Bava Metzia 19a — the Talmud in English

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He lost his bill of divorce in the study hall [he lost the bill of divorce in the study hall]!

He lost the bill of divorce in the house of study]!

He said

Rabbah bar bar Ḥana to the Sages who came to the study hall, who had found the bill of divorce:

If it is a distinguishing mark that you consider

if this is a distinguishing mark that is important in your eyes—I have one in it.

If it is recognition

that you consider

and if it is recognition that is important in your eyes—this too I have in it.

And after he gave them a non-distinctive mark, and also recognized the bill of divorce through recognition,

they returned it to him

they returned the bill of divorce to Rabbah bar bar Ḥana.

Rabbah bar bar Ḥana said:

Rabbah bar bar Ḥana:

I do not know

I do not know:

Whether

perhaps

because of the distinguishing mark—

which was not distinctive—

they returned it

perhaps they returned it to me because of the distinguishing mark,

and they hold

the Sages who ruled to return it to me:

distinguishing marks—

which are not distinctive—

are from the Torah

it is Torah law to rely upon them; therefore they relied upon the mark to return a bill of divorce and thereby permit the prohibition of a married woman, which is from the Torah.

Whether

or perhaps

because of recognition

they returned it to me -

and specifically

because I am

a Torah scholar [a Torah scholar] they returned it to me, because a Torah scholar is not suspected of lying,

[a Torah scholar], they returned it to me, because a Torah scholar is not suspected of lying;

but not an ordinary person

they would not return it to him, for the mark is not a distinctive mark, and they do not rely upon his recognition, because he is suspected of lying and saying that he recognizes the bill of divorce through recognition even though he does not recognize it.

The matter itself

we learned in the beraita brought above, 18b:

one who finds a woman’s bill of divorce in the marketplace:

When the husband admits, he returns it to the woman; when the husband does not admit, he returns it neither to this one nor to that one.

And we ask:

When the husband admits, at any rate, he returns it to the woman!?

And

why do we return the bill of divorce, for

let us be concerned:

[there is reason for concern]:

Perhaps he wrote

the bill of divorce in order

to give

it

in Nisan,

which is the date appearing in the bill of divorce,

and

but in practice

he did not give it to her

the bill of divorce

until Tishrei,

and it follows that she was not divorced until Tishrei—

and

perhaps

the husband went and sold produce from Nisan until Tishrei

the husband went and sold the produce of his usufruct property, which belongs to him, between Nisan and Tishrei, and the sale was legally valid, for during this time she was still his wife

; and

if we give the bill of divorce to the woman,

she will produce

the woman

the bill of divorce written in Nisan, and she will come to seize from purchasers

who bought from the husband

unlawfully

the woman will produce the bill of divorce whose date is Nisan and will seize from the purchasers—to whom the produce was sold after Nisan—unlawfully, for they still belonged to the husband and he was able to sell them. And the Gemara explains its question:

This works according to the one who says:

once he directed

the husband

his attention to divorcing her, the husband no longer has the produce,

then

properly so, for in Nisan he had already directed his attention to divorcing her, and he no longer had the right to sell the produce from that time. If the woman takes the produce from the purchasers, she is acting lawfully, and therefore we return it to her.

for in Nisan he had already set his mind on divorcing her, and from that moment he no longer had the right to sell the produce. Thus, if the woman collects the produce from the purchasers, she is doing so lawfully, and therefore the bill of divorce should be returned to her.

But according to the one who says: The husband has the produce until the time of delivery

of the bill of divorce,

what is there to say!?

For surely there is concern that she will seize from the purchasers unlawfully!? And we answer:

when she comes to seize

when the woman comes to seize from the purchasers on the basis of the date written in the bill of divorce,

we say to her

the court says to her:

Bring proof of when the bill of divorce reached your possession

bring proof of when the bill of divorce came into your possession; and since the court does not rely upon the date written in the bill of divorce with regard to seizing from the purchasers, it returns the bill of divorce to the woman.

And we still ask:

And in what way is it different—

the finding of a bill of divorce, which is returned to the woman—

from

the finding of

debt documents,

which are not returned to the lender!?

For

this

we learned: One who finds debt documents:

If they contain responsibility

a lien

upon property, he does not return them; and we established

and explained it above, 12b—that the Mishna is dealing

when the debtor admits

the borrower admits that he gave the debt document to the lender,

and

nevertheless, the document is not returned to the lender:

Because perhaps he wrote it in order to borrow in Nisan, but did not borrow until Tishrei, and he is collecting from purchasers unlawfully, perhaps the lender will come to collect from purchasers who bought from the borrower after Nisan; and this is certainly unlawful, because since the loan took place only in Tishrei, only the land that the borrower sold after the time of the loan became subject to the lender’s lien.

since perhaps the creditor will come to collect from purchasers who bought from the borrower after Nisan. This would be unlawful, because since the loan took place only in Tishrei, only the land that the borrower sold after the time of the loan became liened to the creditor.

And now this is difficult:

There too, let them return it

even there, concerning debt documents, let them return them to the lender,

and when he comes to collect, let us say to him

the court: “

Bring proof of when the debt document reached your possession” [and when the lender comes to collect by means of a document from the purchasers, the court will say to him: “Bring proof of when the document came into your possession”], as we say concerning a bill of divorce. What difference is there between them!?

[when the creditor comes to collect from the purchasers through the document, the court should say to him: “Bring proof of when the document came into your possession,” just as we say regarding a bill of divorce. What, then, is the difference between them?!

They said

the members of the academy to resolve this:

Here, concerning a woman’s bill of divorce, a purchaser will come and sue her,

it may be assumed that the purchaser will think of suing her to prove when the bill of divorce came into her possession, for

he says

the purchaser to himself:

This is why the Sages returned the bill of divorce to her,

only

so that she not remain tied

and the Sages returned the bill of divorce to her only so that she not remain tied; however,

now that she has come to collect, let her go and bring proof of when your bill of divorce reached her possession

whereas now that she has come to collect and not to marry through the bill of divorce, let her bring proof of when the bill of divorce came into her possession—

but

here, concerning a debt document, a purchaser will not come and sue,

the purchaser will not think of demanding from the lender proof of when the document came into his possession, for

he says

the purchaser to himself:

Since the Sages returned the debt document to him

since the Sages returned the document to him,

it is obvious

that

for what legal purpose did they return it to him? For collecting

it is certainly that they returned the document to him for the purpose of collecting from the purchasers, and if so,

learn from it: The Sages settled the matter, and before I did so, the document reached his possession,

and necessarily the Sages examined the matter and found that the document was given on the date of its writing, before I purchased the land; and for this reason they would not return the document to him, since the purchaser would lose unlawfully.

We learned in the Mishna: One who finds women’s bills of divorce and

bills of manumission of slaves:

The Sages taught: One who finds a bill of manumission in the marketplace:

When the master admits

that he freed his slave,

he returns it to the slave; when the master does not admit: he returns it neither to this one nor to that one.

And we ask:

When the master admits, at any rate, should he return it to the slave!?

And why [

And for what reason should he return it]!?

Let us suspect that he wrote it to give it to him in Nisan, but did not give it to him until Tishrei, and the slave went and acquired property [

and the slave went and acquired property]

from Nisan until Tishrei, and the master went and sold them [

and the master went and sold them, for he is his slave, and whatever a slave acquires, his master acquires] —

And

if we return the document to the slave, perhaps

he produces it

the slave

for the emancipation that was written in Nisan, and he repossesses

those

purchasers

who purchased from the master, claiming that he had already been emancipated in Nisan, and that the property belonged to him and not to his master, and that he could not have sold it; but this would be

not according to law

for in practice he was not emancipated until Tishrei!?

And the Gemara explains its question:

This works well according to the one who says: It is a benefit for a slave to emerge from under his master’s authority into freedom, and

also

like Abaye, who said: “

By their signatures, its witnesses acquire it for him,”

then

properly so,

for from the time the witnesses signed, they “acquired” the emancipation for the slave, and he rightfully takes property from the purchasers to whom the master sold his property after the signing that took place in Nisan.

But according to the one who says: It is a liability for a slave to emerge from under his master’s authority into freedom,

and therefore it is not applicable to say: “By their signatures, its witnesses acquire it for him,” for emancipation is not a benefit for the slave, and “one cannot impose a liability upon a person in his absence” —

what is there to say!?

But surely the difficulty remains: perhaps he will repossess property from the purchasers from Nisan unlawfully!?

And we answer:

When he comes

the slave

to repossess, we say to him

the court says to the slave: “

Bring proof of when the emancipation came into your possession” [

Bring proof of when the emancipation document came into your possession; and you may repossess only after you prove that the sale took place after the document came into your possession].

We learned in the Mishna: If one found

a dayetiki gift document

and receipts, he may not return them, for I say that they were written, and [the owner] reconsidered and decided not to give them:

The Sages taught:

What is a dayetiki: “

This shall be established and shall be

[

this document shall be established and shall be in force with regard to everything written in it],

so that if he dies, his property [shall go] to so-and-so,” meaning: a document in which is written what the dangerously ill person commanded should be done with his property after his death. Even though this document was not delivered into the recipient’s possession, it is as though it were delivered to him and would be established and would be, because the words of a dangerously ill person are considered as written and delivered, and a document or acquisition is not required.

What is

a gift: Everything in which it is written: “

From today and after death,”

he proceeds to explain it.

Evidently,

meaning: Is this the intention of the tan[n]ay—to say that every gift

if it is written “

from today and after death”

is what acquires, but if not

it is written in it “from today and after death,”

it does not acquire!?

Can a person not give a complete gift from today!?

He said

he explained,

Abaye: This is what it is saying:

What is a gift of a healthy person that is like the gift of a dangerously ill person [

like a dayetiki], with regard to

its acquiring only after death,

like the gift of a dangerously ill person:

Everything in which it is written: “

From today and after death,”

for it implies: “I acquire the substance for you from today” [and this acquisition is effective in that the seller has no authority to sell it or give it to another, or bequeath it], “and after death, the produce will also be yours.”

And we raise a difficulty concerning the reason we learned in the Mishna for not returning the dayetiki and the gift, namely: “For I say that he reconsidered and decided not to give them”:

It implies:

The reason is that he did not say

the one now writing the document

“Give”,

but

if we see that he did not reconsider giving them, and

he said

now: “

Give”

the document,

they give it; and we juxtapose it with

that which was taught:

One who found dayetikaot, apotikaot [

a document in which the borrower encumbered a specific field to the lender who had previously lent him an oral loan]

and gifts, even though

both of them admit

that the document was given according to its law,

he may not return it to either this one or that one,

because we are concerned: Perhaps he indeed wrote it for this one but did not deliver it to him, and he did not acquire the field, and then he went back and wrote [another document] for another and delivered it to him, and [the latter] acquired it, and [the first] came to retract his gift to the second, and he wants them to deliver this document to him, so that he can produce it in court, and this document will precede the document of the second, and the first will extract [the property] unlawfully —

And if so, the difficulty arises against what is implied from our Mishna: that if the one writing the document said that they should give the document to the first one, they give it to him!?

Rabbi Abba bar Memel said: It is not difficult

the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita; for: