Bava Kamma 96b (צו:) — the Talmud in English

Does this not mean that the same law applies when the central leaf is split,

which causes the lulav to become invalid? And since the lulav becomes invalid in this manner, this is considered a change sufficient for the robber to acquire it.

And we reject this:

No; when the central leaf is removed,

the central leaf

it is different

from when the central leaf is split. The lulav becomes invalid for its mitzva only when the central leaf is removed,

for it is lacking,

but if the central leaf is split, it does not become invalid, since nothing is lacking from it.

And since a lulav whose central leaf is split does not become invalid, this is not considered a change sufficient for the robber to acquire it.

Some say

that the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi was made in a somewhat different manner, and that the uncertainty can be resolved from his statement:

And this is how they understand it:

Come and hear: Rabbi Matun said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: If the central leaf is split, it is considered as though it had been removed, and it is invalid.

Conclude from this

that his statement proves that when the central leaf is split, this is considered a change sufficient for the robber to acquire it, since the lulav thereby becomes invalid for its mitzva.

Rav Pappa said: In the case of one who robbed another of earth and made it into a brick,

one who robbed earth from another and made it into a brick

he does not acquire it

through this change.

What is the reason?

Since

he can turn it back into earth,

as he can revert it and make it earth again.

And if he robbed

a brick and made it into earth,

a brick and made it into earth

he acquires it

through this change.

What can you say

about this?

Perhaps he can revert it and make it into a brick,

as perhaps he can return and make a brick from the earth.

This is not considered restoring the robbery to its original state, because

this brick is a different one,

and a new identity has come here.

This is not the original brick; rather, it is a different brick, which required its own separate preparation and kneading. It differs from the original, since it is impossible to reproduce it with exact precision, and every brick has its own distinct qualities.

And Rav Pappa said: In the case of one who robbed another of a silver ingot and made coins from it,

one who robbed a piece of silver metal and made coins from it

he does not acquire it

through this change.

What is the reason?

Because

he can revert them and make them an ingot,

as he can return and make a piece of silver from them.

And if he robbed

coins and made them into an ingot,

coins and made them into a piece of silver

he acquires them

through this change.

What can you say

about this?

He can revert it and make coins from it,

as he can return and make coins from it.

This is not considered restoring the robbery to its original state, because these coins would be new, and

a new identity has come here.

If the coins that he robbed were

black,

black coins that appeared old,

and he made them new

by cleaning and polishing them

he does not acquire them,

because this is a reversible change, as they will again age and turn black.

But if the coins were

new,

new coins,

and he made them black,

making them black

he acquires them

through this change.

What can you say

about this?

He can revert them and make them new,

as he can return and renew them.

This is not considered restoring them to their original state, because

it is evident that they are black;

their blackness is recognizable, and it is impossible to make them completely new without their blackness remaining recognizable. Therefore, the change he made in them was an irreversible change.

We learned in the Mishna:

This is the general rule: All robbers pay according to the value of the item at the time of the robbery.

“This is the general rule”—what does it come to include?

What case that has not yet been mentioned in the Mishna is included by the phrase “this is the general rule”?

It comes to include this case,

the following case:

As Rabbi Ela said: If one stole a lamb and it became

in the possession of the robber over time

a ram,

and likewise, if he stole

a calf and it became

in his possession

an ox—

a change occurred in his possession, and he acquired it

for this purpose, so that if he

slaughters and sells

it is his that he slaughters, and it is his that he sells,

and therefore he is exempt from the fourfold and fivefold payment imposed upon a thief who slaughters or sells an ox or a sheep. He is liable only for the double payment for the act of theft.

An incident:

A certain man robbed another of a yoke of oxen.

There was a man who robbed another of a pair of oxen.

He went and plowed with them and sowed seed with them,

he plowed with them and sowed seed with them,

and ultimately he returned them to their owner,

and in the end he returned them to their owner.

The matter came

before

Rav Naḥman, who said to them: Go and assess the improvement that he caused.

Go and assess the increase in value that the robber brought about in his field through the stolen oxen, so that he would pay the victim for it.

Rava said to him:

But did only

the oxen cause improvement? Did the land not cause improvement as well?

Did only the oxen improve the field, while the land itself did not improve it?

He said

to him, Rav Naḥman:

Did I say that the entire improvement should be assessed?

Did I say that they should assess the entire improvement and give it to him? I said only

half,

that he should pay half of the improvement.

He said to him,

Rava:

In the end, it is a stolen item, and it is returned intact,

and he must return it to the victim as he received it.

As we learned

in our Mishna:

All robbers pay according to the value of the item at the time of the robbery.

Why, then, did Rav Naḥman obligate the robber to pay for the improvement produced through the stolen property?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman

said to him: Did I not tell you,

did I not tell you:

When I am sitting in judgment, do not say anything to me,

when I am sitting in judgment to issue a ruling, do not say anything to me to question or challenge my rulings.

For Huna, our colleague, said concerning me:

our distinguished colleague:

I and Shvor the king are brothers in judgment.

I and King Shvor [which is a designation for Shmuel] are considered brothers with regard to legal judgment.

That is, in matters of law, I am as important as Shmuel himself.

And here too I had a reason for my ruling, because

this man is an old-time robber, and I wanted to penalize him.

This man was accustomed to robbery, and I wanted to penalize him. Therefore, I said that he should pay even for the improvement, although he is not liable for it according to the essential law.

Mishna:

a.

If one robbed an animal and it aged, or slaves and they aged,

a change occurred in his possession, since they are no longer fit for labor as they were at the time he robbed them, and the robber acquired them for himself. Therefore, he cannot say to the owners, “Here is yours before you”; rather, he

pays

them money

according to the value at the time of the robbery.

Rabbi Meir says:

Slaves are not acquired by the robber through a change, since their legal status is like that of land, which cannot be robbed and is not acquired by the robber through a change. Therefore,

with regard to slaves, he says to him: Here is yours before you.

b.

If one robbed a coin and it cracked,

so that a noticeable change occurred in it and the robber acquired it through the change; or if he robbed

produce and it rotted;

or if he robbed

wine and it turned sour,

in all these cases there is a noticeable change. Therefore, the robber acquired them for himself, and he

pays according to the value at the time of the robbery.

But if the change was not noticeable, such as if he robbed

a coin and it was disqualified,

the coin being disqualified by the government, so that this change is not apparent in the body of the coin; or if he robbed

teruma and it became impure, leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it, or an animal and a transgression was committed with it

that disqualifies it as an offering, for example, the animal was used for bestiality or was worshipped as idolatry;

or it was disqualified from the altar,

because it developed a blemish;

or it was

destined to be stoned,

because the robber failed to guard it, and it went out and killed a person, for which it is liable to be killed—in all these cases the robber is exempt from paying money. Rather, he

says to him,

the robber says to the victim:

Here is yours before you!

Gemara:

Rav Pappa said:

Regarding the teaching of the tanna in the Mishna that a robber acquires an animal that aged through the change,

not

did the tanna intend by saying

“it aged”

that the animal

actually aged,

and that the change occurred throughout its entire body.

Rather, even if it became emaciated,

meaning that only a partial change occurred in it, the robber acquired it through the change and must pay its value according to the time of the robbery.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But we learned, “it aged,”

and not “it became emaciated”!

It answers: The tanna’s intention in the Mishna was to say

“it became emaciated,”

but the tanna gave an example of emaciation, since not every case of emaciation causes the animal to be acquired by the robber, but only

for example,

an emaciation like that of

“it aged,” which does not recover.

The animal does not return to health after this occurs. But if it was emaciation from which the animal could recover, it is not considered a change.

Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: This is how they state it in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Even if one stole a lamb and it became a ram,

or stole

a calf and it became an ox,

where the change occurred on its own and nothing was diminished from the animal, but rather it grew and improved,

a change occurred in his possession, and he acquired it

for himself, and he pays only the value of a lamb or the value of a calf.

And if

the robber slaughtered

the animal,

and sold

it, or sold it to another, he is not liable for the fourfold and fivefold payment prescribed for a thief who slaughters or sells, since he acquired it through the change, and the animal

is his that he slaughters,

and the animal

is his that he sells.

He said to him: Did I not tell you,

did I not tell you,

do not exchange

the names of the

men,

those who transmit the traditions! For

that

ruling that you attributed in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

was not stated by him; rather,

it was stated in the name of Rabbi Ela!

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: With regard to slaves, he says to him: Here is yours before you!

Rav Ḥanina bar Avdimi said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But Rav,

does he

abandon the Sages

and abandon their position

and act in accordance with Rabbi Meir?

They said

to resolve this:

Because the beraita was taught inversely.

Unlike the Mishna, we learned the two opinions in the beraita in the reverse manner: It is the Sages who hold that with regard to slaves he says to him, “Here is yours before you.” Therefore, Rav ruled in accordance with the Sages of the beraita, whose position is the position of Rabbi Meir in the Mishna.

But the Gemara raises a difficulty against this answer:

And Rav abandons the Mishna,

abandoning the manner in which the Mishna presents the dispute,

and acts in accordance with the beraita!?

On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara gives another answer:

Rav also taught the Mishna inversely.

In our Mishna itself, Rav taught the opinions in the reverse manner, as in the beraita, so that there would be no contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita, and he ruled in accordance with the Sages.

The Gemara analyzes this:

And what is Rav’s reason,

what is his reason

for reversing the Mishna because of

the

beraita?

On the contrary! Let us reverse the beraita because of the Mishna.

They said

to resolve this:

Rav, too, was taught the Mishna inversely

by his teachers.

Rav’s teachers taught him the Mishna in the reverse manner, and Rav did not reverse the opinions because of the beraita.

And another answer:

And if you wish, say:

Rav did indeed reverse the Mishna because of the beraita, and there is no difficulty as to why he did so, since

when he does not reverse

a Mishna because of a beraita, that is specifically when it is

one

Mishna

because of one

beraita. But when it is

one

Mishna

because of two

beraitot, then

he does reverse

it. And here we find two beraitot that are contrary to the Mishna, since we find another beraita that teaches the opinions in the reverse manner from the Mishna:

As it was taught: If one exchanges a cow

that is pregnant

for a donkey.

That is, the owner of the cow pulled the donkey toward himself, thereby effecting an act of acquisition through exchange in order to acquire the donkey and transfer ownership of his cow [which was not present at the site of the acquisition] to the owner of the donkey [in exchange for the donkey that he pulled toward himself].

And it gave birth,

the cow gave birth to its fetus where it was. It is not known through witnesses whether it gave birth after the acquisition, in which case the owner of the donkey acquired a pregnant cow and the offspring belongs to him, or whether it gave birth before the time of the acquisition, in which case the owner of the donkey acquired a cow that was not pregnant and the offspring does not belong to him.

And likewise, one who sells

his maidservant,

the Canaanite maidservant,

and she gives birth.

If

one of these,

one of the two parties,

says

with a claim of certainty:

“She gave birth in my possession,”

and the offspring is mine;

and the other,

the second party,

remains silent, he acquires it,

the one who makes the certain claim that she gave birth in his possession acquires it, in accordance with the principle that where one party makes a certain claim and the other is uncertain, the certain claim prevails.

And if

one says, “I do not know,” and the other says, “I do not know,” they shall divide.

And if

one says, “It is in my possession,”

and she gave birth,

and the other says, “It is in my possession,”

meaning that both are making a definite claim, there is here a partial admission by the seller, which obligates him by Torah law to take an oath concerning everything else, with the oath of one who admits to part of a claim. For the buyer claims from him the cow and its offspring, whereas the seller admits to part of the claim, acknowledging the cow, and denies the remainder, the offspring.

Therefore,

the seller shall swear that she gave birth while in his possession,

and he will then acquire the offspring.

And we do not say that the buyer should swear concerning his claim that she gave birth while in his possession, and that he should take the offspring, despite the fact that he too is making a definite claim:

Because all those who take oaths mandated by the Torah swear but do not collect, this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: One does not swear concerning slaves or land,

rather, the offspring remains in the possession of the owner of the cow, until the buyer brings proof that he purchased the offspring from him.

And if so, we have found another baraita that holds like the first baraita: The Sages are the ones who hold that slaves have the status of land, contrary to the position of the Mishna. Therefore, Rav reversed the attributions in the Mishna, and Rav ruled in accordance with the Sages. But the Gemara still asks: If so, since Rav reversed the attributions in the Mishna because of the two baraitot, what is

this

that Rav stated,

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir”?

But

he should have said, “The halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis,”

as Rav ought to have said! For Rav reversed the statements of the Mishna and aligned it with the statement of the baraita, according to which the Sages equate the law of a slave with the law of land!

The Gemara answers:

This is what

Rav is saying: I myself teach the Mishna according to the version of my teachers, who taught the Mishna in accordance with the statement of the baraita, and I rule that the halakha is in accordance with the Sages.

But you,

according to the way you have reversed

the attributions in the Mishna

and taught it,

having taught the Mishna in the opposite manner, so that according to Rabbi Meir slaves have the status of land, should say:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir.