Bava Kamma 84b — the Talmud in English

“God” is required,

for both the damages of a person and the damages of an ox are written in the section of “Mishpatim,” and in that section it is stated [Exodus 22:8]: “The matter of both of them shall come before God,” which means experts and ordained judges,

and

in Babylonia

there are no

ordained judges. If so, how do they collect damages caused by an ox in Babylonia!?

Rather,

if you say: Even though there are no ordained judges in Babylonia, nevertheless the judges of Babylonia can adjudicate as agents of the judges of the Land of Israel.

If so, the opposite difficulty should be raised:

What is different about ox injuring an ox and ox injuring a person

that they collect them in Babylonia, because

we act as their agents.

Just as it is with admissions and loans,

as we act as the agents of the judges of the Land of Israel and adjudicate in Babylonia cases of loans, both when witnesses who saw the loan itself come before us [“loans”], and when witnesses come to the court who say: “So-and-so admitted in our presence that he borrowed from so-and-so” [“admissions”]. So too we act as their agents and adjudicate cases of damages.

For just as it is necessary to adjudicate cases of loans, so as not to “lock the door” before borrowers, that is, we must provide the lender with a convenient possibility of collecting his debt, because if not, he will lock the door of his house and will not be willing to lend, so it is necessary to adjudicate cases of damages in order to lock the door before robbers and those who cause damage.

If so, with regard to damages of

a person injuring a person and a person injuring an ox as well, we act as the agents

of the judges of the Land of Israel,

just as it is with admissions and loans.

And again it is difficult: What is the difference between this and that!?

They said

the members of the academy answered: We do not act as their agents with regard to damages caused by a person, since

when we act as their agents

of ordained judges, it is

in a matter with which we are certain

that we know how much he is liable.

But

in a matter about which we are not certain,

such as here, where we need to assess the damage and evaluate it,

we do not act as their agents.

They said

the members of the academy asked:

With regard to ox injuring an ox and ox injuring a person as well, we are not certain about it,

for one must assess the damage in the market.

Rather,

you say: There is no difficulty in evaluating the damage, because

go out and see

[go out to the market and see] at

how much

[the Bach]

oxen are sold in the market.

If so, with regard to damages caused by

a person injuring a person and a person injuring an ox as well, go out and see for how much slaves are sold in the market,

so why do they not collect this in Babylonia!?

And furthermore,

it is difficult: If with regard to anything whose value is known we act as their agents, then

double payment

[of a thief]

and payment of fourfold and fivefold

[when one steals an ox or a sheep and then slaughters or sells it]

whose rates are fixed

[whose values are fixed and known, and no special appraisal is needed]

we should act as their agents!

But we have established: They do not adjudicate “cases of fines” in Babylonia!?

They said

the members of the academy answered:

When we act as their agents—

with monetary matters; with fines we do not act as their agents,

and double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment are a “fine” and not “money.”

And we raise an objection: Damages of

a person injuring a person and

also the payment of

“blemish”

in the case of rape and seduction [how much the girl’s value decreases because she changed from a “virgin” into a “non-virgin”]

is monetary;

should we act as their agents!?

And we answer:

When we act as their agents, it is in a matter that is common

[a matter that commonly occurs]; therefore, with regard to damages caused by an ox, which are common, we act as their agents, but

a person injuring a person, which is uncommon—

we do not act

as their agents.

And we raise an objection:

What about humiliation

which is common—should we act as their agents!? They said

the members of the academy:

So too

as you say,

for

Rav Pappa collected

[collected and extracted]

four hundred zuz for humiliation.

And we raise an objection:

But the ruling of Rav Pappa is not upheld

[we do not establish the law according to Rav Pappa],

for

the fact is that

Rav Hisda sent to Rav Nahman

a question concerning the collection of payment for “humiliation,”

and he sent to him

Rav Nahman sent to Rav Hisda:

Hisda, Hisda,

and are you

collecting a fine

in Babylonia!?

And from here [it follows] that “humiliation” is not collected in Babylonia, but why? It is a matter that is common, so let us act as their agents!? And we conclude:

Rather, we act as their agents in a matter that is common

[a matter that commonly occurs]

and there is

[there is]

in it

also

financial loss

[loss of money].

But a matter that is common and there is no

[there is not]

financial loss in it,

we do not act as their agents.

Alternatively

[and likewise]:

A matter that is uncommon and has financial loss in it—we do not act as their agents.

Therefore, with regard to a person injuring a person, even though there is financial loss in it

and monetary loss, for he diminished him from his monetary value,

since it is uncommon—

we do not act as their agents,

as Rava said: A person injuring a person is not collected in Babylonia.

And

humiliation

also,

, even though it is common, since there is no financial loss in it—

we do not act as their agents

and we do not collect it in Babylonia, as Rav Nahman sent to Rav Hisda.

Now the Gemara returns to what was brought [on page 84a] in the name of Rava: Damages caused by an ox to an ox are collected in Babylonia.

And we are astonished:

and

for

an ox injuring an ox

they adjudicate and

collect

its damage

in Babylonia!?

But

he

said: Rava: An ox that caused damage is not collected

[the damage]

in Babylonia.

Whom did it injure

[whom did the ox injure]?

If you say

[if you interpret it]

that it injured

the ox

a person,

it is difficult for you:

Why specifically

did Rava mention

an ox that injured a person

is not collected in Babylonia? Behold,

even a person who injured a person is also not collected in Babylonia!?

And it would have been preferable for Rava to state his ruling concerning a person who injured a person, rather than to state his ruling concerning an ox that injured a person, since a person injuring a person is more common than an ox injuring a person; and if compensation for damage caused by a person to a person is not collected, all the more so compensation for damage caused by a person to an ox. And why, then, did Rava specifically state his ruling with regard to an ox that caused damage!?

Rather, it is obvious that it refers to an ox that caused damage, and it teaches:

and Rava says:

it is not collected in Babylonia,

but how, then, did Rava say above that compensation for an ox that injured an ox is collected in Babylonia!?

They said

the members of the academy offered this resolution:

An ox that gored or caused damage with the intention of causing damage, during the first three times that it did so, is called an “innocent ox” and pays only “half-damage”; this payment is a “fine” [above, 15b]. After three times, the ox becomes a “forewarned ox,” and if it gores again, its owner pays “full damage”; this payment is monetary liability and not a fine.

The innocent ox

about which Rava says: it is not collected in Babylonia, is referring

to

an

“innocent ox,”

and indeed a “fine” is not collected in Babylonia.

Here

when Rava says that compensation for an ox that injured an ox is collected in Babylonia, he is referring

to

an

“forewarned ox,”

and damage caused by an ox to an ox is common damage, and it is collected in Babylonia.

And we challenge this:

but

he

said: Rava said, an ox does not

become

forewarned in Babylonia,

because an ox becomes forewarned only in a court, and in Babylonia they do not bring the ox to court. If so, it is impossible for there to be a “forewarned ox” in Babylonia; and concerning what did Rava say that compensation for damage caused by an ox to an ox is collected in Babylonia!?

They said

the members of the academy offered this resolution: for example,

the innocent ox was made forewarned

the ox became forewarned in the Land of Israel

and

afterward

they brought it here

they brought it to Babylonia, and compensation for damage caused by this forewarned ox, which is “monetary liability,” is collected in Babylonia.

And we challenge this:

but

a forewarned ox that came from the Land of Israel to Babylonia

is an uncommon matter, and regarding an uncommon matter you said

above

we do not perform the agency

of the ordained judges; so why is compensation for it collected in Babylonia!?

And we resolve it: rather, for example,

the Sages from there came

ordained judges from the Land of Israel to Babylonia

and forewarned it

the ox

here.

And we challenge this: but

ultimately, it is an uncommon matter

in such a case,

and you said that with regard to an uncommon matter we do not perform their agency!?

And we conclude:

rather, when Rava said:

compensation for damage caused by an ox to an ox is collected in Babylonia—

with regard to the tooth

an ox that caused damage for its benefit

and the foot

an ox that caused damage through its walking

which are forewarned from the outset,

and it is a common matter, so we perform the agency of the ordained judges.

We learned in the Mishna:

pain—

if he burned him with a spit or with a nail

even on his fingernail, a place where it does not make a wound.

And when he burned him or struck him “on his fingernail,” he did not cause him any damage that reduced his value. It follows that the tanna of our Mishna holds: “

pain that is not

one that is not

in a place of damage”

is paid

it must be paid.

Who is the tanna

who taught our Mishna?

Rava said:

it is

Ben Azzai

that is the position of our Mishna.

For it was taught:

It is stated [Exodus 21:25]: “And you shall give … burning for burning, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.”

Rabbi says: “Burning” was stated first.

Ben Azzai says: “Bruise” was stated first.

And he explains it as he proceeds:

With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi holds: “Burning”

even

that there is not

where there is no

wound is implied,

and if the Torah had stated: “burning for burning,” but had not stated: “bruise for bruise,” I would say: he is always liable for the pain, whether he made a wound in him or whether he did not make a wound in him.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote

also

“bruise,”

in order

to reveal concerning it, “burning,”

that is, to explain what was stated initially [“burning”],

that where there is a wound, there is

he is liable to pay for his pain;

if not

if there is no wound,

not

he does not pay.

For if you would say that even without a “bruise” he is liable to pay for the pain of the burning, then “bruise for bruise” is superfluous, since if he pays for “burning,” all the more so for “bruise,” you may infer from this that there is no obligation to pay pain for a burning in which there is no wound.

For Rabbi holds that there is no obligation to pay “pain” except when he is also obligated to pay for “medical treatment”; and along with the payment for the medical treatment, he also pays for the pain. But “not in a place of a wound,” where there is neither damage nor medical treatment, but pain alone, he is not liable to pay.

And as for that which it teaches: “Burning was stated first,” this is what it means: Had “bruise” not been stated at the end of the verse, we would have explained the beginning of the verse as referring to burning alone, even without a wound.

And Ben Azzai holds:

ordinary

“burning”—

implies that there is a wound,

and had Scripture not added and said: “bruise for bruise,” I would say that he is liable only for a burning accompanied by a wound.

Therefore,

the Merciful One wrote: “bruise”

at the end of the verse, in order

to reveal concerning it, “burning”

which was stated at the beginning of the verse, that it refers even to

one in which there is no wound.

And as for that which it teaches: “Bruise was stated first,” this is what it means: Had “bruise” not been stated at the end of the verse, we would have explained the beginning of the verse as referring to a burning accompanied by a wound.

Accordingly, Ben Azzai holds that pain is paid even when it is not in a place of damage, whereas Rabbi holds that pain is paid only when it is in a place of damage; and the tanna of our Mishna is Ben Azzai and not Rabbi.

Rav Pappa challenged this

he raised an objection to this

saying: On the contrary, the reasoning is more plausible in the opposite way

the reasoning dictates explaining the positions of Rabbi and Ben Azzai opposite to Rava’s words:

For according to Rava, even though Rabbi arranged the Mishnayot, this Mishna was taught not according to his view; yet the reasoning dictates establishing the Mishna according to Rabbi’s view!?

Furthermore: According to Rava, “first,” which Rabbi and Ben Azzai said, refers to what we would have assumed if the Torah had not added: “bruise for bruise.” Surely it is more reasonable to say that the tannaim explained the conclusion of the matter, after “bruise” had been stated in the Torah.

Therefore, the baraita must be explained as follows:

Rabbi says

the end of the verse [“bruise”] proves to us that

“burning”

without a “bruise”

was stated first

at the beginning of the verse.

For Rabbi

holds:

ordinary

“burning”—

implies that there is a wound,

and

the Merciful One wrote “bruise”

at the end of the verse

to reveal concerning it, “burning,”

which was stated at the beginning, that it refers even to

one in which there is no wound.

Ben Azzai says:

the end of the verse proves to us that “burning” with a

wound was stated first.

For Ben Azzai

holds:

ordinary

“burning”

even

implies that there is no wound,

therefore afterward

the Merciful One again wrote “bruise”

at the end of the verse,

to reveal concerning it, “burning”

which was stated at the beginning,

that where there is a wound—

yes; if not—

no.

And as for that which it teaches, “was stated first,”

they stand upon the conclusion

that is, how “burning,” which was stated “first,” is interpreted according to the end of the verse and its conclusion.

And our Mishna, which holds that pain is paid even when it is not in a place of damage, is Rabbi and not Ben Azzai.

Alternatively,

another explanation of the dispute between Rabbi and Ben Azzai:

Everyone

both Rabbi and Ben Azzai holds: ordinary

“burning,” whether there is a wound in it or whether there is no wound in it, is implied.

The Torah is expounded and interpreted through thirteen hermeneutical principles and methods of derivation. One of them is “a generalization and a specification”—there is in the generalization only what is in the specification. That is, if at first the Torah wrote a “generalization” that contains many specifications, and afterward Scripture returned and mentioned one “specification” from within the generalization, we learn and say: This specification came only to explain the generalization, for the law of the “generalization” exists only with regard to that “specification” which the Torah mentioned.