Bava Kamma 8a (ח.) — the Talmud in English

And if he had only superior-quality land and inferior-quality land,

superior-quality land and inferior-quality land,

and he did not have intermediate-quality land, then

those who suffered damage

collect

from the superior-quality land,

as is their law,

while a creditor and a woman collecting her marriage settlement

collect

from the inferior-quality land.

A woman’s marriage settlement is collected according to its law. A creditor, however, since by Torah law his claim is collected from inferior-quality land, and only the Sages instituted that he collect from intermediate-quality land due to the concern that otherwise the door would be closed to potential borrowers, in this case, when the tortfeasor has no intermediate-quality land, the Sages did not institute anything in his favor; rather, the creditor collects according to his Torah-law status, from inferior-quality land.

Rav Shmuel bar Abba now explains his objection from the beraita:

It teaches, in any event, the middle case:

Among the laws taught by the beraita, this law is stated in the middle: If he had

intermediate-quality land and inferior-quality land,

then

those who suffered damage and a creditor

collect

from the intermediate-quality land, while a woman collecting her marriage settlement collects from inferior-quality land.

If you say, “They assess it according to the world’s standard,” it is understandable why this person is considered to have intermediate-quality land, and why the creditor collects from it, since intermediate-quality land is assessed according to the land in the world at large.

But

if,

you say, “They assess it according to his own property,”

it is not understandable why it is considered intermediate-quality land. For among his fields he has no field better than it, and if so,

his intermediate-quality land should be made equivalent to superior-quality land,

as the best of his property, and he should be considered as one who has superior-quality land and inferior-quality land, with only those who suffered damage collecting from the superior-quality land,

while the creditor would be relegated to

the

inferior-quality land.

For a creditor’s law is that he does not collect from superior-quality land. And if it is nevertheless stated in the beraita that the creditor also collects from the intermediate-quality land, it is proven that “they assess it according to the world’s standard,” and not as Rabbi Abba said: “They assess it according to his own property.”

The Gemara answers and rejects the proof from the beraita:

In fact, “they assess it according to his own property”; rather,

what are we dealing with here

[here we are dealing]

with a case where he had superior-quality land and sold it.

That is, at the time of the loan, the debtor had additional land superior to this land. Therefore, this land was then considered only intermediate-quality land, and at that time it had already become liened to the creditor. Consequently, the creditor has the right to collect from it even today, despite the fact that the debtor no longer has a field better than it.

And Rav Ḥisda likewise said

to resolve the matter that we are dealing

with a case where he had superior-quality land and sold it.

The Gemara attempts to prove that the beraita must be established in this manner, because otherwise there would be a contradiction between the beraitot:

It is also reasonable,

that we established the case as one where he had superior-quality land and sold it; it is reasonable to say this for another reason,

as it teaches

in

another

[beraita] [another]: If he had only

intermediate-quality land and inferior-quality land

and did not have superior-quality land, the law is that payments for

damage

are collected

from the intermediate-quality land, while a creditor and a woman collecting her marriage settlement

collect

from inferior-quality land.

But

the [two beraitot] are contradictory

the beraitot

to one another:

This beraita, which maintains that in such a case a creditor collects from inferior-quality land, contradicts the preceding beraita, which maintains that in such a case a creditor collects from intermediate-quality land.

Rather, is it not [so]? Learn from this:

It is proven that the beraitot must be distinguished from one another:

Here

we are dealing

with a case where he had superior-quality land and sold it,

and therefore the creditor collects from the intermediate-quality land, since it had already become liened to him at the time of the loan.

And here,

in the second beraita, we are dealing

with a case where he did not have superior-quality land and sold it.

And this intermediate-quality land, which is the best of his assets, is considered superior-quality land, since everyone agrees that “they assess it according to his own property.” Therefore, the creditor does not collect from it, but from the inferior-quality land.

The Gemara continues and offers another resolution of the beraitot, so that there is no proof at all:

And if you wish, say:

It is possible to establish the beraitot so that

both this and that,

in both beraitot we are dealing

with a case where he did not have superior-quality land and sold it,

and according to everyone, “they assess it according to the world’s standard.”

And there is no difficulty

with the contradiction between the beraitot.

For

this

beraita, which maintains that a creditor’s claim is collected from inferior-quality land, speaks of a case

where his intermediate-quality land was equivalent to superior-quality land according to the standard of the world.

His intermediate-quality land was equal in importance to superior-quality land in the world at large. Therefore, its law is that of superior-quality land, and the creditor has no right to collect from it; he is relegated to the inferior-quality land.

And here,

the beraita that maintains that a creditor collects from intermediate-quality land speaks of a case

where his intermediate-quality land was not equivalent

to superior-quality land according to the standard of the world,

as his intermediate-quality land was equal in importance only to intermediate-quality land in the world at large, and not to superior-quality land. Therefore, the creditor’s law is to collect from it.

The Gemara offers yet another explanation of the contradiction between the beraitot:

And if you wish, say:

It is possible to establish the beraitot such that

both this and that,

in both beraitot we are dealing

with a case where his intermediate-quality land

was

equivalent to intermediate-quality land according to the standard of the world,

and likewise, in both beraitot we are not dealing with a case where he had superior-quality land and sold it.

And here, it is in this that they disagree:

The beraitot disagree about this:

One master holds: They assess it according to his own property,

the beraita that says that a creditor’s claim is collected from inferior-quality land maintains that “they assess it according to his own property.” Since this intermediate-quality land was not inferior to anything else he owned, it is considered superior-quality land, and the creditor is relegated to the inferior-quality land.

And one master holds: They assess it according to the world’s standard,

the beraita that says that a creditor collects from intermediate-quality land maintains that “they assess it according to the world’s standard.” Therefore, his land, which is equivalent to intermediate-quality land in the world at large, is considered intermediate-quality land, and the creditor collects from it according to his law.

The Gemara presents an additional resolution of the contradiction between the beraitot:

Ravina said:

These beraitot

disagree regarding Ulla’s statement,

they disagree about what Ulla said.

For Ulla said: By Torah law, a creditor

his claim is collected

from inferior-quality land. As it is stated

with regard to a person who is owed money by another and comes to collect his debt from him:

“You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring the collateral out to you

[a pledge, so that if the borrower does not pay his debt, the creditor collects the debt from the pledge],

outside.”

It follows that the Torah gave the borrower the option of repaying his debt as he wishes. For

what does a person ordinarily bring outside

for the repayment of his debt? It is

the least valuable of the utensils!

The least valuable and most inferior item. Similarly, when he repays him from his land, he ordinarily repays him with inferior-quality land. It is thus proven that by Torah law a creditor collects from inferior-quality land. The Sages, however, instituted that he collect from intermediate-quality land.

And for what reason did they say

[the Sages instituted] that

a creditor’s claim is collected from intermediate-quality land?

So that the door would not be closed to borrowers,

for if lenders were repaid from inferior-quality land, they would refrain from lending their money, and the door of lenders would be closed before borrowers.

And this is the dispute between the beraitot:

One master,

the tanna in the beraita that says that a creditor’s claim is collected from intermediate-quality land,

holds by Ulla’s enactment,

maintaining in accordance with Ulla that the Sages instituted that a creditor collect from intermediate-quality land.

And one master,

the tanna in the beraita that says that a creditor’s claim is collected from inferior-quality land,

does not hold by Ulla’s enactment,

but maintains that a creditor collects from inferior-quality land, as is his status by Torah law. The Gemara cites another beraita dealing with the order of collection from liened land:

The Sages taught:

One who was obligated to pay three obligations—payments for damage, repayment of a debt to a lender, and payment of a woman’s marriage settlement—and who possessed all three types of land, superior-quality, intermediate-quality, and inferior-quality, and sold his land: If he

sold

all his land

to

one person,

or

sold it

to three people together,

on one day, and the three deeds of acquisition were written on the same day, so that none of them has priority over the others, then

all of them

[all the purchasers]

entered in place of the owners.

That is, their status is like that of the owners: The one who purchased the superior-quality land pays the person who suffered damage from it; the one who purchased the intermediate-quality land pays the creditor from it; and the purchaser of the inferior-quality land pays the woman her marriage settlement from it.

But if he sold them to three people

one after the other,

each tract of land on a different day,

all of them,

all the creditors—the person who suffered damage, the lender, and his divorced wife—

collect

their debts

from the

purchaser who purchased

last,

even if the land in his possession is inferior-quality land. For the purchasers who bought first, even if they bought the superior-quality and intermediate-quality land, can dismiss the claimants by saying: “I left you a place [land] from which to collect at the seller’s property”!

For the law is that one does not collect from liened assets [already in the possession of a purchaser] when there are unencumbered assets [in the possession of the owners], even if the assets that remain are inferior-quality land; and even if the claimant is a person who suffered damage, whose claim is collected from superior-quality land, he collects only from those assets.

And since, at the time the first purchasers acquired the land, other land still remained in the seller’s possession, it follows that the primary law of collection applied to that land, and this law of collection remains even if that land was ultimately sold.

And if

he does not have

the last purchaser enough to pay all three claimants,

he collects from the one before him,

the claimants complete their collection from the purchaser who preceded him. And if

he does not

also have

enough

for the debt,

he collects from the one before the one before him,

the claimants complete their collection from the first purchaser. In such a case, they cannot say, “I left you a place,” since the land they left for collection is insufficient for all the claimants to collect from it. The Gemara asks: Concerning what we learned in the beraita, that if he

sold them to

one

person,

the purchaser entered in place of the owners,

what are the circumstances?

In what manner is this statement referring?

If you say it means at one time

, if we say that the case is one in which the purchaser acquired them together in a single purchase [in one deed], this is obvious! For

now, in the case of three, where it is possible to say that one of them preceded the others

, if he sold to three people on one day, and although their purchases took place at different times—one in the morning and one in the evening—and the first purchaser could ostensibly say, “I left you a place from which to collect,” nevertheless, since it is not apparent from the deed of sale who purchased first,

you say that all of them entered in place of the owners

, because they are considered to have purchased together; if he

sold them to

one

person in one deed, is it necessary to say so

? Must it be stated?! It is obvious that since he acquired them together, no one field has a greater lien upon it than the other, and therefore each one collects according to his law.

Rather, it is obvious

that the case applies even if he sold them to one person over three days,

one after the other

, each field on a different day,

and

if so, there is a difficulty:

what is the difference

, what is different if he sold

to three

one after the other,

so that each one can say to him

, each of the initial purchasers can say to the claimant:

“I left you a place from which to collect!”

And therefore, when the last purchaser acquired the inferior-quality land, even the injured party collects from it.

It is

also the same here

—that same person who acquired everything one field after another—if he acquired the inferior-quality land last,

each one can say to him

, let him say to each of the claimants:

“I left you a place from which to collect!”

And they will all collect from the inferior-quality land that he acquired last. Why, then, do we say that this person entered in place of the owners, and that they all collect according to their respective laws?

The Gemara answers:

What are we dealing with here? With a case in which he acquired the superior-quality land last

. The beraita is speaking of a case in which he acquired the superior-quality land last. Therefore, he cannot say to the claimants, “I left you a place from which to collect,” since if so, they would all collect from the superior-quality land.

And likewise Rav Sheshet said

to resolve the matter, that it is speaking of a case

in which he acquired the superior-quality land last.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against the answer:

If so

, if that is the case, why indeed should each one collect according to his law?

Let them all come and collect from the superior-quality land

, let them all [including the creditor and the woman] come and take from the superior-quality land, since it remained last as free property, and the law requiring their collection was therefore imposed upon it!?

The Gemara answers: The reason they do not all collect from it is

because he says to them

, the purchaser says to the claimants:

“If you remain silent and take according to your law, you will take”

—if you remain silent [and relinquish the claim] and each of you takes according to his law, you may take—

but

otherwise,

if not

, if instead you continue to claim the superior-quality land, then

“I will return the deed for the inferior-quality land to its owner”

, I will return the deed documenting the purchase of the inferior-quality land to the seller, and as a result the seller will have free land,

“and all of you will collect from the inferior-quality land”

, then all of you will collect from this inferior-quality land, since one does not collect from encumbered property when free property is available.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: