under the load,

and

also involves

financial deprivation for the owners,

for it is breaking under the load—

all the more so

that he should be obligated?

Rather,

necessarily,

for what purpose did the Merciful One write

the mitzva of unloading?

To tell you:

Only the mitzva of

unloading

must be performed

for free.

But

loading

he is not obligated to perform except

for payment.

And therefore it was necessary to write both of them, because if only loading had been written, and we had learned unloading from it by a kal va-chomer, we would have concluded that even for unloading he is obligated specifically for payment, for “the measure of the conclusion derived from the law is that of the subject from which it is derived.” Therefore it was necessary to write unloading, to teach us that he is obligated to perform it even for free.

And now the Gemara explains:

And Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that he is obligated to perform loading for free as well,

what is the reason?

For according to his words, the difficulty arises: why did the Torah write the mitzva of unloading as well, when it can be derived by a kal va-chomer from loading!?

And the Gemara explains:

Because

he holds

that the verses are not differentiated.

For the wording of the verses does not indicate which one speaks of loading and which one of unloading. Therefore, if only one verse had been written, we would have concluded that it speaks only of the mitzva of unloading, concerning which it is more obvious that he is obligated, and we would not have known that he is obligated with regard to loading as well. Therefore the verse had to write two passages.

And the Rabbis

will answer this claim—

Why are the verses not differentiated?!

For

here,

in one of the verses,

it is written, “

For you see your enemy’s donkey

lying under its burden,”

which

indicates

that one must unload it.

Whereas

there,

in the second verse,

it is written, “

You shall not see the donkey of your brother

or his ox fallen on the road”—they and their loads are on the road, it indicates

[it indicates that the animal is lying on the road, with the load beside it, and one must load it upon the animal]

And Rabbi Shimon

holds that

“fallen on the road”

indicates that the animal is fallen, and its load is upon it

[it indicates that the animal is lying while the load is still upon it, and one must unload it].