Bava Kamma 96a — the Talmud in English

This refers to the case in which he collects even an enhancement that has reached the stage at which it can be harvested:

it is speaking of a case

in which he collects from it an amount equal to the value of the land and its enhancement—that is, he collects the land for a debt whose value equals that of the land together with its enhancement. In that case, he does not need to return the enhancement to him.

то есть взыскивает землю в счет долга, равного стоимости земли вместе с улучшением; в таком случае ему не нужно возвращать ему стоимость улучшения.

This refers to the case in which he must return to the purchaser an enhancement that has reached the stage at which it can be harvested:

it is speaking of a case

in which he collects from it only an amount equal to the value of the land—that is, he has a debt only equal to the value of the land, without the enhancement. In that case, he must pay the purchaser for the enhancement. He does not need to give the purchaser the enhancement from the land itself; rather, he may compensate him with money, as Shmuel said above.

то есть его долг составляет лишь стоимость земли без улучшения. Поэтому он должен выплатить покупателю стоимость улучшения. При этом он не обязан передавать покупателю часть земли, соответствующую улучшению, а может рассчитаться с ним деньгами, как ранее сказал Шмуэль.

Ravina

said to him:

This works well according to the one who says—

the one who holds that

if the purchaser has money, he cannot remove the creditor by paying him money—

rather, the creditor has the right to take the actual land that was pledged to him—

the statement is understood: the creditor does not need to give the purchaser payment for the enhancement that the purchaser produced in the land from the land itself; rather, he may pay him with money.

слова Шмуэля: кредитор не обязан выплачивать покупателю стоимость улучшения, произведенного им в земле, из самой земли, а может выплатить ему деньги.

But according to the one who says—

the one who holds that

if the purchaser has money, he can remove the creditor by paying him money—

and the creditor has no right against the purchaser to collect specifically from the land pledged to him:

If so,

let the purchaser say to him—

let the purchaser say to him:

If I had money, I could remove you from the entire field—

if I had money, I could remove you from the entire field and give you money for the debt instead of the land—

now at least give me a plot of land equal to the value of my enhancement.

Now at least give me a plot of land equal to the value of my enhancement.

Rav Ashi

said to him:

With what are we dealing here?

We are dealing here—

with a case in which the borrower designated this field for him as

the borrower made this field for him

an apotiki—

that is,

the borrower said to him

the borrower said to the lender:

“You shall have repayment only from this.”

In this case, the field is absolutely pledged to the creditor, and according to everyone, the purchaser cannot remove him by paying money; rather, the creditor collects the land. Therefore, even for the enhancement produced by the purchaser, the creditor need not pay him from the land itself; rather, he pays him with money.

Rava said: If

если

one robbed

something,

and enhanced

the stolen property, and

sold

it to another together with the enhancement;

and

likewise, if

one robbed

something,

and enhanced

the stolen property, then died, and

bequeathed

the stolen property to his son—

the enhancement that

the robber produced, and in which he has a right [to one-half, one-third, or one-quarter, as we saw above according to Rabbi Shimon, or a right to the entire enhancement according to our Mishna, by virtue of the enactment for the benefit of those who repent]—this right

the robber sold

the robber to the purchaser, and the same law applies to an heir:

the enhancement that

the robber

bequeathed

Therefore, when the person robbed collects his stolen property, he must pay the purchaser and the heir for the enhancement.

Rava raised the following question:

If

the purchaser produced the enhancement

or an heir did so,

what is the law?

Do the purchaser and the heir have a right to receive one-half, one-third, or one-quarter of the enhancement, like the robber [according to Rabbi Shimon]? Or not?

After raising the question, he returned and resolved it

After asking the question, he resolved it:

What did the first seller sell to the second

in the object that he sold him?

Every right that would come into his possession.

He sold him every right in the object, and since the robber had a right to receive one-half, one-third, or one-quarter of the enhancement of the stolen property [according to Rabbi Shimon], the purchaser and the heir likewise received this right from the robber.

Rava raised the following question:

If

a gentile produced an enhancement

in an object that he had robbed,

what is the law?

Does he have a right to the enhancement that he produced in the stolen property, or not?

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina:

Is it possible that

we should stand up and make an enactment for a gentile

—that we should establish an enactment enabling a gentile to acquire the enhancement that he produced in stolen property?

He said to him: It is not necessary—

the question was needed only in a case

such as one in which

the gentile robber sold it

to a Jew,

and the question is whether the Jew who purchased it from the gentile has a right to the enhancement that he produces in the stolen property.

And we raise an objection:

Ultimately,

every right

that comes by virtue of a gentile is

its law

like that of a gentile.

All the right to the enhancement of the stolen property comes by virtue of the robber. Since the robber is a gentile and has no right to the enhancement of the stolen property, the Jewish purchaser who derives his right from him likewise has no greater right to the enhancement than the gentile does.

And we answer:

It is not necessary—

the question was needed only in a case

such as one in which a Jew robbed the object and sold it to him

the Jewish robber sold it to a gentile,

and the gentile enhanced it, and then

then

the gentile sold it

sold it

to a Jew—what is the law?

Does the Jewish purchaser have a right to the enhancement produced by the gentile in the stolen property, so that he receives one-half, one-third, or one-quarter of it?

And these are the sides of the question:

Do we say

that

since originally

the object was robbed by

a Jew, and afterward

it once again came into the possession of

a Jew—

there is reason to say that

the Sages enacted a provision—

the Sages made an enactment, and he has a right to the enhancement of the stolen property and may receive payment for it from the person robbed.

Or perhaps

perhaps

since there was a gentile in the middle

and he was the one who produced the enhancement in the stolen property—

the Sages did not enact a provision for him.

The Sages did not make an enactment granting him a right to the enhancement of the stolen property.

The Gemara has no resolution for this question; rather,

the question remains unresolved.

This question will remain in place until Elijah the Tishbite comes and resolves it.

The Gemara now discusses which changes in an object are considered a change through which the robber acquires the object.

Rav Pappa said: One who robs a palm tree from another

one who robs a palm tree from another person

and cuts it down

and cuts it down,

even though he throws it from the land of the person robbed onto his own land

even though he moves it from the land of the person robbed to his own land—

he does not acquire it

the robber does not acquire the palm tree through this change.

What is the reason?

At first it is called a palm tree, and now too it is called a palm tree

it is called.

At first it was called a palm tree, and now too it is called a palm tree. Its name did not change as a result of the cutting; therefore, this act does not enable the robber to acquire it , but he must return the palm tree itself to the person robbed.

And even if one robbed

a palm tree and made wooden billets from it

and made wooden pieces from it—

he does not acquire it.

Because

at any rate, now they are called billets of a palm tree

because now, in any event, they are called palm-tree billets, and the name “palm tree” still applies to them. Therefore, the act is not considered an acquiring change.

But if one robbed

billets

wooden billets

and made beams from them

and made beams from them—

he acquires them,

because their name changed through the act.

And if one robbed

large beams

large beams

and made small beams from them

and made small beams from them—

he does not acquire them,

because the name “beams” still applies to them.

And if

he made

from the beams

boards

boards—

he acquires them,

because their name changed.

Rava said: One who robs

one who robs

a lulav

a lulav

and made leaves from it

and made leaves from it, having stripped all the leaves from the central spine—

he acquires

the lulav through this act,

because at first it was called a lulav, and now they are leaves

because at first it was called a “lulav,” and now they are “leaves.”

And likewise, if one robbed

leaves

leaves

and made broom strips from them

and made broom strips from them, splitting each leaf in two [an act that cannot be reversed]—

he acquires

the strips through this act, because

at first they were leaves, and now they are broom strips

at first they were called “leaves,” and now they are broom strips.

And if one robbed

broom strips

broom strips

and made a rope from them

and made a rope from them—

he does not acquire it. What is the reason?

Because this is an act that can be reversed:

he can undo it, and it becomes broom strips

he can return and unravel the rope, and they again become broom strips.

Rav Pappa raised the following question:

If

the central leaf of the lulav split

the central leaf of the lulav split at the hand of the robber,

what is the law?

How is this act regarded with regard to a change?

Come and hear a proof:

As Rabbi Matun said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi:

If

the central leaf is removed—

the lulav is disqualified

for use in the mitzva.