Bava Metzia 25a — the Talmud in English

Or if he found

three coins, one atop the other,

which proves from this that they were placed there intentionally [and in the Gemara it will be explained what their identifying feature is], he is obligated to announce them.

And likewise, if he found

bundles in private domain,

he is obligated to announce them, for their place of discovery is their identifying feature.

This is not so with bundles in public domain, which roll beneath the feet of people and animals and do not remain in the place where they were initially placed.

And

likewise, if he found

loaves of a householder,

he is obligated to announce them, because a householder is accustomed to marking his loaves.

And

likewise, one who finds

bundles of wool purchased from the craftsman’s house,

is obligated to announce them, because they have an identifying feature, since every craftsman makes them in a slightly different manner.

Or if he found

jugs of wine and jugs of oil —

behold,

in every finding of

these

he is obligated to announce them,

because they have an identifying feature, and their owners did not despair of recovering them.

Gemara:

We learned in the first clause of our Mishna that one who finds a vessel with produce inside it, or a pouch with coins inside it, is obligated to announce them.

It is implied:

the reason

that he is obligated to announce them is because

he found produce i

nside t

he vessel, and coins i

nside t

he pouch.

It is implied:

but

if he found

a vessel

and in front of it

[before the vessel] there was lying

produce,

or if he found

a pouch

and in front of it

there were lying

coins, behold these,

the produce and the coins, are

his,

and only regarding the vessel, which has an identifying feature, does he announce, and he gives it to whoever provides an identifying feature for it.

But regarding the produce, even though it was adjacent to the vessel, we do not say that it fell from it. And since it has no identifying feature, it belongs to the one who found it.

And we say:

we learned this

[this law] in a beraita.

For the Sages taught: One who found a vessel with produce in front of it,

or one who found

a pouch with coins in front of it

behold these

[the produce and the coins]

are his.

When are these matters stated? When all the produce was found outside the vessel.

But if

some

of the produce was found

i

nside t

he vessel, and some of it on the ground,

and likewise if

some

of the coins were found

in the pouch, and some of them on the ground

he is obligated to announce them

as well.

And the reason is that it is reasonable that these produce and coins, too, had been inside the vessel and the pouch and fell from them. Therefore, the finder announces his find, and the owner of the vessel comes and provides an identifying feature for it, and he also takes the produce. And likewise with the coins.

And we raise a contradiction: One who found an object that has no identifying feature alongside an object that has an identifying feature,

for example, he found coins in front of a pouch,

is obligated to announce

everything, and the coins are given to the one who provides an identifying feature for the pouch.

When are these matters stated? When the owner of the lost object claims that everything is his.

But if

the owner

of the pouch, which has

an identifying feature,

came and provided an identifying feature for it,

and took

the pouch

as his,

and said that the coins were not his,

the other has acquired

the finder,

the object that has no identifying feature.

That is, the coins.

It is proven from here that the owner of the pouch takes the coins by means of the identifying features of the pouch, and not as we inferred from our Mishna, and as we learned in the above beraita, that the finder always acquires the coins!

Rav Zevid said: It is not difficult.

This

what we learned in our Mishna and in the beraita, that they belong to the finder, is speaking

of a tub and flax.

He found a tub lying, with flax in front of it. Certainly this flax did not fall from the tub, for if so, certainly a little flax would have remained in the vessel. And the same law applies to a pouch with coins in front of it: if the coins fell from it, certainly some of them would have remained in the pouch. Rather, it is necessarily speaking of two separate lost objects.

Whereas

this

which we learned in the second beraita, that he is obligated to announce everything, is speaking

of a basket and produce

[in a vessel with produce in front of it]. In such a case, it is possible that it is one lost object: initially the produce was in the vessel, but because of the falling, all the produce slid out of the vessel, and nothing remained in the vessel.

Rav Pappa said:

Indeed, it is possible to say that

both this and that

are speaking

of a basket and produce. And it is not difficult: this

which we learned in the second beraita, that he is obligated to announce everything, is speaking

where something remained in it

[something remained] in the vessel, and therefore it is reasonable to say that the produce outside also fell from this vessel.

Whereas

this

which we learned in our Mishna and in the first beraita, that he is not obligated to announce, is speaking

where nothing remained in it

in the vessel, and therefore it is reasonable that the produce is not from this vessel.

And if you wish, say: Both this and that are cases where nothing remained in it

in the vessel,

and it is not difficult: this

which we learned, that he is obligated to announce everything, is speaking

where its face was turned toward the produce

[the face of the vessel, that is, its open side, was directed toward the produce], and therefore it is reasonable that the produce fell from it.

Whereas

this

which we learned, that he is not obligated to announce, is speaking

where its face was not turned toward the produce,

and therefore it is not reasonable that the produce fell from this vessel.

And if you wish, say: Both this and that are cases where its face was turned

of the vessel

toward the produce,

and no produce remained in the vessel,

and it is not difficult: this

which we learned, that he is not obligated to announce everything, is speaking

where the basket has rims

[where the basket has a rim surrounding it, doubled inward], and with such a type of basket, if produce had fallen from it, it is reasonable that a little of it would have remained inside, because its rim would have prevented it from falling. Rather, it is necessarily the case that these are two lost objects, and there is no connection between the produce and the basket.

Whereas

this

which we learned, that he is obligated to announce, is speaking

where the basket has no rims,

and therefore it is possible that initially the produce was in this vessel and all of it fell from it.

We learned in our Mishna:

piles of produce and piles of coins

—he is obligated to announce them.

And we considered it: Is

can you infer from it

from our Mishna that

the number

of the piles

is an identifying feature!?

For if not, by means of what identifying feature are the produce and coins returned?

And the Gemara rejects:

Teach: a pile of produce,

for he found one pile of produce. If so, there is no number here by which he could provide an identifying feature.

Rather, the identifying feature is the place where the produce was lying. Since the produce is piled in a heap, certainly it was placed there intentionally. And the owner of the produce will come and say: I placed it in such-and-such a place.

And we considered it: If so,

can you infer from it

from our Mishna that

the place is an identifying feature!

And the Gemara rejects:

Teach: piles of produce,

and the identifying feature is the number of the piles.

And since this is so, it is indeed necessarily proven from our Mishna that one of the two things, the place or the number, is an identifying feature. But there is no proof from our Mishna in favor of one side or the other.

We learned in our Mishna:

three coins, one atop the other

—he is obligated to announce them.

Rabbi Yitzhak Migdalaha said:

What we learned, that he is obligated to announce them, is

when they are made

the coins

like towers.

The widest coin is placed below, and upon it the medium coin, and upon it the narrowest coin is placed. This is like the form of a tower, whose foundation is wide and which becomes narrower toward the top.

Since the coins are lying in this manner, certainly they did not fall; rather, they were placed there intentionally. And the owners intended to return and take them, but forgot them. Therefore he takes them and announces them, and the owner of the lost object comes and provides an identifying feature: they were made like towers.

It was taught likewise

in a beraita:

One who found scattered coins—

behold, these are his.

And if the coins were

made like towers—

he is obligated to announce them.

And what are they that are made like towers?

Three coins, one atop the other.

And it is proven from here that the law that three coins, one atop the other, obligate him to announce them applies when they are made like towers, in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yitzhak Migdalaha.

And we considered it:

This itself is difficult! You said

at the beginning of the beraita:

one who found scattered coins—

behold, these are his.

It is implied:

but

if the coins are

sliding one upon another,

where one coin is lying entirely on the ground, the second has part of it on the first and part on the ground, and likewise the third has part of it on the second and part on the ground, this is not the manner of falling—and

he is obligated to announce them.

Say the latter clause: They are made like towers—

he is obligated to announce them.

It is implied that specifically in such a case is he obligated to announce them;

but, if they are sliding one upon another,

behold, these are his,

because even such a form is the manner of falling!

And the Gemara explains: one may not infer from the first clause as you inferred, because the

tanna

of the beraita

, in every

case

in which they are not made

the coins

like a tower,

even when they are overlapping one another

calls them scattered.

And therefore, included in what the tanna taught in the first clause, “If one found scattered coins, these belong to him,” is also the case of overlapping coins; and this is as is inferred from the final clause.

Rabbi Hanina said: They taught

that one who finds three coins made like a tower is obligated to announce them

only

in the case of coins

of three different kings

[for each king inscribed his name and his image on the coin of his time].

But

if he found three coins

of one king

he is not obligated to announce them.

And we raise an objection:

What are the circumstances?

If they are made

the coins

like a tower,

with the coins differing in their size, then

even

if all three of them are

of one king,

whose images are identical,

also

he should be obligated to announce them, for the manner in which they were placed proves that they were placed deliberately!

And if they are not made like a tower -

even in the case of three different kings as well he should not

be obligated to announce them, for this is not the manner of intentional placement, but the manner of falling!

Rather, if it was stated

that Rabbi Hanina’s statement

it was stated as follows:

They taught, only in the case of one king -

like three kings.

That is, even if they are of one king, whose three images are identical, but they are like three kings; that is, their widths are not equal, and they appear like three different coins.

And what are the circumstances

of one king being like three kings?

They are made like towers.

That is,

the wide one is below

[the wide coin is the bottom one],

and the intermediate one is above it

[and the medium one is placed upon it],

and the small one is above the intermediate one

[and the smallest is placed upon the middle one].

For

if coins are found in this form,

we say:

certainly,

the owner deliberately placed them

there, for coins do not ordinarily fall in such a form.

But

coins

of one king,

such that

all of them are alike

[all of them are similar] in their width,

even though they are placed one upon another

[even though they are actually placed one upon the back of the other] -

these belong to him.

Because

perhaps it happened by chance, and they fell together

[for we say that it is possible that this is what happened: the coins fell at one time and came to rest in this form] .

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even

three coins

of one king,

whose widths are equal, if they are found placed one upon another

he too announces them.

Since the coins are placed one upon another, there is a distinguishing mark here, for it is not plausible to say that they fell by chance in such a form.

And we raise an objection:

What does he announce -

the number?

That the finder announces and says: “I found such-and-such coins,” and the owner comes and gives a distinguishing mark, saying: “You found them one upon the other”!

If so,

why specifically three,

why did the tanna mention specifically three coins? For

even

in the case of

two

[two]

also

this law applies!

Ravina said:

The finder does not announce the number; rather,

he announces, “coins.”

For the finder announces that he found coins, and the owner of the lost property comes and states the number of the coins. And therefore the tanna did not state his law with regard to two coins, because in such a case the owners cannot give the number as a distinguishing mark, for the minimum number of coins is two, and if a person comes and says that there were two coins there, this is not a distinguishing mark .

Rabbi Jeremiah raised a dilemma:

If he found the coins placed

like a bracelet,

that is, in a circle, like a bracelet

what is [the law]?

[The sides of the uncertainty in this dilemma and in the dilemmas below are: is such a form certainly intentional placement, or is it possible that they fell unintentionally in such a form?]

Rabbi Jeremiah further raised a dilemma: if he found them placed

in a row

[in a row], one beside the other

what is [the law]?

Like a tripod,

like the three legs of a vessel, each leg opposite the space between the other two

what is [the law]?

Like a ladder,

with most of the middle coin placed upon the bottom one, and most of the upper one placed upon the middle one, in the form of steps

what is the law?

what is the law?

And we say:

Resolve from this,

from the statement of Rav Nahman below,

one

[one] of Rabbi Jeremiah’s dilemmas.

For Rav Nahman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: Anything such that if one inserts a splinter between them

[between the coins]

and lifts them at one time

by lifting the splinter

he is obligated to announce them,

because coins placed in such a stable form, that they can be taken by means of a splinter, are proven to have been placed deliberately. And from here it is possible to resolve the dilemma concerning “like a ladder.” For when they are placed like a ladder, they can be taken together by means of a splinter. And if so, he is obligated to announce them .