Bava Kamma 85a (פה.) — the Talmud in English

Here, they disagree

with regard to a “generalization” and a “specification” that are separated from one another

—if there is an interruption in the verse between the “generalization” and the “specification,”

they disagree

: Rabbi and ben Azzai.

Rabbi maintains:

A general statement and a specific statement separated from one another

are not interpreted as a general statement followed by a specific statement.

Therefore, the specific statement does not explain the general statement by saying, “Only what is included in the specific statement is included in the general statement.” It is as though the verse had stated a general statement without a specific statement, and everything is included.

Here, too, “burn” is a “generalization,” since everything is implied, both a burn accompanied by a wound and one not accompanied by a wound. And “wound” is a “specification.” Had “wound” appeared in the verse immediately adjacent to “burn,” we would have said, “Anything included in the generalization is limited to what is specified.” But since “wound for wound” interrupts between “burn” and “wound,” we do not apply here the interpretive principle of “generalization and specification.” Rather, it is as though only a “generalization” had been stated, and everything is included.

And ben Azzai maintains

that a generalization and a specification separated from one another

are interpreted as a generalization and specification.

Therefore, the “specification”—

“wound”—is the explanation of the “generalization,” and there is no liability for payment for a burn unless it is accompanied by a wound.

If you would say

if you ask:

Why do I need “wound,” according to Rabbi?

According to your explanation, it does not come to explain the “burn” stated first in the verse!?

It may be said: “Wound” comes

to

make him liable for

additional payments.

Otherwise, you might say: A burn accompanied by a wound is like a burn not accompanied by a wound, and he pays only for pain. The verse therefore teaches us that for a burn accompanied by a wound, in addition to pain, he pays for

the burn

and also for the wound. The Mishna teaches: “What is pain? … We assess

how much a person such as this would wish to receive

in order to suffer such pain

.”

And we question:

Pain

that is

in place of the injury,

for example, when he cut off his hand and paid him for the hand according to the reduction in his value as a slave sold in the market,

how do we assess

[how do we assess] the pain separately!?

Said

[he explained]

Shmuel’s father: We assess how much

money

a person would wish to receive

in order to agree

to have

his

hand

cut off.

And we question: If he agrees

to have his hand cut off, it is not pain alone

[only]

that

is involved,

for all five types of payment are present,

and therefore you cannot assess the pain by itself!?

Furthermore,

are we dealing

with fools

[fools]

here,

and who would agree to have his hand cut off in exchange for any amount of money in the world!?

And we explain:

Rather,

we assess for how much money a person would agree

to have cut off

[to have them cut off for him] his

severed hand

that is still attached by tightly stretched tendons, which is unfit for work. It follows that there is no “injury” here, but only “pain.”

And we challenge: This still is not satisfactory, for even

with regard to cutting off his severed hand, pain alone is not involved,

as

there is

also

pain and

also

humiliation, for

it

the matter is embarrassing to him

[he is embarrassed by it]

[he is ashamed of the matter]

to take

[to take]

flesh from his body and cast it

[to throw it]

to the dogs!?

And we explain:

Rather,

this is what Shmuel’s father said:

We assess how much a person would wish to receive to have his hand, for which he was sentenced by the government to be cut off, cut off either by a drug or by a sword.

[A person whom the king punished by ordering that his hand be cut off with a drug, which causes no pain in cutting off the hand; for how much money would he agree to have his hand cut off with a sword?]

The members of the academy said

[they objected]

here

[in this situation]

too, he would not take

[he would not take]

and cause himself pain.

After all, no person is prepared to cause himself so much pain for any amount of money in the world! Furthermore, one cannot claim that the person who caused the injury should pay such a huge sum, since it is impossible to compare the value of pain that has already been suffered with the large sum that a person would demand in order to agree to endure it!? And we conclude:

Rather, we assess how much a person would be willing to pay to have his hand, for which he was sentenced by the government to be cut off by a sword, cut off by a drug instead.

[A person whose hand the king decreed must be cut off by a sword: how much money would he be prepared to pay the king’s agent to cut off his hand with a drug without pain instead of with a sword.] And we question:

This

“to receive” should have been “to pay”!

That is, why do we say: How much money would a person wish “to receive” in order to suffer such pain? According to your explanation, we assess how much money a person would be prepared “to pay” in order not to suffer!?

He said:

[He explained:]

“For this one to take”

[the injured party]

“from this one”

[the assailant]

“what this one gave”

[what the injured party had been prepared to pay the king’s agent, so that he would not suffer].

We learned in the Mishna:

Medical treatment—

if he struck him, he is obligated to provide him with medical treatment.

If growths developed on him, if they resulted from the injury, he is liable; if they did not result from the injury, he is exempt. If it healed and then reopened, and it healed and then reopened, he is obligated to provide him with medical treatment. If it healed completely, he is not obligated to provide him with medical treatment.

The Sages taught: If growths developed on him

[blisters or pus], if

they resulted from the injury,

even though the injury had healed

and then reopened

[returning to its previous state],

he is obligated to provide him with medical treatment

and

also

he is obligated to pay

him compensation for his incapacity,

if he took to his bed because of the growths.

If growths developed on him

that did not result from the injury, he is not obligated to provide him with medical treatment, nor is he obligated to pay him compensation for his incapacity,

and later the Gemara explains that “that did not result from the injury” means that he violated the doctor’s instructions, and the growths developed because of this.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even

if they developed

because of the injury, he is obligated

he

to provide him with medical treatment, but he is not obligated to pay him compensation for his incapacity,

and later we will explain their dispute.

And the Sages say: With regard to his incapacity and his medical treatment,

the Torah obligates the assailant to pay for both and compares them to one another. Therefore,

anyone who is liable for incapacity is liable for medical treatment, and one who is not liable for incapacity is not liable for medical treatment.

Consequently, since he is not liable for incapacity, despite the fact that the growths developed because of the injury and in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, he is likewise not liable for medical treatment.

The Gemara asks:

With regard to what do they disagree,

the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda?

Rabba said: I found the Sages in the house of study sitting and saying

[I found students in the beit-midrash who were explaining the dispute as follows]:

Here, they disagree with regard to whether an injury may be bandaged,

whether the injured party is permitted to bandage the injury and wrap it so that he will not suffer from the cold, even though this bandage causes the site of the injury to become heated and, as a result, growths develop on it.

The Sages

[the first tanna]

hold: An injury may be bandaged,

meaning that the injured party is permitted to bandage his injury. Therefore, if growths developed on him as a result of the bandaging, these are growths that resulted from the injury, and he is obligated to pay him for his medical treatment and his incapacity.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: An injury may not be bandaged,

and the injured party is not permitted to bandage his injury against the cold. Nevertheless,

medical treatment, concerning which the verse repeats itself,

[as the Torah repeats its wording, “and he shall provide medical treatment”]

he is liable

to pay him—by virtue of the decree of the verse.

For incapacity, concerning which the verse does not repeat itself,

as it is stated: “Only his incapacity shall he pay,”

he is not liable.

And according to the Sages: Since he is not liable for incapacity, he is not liable for medical treatment; and below the Gemara explains what they derive from the fact that the verse repeats itself with regard to medical treatment.

And I said to them

[Rabba said to the Sages who were sitting in the house of study]:

If an injury may not be

at all

bandaged, then he is not liable for medical treatment either,

for it is inconceivable that the injured party should act in a manner that is entirely unacceptable and then be able to claim the cost of his medical treatment and his incapacity from the assailant.

Rather,

their dispute should be understood as follows:

Everyone

holds:

An injury may be bandaged, but it may not be excessively bandaged,

[with an overly tight bandage], and here we are dealing with a case in which the injured party bandaged the injury with an excessively tight bandage for his own comfort, and as a result growths developed on him and he took to his bed.

And in this they disagree:

Rabbi Yehuda holds: Since it may not be excessively bandaged,

these growths resulted from the negligence of the injured party; and logically, one could say that the assailant should be liable neither for his medical treatment nor for his incapacity.

Nevertheless,

for medical treatment, concerning which the verse repeats itself—

he is liable

to pay, but

for incapacity, concerning which the verse does not repeat itself—

he is not liable.

And the Sages

[the first tanna]

hold: Since the verse repeats itself with regard to medical treatment,

and he is obligated to provide him with medical treatment even when he used an excessively tight bandage, therefore

for incapacity

[for his incapacity]

he is also liable, for

indeed

incapacity was compared

to

medical treatment.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: With regard to

his

incapacity he is not liable,

since

the Merciful One excluded it

and said:

“Only

his incapacity shall he pay,” and this “only” is an exclusion—to exempt the assailant from payment of compensation for his incapacity if the injured party bandaged himself with an excessively tight bandage.

And the Sages

hold: That which the Torah said,

“only,”

for growths that developed

not as a result of the injury is what it came

[to teach]. But when growths developed because of an excessively tight bandage, the Merciful One did not exclude it, and he is to be made liable through the comparison to medical treatment; and with regard to medical treatment, the verse indeed repeats itself in order to make him liable even though he bandaged the injury with an excessively tight bandage.

And we challenge this:

But according to the latter Sages

[the “Sages” of the beraita]

who say:

medical treatment was compared to incapacity, and

anyone who is liable for incapacity is liable for medical treatment, and one who is not liable for incapacity is not liable for medical treatment,

and in the case of an excessively tight bandage he is exempt both from incapacity and from medical treatment,

why do I need the fact that the verse repeats itself with regard to medical treatment,

since it is not needed for the case of an excessively tight bandage!?

And we answer:

It is needed for him

the repetition of the wording of the verse

for that which was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

The school of Rabbi Yishmael says:

Why did the verse repeat itself and say:

“And he shall provide medical treatment”

rather than simply say, “and he shall heal”?

Rather, we learn

from here that permission was granted to a physician to provide medical treatment,

whether for an injury caused by a human being or for an injury caused by Heaven, and we do not say: If Heaven brought illness upon him, it is the decree of the King and a physician is forbidden to overturn it. Rather, permission was granted to provide treatment for every illness.

The Sages taught: From where is it derived that if growths developed on him because of the injury,

after the injury had healed,

and the injury reopened

[returning to its previous state],

he is obligated

to provide him with medical treatment and is obligated to pay him compensation for his incapacity?

The verse states: “Only his incapacity shall he pay, and he shall provide medical treatment.”

From the fact that the Torah repeats its wording, we learn that he is liable even though the injury had already healed, since the growths that resulted from the injury caused it to reopen.

Can

[you derive from here]

even

if growths developed on him

that did not result from the injury?

The verse states: “Only,”

which is an exclusion: he is liable only if they developed because of the injury.

Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Even

if they developed

because of the injury, he is exempt,

and we learn this from what

is stated: “Only.”

The amoraim disagree concerning the explanation of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda’s statement:

Some say:

Even

if they developed on him

because of the injury, he is exempt

from

entirely, like

the view of

the latter Sages,

who derived medical treatment from incapacity through a comparison: Anyone exempt from incapacity is exempt from medical treatment.

And some say:

Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda did not say:

“Even when they resulted from the injury he is exempt”

except

from incapacity,

as it is stated, “Only his incapacity shall he pay,”

but he is liable

for

medical treatment,

since the Torah repeated itself with regard to it: “And he shall provide medical treatment.”

And

according to whom

does Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda hold?

According to his father,

[his father,] Rabbi Yehuda, who says with regard to an excessively tight bandage: He is liable for medical treatment but not for incapacity.

The master said

in the preceding beraita:

One might

have thought that he is liable

even

if growths developed on him

that did not result from the injury. The verse states: “Only,”

“his incapacity shall he pay.” It might have entered our minds that here we are dealing with a case in which the injury healed completely, and afterward growths developed on their own.

And we are astonished:

Does “that did not result from the injury” require a verse!?

Is it not obvious that the assailant is not obligated to pay for medical treatment and incapacity that did not result from his assault!?

They said

[the members of the academy answered]:

What is meant by “that did not result from the injury,”

for which the verse is needed to exempt him?

As it was taught

in a beraita:

Consider the case where he violated

the injured party

the doctor’s instructions,

and ate honey or all kinds of sweets,

even though the doctor had warned him not to eat them,

because honey and all kinds of sweets are harmful to an injury,

and he raised

his

injury to the condition called gargutani

because of what he ate.

Might it be

the assailant

is obligated to provide him with medical treatment [the injured party had failed to take care of himself by refraining from eating sweets, but this is not complete negligence, and one might therefore think that the assailant is obligated to provide him with medical treatment].

The verse states: “Only

his incapacity shall he pay, and he shall provide medical treatment.” The Torah excluded him from liability for his incapacity and medical treatment even in the case of this minor negligence, namely, that he violated the doctor’s instructions.

And

what is “gargutani”

mentioned by the beraita?

He said

[he explained:]

Abaye: A twisted growth

[“dead flesh” present on a living person].

And what is its treatment

[how is it cured], through

ahala

[the name of an herb ]

and kira

[wax]

and kalba

[resin that drips from a tree ].

And if he said to him

the assailant said to the injured party: “I do not want you to be treated by another physician who will take a great deal of money; rather,

I will treat you myself”

[I will heal you], he

can say to him

[the injured party can say to him]:

“You are like a lurking lion to me.”

[like a lion lying in ambush]. That is, since you injured me, if you treat me in order to heal me, it is as though a lion lying in ambush to strike and devour me were treating me. A person cannot be healed in such a manner, because the patient must feel at ease with the physician.

And if he said to him

the tortfeasor:

“I will bring you a physician who treats for free,”

[I will bring you a relative of mine ] who will treat and heal you without payment.

He

can say to him

the injured party: “I am not prepared to be treated by him, because

a physician who treats for free provides a treatment that is worth nothing.”

[A physician who treats without payment provides “free” treatment, meaning that it has no value.] Perhaps he will give him ineffective medicines, because his heart and mind will not be attentive to the patient’s essential needs, since he does not expect to receive payment.

And if

the tortfeasor

said:

“I will bring you a distant physician,”

[I will bring you a physician who lives far away], and he will treat you at a lower price than other physicians. He

can say to him

the injured party: It is impossible to rely on

a distant physician,

because

the eye is blind;

it is possible that he will blind the eye of the person he is treating and will not be concerned, since he will soon go on his way.