Bava Metzia 102b — the Talmud in English

And this incident

occurred

before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

and before Rabbi Yose, and they said: They shall divide the intercalated month, since he said two contradictory formulations, and it is uncertain whether to accept and follow the first formulation or the last one; therefore, they shall make a division, and he shall pay him for half of the intercalated month.

Gemara:

In the first clause, the Mishna says that sometimes the intercalated month belongs to the tenant, and sometimes it belongs to the landlord. In the latter clause, the Mishna brings an incident in which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yose ruled that they should divide the intercalated month.

And we raise an objection: Are they bringing

an incident to contradict

the ruling stated at the beginning? And we answer:

A section is missing, and this is what it teaches,

a section is missing from the Mishna, and this is how it should read:

And if he said to him, “For twelve gold coins per year, at one gold dinar per month”—

they shall divide it.

And an incident also

and such an incident occurred

in Tzippori, involving one who rented a bathhouse from his fellow for twelve gold coins per year, at one gold dinar per month; and the incident came before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yose, and they said: They shall divide the intercalated month.

According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yose, if two formulations that contradict one another were stated, it is uncertain whether to follow the last formulation and say that he retracted the first, or whether to follow the first formulation, since he did not explicitly retract it .

Because of the uncertainty, the ruling is that they divide it.

And the Gemara brings a dispute between amoraim as to whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, or whether the halakha is not in accordance with him, for various reasons.

Rav said: If I had been there,

if I had been in Tzippori and they had asked me,

I would have given all of it to the landlord,

I would have given the landlord the entire intercalated month, because I rule in accordance with ben Nannas, who says: Follow the last formulation, in the chapter Beit Kor , in Bava Batra 105a; and since at the end of his words he said that the rental is by months, the landlord acquired the intercalated month.

And we raise an objection:

What does this teach us

what new point is Rav teaching? If he is teaching that the halakha is:

Follow the last formulation, Rav already said this once!

Rav already said this matter!

As Rav Huna said in the name of the school of Rav,

the students of Rav said in his name: One who sells an item to his fellow and says: “I am selling it for

an istera

a provincial sela,

one hundred ma'ah

one hundred prutot,” and the buyer agreed and purchased the item, must pay

one hundred ma'ah,

even though at first he said “an istera,” which is a coin worth ninety-six prutot ; we follow the last formulation. And likewise, if he sold it to him for

one hundred ma'ah, an istera,

he owes him

an istera

for this reason.

And we answer: From these words of Rav there is no proof that one says, “Follow the last formulation,” when the formulations contradict one another, since

if it were from there, I would have said

I would have thought that the last formulation

explains

the first formulation, and when he said, “An istera, one hundred ma'ah,” his intention was a large sela worth one hundred prutot, and not the ordinary sela. And likewise, when he said, “One hundred ma'ah, an istera,” his intention was one hundred inferior prutot that were worth only an istera.

He teaches us

Rav teaches us that the ruling is with the landlord in the bathhouse of Tzippori because of following the last formulation .

And Shmuel said:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, for it is uncertain whether to follow the first formulation or to follow the last formulation; however, in a monetary uncertainty, the ruling is that the one who seeks to extract money from his fellow must bring the proof.

And in the Mishna, where the ruling is that they divide it,

it is coming

to a case

in the middle of the month

the thirteenth

we are dealing,

for then two questions arise from the uncertainty:

a. Does the tenant have the right to live in the house during half of the following month?

b. Is the tenant obligated to pay for the half-month during which he lived in the house?

The answer to the first question is that the landlord can remove the tenant from his house because of the uncertainty, since he is in possession of the house, for land remains in the possession of its owner and not in the possession of the one dwelling in it.

In contrast, the answer to the second question is that the tenant is not obligated to pay for the half-month during which he already lived in the house, because he is in possession of the money .

Therefore, the ruling is that they divide it: for the half-month during which he already lived in the house, he does not pay; and for the half-month that will come, he is obligated to pay, since the landlord can remove him from the house from now onward if he does not pay him.

But if he comes

to the court

at the beginning of the month, the entire month belongs to the landlord,

since the landlord can remove him from the house if he does not pay him.

And if he

comes

to the court

at the end of the month, the entire month belongs to the tenant,

and he cannot claim rent for the time that the tenant already dwelled in the house.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction in Shmuel’s words:

Did Shmuel say: We do not say, “Follow the last formulation,”

rather, there is uncertainty in the matter?

But Rav and Shmuel both said:

One who sells grain to his fellow and says to him:

A kor

thirty seahs

for thirty

selas

I am selling to you, can

the seller

retract even with regard to the last seah,

since, as long as the buyer has not taken possession of the last seah, he has not yet acquired anything, because the entire kor is one transaction , and he cannot acquire part of it .

And if the seller said:

A kor for thirty

selas,

a seah for a sela I am selling to you,

and the buyer took possession of part of the grain,

the first one he acquires first,

and the seller cannot retract with regard to those seahs that the buyer already took, because at the end of his words the seller said that each seah would be sold separately.

And from these words of Shmuel it is proven that he holds, “Follow the last formulation,” for he said, “a seah for a sela,” and one should not follow the first formulation, “a kor for thirty”; and this contradicts Shmuel’s words, for he rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in our Mishna! And we answer: Shmuel holds, “Follow the last formulation,” only because of uncertainty, and all that he said must be explained accordingly.

There,

in our Mishna,

what is the reason

what is the reason that they divide it?

Because he is in possession,

the tenant is in possession of the money, and the landlord is in possession of the house; and because of the uncertainty as to which formulation should be followed, we leave the money in its presumptive possession.

Here,

in the case of one who sells grain,

he too is in possession,

the buyer is in possession of the seahs that he took, and because of the uncertainty—perhaps we say, “Follow the last formulation”—we leave them in his possession, since with movable property the one in possession of it is considered in possession of it, unlike land. And in fact, we do not follow the last formulation with certainty .

And Rav Naḥman said:

The halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yose; rather,

the land remains in the possession of its owners,

and the landlord acquires the intercalated month even if he comes to court at the end of the month.

And the Gemara wonders:

What does this teach us

Rav Naḥman? That we say

“Follow the last formulation”

with certainty?

That is Rav’s view!

These are Rav’s words!

And the Gemara explains: Rav Naḥman holds that the ruling is with the landlord

even though he completely reversed it,

even if he initially said “one gold dinar per month” and afterward said “twelve gold coins per year,” in which case according to Rav the ruling is with the tenant because of following the last formulation, whereas according to Rav Naḥman the ruling is with the landlord .

Rav Naḥman holds like Shmuel, that it is uncertain whether to follow the first formulation or the last, and with regard to money subject to uncertainty, the ruling is that the one who seeks to extract from his fellow must bring the proof.

However, Shmuel and Rav Naḥman disagree in this: Shmuel holds that if they come to court at the end of the month, the ruling is with the tenant, because he is in possession of the money; whereas Rav Naḥman holds that the time at which they came to court is not significant.

According to Rav Naḥman, since the uncertainty itself—whether the tenant is entitled to dwell in the house for an additional month—arises at the beginning of the month, the ruling is already decided in favor of the landlord, because land remains in the possession of its owner. It follows that the tenant dwelled during this month in the landlord’s house that was not rented to him, and he is obligated to pay for it .

According to Rav Naḥman, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that they divide it whether he comes at the beginning of the month, in the middle of the month, or at the end of the month; and he holds like Sumakhos, that money subject to uncertainty is divided , whereas according to the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos, the intercalated month always belongs to the landlord.

Now the Gemara brings a problem concerning a dispute between the landlord and the tenant over payment of the rent.

They asked Rabbi Yannai:

A landlord and a tenant who came to court,

the tenant said: I gave

the rental payment.

And the landlord says: I did not take

rent from you.

Upon whom

which of them

is the obligation to bring proof

of his claim? And the Gemara examines:

When

did they come to court?

If

they came

within its term,

before the rental days had ended and the payment date had not yet arrived, since rent is payable only at the end?

But

we learned

in the Mishna that in this case the tenant must bring proof that he paid, and there is no room for the problem!

If after its term

they came to court?

But

we learned

this as well in the Mishna: then the landlord must bring proof of his claim!

And the Gemara brings the words of the Mishna in tractate Bekhorot,

as we learned:

If the father died

who had a firstborn son

within thirty days

of the birth of his son, the son is

presumed not to have been redeemed,

and he is obligated to redeem himself when he grows up ,

until he brings proof that he was redeemed

by his father , and is exempt from his obligation.

And if the father died

after thirty days

from the birth of his son, the son is

presumed to have been redeemed,

and is exempt from redeeming himself when he grows up,

until they say to him:

We know that your father did not redeem you, because he said to us before his death

that he had not been redeemed,

and then he is obligated to redeem himself. [Bekhorot 49a]

From this Mishna it is possible to learn concerning payment of rent that before the time of payment has arrived, one must assume that he has not paid , and after the time, one must assume that he has paid, unless it has been proven otherwise.

And we interpret the question:

It is necessary only

when they came to court

on the day on which his term is completed

[on the last day of the rental], and the renter claims that he paid on that day.

Is it a person’s practice to pay on the day on which his term is completed, or not?

[Does a person pay on the last day, or not,] and is it a person’s practice to pay only on the day after the last day?

Rabbi Yohanan said to them: You have learned it,

we have stated in the Mishna the resolution of this question.