Bava Kamma 8b — the Talmud in English

If so,

if this indeed is the reason,

with regard to damages as well, let us say so!

Also with regard to the collection of damages, why does the injured party collect from the idit? Let the purchaser say to him: If you wish to take from the beinonit, take; and if not, I will return the document of the zibburit, etc., and then you will take only from the zibburit. And the Gemara continues its objection:

Rather,

necessarily,

with what are we dealing here,

we are dealing here with a case in which the purchaser cannot say this—for example, the seller died and left

orphans [

orphans ]

who are not fit for repayment,

orphans whose father left them not land but movable property are not required to repay the creditors from it, and even if they acquire land after his death, they are not required to repay the creditor from it. Therefore, even if he returns the zibburit land, this is considered land acquired after their father’s death, and they will not repay from it,

and

consequently

his lien upon his property rests upon him,

the lien of the claimants remains upon the purchaser’s lands,

therefore it is not possible to say so,

therefore the purchaser cannot say, “I will return the document.” The question thus returns: Why should they not all collect from the last idit?

The Gemara answers with another answer:

Rather,

the reason that they do not collect from the idit that he acquired last, but only according to their law,

is because he says to them,

the purchaser says to the creditors:

For what reason did the Sages say, “One does not collect from encumbered property in a place where there is unencumbered property”?

Your right to claim the idit is because of the enactment of the Sages that one does not collect from encumbered property, etc.; consequently, the basic law of the collection remains with the last one. However, the reason that the Sages enacted this was only

because of my enactment,

for the benefit of purchasers like me, so that they would not collect from them; and since the enactment was for my benefit and advantage, I say:

I do not want this enactment,

I do not want this enactment, which is not good for me! And since he does not desire it, the enactment is nullified here; consequently, the claimants have no right to collect from the last field, and their right remains only to collect according to their law.

And we find that he has the power to say this:

as with the statement of Rava,

as Rava stated such reasoning,

for Rava said: Whoever says, “I cannot accept a rabbinic enactment”

that they enacted for my benefit,

such as this,

like that enactment about which they were speaking then in the beit-midrash,

we heed him,

he has the power to say this and nullify the enactment of the Sages.

The Gemara asks:

What is “such as this”?

Which rabbinic enactment were they discussing in the beit-midrash, concerning which Rava’s statement was said?

The Gemara answers:

as with the statement of Rav Huna,

the matter was stated concerning the law of Rav Huna,

for Rav Huna said: A woman can say to her husband, “I will not be sustained, and I will not work,”

The Sages enacted that the husband is obligated in his wife’s sustenance in exchange for the work of her hands, because they were concerned that the work of her hands might not suffice for her sustenance, and in order that they not come to enmity, they enacted that the work of her hands belongs to the husband. If she says to her husband, “I will not sustain myself from yours”—that is, “I waive the sustenance, and in exchange I will not work and will not give the work of my hands”—she can say this. The reason is as Rava said: Since the enactment was for her benefit, she can say, “I do not want this enactment.”

And the Gemara continues to discuss the law of collection from a purchaser who acquired the three fields, with the idit last:

This is obvious [

it is obvious that this is the law ]

if the purchaser sold the beinonit and the zibburit,

if this purchaser, who acquired the three fields, with the idit last, then returned and sold the beinonit and the zibburit to another,

and retained

the

idit

for himself [with him], the law is:

let them all come and collect from the idit,

all the claimants [the injured party, the creditor, and the woman] will collect from the idit that remained in his possession,

for it is the last one,

because the idit remained last as unencumbered property with the seller, and the basic law of their collection remained upon this land. And although, when the three fields were in the purchaser’s possession, the creditor and the woman would not collect from the idit, as explained, after the purchaser sold the beinonit and the zibburit, the law changed, as the Gemara continues to explain:

and the beinonit and the zibburit are not with him,

and the beinonit and the zibburit are no longer in his possession,

for he can say to them—

so that he can say to them:

collect from the beinonit and the zibburit

because

I do not want the rabbinic enactment,

the reason that when the purchaser has all three fields in his possession each one collects according to his law, even though the idit was acquired last, is that the purchaser has the ability to say, “I do not want the enactment of the Sages that they made for my benefit, that one does not collect from encumbered property where there is unencumbered property.” Consequently, this enactment is nullified and each one collects according to the essence of his lien. But when he sold the beinonit and the zibburit, he does not have the ability to say, “I do not want the enactment of the Sages,” for his fellow who acquired them from him does want the rabbinic enactment.

In this case it was obvious to the Gemara that this was the law; the Gemara is uncertain only in the opposite case:

But

if the purchaser

sold

to another only the

idit, and retained

for himself the

beinonit and zibburit,

in this there is uncertainty:

what

what is the law? Will they all go to collect from the idit in the possession of the second purchaser, and will they not collect from the first purchaser, who claims, “I want the rabbinic enactment,” according to which one collects only from unencumbered property? Since the idit remained last as unencumbered property in the seller’s possession, the basic law of your collection is from it?

Abaye thought to say

that this was indeed so, and

they all come and collect from the idit,

all of them would take from the idit in the possession of the second purchaser, because with the seller it remained last as unencumbered property.

Rava said to him

to Abaye:

What did the first one sell to the second? Every right that would come into his possession!

For when one sells an object to another, the sale includes all the rights of claims that the seller has regarding that object. Consequently, here the first purchaser sold to the second purchaser the right to prevent them from collecting from the idit, as Rava continues to explain:

and since if they had come

if the claimants had come

to the first purchaser

when he still held the three fields in his possession, including the idit,

he could have made them collect from the beinonit and the zibburit,

he could have given the creditor from the beinonit and the woman from the zibburit,

and even though when he acquired the beinonit and the zibburit, the idit was still unencumbered,

despite the fact that when this purchaser acquired the beinonit and the zibburit, the idit remained in the seller’s possession as unencumbered land,

and

the rule is that

one does not collect from encumbered property as long as there is unencumbered property,

and it should therefore have been that they all collect from the idit, which was last to be unencumbered; nevertheless, this is not the law, because

he can say to them [

the purchaser ]

“I do not want this enactment,”

and therefore, take according to your law. Consequently, the

purchaser

the

second

who also acquired from him the rights of claims that he had,

can likewise say to them, “Collect from the beinonit and the zibburit,

he too can prevent the creditor and the woman from collecting from the idit, and tell them to take according to their law from the beinonit and the zibburit,

for when [

since when he acquired ]

the second purchaser

the idit,

he acquired it with the intention of acquiring every right that the first purchaser had regarding it,

he acquired them with the intention that all the rights the seller had concerning this land should be in his possession; and since the seller had the power to prevent them from collecting from the idit, he too has the power to do so.

And the Gemara brings another law concerning collection from a purchaser who sold to a second purchaser:

Rava said: Reuven who sold

the

all his fields

to Shimon, and Shimon went and sold one field

of them

to Levi.

And

now

the creditor of Reuven came

to collect his debt from these fields encumbered for his debt. The law is:

if he wishes, he collects from this one; if he wishes, he collects from that one.

That is, he may collect, if he wishes, from the fields that remained with Shimon, and if he wishes, he may collect from the field that Levi acquired. However, from Shimon he can collect even if only the idit remained in his possession, because he says to him: Since you acquired all the fields from Reuven, you entered in Reuven’s place to be encumbered for his debt.

And

from Levi, however,

we said this only where he acquired beinonit,

he cannot collect from him except if Levi acquired the beinonit, because then he says to him: You took the beinonit that is encumbered to me.

But

if Levi

acquired [

acquired ]

the idit and the zibburit, [he does] not.

The creditor does not collect from him, because

Levi says to him

Levi says to the creditor:

For this reason I was precise and acquired,

therefore I was precise to acquire specifically the

idit and the zibburit,

which are

land that is not suitable for you,

for the essence of your lien is not upon these lands, so that you will not collect from me from these lands.

And the Gemara adds an additional condition:

and even if he bought בינונית

even if Levi bought the בינונית,

we said

that the creditor can collect from him

only

in a case

that he did not leave a בינונית like it,

that Levi bought all the בינונית properties and did not leave a בינונית like it in Shimon’s possession,

for he cannot say to him,

so that Levi could not say to the creditor:

“I left you a place with regard to Shimon”

from which to collect. Rather, the creditor can say to Levi: “You took my lien, which is the בינונית, and it is my right to collect from it.”

But,

if Levi did not buy all the בינונית properties, but

left a בינונית like it

[like it]

by

[with]

Shimon, he does not collect from him.

In this manner, the creditor does not collect from the בינונית that is in Levi’s possession,

for he can say to him,

as Levi can say to him:

“I left you a place”

with Shimon

“from which to collect!”

And apropos of the law of collection from purchasers, the Gemara brings another law concerning a creditor who comes to collect from a purchaser:

Abaye said: Reuven sold a field to Shimon with liability

that if they seize the field from him because of his debt, he will pay him its value,

and there came

[and came]

the creditor of Reuven and seized

[and wants to seize the field]

from Shimon—

the law is that Reuven goes and conducts litigation with him.

This is the law: Reuven can go and stand in judgment with that creditor, in order to remove him from the field with any claim that he has [such as when he says to him, “I repaid you,” or he has a counterclaim against him concerning another debt, and withholds this debt in exchange for that debt, and the like ].

And he cannot say to him,

the creditor cannot say to Reuven:

“You are not a litigant of mine!”

You are not my litigant, because the field has left your possession, and I am claiming nothing from you, but only from Shimon. Rather, Reuven too is considered a litigant, because

he can say to him,

as Reuven can say to the creditor: Behold,

“if you take it from him, it will return upon me!”

If you take the field from Shimon, Shimon will return to me to demand from me the value of the field, because I accepted liability for this sale. And since Reuven suffers a loss in the matter, he too is considered a litigant, and he can stand and argue against the creditor in this litigation.

And the Gemara brings another version of Abaye’s statement:

And some say,

there are those who say that Abaye said as follows:

Even

when Reuven sold the field to Shimon

without liability, as well,

even then Reuven can stand in judgment with the creditor who came to seize the field from Shimon, and even though Reuven did not accept liability for the sale of the field, and Shimon cannot return to him and demand the value of the field from him if it is seized from him, for in any event Reuven is considered a litigant, because

he can say to him

Reuven can say to the creditor:

“I do not want Shimon to have a grievance against me!”

It is not agreeable to me that Shimon should have a grievance against me, because I sold him a field and it was removed from his possession because of my debt. And since this concerns me with regard to the grievance, I am considered a litigant, and I can stand and argue in court.