Bava Metzia 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Huna said:

Even when a person comes and claims that a person from the city of Shavrei sent the bill of divorce with him, and it fell from him, and we know that in the city of Shavrei there are not two people with the same name, nevertheless

we are concerned that there are two Shavrei

we are concerned that perhaps there are two cities named “Shavrei,” and in the other city of Shavrei there is a person whose name is identical to his, and the bill of divorce fell from that person; therefore, it is not returned to him] .

And Rav Hisda said to Rabba: Go out and examine it, because this evening Rav Huna will ask you about it

go and examine the matter, because in the evening Rav Huna will ask you about this matter] .

He went out

, examined it, and found

Rabba went out, examined the matter carefully, and found] proof for the matter.

As we learned: Any document executed by a court

any document that had been authenticated in court] that was found, in which case there is no concern that the person reconsidered and decided not to give it] —

it shall be returned.

And this bill of divorce, which was found in Rav Huna’s court, had been authenticated, as that is why it had been brought there. If so, there is no concern at all, and it should therefore be returned to the agent who claims it .

And now the Gemara continues to explain Rabba’s challenge to Rabba:

But Rav Huna’s court, which

since everyone comes there to litigate,

is

like]

considered a place where caravans are common, and

nevertheless

Rabba resolved that the bill of divorce should be returned

to the one who claims that it is his!

Apparently,

it is evident from here that only

if two people named Yosef ben Shimon have been established

in one city —

yes,

then we are concerned about this.

If they have not

been established —

no,

we are not concerned. Therefore, Rabba said that we are not concerned about two cities named Shavrei, since two such cities have not been established.

Rabba performed an act

with regard to a bill of divorce that was found in

the flax house

what this place was will be explained below]

of Pumbedita, in accordance with his teaching

in accordance with his statement], namely, his above position that there is concern about two people named Yosef ben Shimon only when two conditions are met:

a. The document was found in a place where caravans are common.

b. Two people named Yosef ben Shimon had been established in the city.

Since in that incident the two conditions were not met, as will be explained below, Rabba instructed that the bill of divorce be returned.

Some say

that “the flax house” means

the place where flax is sold

the place where flax is sold],

and it

specifically

was a place where two people named Yosef ben Shimon had not been established,

so that

even though caravans are common

in that place, as people come there to purchase flax, it is returned.

And some say

that “the flax house” means

the place where flax is soaked

the place where flax is soaked],

and

it is returned

even though two people named Yosef ben Shimon had been established

in one city, because

caravans are not common

in that place.

Rabbi Zeira posed a contradiction between the Mishna and a beraita

he raised a difficulty from the Mishna cited above against a beraita] —

and resolved it

and answered his difficulty]:

We learned: One who brings a bill of divorce and it was lost from him, if he found it immediately —

it is valid. But if not —

it is invalid.

And we raised a contradiction: One who finds a woman’s bill of divorce in the marketplace, when the husband admits

that he gave the bill of divorce to the woman and it was lost from her —

he shall return it to the woman.

But if

the husband does not admit,

but claims that it fell from him and that he has not yet given it to her —

he shall return it neither to this one nor to that one

neither to the husband nor to the woman].

He may not return it to the husband, lest he already divorced her and it fell from the woman. If he returned it to the husband, the husband might lie and claim that he had already paid her ketuba, and that she therefore returned the bill of divorce to him.

And he may not return it to the woman, lest the husband wrote the bill of divorce and ultimately reconsidered and did not divorce her. If he returned the bill of divorce to her, she might marry on the basis of it unlawfully.

In any event, it is taught

in any event, we learn]:

when the husband admits —

he shall return it to the woman,

and the tanna did not distinguish between a short time and a long time. It follows that

even

if the bill of divorce was found

after a long time

it is returned!

And he resolved it

and Rabbi Zeira answered]:

Here,

in the Mishna, the case is

a place where caravans are common.

Therefore, if a long time passed from the time it was lost, there is concern that it fell from someone else.

And

if

here,

in the beraita, the case is

a place where caravans are not common,

there is therefore no concern.

Some say

that according to Rabbi Zeira, what we learned—that it is not returned—and established as referring to a place where caravans are common, applies specifically

when two people named Yosef ben Shimon had been established there, for

then

we do not return it, and that is

in accordance with the view

of Rabba,

who holds this above.

And

some say

that according to Rabbi Zeira, he establishes the Mishna

even though two people named Yosef ben Shimon had not been established,

so that even in such a case

we do not return it

we do not return it],

and

it follows that Rabbi Zeira

disagrees

with

Rabba .

And we say:

Granted, Rabba,

who challenged our Mishna from the Mishna in tractate Gittin, it is understandable why

he did not say as Rabbi Zeira,

who challenged the beraita from the Mishna in tractate Gittin. This is because

a Mishna

against a Mishna —

is a stronger challenge

it is a preferable challenge], since the Mishna is primary, and it is perplexing when two Mishnayot contradict one another.

This is not so with a beraita that contradicts the words of a Mishna, as this is not such a strong difficulty, because one can say that the beraita is not authoritative. For if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who arranged the Mishnayot, did not teach what is stated in the beraita, from where did Rabbi Hiyya [who arranged the beraitot] derive this ruling?!

Rather, Rabbi Zeira,

who challenged the beraita,

why did he not say as Rabba?

He could say to you

that Rabbi Zeira said: There is no contradiction between the Mishnayot at all. For

is it taught

in our Mishna:

“He said, ‘Give it,’ —

they give it, even after a long time”?

The Mishna did not state this explicitly; rather, Rabba inferred it. And

perhaps

one can infer something else from the Mishna:

“He said, ‘Give it,’ —

they give it, and it is always as we have established,

as was ruled halakhically [in the Mishna in tractate Gittin], that this applies specifically when it was found

immediately.

Therefore, Rabbi Zeira preferred to challenge the beraita. Since the tanna explicitly taught that it is returned to the woman, he should have distinguished between immediately and after a long time.

This is not so with our Mishna, in which the tanna taught only that it is not returned, while the ruling that if he said “Give it,” they give it is merely an inference. Therefore, the tanna was not required to clarify whether the case applies specifically when it was found immediately or also after a long time.

And we inquire:

According to the one who says

above that

according to Rabbi Zeira, in a place where caravans are common,

there is concern that it fell from someone else,

even though two people named Yosef ben Shimon had not been established, and this disagrees with Rabba

and he disagrees with Rabba], who holds that there is concern only when two such people had been established,

over what do they disagree

—Rabbi Zeira and Rabba?

And we explain:

Rabba holds: What is taught

what we learned]

“Any document executed by a court shall be returned”

to the person for whom the document was written, even in a case

where it was found in a court

. And

indeed,

a court —

is like a place where caravans are common

as we said above. Nevertheless, we learned that it shall be returned. It is evident from here that specifically

when two people named Yosef ben Shimon had been established,

then there is concern that it fell from someone else, and

it is not returned.

But if

they had not been established —

it is returned.

And Rabbi Zeira could say to you: Is it taught

and did we learn] in our Mishna:

“Any document executed by a court that was found in court”?

After all,

it is taught, “Any document executed by a court shall be returned,”

and the Mishna did not specify where the documents were found.

It is always

possible to say that the case is specifically

where it was found outside

where the documents were found outside the court]. But if they were found in court, which is a place where caravans are common, it is not returned, even if two people with that name had not been established.

Rabbi Yirmeya said

to resolve the difficulty above: What we learned—that it is returned—refers to a case

such as where

the

witnesses

who signed the bill of divorce say:

“We never signed —

except on a single bill of divorce belonging to Yosef ben Shimon,”

and it is this man, who is now claiming the bill of divorce . Therefore, there is certainly no concern that it fell from someone else.

And we ask:

If so, what is the point of stating this

what is the novelty? It is obvious that it is returned]?

And we explain:

Lest you say:

Even though the witnesses say this, we should still

be concerned

we should be concerned]

perhaps

the document that was found is a different bill of divorce, and

the names happened to be identical, and the witnesses were identical

and it happened that the names of the husband and wife were also identical to the names of those before us, and the names of the witnesses were also identical ] —

it teaches us

that this is a remote concern, and we are not concerned about it.

Rav Ashi said

to resolve the difficulty above: What we learned—that the bill of divorce is returned—refers to a case

such as

where the claimant provides an identifying mark,

saying: “There is a perforation

in the bill of divorce

next to a particular letter,”

and his statement is found to be accurate .

And

it is implied by Rav Ashi’s words that

specifically

when he said that there was a perforation

next to a particular letter,

which is a distinctive identifying mark, it is returned to him.

But

if he said that it contained

a perforation in general,

without specifying its location —

not

is it returned.

The reason is that

Rav Ashi was uncertain

he was uncertain] about what we will learn below: that a lost object is returned on the basis of

identifying marks

that are not distinctive],

whether

it is a

Torah

law, in which case it is possible to rely on identifying marks even with regard to prohibitions and return a bill of divorce on their basis,

or

perhaps] it is a

rabbinic

enactment. If so, specifically with regard to returning a lost object, which involves monetary law, could the Sages enact this, since they have the power to expropriate a person’s property, as the principle is that property rendered ownerless by a court is ownerless; but with regard to a prohibition, they cannot.

Since Rav Ashi was uncertain about the matter, he therefore said that a bill of divorce is returned only on the basis of a distinctive identifying mark .

An incident involving

Rabba bar bar Hana —

who was an agent bringing a bill of divorce —