Bava Metzia 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

The explanation is:

it must be established,

with

the workers who lead

the oxen ,

the homeowner’s oxen,

whose loss would be greater [

as their potential loss is greater].

For in the time of the Gemara, most agricultural work was performed with oxen. Oxen were used to plow vineyards and even at the time of their harvesting; they transported the plowing implements and the harvesters between the rows of vines in a wagon driven by oxen. At the time of harvesting, the grapes would be placed in the wagon.

Therefore, if the owners are not present with the workers and do not supervise them, they may suffer a major loss, because workers do not generally take care with the vineyard or the oxen. They lead the oxen over the vines and saplings, damaging them, and the oxen themselves may be dragged along and injured.

We learned in our Mishna: One who finds a garment

spreads it out for its care, but not for his own honor, etc.

They raised a dilemma before them:

If the finder wishes to spread out the garment both

for his own use and

also

for its care—

what

is the halakha? Is he permitted to do so, or is it prohibited?

Come and hear

a proof from what we learned in our Mishna:

He spreads it out for its care.

This implies that only

for its care—

yes,

indeed, he is permitted to spread it out.

If he spreads it out both for his own use and for its care—

no,

he may not spread it out!

Say the latter clause: But not

may he spread it out

for his own honor.

This implies that only

for his own honor

alone,

is it not

permitted for him to spread it out.

But

if he spreads it out

for its care and for his own use—

it is well and good!

Rather, from this,

from the words of our Mishna,

there is no proof.

For we do not know whether the first clause is precise or the latter clause is precise.

Come and hear,

a proof from the words of the beraita, in which we learned: One who finds a garment

may not spread it out, neither on a bed nor on a peg

a stake or hanger]

for his own use. But he may spread it out on a bed or on a peg—

for its care.

And if

guests happen to come to him, he may not spread it out

while they are staying with him,

neither on a bed nor on a peg, whether for his own use

or

whether for its care!

The Gemara now understands that the reason that if guests happen to come to him he may not spread it out even for its care is that by spreading it out he gains honor from the garment, and this is therefore spreading it out both for his own use and for its care.

This proves that when it is both for his own use and for its care, it is prohibited!

The Gemara rejects this: It is indeed possible to say that when it is both for his own use and for its care it is permitted,

but there,

when guests happen to come to him, it is prohibited for him to spread it out even solely for its care, because

by

spreading it out when guests are present,

he destroys it

as though he were burning it].

as though he were burning it.

If it is because of the evil eye,

so that the guests’ evil eye will affect it as a result.

If it is because of thieves,

perhaps the guests will steal it.

Come and hear

a proof from a beraita concerning the heifer whose neck is broken which the Torah says, “upon which no labor has been performed,” meaning that no work was performed with it:

It was taught:

If one brought

the heifer that they wish to bring as the heifer whose neck is broken

into the yoke

a device in which several animals are joined by their necks side by side and thresh grain together ],

and it threshed

the grain on its own, without the owner’s intention, that heifer is still

fit

for use as the heifer whose neck is broken. Since he did not intend that it thresh, this threshing is not considered labor that disqualifies it, and it falls within the scope of what is stated in the passage: “They shall take a heifer of the herd, upon which no labor has been performed, which has not pulled a yoke.”

But if the heifer’s mother was threshing the grain, and he brought the heifer

so that it could nurse

from its mother

and

also

thresh

with it while nursing—

it is disqualified.

But here,

when he brought it so that it would nurse and thresh,

it is both for his own use and for its care,

for he brought the heifer both for its benefit, so that it would nurse, and for his own benefit, so that it would thresh,

and it teaches

that it is

disqualified,

since this is considered that he performed labor with it!

The Gemara rejects this:

There, it is different, as the verse says: “Upon which no labor has been performed”—

this implies

in any event,

even if this was also for its benefit.

We challenge this:

If so, even

in

the first clause,

where he did not intend that it thresh,

also

it should be disqualified!

We answer:

This

the first clause

is comparable only to that which we learned

with regard to a red heifer, concerning which it is stated, “which has not pulled a yoke”: If

a bird alighted

perched

upon it,

without the owner’s knowledge—

it is fit,

as this is not considered that a yoke was placed upon it.

But if

a male animal mounted it,

even though this occurred without the owner’s knowledge—

it is disqualified.

What is the reason? As

was

explained by Rav Pappa.

For Rav Pappa said: If

it

had been written

in the passage concerning the heifer whose neck is broken, “upon which no labor has been

performed,” and

it had also been

read

that way:

“upon which labor was performed,” I would have said

that

even

if labor was performed with it

involuntarily,

without his knowledge, it would be disqualified.

And if it had been written “he performed labor,” and read “it performed labor,” I would have said

that it is not disqualified

until he himself performs labor with it

until he personally worked with it knowingly].

until he himself works with it, knowingly.

But

now that “he performed labor” is written

and

in the reading

we read

as though it had been written

“labor was performed,” we require

that it be

“labor was performed”—

analogous to “he performed labor.”

That is,

just as when he performed labor

with it himself

he must be pleased with it, so too

when

labor was performed

with it on its own, it is disqualified specifically when

he is pleased with it.

Therefore, when a bird alighted upon it, providing him with no benefit and not being desirable to him, it is not disqualified on that account.

But when a male animal mounted it, thereby benefiting the owner, since he wants his cow to become pregnant, it is disqualified.

Accordingly, the first clause of the beraita, which discusses a heifer that threshes although its owner does not want this, is comparable to the case of a bird alighting upon it, from which the owner derives no benefit. Therefore, the heifer is not disqualified on that account.

We learned in our Mishna:

He uses silver vessels and copper vessels, etc.

The Sages taught: One who finds wooden vessels,

and their owners delay in seeking them,

uses them

the finder

so that they will not rot .

And if he finds

copper vessels, he uses them

even

with hot water,

and not only with cold water.

But he may not

use them

by

placing them upon

the fire

to heat something in them],

because

he

wears them out

through this [and the statement that he uses them with hot water refers to water heated on the fire in another vessel].

If he finds

silver vessels, he uses them

specifically

with cold water. But he may not

use them

with hot water, because

use with hot water

blackens them.

If he finds

shovels

used to rake material from the fire]

and axes, he uses them for

something

soft, but not for

something

hard, because

using them on something hard

diminishes them

damages them].

wears them down.

If he finds gold vessels or glass vessels, he may not touch them—

until Elijah comes.

Just as they said

that the finder must tend to

a lost item

whose owners have delayed seeking it,

so they said

also

with regard to a deposit,

which the bailee must tend to.

We are perplexed:

A deposit—

what business does it have with him

what is the depositary doing with the deposit]? How could he be permitted to use it? Let the owners of the deposit come and care for it!

Rav Adda bar Ḥama said in the name of Rav Sheshet:

This refers

to a deposit whose owners went overseas,

and cannot tend to it; therefore the bailee must tend to it as he would to a lost item.

We learned in our Mishna:

If one finds a sack or a basket, or anything that it is not his way to take—

he may not take it.

From where are these matters derived?

For the Sages taught:

From what is written in the passage concerning a lost item:

“And you hide yourself,”

which implies that there are

times when you may hide yourself

from the lost item.

And from the fact that the same passage states, “You may not hide yourself,” it follows that there are

times when you may not hide yourself.

How so?

How is it possible for the finder to be permitted to ignore the lost item?

The beraita presents three possibilities:

a. If

the

finder

was a kohen, and it

the lost item

was in a cemetery

and a koen is forbidden to become impure through contact with the dead],

as a kohen is prohibited from becoming impure through contact with the dead, b.

Or if

the finder was

an elderly man, and it was beneath his dignity

to return the lost item,

c.

Or if

the

work was his,

the finder’s, and he was currently engaged in it,

was worth more than

the value of

his fellow’s

lost item [meaning that the wages for interrupting his work, which he would lose if he tended to the lost item, exceed the entire value of the lost item],

therefore,

in cases such as these,

it is said: “And you may hide yourself from them.”

We inquire about this:

For what purpose

for which of these possibilities

was the verse necessary

to teach us that one may hide himself?

If we say for

the case of a

kohen with the lost item in a cemetery,

then

it is obvious

that he need not return a lost item located in a cemetery!

For

this

law of returning a lost item is a

positive commandment,

“You shall surely return them” .

And

if

this

prohibition against a kohen becoming impure through contact with the dead is also a

negative commandment,

“He shall not become impure for a dead person,”

and

also a

positive commandment,

“They shall be holy.”

And

it is obvious that

the

positive commandment

of the lost item

cannot come

and override the negative and positive commandments of

the kohen’s ritual impurity!

Furthermore,

and moreover, even if the prohibition of impurity for kohanim consisted only of a negative commandment, nevertheless

we do not override a prohibition

the prohibition of impurity for kohanim

on account of

before

a monetary matter,

the mitzva of returning a lost item.

And

rather

what are we to say, that the verse “and you disregard it” comes to teach us

about

the second case mentioned in the beraita, which was

that his property was greater than that of his fellow,

so that he is not obligated then to return it?

After all, this law

follows from Rav Yehuda citing Rav!