Bava Metzia 19a (יט.) — the Talmud in English

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He lost his bill of divorce in the study hall

He lost the bill of divorce in the house of study]!

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said

to the Sages, members of the study hall, who had found the bill of divorce:

If an identifying mark is what you consider significant, I have one in it.

to the scholars in the house of study who had found the bill of divorce:

If visual recognition

is what you consider significant, I have that in it as well

[and if visual recognition is what you consider significant, I have that as well].

After he gave them a non-distinctive identifying mark and also recognized the bill of divorce through visual recognition,

they returned it to him

[they returned the bill of divorce to Rabba bar bar Ḥana].

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said

:

I do not know

[I do not know]:

Whether

[perhaps]

because of the identifying mark—

which was not distinctive—

they returned it

[did they return it to me because of the identifying mark],

and they hold

that the Sages who ruled that it should be returned to me hold:

identifying marks—

that are not distinctive—

are of Torah status

[it is Torah law to rely upon them]. Therefore, they relied on the identifying mark to return the bill of divorce and thereby permit the prohibition of a married woman, which is of Torah status.

Or

perhaps

because of visual recognition

they returned it to me—

and specifically

because I am a

Torah scholar [a Torah scholar], since a Torah scholar is not suspected of lying,

[a Torah scholar], they returned it to me, because a Torah scholar is not suspected of lying;

but not an ordinary person

they would not have returned it to him, for the identifying mark is not distinctive, and they do not rely on his visual recognition, because he is suspected of lying and claiming that he recognizes the bill of divorce through visual recognition when in fact he does not recognize it.

The Gemara returns to the matter itself

[we learned in the beraita cited above, 18b]:

One who finds a woman’s bill of divorce in the marketplace:

If the husband admits it, he should return it to the woman; if the husband does not admit it, he should return it neither to this one nor to that one.

And we challenge this:

If the husband admits it, at least, should he return it to the woman!?

And

why do we return the bill of divorce? Surely

let us be concerned

[there is reason for concern]:

Perhaps he wrote

the bill of divorce in order

to give

it

in Nisan

the date appearing on the bill of divorce,

but

in practice

he did not give it to her

the bill of divorce

until Tishrei

and it follows that she was not divorced until Tishrei—

and

perhaps

the husband went and sold the usufruct of her usufruct property from Nisan until Tishrei

[the husband went and sold the produce of the usufruct property, which belongs to him, between Nisan and Tishrei], and the sale was valid, since during that period she was still his wife

; and

if we give the bill of divorce to the woman,

she will produce

the woman

the bill of divorce written in Nisan and come to collect from the purchasers

who bought from the husband

unlawfully

[the woman will produce the bill of divorce dated Nisan and collect from the purchasers—to whom the produce was sold after Nisan—unlawfully], since the produce still belonged to the husband and he was entitled to sell it. The Gemara explains its challenge:

This works according to the one who says:

Once he set

the husband

his mind on divorcing her, the husband no longer has the produce

then

it is well,

for in Nisan he had already set his mind on divorcing her, and from that moment he no longer had the right to sell the produce. Thus, if the woman collects the produce from the purchasers, she is doing so lawfully, and therefore the bill of divorce should be returned to her.

But according to the one who says: The husband has the produce until the time of delivery

of the bill of divorce,

what can be said!?

Surely there is reason to fear that she will collect from the purchasers unlawfully!? And we answer:

When she comes to collect

[when the woman comes to collect from the purchasers based on the date written in the bill of divorce],

we say to her

[the court says to her]:

Bring proof of when the bill of divorce reached your possession

[bring proof of when the bill of divorce came into your possession]. Since the court does not rely on the date written in the bill of divorce with regard to collection from the purchasers, the bill of divorce may therefore be returned to the woman.

We nevertheless challenge:

And what is the difference—

between finding a bill of divorce, which is returned to the woman—

from

finding

debt documents,

which are not returned to the creditor!?

For

this

we learned: One who finds debt documents:

If they contain liability

[a lien on]

property, he should not return them; and we established

[and explained it above, 12b] that the Mishna is dealing

when the debtor admits

[the borrower admits that he delivered the debt document to the creditor],

and

nevertheless the document is not returned to the creditor:

Because perhaps he wrote it in Nisan in order to borrow, but did not borrow until Tishrei, and he is collecting from purchasers unlawfully,

since perhaps the creditor will come to collect from purchasers who bought from the borrower after Nisan. This would be unlawful, because since the loan took place only in Tishrei, only the land that the borrower sold after the time of the loan became liened to the creditor.

And now this is difficult:

There too, let us return it

[there too, regarding debt documents, let us return them to the creditor],

and when he comes to collect, let us say to him

the court: “

Bring proof of when the debt document reached your possession”

[and when the creditor comes to collect through a document from the purchasers, the court should say to him: “Bring proof of when the document came into your possession”]. This is what we say regarding a bill of divorce. What difference is there between them!?

They said

the members of the academy to resolve the difficulty:

Here, regarding a woman’s bill of divorce, the purchaser will come and sue her,

it is reasonable to assume that the purchaser will think to sue her and demand that she prove when the bill of divorce came into her possession, because

the purchaser said

to himself:

The reason the Sages returned the bill of divorce to her

was only

so that she would not remain unable to marry,

[and the Sages returned the bill of divorce to her only so that she would not become an aguna]; but

now that she has come to collect, let her go and bring proof of when the bill of divorce came into her possession

[whereas now that she has come to collect, and not to marry by means of the bill of divorce, she should bring proof of when the bill of divorce came into her possession]—

But

here, regarding a debt document, the purchaser will not come and sue

[the purchaser will not think to demand from the creditor proof of when the document came into his possession], because

the purchaser said

to himself:

Since the Sages returned the debt document to him

[since the Sages returned the document to him], it is

obvious

that

they returned it to him for some legal purpose; it must have been for collection

[surely they returned the document to him in order to collect from the purchasers]. If so,

infer from this: The Sages investigated the matter, and the document reached his possession before me, [and necessarily the Sages examined the matter and determined that the document was delivered on the date it was written, before I purchased the land]. Therefore, they do not return the document to him, since the purchaser would thereby lose unlawfully.

[the Sages must have examined the matter and determined that the document was delivered on the date it was written, before I purchased the land]. Therefore, they do not return the document to him, since the purchaser would thereby suffer an unlawful loss.

We learned in the Mishna: One who finds bills of divorce and

bills of manumission:

The Sages taught: One who finds a bill of manumission in the marketplace:

When the master admits

that he emancipated his slave,

he should return it to the slave; if the master does not admit it, he should return it neither to this one nor to that one.

And we ask:

When the master admits, at any rate, should he return it to the slave!?

But why should he return it!?

why should it be returned]!?

Let us be concerned that perhaps he wrote it in Nisan in order to give it to him, but did not give it to him until Tishrei, and the slave went and acquired property and the slave went and acquired property

and the slave went and acquired property]

from Nisan until Tishrei, and the master went and sold it and the master went and sold it, since he is his slave, and whatever a slave acquires belongs to his master]—

and the master went and sold it, since the slave is his, and whatever a slave acquires belongs to his master]—

But A0010if we return the document to the slave, perhaps

if we return the document to the slave, perhaps

he produces it A0012the slave

the slave

to establish his emancipation, which was written in Nisan, and repossesses A0014the slave those purchasers A0016who bought from the master, claiming that he had already been emancipated in Nisan, and that the property belonged to him rather than to his master, so that the master had been unable to sell it; but this

those

purchasers

who bought from the master, claiming that he had already been emancipated in Nisan, and that the property belonged to him rather than to his master, so the master could not have sold it; and this would be

is not legally valid A0018since in practice he was not emancipated until Tishrei!?

since in fact he was not emancipated until Tishrei!?

The Gemara explains its question:

This works well according to the one who says: It is a benefit for a slave to emerge from under his master’s authority into freedom, and A0021even

also

in accordance with Abaye, who says: “

The witnesses acquire it for him through their signatures,” A0024then

then

it is fine, A0026because from the moment the witnesses signed, they “acquired” the emancipation for the slave, and he is legally entitled to repossess the property from the purchasers to whom the master sold it after the signature, which took place in Nisan.

because from the time the witnesses signed, they “acquired” the emancipation for the slave, and he lawfully seizes the property from the purchasers to whom the master sold it after the signing that took place in Nisan.

But according to the one who says: It is a liability for a slave to emerge from under his master’s authority into freedom, A0029and therefore it cannot be said: “The witnesses acquire it for him through their signatures,” since emancipation is not a benefit for the slave, and “one cannot create a liability for a person in his absence”—

and therefore it is not possible to say, “The witnesses acquire the benefit for him through their signatures,” since emancipation is not beneficial for the slave, and “one may not cause a person a detriment in his absence”—

what can be said!? A0031But surely the difficulty remains: perhaps he will repossess property from purchasers from Nisan, unlawfully!?

Would it not be difficult: perhaps he will unlawfully seize property from purchasers from Nisan!?

And we answer:

When A0034the slave

the slave

comes to repossess it, we say to him A0036the court says to the slave: “

the court says to the slave: “

Bring proof of when the emancipation document came into your possession” Bring proof of when the emancipation document came into your possession, and repossess the property only after proving that the sale took place after the document came into your possession].

bring proof of when the document of emancipation reached your possession, and seize the property only after proving that the sale took place after the document reached your possession].

We learned in the Mishna: If one found

a dayyetaqi gift document A0049and receipts, he may not return them, as I say that they had been written, but the person reconsidered and decided not to give them:

and receipts, he may not return them, because I say that they had been written, but the person reconsidered and decided not to give them:

The Sages taught:

What is a dayyetaqi? “

This shall stand and be in force” This document shall stand and be in force with regard to everything written in it],

this document shall stand and take effect in accordance with everything written in it],”

so that if he dies, his property goes to so-and-so, A0055meaning: A document in which the instructions of a person on his deathbed are written, stating what should be done with his property after his death. Although this document was not delivered into the recipient’s possession, it is considered as though it had been delivered to him, and it stands and is in force, because the words of a person on his deathbed are considered like written and delivered instructions, and no document or act of acquisition is required.

that is, a document containing what a person dangerously ill commanded should be done with his property after his death. Even though this document was not delivered to the recipient, it is considered as though it was delivered to him and will take effect, because the instructions of a dangerously ill person are considered as though they were written and delivered, and no document or act of acquisition is required.

What is

a gift? Everything in which it is written: “

From today and after death,” A0061it proceeds to explain this phrase.

as it proceeds to explain.

Apparently, A0063meaning: Is this what the tanna intends to say—that every gift

meaning: Is this what the tanna intends to say—that every gift

only acquires A0065if “

from today and after death”;

from today and after death” is written in it,

and if “from today and after death” is not written in it,

it does not acquire!? A0069Can a person not give a fully effective gift from today!?

Can a person not give a complete gift from today!?

He said A0071Abaye explained:

he explained—

This is what it means:

What is a gift from a healthy person that is like a gift from a person on his deathbed like a dayyetaqi], with regard to

like a dayetiki], with regard to

acquiring only after death, A0076as with a gift from a person on his deathbed:

as with the gift of a dangerously ill person:

Everything in which it is written: “

From today and after death,” A0079which implies: I transfer ownership of the substance of the property to you from today [and this acquisition is effective in that the seller no longer has the authority to sell it, give it to someone else, or bequeath it], and after my death its produce will also belong to you.

meaning: I transfer ownership of the substance of the property to you from today [and this transfer is effective, so the seller no longer has the right to sell it, give it to someone else, or bequeath it], and after my death its produce will also be yours.

We raise a difficulty concerning the reason given in the Mishna for not returning the dayyetaqi and the gift: “As I say that he reconsidered and decided not to give them”:

It implies:

The reason is that he did not say A0083the person now writing the document,

the person now writing the document

“Give it”;

but A0086if we see that he did not reconsider giving them, and he

if we see that he did not reconsider giving them, and

said A0088now: “

now: “

Give it” A0090the document,

the document,

we give it; but we raise a contradiction A0092from that which was taught:

from what was taught in a beraita:

If one found dayyetaqi documents, apotiki documents a document in which a borrower pledges a specific field to a lender for a loan that he previously received orally]

a document in which a borrower pledges a particular field to a lender for a loan previously given orally],

and gifts, even though

both parties admit A0097that the document was duly delivered,

that the document was delivered properly,

he may not return it either to this one or to that one, A0099because we are concerned that perhaps he really wrote it for this person but did not deliver it to him, and therefore the recipient did not acquire the land; then he wrote another document for someone else and delivered it to him, and that person acquired it, but now the donor wishes to retract the gift to the second person and wants this document to be delivered to him so that he can produce it in court, causing this document to take precedence over the second person’s document, and enabling the first recipient to take the property unlawfully—

because we are concerned that perhaps he truly wrote it for this person but did not deliver it to him, so the person did not acquire the land; then he wrote another document for someone else and delivered it to him, and the second person acquired it. Now he wishes to retract the gift to the second person, and wants this document to be delivered to him so that he can produce it in court. This document would then precede the second person’s document, and the first recipient would extract the property unlawfully—

And if so, a difficulty arises concerning what is implied by our Mishna: If the person who wrote the document said that it should be given to the first recipient, it is given to him!?

Rabbi Abba bar Memel said: It is not difficult A0106to reconcile the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita, because:

the apparent contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita; because: