Bava Metzia 32a (לב.) — the Talmud in English

Alternatively,

two out of three

[two of the three, who will testify that there were three of them at the time of the division],

or alternatively,

bring

two other witnesses

who will testify

that you divided it in the presence of three.

Since Rav Safra divided the merchandise in the presence of two, and not in the presence of three, the division did not take effect.

Rav Safra said to him:

Rav Safra said to Rabba:

From where do you derive this

that one must divide specifically in the presence of three, and that two witnesses do not suffice?

Rabba said to him:

Rabba said to Rav Safra:

As we learned in the Mishna: If there is a court—

he stipulates before them. If there is no court, before whom should he stipulate? His own takes precedence.

An unspecified court consists of three people. It is therefore proven from here that one does not have the power to transfer money from one person to another with fewer than three.

Rav Safra said to him:

Rav Safra said to Rabba:

Are the cases comparable

[is the case here comparable to the case in our Mishna]?

There,

in the matter of returning a lost object,

where he removes money from this one and places it with that one,

meaning, they stipulate that the finder may take from the owner of the lost object the wages for caring for it—

we require

for this purpose

a court.

But here,

in the act of division, is it the case that

I took what belonged to him

[did I take something belonging to Issur]? After all, each person takes his own share! The reason this act must be performed in the presence of others is merely

to publicize the matter,

so that they will know that I divided the merchandise equally! And for this purpose,

two suffice

[two witnesses are enough, as with any testimony].

Know

that this is so from the following proof:

We learned in the Mishna: A widow sells

from the property of orphans for the purpose of providing for her sustenance

without a court,

provided that two people see that she is not selling it cheaply, so that the orphans will not suffer a loss.

Abaye said to him: Was it not stated concerning it

[concerning that Mishna]:

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said:

indeed,

a widow does not require a court of experts, but

nevertheless

she requires

a

court of laymen!?

If so, the same law applies here: at least a court of laymen is required! Since three people were not present, the division was invalidated.

Mishna:

a.

If he found it

[the cow]

in a stable—

he is not obligated

to care

for it.

But if he found it

in the public domain—

he is obligated

to care

for it.

The Gemara will explain what novelty is taught by the words of the Mishna.

b.

And if the lost object was

the lost animal

in a cemetery,

and the finder was a kohen—

he may not become impure for it

[he may not violate the prohibition against a kohen contracting ritual impurity in order to return the lost object].

And likewise,

if his father said to him

the kohen

“Become impure”

in order to return the lost object!

Or if

the lost object was in a place from which he was permitted to take it, and

his father said to him

his father

“Do not return it!”

He may not obey him.

c.

If he unloaded

the load from an animal that had fallen beneath its load,

and loaded

the load onto it again, and the animal again fell beneath its load, and again he

and the animal again fell beneath its load,

even if

the matter was repeated

four or five times—he is

obligated

to continue unloading and loading it.

As it is stated: “You shall surely unload with him.” The repetition of the wording indicates that he must return to unload and load it even many times.

But if

the owner of the animal walked away

the owner of the animal

and sat down, and said: “Since the mitzva is incumbent upon you, if you wish to unload it,

unload it!”—he is exempt

from unloading it on his own,

as it is stated: “You shall surely unload

it

with him.” The wording “with him” indicates that he is commanded to unload it specifically together with the owner of the animal. But if the owner of the animal does not assist with the unloading, he is exempt.

The wording “with him” indicates that he is obligated to unload it specifically together with the animal’s owner. But if the owner does not assist in unloading it, he is exempt.

d.

If the owner of the animal was

the owner of the animal

elderly, or

was

ill,

and therefore unable to assist with unloading and loading —

he is obligated

to perform the task alone.

e.

There is a Torah mitzva to unload.

But there is no Torah mitzva

to load

[the matters will be explained below in the Gemara].

Rabbi Shimon says: There is also

a Torah mitzva

to load.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was upon it,

upon the donkey,

more than its load

that it is capable of carrying—

he need not attend to it

to assist in loading it.

As it is stated: “Beneath its burden,”

which implies specifically

a burden that

the donkey

can bear.

Gemara:

The first clause of our Mishna—“If he found it in a stable, he is not obligated to care for it”—is seemingly puzzling. Whichever way one looks at it, if the reference is to a locked stable, he is certainly not obligated to care for it, since this is not a lost object. And if it is an unlocked stable, why should he not be obligated to attend to it in order to prevent it from becoming lost? It may leave and become lost, and by virtue of the obligation to return a lost object, a person is obligated to save his fellow’s property from being lost even before it has actually been lost to its owner.

Rava came to explain the matter:

Rava said: “The ‘stable’

mentioned in

the statement

of our Mishna refers to a stable that

does not mislead,

does not cause the animal inside it to leave and flee.

And

on the other hand, it

does not safeguard

the animal, because it is not locked. If the animal wishes to leave, it leaves.

And from where do we know this?

That the reference is to a stable that

does not mislead—this is proven

from the fact that it teaches

“he is not obligated”

to return it to its owners. For if the stable misled the animal, the person who encountered it would be obligated to return it.

to return it to its owner. For if the stable caused the animal to stray, the person who encountered it would be obligated to return it.

And

what we said, that the reference is to a stable that

does not safeguard—this is proven

from the fact that it was necessary to teach

“he is not obligated.” If you should think

that the reference is to a

stable that

safeguards

the animal, it is obvious that he is not obligated to care for it!

For

now,

if he

found it outside

he would bring it inside

[if he found it outside, he would bring it into the safeguarding stable, thereby fulfilling the obligation to return it]!

Now, when he

finds it inside

[when he finds it inside the stable],

is it necessary

to say that he is not obligated to care for it?!

Rather, conclude from it

that the reference is to a stable that

does not safeguard the animal.”

And we conclude:

Conclude from it.

We learned in our Mishna:

If he found it in a stable, he is not obligated.

If he found it in the public domain, he is obligated to care for it.

Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

The statement that he is not obligated when he found it in a stable refers to a case

where it is standing

the stable

within the town’s boundaries,

so that it is in a safeguarded location.

The Gemara infers from Rabbi Yitzḥak’s words:

By inference,

you learn this from these words,

that when he found it

in the public domain, even

if it was

within the town’s boundaries, he is also obligated

to return it.

to return it.

Some teach

Rabbi Yitzḥak’s statement

with regard to the latter clause

of our Mishna, in which we learned:

In the public domain—

he is obligated to care for it.

And concerning this

Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

The statement that he is obligated to care for it refers to a case

where it is standing outside the town’s boundaries.

And concerning this the Gemara infers:

By inference,

you learn from these words of Rabbi Yitzḥak

that when he found it

in a stable, even if it is

standing outside the town’s boundaries—

it

is also not necessary to care for it.

is also not obligated to attend to it.

We learned in our Mishna:

In a cemetery—

he may not become impure for it.

The Sages taught: From where is it derived that if his father said to him,

to his son who is a kohen:

“Become impure”

in the cemetery in order to return a lost object found there —

or he said to him: “Do not return

the lost object! [And even a lost object located in a place from which he is permitted to return it] —

that he may not obey him?

As it is stated: “Every person shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord.”

The verse juxtaposed the mitzva of honoring father and mother with the observance of Shabbat, and concluded: “I am the Lord.”

And the juxtaposition of the verse indicates that although I told you, “You shall fear your father,” nevertheless—I am the Lord!

all of you,

both you and your father,

are obligated in My honor.

Therefore, if your father tells you to violate My word and desecrate Shabbat, or if he tells you not to return a lost object—you must not obey him.

And we raised an objection to this:

The reason

that he must not obey his father is because

the Merciful One wrote: “You shall observe My Shabbatot,

I am the Lord.”

Had it not been so,

were it not for this verse,

I would have said: He should obey him

—his father, telling him not to return the lost object!

And why?

For

this,

the reverence due to one’s father, is only a

positive

commandment: “Honor your father and your mother.”

While

if

this,

the mitzva of returning a lost object,

is both a prohibition and a positive commandment,

for it is written concerning it: “You shall surely return them,” which is a positive commandment, and it is also written concerning it: “You may not disregard them,” which is a prohibition.

And

behold,

a positive commandment cannot come

[cannot override]

both a prohibition and a positive commandment!

And the Gemara explains: Nevertheless,

it was necessary

to have the verse “I am the Lord,” in order to expound that he is obligated to return the lost object when his father commands him not to return it.

For

it might enter your mind to say: Since the Torah juxtaposed

by means of a gzera shava,

the honoring of father and mother

with the honor of

the Omnipresent

, as it is stated here,

in the context of honoring one’s father,

“Honor your father and your mother,” and it is stated elsewhere,

in the Book of Proverbs,

“Honor the Lord with your wealth.” Therefore

I would have said

that he should obey him

—the son should obey his father even when this entails committing a transgression!

This teaches us

the verse “I am the Lord”—

that he must not obey him.

We learned in our Mishna:

It is a mitzva from the Torah to unload, but not to load.

And we raised an objection to this:

What

is the explanation of what we learned,

“but not to load”?

If you say

that it is meant literally, that one is obligated only to unload,

but is not

obligated

to load at all,

this cannot be!

For

what difference is there with regard to unloading,

for which one is obligated, because

it is written: “You shall surely unload with him,”

that is, help him unload,

while with regard to loading as well, it is written: “You shall surely raise it up with him,” which means, help him load it!

Rather,

this is the intention of our Mishna,

as follows:

It is a mitzva from the Torah to unload for free,

because of the suffering of living creatures.

And he is not

obligated by the Torah

to load for free, but

only

for payment.

Rabbi Shimon says: He is obligated to load as well

he is obligated

for free.

And the Gemara brings proof that the distinction between unloading and loading is whether one is obligated to do it for free or only for payment—from a beraita.

We have already learned this

[we learned this matter in a beraita].

As the Sages taught: Unloading

—one is obligated to do it

for free. Loading

—only

for payment.

Rabbi Shimon says: Both this and that,

both unloading and loading, one is obligated to do

for free.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reasoning of the Rabbis?

For if it enters your mind to say that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

that one is obligated to load even for free,

the Merciful One should have written

only the mitzva of

loading, and there would be no need

to write the mitzva of

unloading, and I would say

[I would already derive this independently, by means of a kal va-chomer]:

If, with regard to loading, there is no suffering of living creatures

if he does not load it, since the animal does not suffer when it has no burden upon it,

and

there is also

no financial loss

for the owners if he does not load it, since the animal is not damaged when the burden is not upon it, nevertheless he is

obligated

in it.

With regard to unloading, which involves the suffering of living creatures,

when the animal collapses beneath the burden,

and

also involves

financial loss for the owners,

since the animal may break down beneath the burden—

all the more so

should one be obligated?

Rather,

necessarily,

for what halakhic purpose did the Merciful One write

the mitzva of unloading?

To tell you:

Only the mitzva of

unloading

must be performed

for free.

Whereas

loading

one is not obligated to perform except

for payment.

And therefore it was necessary to write both of them, because if only loading had been written, and we had derived unloading from it by means of a kal va-chomer, we would have concluded that even for unloading one is obligated specifically for payment, since “the principle derived through an inference cannot be stronger than the principle from which it is derived.” Therefore it was necessary to write unloading, to teach us that one is obligated to perform it even for free.

And now the Gemara explains:

And Rabbi Shimon,

who maintains that one is obligated to load as well for free,

what is the reason?

For according to his words, the following difficulty arises: Why did the Torah write the mitzva of unloading as well, when it could be derived by means of a kal va-chomer from loading?

The Gemara explains:

Because

he maintains

that the verses are not distinctly assigned.

For the wording of the verses does not indicate which one speaks of loading and which one of unloading. Therefore, if only one verse had been written, we would have thought that it referred only to the mitzva of unloading, concerning which it is more obvious that one is obligated, and we would not have known that one is obligated with regard to loading as well. Therefore the verse had to write two passages.

And the Rabbis

will respond to this argument:

Why are the verses not distinctly assigned?!

For

here,

in one of the verses,

it is written, “

When you see the donkey of one who hates you

lying beneath its burden,”

which

indicates

that he must unload it.

Whereas

there,

in the second verse,

it is written, “

You shall not see your brother’s donkey

or his ox fallen on the road, and disregard them; you shall surely raise it up with him,” which clearly indicates

[it indicates that the animal is lying on the road, with its burden beside it, and one must load the burden onto it] .

And Rabbi Shimon

maintains that

“fallen on the road”

indicates that the animals themselves are fallen, while their burdens are upon them

[it indicates that the animal is lying with the burden still upon it, and one must unload it].