Bava Metzia 30a — the Talmud in English

An explanation:

it is necessary to establish,

with

the workers who lead

the oxen ,

the oxen of the homeowner,

whose loss is greater [

for their loss is greater].

For in the time of the Gemara, most agricultural work was done with oxen. And in plowing the vineyards, and even at the time of their harvesting, they would make use of oxen, which would carry the plowing implements and the harvesters between the rows of the vineyards, in a wagon led by oxen. And at the time of the harvesting they would place the grapes in the wagon.

Therefore, if the owners are not present with the workers and do not supervise them, a great loss can be caused to them, because it is not the way of workers to take care for the vineyard and the oxen, and they lead them over the vines and the saplings, and these become damaged, and the oxen too are dragged and broken.

We learned in our Mishna: one who found a garment

spreads it out for its benefit, but not for his honor, etc.

They raised a question before them:

if the finder wishes to spread out the garment also

for his benefit and

also

for its benefit—

what?

is it permitted for him to do so, or is it forbidden?

Come and hear

a proof from what we learned in our Mishna:

he spreads it out for its benefit.

And it follows that only

for its benefit—

yes,

indeed, it is permitted for him to spread it out.

If for his benefit and for its benefit—

no,

he may not spread it out!

Say the latter clause: “But not

he spreads it out

for his honor.”

And it follows that only

for his honor

alone,

is it that he may not

spread it out.

But

if he spreads it out

for its benefit and for his benefit—

it is well!

Rather, from this,

from the words of our Mishna,

there is nothing to infer from it.

For we do not know whether the first clause is precise or the latter clause is precise.

Come and hear,

a proof from the words of the beraita, in which we learned: one who finds a garment

may not spread it out, neither on a bed nor on a peg [

a stake, a hanger]

for his benefit. But he may spread it out on a bed and on a peg—

for its benefit.

And if

guests happened to come to him, he may not spread it out

at the time when they are staying with him,

neither on a bed nor on a peg, whether for his benefit

or

whether for its benefit!

And the Gemara now understands that the reason that if guests happened to come to him he may not spread it out even for its benefit is that by spreading it out he is honored by the cloak, and this is spreading it out for his benefit and for its benefit.

And it is proven from here that spreading it out for his benefit and for its benefit is forbidden!

And the Gemara rejects: It is indeed possible to say that spreading it out for his benefit and for its benefit is permitted, but

it is different there,

when guests happened to come to him, for then it is forbidden for him to spread it out even for its benefit alone, because

by

spreading it out when he has guests—

he destroys it [

as though he is burning it].

And in what way does he burn it?

If it is because of the evil eye,

for through this the evil eye of the guests will prevail over it.

If it is because of thieves,

perhaps the guests will steal it.

Come and hear

a proof from a beraita concerning the beheaded heifer which the Torah stated, “upon which no labor has been done,” meaning that no work was performed with it:

It was taught:

If one brought it,

the heifer that they wish to bring as a beheaded heifer,

to the foddering pen [

a type of device in which several animals are joined by their necks one beside the other, and they thresh the grain together ],

and it threshed

the grain by itself, without the intention of its owner, nevertheless that same heifer

is fit

for the purpose of a beheaded heifer. For since he did not intend that it thresh, this threshing is not considered labor to disqualify it, and it is included in what is stated in the passage: “And they shall take a heifer of cattle, upon which no labor has been done, which has not drawn with a yoke.”

But if the mother of the heifer was threshing the grain, and he brought in the heifer

so that it should suckle

from its mother,

and

it should also

thresh

with it at the time of nursing—

it is disqualified.

But here,

when he brought it in so that it should suckle and thresh,

it is for his benefit and for its benefit,

for he brought in the heifer both for its benefit, so that it should suckle, and for his benefit, so that it should thresh,

and it teaches

that it is

disqualified,

since this is considered that he worked with it!

And the Gemara rejects:

It is different there, for the verse says: “upon which no labor has been done”—

it implies

in any event,

even if this was also for its benefit.

And we ask:

If so, even

in

the first clause,

where he did not intend that it thresh,

also

it should be disqualified!

And we answer:

This

the first clause,

is comparable only to that which we learned

concerning a red heifer, about which it is stated, “which has not borne a yoke”: if

a

bird

stood upon it,

without the knowledge of the owners—

it is fit,

for this is not considered that a yoke was placed upon it.

But if

a male mounted it,

even though this was without the knowledge of the owners—

it is disqualified.

What is the reason? As

Rab

Pappa explained.

For Rav Pappa said: If

it had

been written

in the matter of the beheaded heifer, “upon which no

labor has been done,” and

it had also

been read

this way:

“it was worked,” I would have said

that

even

if labor was performed with it

by itself,

without his knowledge, it is disqualified.

And if it had been written “he worked,” and read “he worked,” I would have said

that it is not disqualified

until he himself worked with it [

until he himself worked with it, knowingly].

But

now, since it is written “he worked,”

without a vav,

and

in the reading

we read

as though it had been written

“it was worked,” we require

that it be

“it was worked”—

analogous to “he worked.”

And that is:

just as “he worked”

with it means that he himself did so—

because it was pleasing to him, so

when it

was worked

with it by itself, it is disqualified specifically where

it was pleasing to him.

And therefore, when a bird stood upon it, from which he derives no benefit and which is not pleasing to him, it is not disqualified through this.

But when a male mounted it, from which the owner profits, since he wishes for his cow to become pregnant, it is disqualified.

And if so, the first clause of the beraita, which speaks of a case in which the heifer threshes but its owner does not want this, is analogous to the case in which a bird stood upon it, from which the owner derives no benefit, and therefore the heifer is not disqualified through this.

We learned in our Mishna:

silver vessels and copper vessels—he uses them, etc.

The Sages taught: One who finds wooden vessels,

and their owners delayed in seeking them,

uses them

the finder—

so that they should not rot .

And if he found

copper vessels, he uses them

even

with hot substances,

and not only with cold substances.

But he may not

use them

by

placing them upon

the fire [

the fire] to heat something in them,

because

he

wears them out

through this [and that which we learned, that he uses them with hot substances, means that they were heated upon the fire in another vessel].

If he found

silver vessels, he uses them

specifically

with cold substances. But he may not

use them

with hot substances, because

use with hot substances

blackens them.

If he found

shovels [

with which one rakes from the fire]

and axes, he uses them with

a

soft

thing, but not with

a hard

thing, because use of them with a hard thing

diminishes them [

damages them].

If he found

golden vessels and glass vessels, he may not touch them—

until Elijah comes.

Just as they said

that the finder must tend to

a lost object

whose owners delayed in seeking it—

so they said

also

regarding a deposit,

that the depositary must tend to it.

And we wonder:

A deposit—

what business does it have with him [

what is the depositary’s role with the deposit]? How is it permitted for him to use it? Let the owners of the deposit come and tend to it!

Rav Adda bar Hama said in the name of Rav Sheshet:

it is speaking

of a deposit whose owners went overseas,

and they cannot tend to it; therefore the depositary must tend to it as to a lost object.

We learned in our Mishna:

If one finds a sack or a basket, or any object that it is not his way to take—

he shall not take it.

From where are these matters?

For the Sages taught

from what is written in the passage concerning a lost object:

“And you disregard,”

which implies that there are

times when you disregard

the lost object.

And from that which is written in that same passage, “you may not disregard,” it implies that there are

times when you do not disregard.

How is this?

How is it possible that it is permitted for the finder to disregard the lost object?

And the beraita brings three possibilities for this:

a. If

the

finder

was a priest, and it,

the lost object, was found

in a cemetery [

and a priest is forbidden to become impure through the dead],

b.

or he was

the finder

an elderly man, and it was not in accordance with his honor

to return the lost object,

c.

or there was

the

work belonging to him,

the finder, in which he is presently engaged,

greater than

the value of the lost object

of his fellow [

meaning that the wages for interrupting his work, which he would lose if he tended to the find, exceed the value of the entire lost object],

therefore,

in cases such as these,

“And you disregard them” was stated.

And we inquire about it:

For what,

for which of these possibilities

was a verse necessary

to teach us that it is permitted to disregard?

If you say for

the matter of

a priest with the lost object in a cemetery,

it is

obvious

that he is not required to return a lost object found in a cemetery!

For

this,

the law of returning a lost object, is a mitzva of

positive commandment

—“You shall surely return them” .

And

if

this,

the prohibition against a priest becoming impure through the dead, is also a prohibition of

negative commandment

—“He shall not become impure for a person,”

and

also a mitzva of

positive commandment—“They shall be holy.”

“They shall be holy.”

And

it is obvious that

the [

cannot come]

positive commandment

of a lost object

does not override the negative commandment and positive commandment of

the impurity of a priest!

And furthermore,

and moreover, even if the prohibition of priestly impurity were only a negative commandment, nevertheless

we do not override a prohibition

the prohibition of priestly impurity—

before [

ahead of]

a monetary matter,

the mitzva of returning a lost object.

And

Rather

what shall be said, that the verse “and you ignore it” came to teach us

for

the second case mentioned in the baraita, which was

his was greater than his fellow’s,

that he is not obligated then to return it?

This law—

is derived from [what] Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav!