Bava Metzia 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

Rabba bar Rav Huna said:

It is referring to a case

such as

where the extortionists

took it [

non-Jews who seize fields from Jews] from the robber’s possession, and because of him . And as for what we learned: “And it is emerging from his possession,” this means that it is emerging from the robber’s possession through the extortionists.

If the robbed party came to collect

the

principal,

that is, the field itself, from the robber—

he collects from liened property.

If the robbed party came to collect produce—

he collects from unsold property.

Rava did not state

the explanation of

Rabba bar Rav Huna,

because the expression

“And it is emerging from his possession”—

it is emerging

by law,

through a court—

is indicated.

It does not mean that it is emerging from his possession through extortionists.

And Rabba bar Rav Huna did not state

the explanation of

Rava,

because the expression

“And it is emerging from his possession”—

literally [

in its actual state, as it was initially]

is indicated,

and not that pits, ditches, and caves had been dug in it.

Rav Ashi said

to explain the beraita in accordance with Shmuel: The beraita—

states the cases in different aspects.

That is, the beraita is speaking about two aspects of the same case. Namely:

For example, a person robbed

a

field from another person

when it was

full of produce, ate the produce, and

then

sold the field

to someone else.

The law is then as follows:

When

the purchaser

of the

robber comes to collect

the

principal,

after the field was repossessed from him in order to return it to the robbed party—

he collects from liened property.

Whereas when

the robbed party

comes to

collect produce,

since it was robbed from him while full of produce—

he collects from unsold property,

because the amount is not fixed.

We raise an objection:

Whether according to Rava,

and

whether according to Rabba bar Rav Huna,

who explained that the robbed party collects from the robber, the debt that the robber owes the robbed party

is an oral loan,

since no document was written concerning it,

and an oral loan is not collected from liened property!

And we answer:

Here we are dealing with a case in which he stood

the robber

before the court,

and he became obligated to pay,

and afterward he sold [

his property]. Since he stood before the court, the matter becomes known publicly, and this is like a loan documented in a deed.

We raise an objection:

If so, produce as well

should be collected from liened property, since the consumption of the produce also becomes publicly known and is like a loan documented in a deed!

And we answer: It is referring

to a case in which he stood before the court concerning the principal, but did not stand before the court concerning the produce .

We raise an objection:

But what is the basis for this distinction?

How could it be obvious and definitive to the tanna that the case in which he stood before the court concerned the principal and not the produce? And we explain:

As a general matter [

usually],

when a person brings a claim,

when one person brings a claim against another—

he claims the principal first [

he first claims the principal]. Therefore, the tanna taught that he collects the principal from liened property, because presumably he stood before the court concerning it. But he did not stand before the court concerning the produce, and therefore he collects only from unsold property .

We challenge this:

And

if

Shmuel held that the

purchaser

from a robber has no right to appreciation?

But Shmuel said to Rav Ḥinnana bar Sheilat [

who was a scribe]: When you write a deed for someone selling his field,

consult him [

take his advice],

and

if he wishes,

write

in the deed that he accepts responsibility to reimburse the purchaser from

the best [

from the choicest of his property],

the appreciation and the produce [

appreciation and produce], if the field is repossessed from him.

Now,

in what case

was Shmuel speaking?

If it is

a case in which

a creditor

repossessed the field from the purchaser,

who has

the creditor

a right to the produce?

But Shmuel said: A creditor collects the appreciation.

It is indicated that

appreciation—

yes,

indeed he collects it.

But produce—

no!

Rather, is it not

necessarily referring

to a purchaser from a robber,

and it is proven that a purchaser has a right to appreciation!

Rav Yosef said: Here we are dealing—

for example, he has

the robber

another field.

It belongs to him, and he gives that field to the purchaser. Since he is not giving him money in exchange for money and adding to it, but is giving him land in exchange for his money, this does not appear to be interest .

Abaye said to him: Is it permitted to lend a se’a in exchange for a se’a [

that is, to lend another person a se’a of grain on the condition that he return another se’a to him later],

when he has land?

It is prohibited, because we are concerned that the produce may increase in price, and it will turn out that the borrower gives the lender more than he lent him, which is like interest! [Although he returns him only one se’a, as he borrowed from him, the Sages prohibited this].

If so, here too, despite the fact that the robber gives him land and not money, since ultimately he gives him more than he paid, this is like interest!

He said to him:

Indeed,

there,

in a

loan,

it is prohibited. But

here,

where it concerns a

sale,

it is permitted. This is because interest applies more stringently to a loan than to a sale: interest in a loan is prohibited by Torah law, whereas in a sale it is prohibited by rabbinic law .

Some say: Rav Yosef said: Here we are dealing—

for example, they acquired it from him.

That is, they performed a kinyan at the time of the sale, that he would give him the appreciation if the field were repossessed from him. Therefore, this is not considered interest, since the seller was obligated in the matter even before there was any benefit from waiting for the money.

Abaye said to him: Is it permitted to lend a se’a in exchange for a se’a when they acquired it from him?

After all, in the case of a loan, it is prohibited even if they performed a kinyan!

He said to him: There—

a loan, whereas here—

a sale.

It is specifically prohibited in the case of a loan, because interest applies more stringently to a loan than to a sale.

With regard to the matter itself, Shmuel said: A creditor collects the appreciation.

Rava said: Know

that this is so, and that the purchaser cannot claim, “I improved the land,”

for this is what the seller writes for the purchaser

in the warranty clause that he writes in the deed of sale:

“I shall arise and quiet [

I shall settle],

and purify [

I shall clear it of every claim],

and clear [

I shall absolve]

this sale [

this sale],

it and its expenses and its appreciations [

it, the expenses you will incur on it, and the appreciation it will produce ],

and I shall stand it before you [

and place it before you],

and the purchaser of this sale has agreed and accepted upon himself [

the purchaser agreed , and accepted these conditions]”.

And since the seller accepted responsibility toward the purchaser also for the appreciation, a creditor collects the appreciation from the purchaser, since the purchaser can then recover from the seller and does not suffer a loss thereby.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said to Rava: If that is so, with regard to a gift, for which he did not write

in the deed

this [

since this formulation is not written in the deed],

is it likewise the case that he does not repossess

the creditor

the appreciation,

since the recipient of the gift has no one from whom to recover the appreciation?

He said to him: Yes.

Indeed, that is so.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin was astonished and asked: It follows, then, that when a purchaser buys a field, the appreciation is repossessed from him, whereas when someone receives a gift, it is not repossessed from him.

Is a gift more advantageous than a sale?

He said to him: Yes,

indeed. In this matter,

a gift is very much more advantageous

than a sale.

The reason is that, granted, with regard to the body of the land, the creditor says to the recipient of the gift: Why did you accept the gift? It was pledged to me! From where shall I collect my debt if I do not take it?

But with regard to the appreciation, the recipient of the gift says to him: Had I not accepted it, it would not have appreciated, and you would have taken only the body of the land. If so, what loss have I caused you by your not taking the appreciation? [Unlike the purchaser, since he can recover from the seller, the appreciation is repossessed from him as well].

Rav Naḥman said: This Mishna

below

supports Mar Shmuel, while our colleague Huna interprets it in another matter [

interprets it as referring to a different matter].

As it was taught: If one sells a field to another, and it emerges from his possession, when he,

the purchaser, subsequently

collects

from the seller,

he collects the principal from liened property, and the appreciation he collects from unsold property.

This proves Shmuel’s statement, that a creditor has a right to appreciation.

But our colleague Huna interprets it as referring to another matter, to a purchaser from a robber.

For the robbed party certainly has a right to the appreciation, because he claims: My land produced the appreciation.

This is not so with regard to a creditor, since as long as he has not repossessed the field, it does not belong to him, and the appreciation was produced in the purchaser’s domain.

It was taught in another beraita: If one sells a field to another, and the other improved it,

the other person,

and a creditor came and repossessed it. When he

subsequently

collects,

the law is as follows:

If the appreciation exceeds the expenditure [

the expenses that the purchaser spent improving the land]—

the purchaser takes

the purchaser

the

portion of

the appreciation

exceeding the expenses

from the owner of the land,

as the purchaser claims to him: I paid your debt with the appreciation that was taken from me.

And

the

expenditure

he takes

from the creditor.

And if the expenditure exceeds the appreciation, that is,

he spent more than the land appreciated,

he has only

the

expenditure

to the

extent of the appreciation,

and he takes it

from the creditor.

The remainder of the expenses he spent he loses.

But this

beraita,

how does Shmuel interpret it [

as referring to which case]?

If

we interpret the beraita

as referring to a purchaser from a robber [

and what we learned in the beraita, “and a creditor came and repossessed it,” refers to the robbed party]—

the first clause is difficult, for

after all,

Shmuel said: A purchaser from a robber has no right to appreciation,

whereas in the first clause of the beraita we learned that he does have a right to appreciation.

And

if

we interpret it as referring

to a creditor—

it is difficult

for Shmuel with regard to both the

first clause and

the

last clause! For

after all,

Shmuel said: A creditor collects the appreciation,

indicating that he collects all the appreciation, whereas in the beraita we learned that the creditor reimburses the purchaser for the expenditure!

And we answer:

If you wish, say

that the beraita is referring

to a purchaser from a robber,

and

for example, he has land.

Alternatively—

they acquired it from him.

In these cases, Shmuel too agrees that he has a right to appreciation, as explained above.

If you wish, say

that the beraita is referring

to a creditor, and there is no difficulty: