Bava Metzia 15a — the Talmud in English

Rabba bar Rav Huna said:

it is speaking

for example ![](pamud.bmp "

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that they seized it

the extortionists [

non-Jews who forcibly seize fields from Jews] from the authority of the robber, and because of him . And that which we learned: “and it emerges from beneath his hand”—this means that it emerges from beneath the hand of the robber, through the extortionists.

If the robbed person came to collect

the

principal,

that is, the field itself, from the robber—

he collects from liened properties.

If the robbed person came to collect produce—

he collects from unencumbered properties.

Rava did not say

his resolution of

Rabba bar Rav Huna,

because the expression

“and it emerges from beneath his hand”—

it emerges

through a legal proceeding,

through a court,

is implied.

And not that it emerges from beneath his hand through extortionists.

And Rabba bar Rav Huna did not say

the resolution of

Rava,

because the expression

“and it emerges from beneath his hand”—

in its actual state [

in the way it is, as it was initially]

is implied,

and not that pits, ditches, and caves were dug in it.

Rav Ashi said

to resolve the beraita according to Shmuel: The beraita—

is taught with regard to two sides.

That is, the beraita speaks about two sides of the same case. And this is:

For example, when he robbed

a person

of a field from his fellow

when it was

full of produce, and he ate the produce, and

then

he sold the field

afterward.

The law is then as follows:

When

the

purchaser

came to collect

the

principal,

after the field was seized from him in order to return it to the robbed person—

he collects from liened properties.

But when

the

robbed person

came to collect produce,

for they robbed it from him while it was full of produce—

he collects from unencumbered properties,

because they are not fixed in amount.

And we raise an objection:

Whether according to Rava,

and

whether according to Rabba bar Rav Huna,

who established that the robbed person collects from the robber, the debt that the robber owes the robbed person

is an oral loan,

for no document was written concerning it,

and an oral loan does not collect from liened properties!

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? When he stood

the robber

in court,

and became liable to pay,

and afterward he sold [

and afterward sold his properties]. Since he stood in court, the matter has publicity, and this is like a loan documented in a deed.

And we raise an objection:

If so, produce also

should collect from liened properties, for there is also publicity concerning the eating of the produce, and it is like a loan documented in a deed!

And we answer: It is speaking

when he stood in court concerning the principal, but did not stand in court concerning the produce .

And we raise an objection:

But what is the fixed assumption?

How is the matter fixed and clear to the tannaitic authority, that the one who stood in court stood concerning the principal, and not concerning the produce?! And we explain:

As a general matter [

usually],

when a person makes a claim,

when a person claims against his fellow—

he claims the principal first [

first of all, he claims the principal]. Therefore the tannaitic authority taught that he collects the principal from liened properties, because presumably he stood in court concerning them. But he did not stand in court concerning the produce, and therefore he collects only from unencumbered properties .

And we ask:

And

if

Shmuel holds, that the

purchaser

from a robber has no improvement?

But Shmuel said to Rav Ḥinnana bar Shilat [

who was a scribe]: When you write a deed for one who sells his field,

consult him [

take his advice],

and

if he wants,

write

in the deed that he accepts upon himself to compensate the purchaser from

the choicest [

from the best of his properties],

the improvement and the produce [

the improvement and produce], if the field is seized from him.

And now,

in what case,

what case was Shmuel speaking about?

If it is in

a case where a

creditor

seized it from the purchaser,

who has

the creditor

produce?

But Shmuel said: A creditor collects the improvement.

It is implied:

improvement—

yes,

indeed he collects it.

But produce—

no!

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking

of a purchaser from a robber,

and it is proven that the purchaser has improvement!

Rav Yosef said: Here, with what are we dealing—

for example, he has

the robber

other land,

belonging to him, which he gives to the purchaser. Since this is so—that he does not give him money in exchange for money and add to it, but gives him land in exchange for his money—this does not appear to be interest .

Abaye said to him: Is it permitted to lend a se’a for a se’a [

that is, to lend his fellow a se’a of grain on the condition that he return another se’a to him later],

in a place where he has land?

This is forbidden, because we are concerned lest the grain become more expensive, and it will emerge that the borrower gives the lender more than he lent him, and this is like interest! [Even though he returns him only one se’a, as he borrowed from him, the Sages prohibited this].

And if so, here too, despite the fact that the robber gives him land, and not money, since in the end he gives him more than he paid, this is like interest!

He said to him:

Indeed,

there,

in

a loan,

it is forbidden. But

here, where it is speaking of

a sale,

in a sale, it is permitted. For interest applies more strongly in a loan than in a sale, since interest in a loan is from the Torah, whereas in a sale it is rabbinic .

There are those who say:

Rav Yosef said: Here, with what are we dealing—

for example, they acquired it from him.

That is, they performed an act of acquisition at the time of the sale, that he would give him the improvement if it were seized from him. Therefore this is not considered interest, since the seller was obligated in the matter even before there was compensation for waiting for the money.

Abaye said to him: Is it permitted to lend a se’a for a se’a in a place where they acquired it from him?

After all, in a loan, even if they performed an act of acquisition, it is forbidden!

He said to him: There—

a loan, and here—

a sale.

And it is specifically in a loan that it is forbidden, because interest applies more strongly in a loan than in a sale.

The body of the matter: Shmuel said: A creditor collects the improvement.

Rava said: Know

that this is so, and the purchaser cannot claim, “I improved the land,”

for this is what the seller writes to the purchaser

in the formula of responsibility that he writes in the deed of sale:

“I shall arise and quiet [

I shall calm],

, and purify [

I shall purify from every challenge],

and clear [

and cleanse]

this sale [

this sale],

it, its expenses, and its improvements [

it, the expenses that you will expend on it, and the improvement that it will produce ],

and I shall place it before you [

and I shall place it before you],

and the purchaser of this sale desired and accepted upon himself [

and the purchaser agreed , and accepted these conditions upon himself] .”

And since the seller accepted responsibility toward the purchaser also for the improvement, therefore the creditor collects the improvement from the purchaser, since he can return to the seller, and he does not suffer a loss through the matter.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said to Rava: If that is so, a gift, for which it is not written for him

in the deed

so [

for this formula is not written in the deed],

is it also the case that he does not seize

the creditor

the improvement,

for the recipient of the gift has no one to whom he can return and from whom he can collect the improvement?

He said to him: Yes.

Indeed, so.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin wondered and asked: It emerges, then, that from the purchaser of a field they seize the improvement. But from the recipient of a gift they do not seize it.

And is the power of a gift greater than that of a sale?

He said to him: Yes,

indeed. In this matter,

very much greater

is the power of a gift than that of a sale.

And the reason for the matter is: with regard to the body of the land, it is understandable that the creditor claims to the recipient of the gift: Why did you accept the gift? After all, it was mortgaged to me! And from where shall I collect my debt if I do not take it?

But with regard to the improvement, the recipient of the gift claims to him: Had I not accepted it, it would not have improved, and you would have taken only the body of the land; if so, what did I cause you to lose by your not taking the improvement? [Unlike the purchaser, since he can return to the seller, they seize the improvement from him as well].

Rav Naḥman said: This teaching

that follows

supports Master Shmuel, while our colleague Huna establishes it with other matters [

establishes it in another matter].

As it was taught: One who sells a field to his fellow, and it emerges from beneath his hand, when he,

the purchaser, returns and

collects

from the seller,

he collects the principal from liened properties, and the improvement he collects from unencumbered properties.

This proves in accordance with Shmuel’s words, that a creditor has improvement.

But our colleague Huna establishes it with other matters, with a purchaser from a robber.

For the robbed person certainly has improvement, because he claims: My land improved.

Unlike a creditor, for as long as he has not seized the field, it is not his, and it improved in the purchaser’s authority.

Another teaching: One who sells a field to his fellow, and his fellow improved it,

his fellow,

and a creditor came and seized it. When he

returns and

collects,

the law is as follows:

If the improvement is greater than the expenditure [

the expenses that the purchaser expended in improving the land]—

the purchaser takes

the purchaser

the

portion of

the improvement

exceeding the expenses

from the owner of the land,

as the purchaser claims to him: I repaid your debt with the improvement that they took from me.

And

the

expenditure

he takes

from the creditor.

And if the expenditure is greater than the improvement, that is,

that he expended more expenses than the land improved,

he has only

the

expenditure

according to

the measure of the improvement,

and he takes it

from the creditor.

And he loses the rest of the expenses that he expended.

But this,

this beraita,

in what case does Shmuel establish it [

in what case will Shmuel establish it]?

If

we establish the beraita

with a purchaser from a robber [

and that which we learned in the beraita, “and a creditor came and seized it”—this means the robbed person]—

the first clause is difficult, for

after all

Shmuel said: A purchaser from a robber has no improvement,

whereas in the first clause of the beraita we learned that he has improvement.

And

if

we establish that it is speaking

of a creditor—

it is difficult

for Shmuel both in the

first clause and

also in the

final clause! For

after all

Shmuel said: A creditor collects the improvement,

implying that he collects all the improvement. But in the beraita we learned that the creditor returns the expenses to the purchaser!

And we answer:

If you wish, say

that the beraita is speaking

of a purchaser from a robber,

and

for example, he has land.

Alternatively—

when they acquired it from him.

For in these cases even Shmuel concedes that he has improvement, as was explained above.

If you wish, say

that the beraita is speaking

of a creditor, and it is not difficult: