Bava Metzia 102a — the Talmud in English

Rav Sheshet said to them

to his students:

You have learned it [in the Mishna]:

written in the Mishna:

Something that is not skilled labor, which the tenant performs, and this too is not

and this also is not

skilled labor

necessarily, for

it is possible

to place the mezuzah

in the hollow of a reed

in the hollow of a reed] and hang it , and it is not necessary to carve into the stone.

The Sages taught: One who rents a house to another, it is incumbent upon the tenant to make a mezuzah for it.

And

even though the mezuzah belongs to him,

when he leaves

the house to live in another house,

he may not take it in his hand and leave

and affix the mezuzah in his new house, because he causes harmful beings to enter the house , and harm whoever dwells there.

And

if he rented

from a gentile

and made a mezuzah in accordance with the law,

he takes it in his hand and leaves,

because perhaps the gentile will disgrace the mezuzah .

And it happened with one who took it in his hand and left,

and he was punished measure for measure,

and he buried his wife and his two sons .

And we challenge:

A deed that contradicts [the preceding statement]!

For the beraita says that if the homeowner is a gentile, one must take the mezuzah, so how does it bring a deed indicating that one who acted in this manner was punished?

Rav Sheshet said:

The proof of the beraita is

from the first clause,

and the deed was with an Israelite homeowner.

We learned in our Mishna:

The manure belongs to the homeowner, and there is nothing for the tenant except that which comes out of the oven and the stove alone.

the renter receives only what comes out of the oven and the stove.

And the Gemara discusses:

With what are we dealing?

The Mishna, which said that the manure belongs to the landlord—of what courtyard did it speak, and who owns the animals that produced the manure?

If you say it is a courtyard that he rented to the tenant, and the oxen belong to the tenant?

If the courtyard is rented to the tenant, and the oxen belong to the tenant?

Why

why does the manure belong

to the homeowner

—by what did he acquire it?

Rather,

say that it is dealing

with a courtyard that he did not rent to the tenant,

and the tenant rented only the house,

and

then ordinarily

the landlord’s oxen are found in it, and therefore the manure belongs to him.

And we challenge:

It is obvious!

Since the animals are his, surely their droppings are his.

And we answer:

It is necessary

rather

in the landlord’s courtyard,

which he did not rent to the tenant, and he gave the tenant only permission to enter and leave through the courtyard .

And oxen that came from elsewhere stood in it.

And oxen belonging to strangers came into the courtyard, and they presumably relinquish ownership of the droppings, and the landlord acquired them from the state of ownerlessness through the acquisition of the courtyard at the moment they fell into his courtyard.

And this explanation

supports Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina.

For Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge,

and a person acquires objects placed in his domain even though he did not intend to acquire them .

And now the Gemara discusses at length the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina.

It raises an objection

from this beraita:

If one said,

a person:

“Any lost objects that will come into it

of my domain

today,”

for example, if a river will flood fish into it, I want that

my courtyard should acquire for me, he has said nothing

because he did not have the intention to acquire at the moment when the lost object came into his domain.

And now this is difficult:

And if it is so with regard to this

if this is true

that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge, why did he not

say anything

and did not acquire? After all, the courtyard acquires even if he said nothing !

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a courtyard that is not guarded,

and an object that is not guarded by the courtyard is not acquired through it unless the owners were standing beside the courtyard , as is stated in the chapter Shenayim Ochazin. [Bava Metzia 11a]

And we challenge:

If so, say the final clause

and see whether you can explain it according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina.

It is written in the final clause:

He acquired a reputation for a lost object in the city,

for example, it became known that the river flooded fish into his field; then

his words

which he said at the outset, “Let my courtyard acquire for me,”

stand,

and the courtyard acquired for him.

And if it is speaking of a courtyard that is not guarded,

the beraita,

when he acquired a reputation for a lost object in the city, what

is it?

What benefit is there from the fact that he acquired a reputation for a lost object in the city? After all, a courtyard that is not guarded does not acquire !

And we answer:

Since he acquired a reputation for a lost object in the city, people keep away from it

people distance themselves from it, because they fear the authorities who might say to them that they took the lost object of so-and-so,

and it becomes

and the courtyard is considered

like a guarded courtyard .

It raises an objection

against Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina from a beraita that adds details concerning the laws of our Mishna.

For it was taught: One who rents a house from another, but did not rent the courtyard to him ,

manure

in the courtyard,

that comes out of the oven and the stove

is the tenant’s, as it is written in the Mishna.

And one who catches

catches and places into a vessel

from the air

the manure of foreign animals that came into the courtyard,

it is his,

because the owner of the courtyard has not yet acquired it.

And

droppings

that are in the cowshed and in the courtyard—

belong to the homeowner,

because he did not rent the courtyard and the cowshed.

And if it is so with regard to that which Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge,

as a matter of strict law, the

one who catches from the air, why is it his? The air of his courtyard

belongs to the landlord

it is!

And the law is that the airspace of the courtyard acquires for the owner of the courtyard, and if one throws a bill of divorce to a woman and it reaches the airspace of her courtyard, she is divorced even if the bill of divorce is burned before reaching the ground. [Mishna, Gittin 79a]

Abaye said

an answer: The beraita is dealing

with one who attached a vessel to the underside of a cow

near its orifice, so that before the droppings entered the airspace of the landlord’s courtyard, they had already entered his vessel.

Rava said:

Even if the droppings were in the airspace of the courtyard before entering the vessel, the owner of the courtyard did not acquire them, because an object found in the

airspace whose end is not

for the object

to come to rest

on the ground,

is not considered as placed

in the courtyard

[it is] considered, and the courtyard does not acquire.

and the courtyard does not acquire it.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction in Rava’s words:

Was it obvious to Rava

that airspace whose end is not to come to rest is not considered as placed,

but he was in fact uncertain about it!

For Rava was uncertain about this!

For Rava asked: If one threw a purse

and relinquished ownership of it , and threw it

through this entrance

of his fellow’s courtyard

and it exited through this entrance

of the courtyard,

what is the law?

Is airspace whose end is not to come to rest considered as placed,

and the owner of the courtyard acquired the purse,

or is it not considered as placed,

and he did not acquire the purse?

And we answer: The cases must be distinguished:

There, nothing interrupts,

there nothing interrupts between the airspace in which the purse is and the ground of the courtyard, and there Rava was uncertain.

Here, a vessel interrupts

between the airspace and the ground, and in this case it is obvious to Rava that the object is not considered as placed on the ground if its end is not to come to rest.

And we return to the beraita:

And those in the cowshed and in the courtyard, they belong to the homeowner.

And we challenge the body of the beraita:

Two [places]!

Why speak of two places—of a courtyard and of a cowshed? After all, neither of them is rented .

Abaye said: This is what it is saying: And those in the cowshed that is in the courtyard, they belong to the homeowner.

The conjunctive “and” before the word “in the courtyard” should not be changed in the beraita, and the beraita is speaking only of droppings in the cowshed of the courtyard, because the beraita is dealing with a case in which the courtyard was rented, and the droppings in it belong to the tenant, unlike the way we established the Mishna, in an unrented courtyard. And it teaches us in accordance with Rav Ashi below.

Rav Ashi said:

The beraita

this teaches: One who rents out his courtyard without specification,

and did not mention the cowshed,

has not rented the cowshed in it.

It raises an objection

against Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina from a beraita:

Pigeons belonging to people are not subject to the commandment of sending away the mother bird. But

the pigeons of a dovecote and the pigeons of an upper room,

which do not belong to the owner of the dovecote,

are subject to sending away.

And the eggs

are forbidden as robbery

by rabbinic law, even though the owner of the dovecote did not acquire them,

because of the ways of peace,

and this is not complete robbery .

And we challenge:

And if it is so with regard to that which Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge,

it follows that the owner of the dovecote acquired the eggs through acquisition of the courtyard, for they are guarded in the dovecote, and the Torah calls the eggs a “nest”; and if they have an owner, he is exempt from sending away, for

read here

it is written in the passage:

“When

a bird’s nest” [Deuteronomy 22:6], and they expound:

excluding that which is prepared,

which has an owner !

Rava said

an answer: In truth, eggs that the bird laid in the dovecote are exempt from sending away the mother bird, because the owner of the dovecote acquired them, in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina.

This beraita forbids taking the eggs while they are emerging from the bird because of the commandment of sending away the mother bird, for

an egg when most of it has emerged

from the bird is considered as though it has emerged, and then

it is that she becomes obligated in sending away, but it is not acquired

and it is not acquired] by the owner of the dovecote, and she is not exempt because of “prepared”

until it falls into his courtyard,

for as long as it is attached to the bird, it is not guarded in the dovecote.

And when it teaches

in the beraita

“they are subject to sending away,” it means before

before

it falls into his courtyard.

And we challenge:

If so, why

why did the beraita say that the eggs

are forbidden as robbery,

for the eggs are attached to the bird, and just as the bird itself is not forbidden as robbery at all, and not even because of the ways of peace, because the owner of the dovecote knows that it is the nature of the bird to go out and come from place to place, so too the eggs are not forbidden!

And we answer: it is theft on account of ways of peace even

of the pigeons

, and not only of the eggs, because the owner of the dovecote has his mind on them, since he is certain that they will return to the dovecote.

And if you wish, say: Actually

there is no prohibition against taking the bird on account of ways of peace, as we had previously thought, and the prohibition of the beraita is

only concerning the eggs

. And once most of the egg has emerged,

his mind is on it

, the owner of the dovecote

upon it

, and he is certain that the egg will fall into the dovecote and remain there.

And now the Gemara comes to explain the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina in a different manner from Rava’s approach. According to this approach, the beraita is speaking of an egg that fell into the dovecote, and nevertheless the owner of the dovecote did not acquire it, even though a person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge.

And now [

now] that it is known to us

that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is prohibited to acquire eggs as long as the mother is crouching over them, as it is stated

“You shall surely send away the mother”

and afterward [

and afterward]

“and the young you may take for yourself”

, and acquiring the nest is prohibited like taking.

Even if you say [

even if you say],

that it fell

the egg

into his courtyard

, he does not acquire it, for

wherever he is able to acquire it for himself

, his courtyard acquires it for him,

and wherever he is unable to acquire it for himself

, his courtyard likewise does not acquire it for him. [Wherever he himself can acquire the object, the courtyard can acquire it for him; and wherever he himself cannot acquire it, his courtyard likewise does not acquire it for him,] so that the power of the courtyard should not be greater than the power of its owner.

And we raise an objection:

If so

, the beraita states that the eggs are

prohibited as theft on account of ways of peace

only, yet they have a more serious prohibition!

Whichever way you look at it,

if he sent her away

, the mother, before he took the eggs, then at the time of the sending away the owner of the dovecote had already acquired the eggs, because at that point he was permitted to acquire them; and from then on

it is full-fledged theft [

it is complete theft].

If he did not send her away

, and then the owner of the dovecote did not acquire the eggs, and there is no theft concerning them, nevertheless

he must send her away

on account of the Torah mitzva, and the beraita should not have said that taking the eggs involves a rabbinic prohibition on account of ways of peace.

And we answer: the beraita is speaking

of a minor who is not fit for

mitzvot of

sending away

, and he took the eggs without sending her away; and since the owner of the dovecote did not acquire the eggs, there is no full-fledged theft concerning them.

And we raise an objection: Is

a minor fit for ways of peace?!

For just as the minor is not commanded concerning sending away the mother bird, so he is not warned concerning ways of peace.

And we answer:

This is what he is saying: The minor’s father is obligated to return

the eggs to the owner of the dovecote

on account of ways of peace

. And on account of the mitzva of sending away the mother bird, he is not obligated to return the eggs after the minor has taken them.

Mishna:

One who rents a house to his fellow for a year

, and it was not known at the time of the rental whether the year would be intercalated or not, and

the year became intercalated.

The law is that the year

became intercalated for the

benefit of the

tenant

, and

he has the right to live in the house for thirteen months, with the payment established for what he is to pay for a year.

And if

he rented it to him

the house

for a number of months

,

the year became intercalated—

it became intercalated for the landlord,

and the tenant must pay for the intercalary month.

An incident in Sepphoris, involving one who rented a bathhouse from his fellow

, and he said as follows: “Behold, I rent the bathhouse

for twelve

gold

dinars per year, at the rate of one gold

dinar

one

per month.