Bava Metzia 102a (קב.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Sheshet said to them

to his students:

You have learned it [

it is written in the Mishna]:

A matter that does not require the work of a craftsman, which the tenant performs; and this too is not [

and this too is not]

the work of a craftsman,

necessarily, because

it is possible

to place the mezuzah

in a reed tube [

in the hollow of a reed and hang it , rather than being required to carve into the stone.

The Sages taught: One who rents a house to another—the tenant is responsible for affixing a mezuzah for him.

And

And even though the mezuzah belongs to him,

when he leaves

the house to live in another house,

he may not take it in his hand and leave

and affix the mezuzah in his new house, because by doing so he causes harmful spirits to enter the house , and harm whoever will live there.

But

And if he rented

from a gentile

and affixed a mezuzah properly,

he takes it in his hand and leaves,

lest the gentile treat the mezuzah with contempt .

And there was an incident involving one who took it in his hand and left,

and he was punished measure for measure,

and he buried his wife and two sons .

And we challenge:

Does the incident contradict the ruling!

The beraita says that if the homeowner is a gentile, one should take the mezuzah; how, then, can it cite an incident indicating that one who acted in this manner was punished?

Rav Sheshet said:

The proof of the beraita applies

to the first clause,

and the incident involved a Jewish homeowner.

We learned in our Mishna:

The manure belongs to the homeowner, and the tenant has nothing

except that which emerges from the oven and the stove alone.

And the Gemara discusses:

What are we dealing with?

When the Mishna says that the manure belongs to the landlord, of what type of courtyard is it speaking, and who owns the animals that produced the manure?

If you say it is a courtyard that he rented to the tenant, and the oxen belong to the tenant [

if the courtyard is rented to the tenant and the oxen belong to the tenant]?

Why [

why would the manure be

the homeowner’s

? By what means did he acquire it?

Rather,

let us say that it is referring to

a courtyard that was not rented to the tenant,

and the tenant rented only the house,

and

and then, ordinarily,

the landlord’s oxen are there, and therefore the manure belongs to him.

And we challenge:

It is obvious!

Since the animals are his, certainly their droppings are his.

And we answer:

It is necessary

only

in a courtyard belonging to the landlord

that he did not rent to the tenant, but granted the tenant only permission to enter and leave through the courtyard .

And oxen that came from elsewhere stood there. [

Oxen belonging to strangers came into the courtyard,] and presumably their owners relinquish the droppings, and the landlord acquired them from the state of ownerlessness through kinyan chatzer—acquisition by virtue of one’s courtyard—at the moment they fell into his courtyard.

And this explanation

supports Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina.

For Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge,

and a person acquires objects placed in his domain even though he did not intend to acquire them .

The Gemara now discusses at length the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina.

A challenge is raised

from this beraita:

If one said

a person:

Any lost objects that will come into

his domain

today,

for example, if a river will wash fish into it, “I want

my courtyard to acquire them for me,” he has said nothing,

because he did not have the intention to acquire the item when the lost object entered his domain.

The difficulty now is:

And if this is so [

if this is correct]

that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge, why did he not

say anything

and why did he not acquire it? The courtyard acquires even if he said nothing !

And we answer:

Here, what are we dealing with? A courtyard that is not guarded,

and an object that is not guarded by the courtyard is not acquired through it unless the owner is standing beside the courtyard , as stated in the chapter Shenayim Ochazin. [Bava Metzia 11a]

And we challenge:

If so, say the latter clause

and see whether you can explain it in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina.

It is written in the latter clause:

He acquired a reputation in the city concerning the lost object,

for example, it became known that the river had washed fish into his field; then

his words,

which he had initially said, “Let my courtyard acquire it for me,”

stand,

and the courtyard acquired it for him.

And if the beraita is speaking

of

a courtyard that is not guarded, what

does it accomplish [

what does the fact that he acquired a reputation in the city concerning the lost object accomplish!] For a courtyard that is not guarded does not acquire !

And we answer:

Once he acquires a reputation in the city concerning the lost object, people keep away from it [

people keep away from it], because they fear the authorities who might tell them that they took so-and-so’s lost object,

and it becomes [

and is considered] the courtyard

like a guarded courtyard .

A challenge is raised

against Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina from a beraita that adds details concerning the laws of our Mishna.

It was taught in a beraita: One who rents a house from another, and he did not rent the courtyard to him ,

the manure

in the courtyard

that emerges from the oven and the stove

belongs to the tenant as it is written in the Mishna.

And one who catches [

who catches it and puts it into a vessel]

from the air

manure from animals belonging to strangers that came into the courtyard,

it belongs to him,

because the owner of the courtyard has not yet acquired it.

And

And droppings

in the stable and in the courtyard—

belong to the homeowner,

because he did not rent out the courtyard and the stable.

And if Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement is so—that he said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge,

according to the fundamental law , the

one who catches it from the air—why does it belong to him? The airspace of his courtyard

of the landlord

belongs to him!

For the law is that the airspace of a courtyard acquires for the owner of the courtyard; and if one throws a bill of divorce to a woman and it reaches the airspace of her courtyard, she is divorced, even if the bill is burned before it reaches the ground. [Mishna, Gittin 79a]

Abaye said

in answer: The beraita is speaking

of one who attached a vessel to the underside of a cow,

close to its orifice, so that before the droppings entered the airspace of the landlord’s courtyard, they had already entered his vessel.

Rava said:

Even if the droppings were in the airspace of the courtyard before they entered the vessel, the owner of the courtyard did not acquire them, because an object found in

airspace that is not destined

of the object

to come to rest

on the ground

is not considered to be resting

in the courtyard

,

and the courtyard does not acquire it.

The Gemara raises a contradiction in Rava’s statements:

Is it obvious to Rava

that airspace not destined to bring the object to rest is not considered as though it were resting,

when he raised it as a question! [

For Rava was uncertain about this!]

For Rava raised the following question: One threw a purse

and renounced ownership of it , and threw it

through this entrance

of another person’s courtyard

and it exited through this entrance

of the courtyard,

what is the law?

Is airspace not destined to bring the object to rest considered as though it were resting,

so that the owner of the courtyard acquired the purse,

or is it not considered as though it were resting,

and he did not acquire the purse?

And we answer: The cases must be distinguished:

There, nothing interrupts, [

there, nothing interrupts] between the airspace in which the purse travels and the ground of the courtyard, and there Rava was uncertain.

Here, a vessel interrupts

between the airspace and the ground; in this case it is obvious to Rava that the object is not considered to be resting on the ground if it is not destined to come to rest.

We return to the beraita:

And those in the stable and in the courtyard belong to the homeowner.

And we challenge the body of the beraita:

Two clauses!

Why mention two places—the courtyard and the stable—when neither of them was rented?

Abaye said: This is what it means: And those in the stable located in the courtyard belong to the homeowner.

The conjunctive “and” before the word “in the courtyard” should not be retained in the beraita. The beraita speaks only of droppings in the stable of the courtyard, because it is speaking of a case in which the courtyard was rented, and the droppings in it belong to the tenant, unlike the way we established the Mishna, in a courtyard that was not rented. The beraita teaches us the principle stated by Rav Ashi below.

Rav Ashi said:

The beraita

therefore says: One who rents out his courtyard without specification,

and did not mention the stable,

did not rent out the stable located in it.

A challenge is raised

against Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina from a beraita:

Pigeons belonging to people are not subject to the mitzva of sending away the mother bird. However,

dovecote pigeons and attic pigeons

that do not belong to the owner of the dovecote

are subject to the mitzva of sending away the mother bird.

And the eggs

are forbidden as robbery

by rabbinic law, even though the owner of the dovecote did not acquire them,

on account of the ways of peace

and this is not full-fledged robbery .

And we challenge:

And if Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement is so—that a person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge,

then the owner of the dovecote acquired the eggs through kinyan chatzer, since they are guarded in the dovecote. The Torah refers to the eggs as a “nest,” and if they have an owner, he is exempt from sending away the mother bird, for

one may read here [

it is written in the passage] “

When you happen upon

a bird’s nest” [Deuteronomy 22:6], and it is expounded:

excluding one that is prepared,

that has an owner !

Rava said

in answer: Indeed, eggs that a bird laid in the dovecote are exempt from the mitzva of sending away the mother bird, because the owner of the dovecote acquired them, in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina.

This beraita forbids taking the eggs while they are emerging from the bird on account of the mitzva of sending away the mother bird, for

an egg once most of it has emerged

from the bird is considered to have emerged, and then

it is subject to the obligation of sending away the mother bird, but it is not acquired [

and it is not acquired] by the owner of the dovecote and is not exempt as “prepared”

until it falls into his courtyard,

because as long as it remains attached to the bird, it is not guarded in the dovecote.

And when the beraita teaches

in the beraita

that they are subject to the mitzva of sending away the mother bird, it is before [

before]

they fall into his courtyard.

And we challenge:

If so, why [

why did the beraita say that the eggs

are forbidden as robbery,

for the eggs are attached to the bird. Just as the bird itself is not forbidden as robbery at all, nor even on account of the ways of peace, because the owner of the dovecote knows that birds customarily go out and come from place to place, so too the eggs should not be forbidden!

And we answer: It is theft on account of the ways of peace even

[unclear: corrupted wording],

and not only in the case of the eggs, because the owner of the dovecote has them in mind, as he is certain that they will return to the dovecote.

Alternatively, say: Actually

there is no prohibition against taking the bird on account of the ways of peace, as we had previously thought; rather, the prohibition in the

beraita

applies only to the eggs. And once most of the egg has emerged,

his mind

of the owner of the dovecote

is upon it,

and he is certain that the egg will fall into the dovecote and remain there.

The Gemara now comes to explain the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina in a different manner from Rava’s explanation. According to this approach, the

now

that it is known to us

that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is prohibited to acquire eggs as long as the mother is sitting upon them, as it is stated:

“You shall surely send away the mother,”

and afterward

“you may take the young for yourself,”

“and afterward you may take the young for yourself,”

and acquiring the nest is prohibited like taking the young.

Even if you say

even if you say

that it fell

the egg

into his courtyard,

he does not acquire it, since

wherever he is able to acquire it,

his courtyard acquires it for him,

and wherever he is unable to acquire it,

his courtyard likewise does not acquire it for him. In every place where he himself can acquire an item, his courtyard can acquire it for him; and wherever he himself cannot acquire it, his courtyard likewise does not acquire it for him, so that the power of the courtyard should not be greater than the power of its owner.

And we challenge this:

If so,

the beraita states that the eggs are

prohibited as theft on account of the ways of peace

alone, yet they involve a more severe prohibition!

Whichever way one looks at it,

if he sent her away,

the mother before taking the eggs, then at the time he sent her away the owner of the dovecote had already acquired the eggs, because at that point he was permitted to acquire them; and from then on

it is full-fledged theft

that is, complete theft. If he did not send her away,

and the owner of the dovecote did not acquire the eggs, so that they do not involve theft, nevertheless

he must send her away

because of the Torah mitzva, and the beraita should not have stated that taking the eggs involves a rabbinic prohibition on account of the ways of peace.

And we answer: The beraita is speaking

of a minor who is not fit for

the

mitzva of sending away the mother bird,

and he took the eggs without sending her away. Since the owner of the dovecote did not acquire the eggs, they do not involve full-fledged theft.

And we challenge this: Is

a minor subject to the ways of peace?!

Just as a minor is not commanded regarding the mitzva of sending away the mother bird, so too he is not warned regarding the ways of peace.

And we answer:

This is what it means: The minor’s father is obligated to return

the eggs to the owner of the dovecote

on account of the ways of peace.

But because of the mitzva of sending away the mother bird, he is not obligated to return the eggs after the minor has taken them.

Mishna:

One who rents a house to another for a year,

and it was not known at the time of the rental whether the year would be a leap year or not, and

the year became a leap year.

The law is that the year

is intercalated in

favor of the

tenant

, and

he has the right to live in the house for thirteen months, while paying the amount stipulated for a year.

And if

he rented it to him

the house

for a number of months,

a specified number,

the year became a leap year—

the additional month belongs to the landlord ,

and the tenant must pay for the additional month.

An incident occurred in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another,

and he said: I hereby rent the bathhouse

for twelve

golden

dinars per year, one dinar

of gold

one

per month.