Bava Kamma 84b (פד:) — the Talmud in English

“God” is required,

for both damages caused by a person and damages caused by an ox are written in the portion of “Mishpatim,” and in that portion it is stated: “The matter of both of them shall come before God,” which refers to judges who are experts and semukhim,

and

in Babylonia

there are no

semukhim. If so, how can damages caused by an ox be collected in Babylonia!?

Rather,

you must say: Even though there are no semukhim in Babylonia, nevertheless the judges of Babylonia can adjudicate by virtue of the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.

If so, the opposite difficulty arises:

What is different about an ox that damages an ox and an ox that damages a person

that they collect the payment in Babylonia, because

we act as their agents.

Just as it is with admissions and loans,

as we act as the agents of the judges of Eretz Yisrael and adjudicate cases of loans in Babylonia—both when witnesses who saw the actual loan come before us (“loans”) and when witnesses come to the court and say: “So-and-so admitted in our presence that he borrowed from so-and-so” (“admissions”)—so too we act as their agents and adjudicate cases of damages.

For just as it is necessary to adjudicate cases of loans in order not to “lock the door” before borrowers, meaning that we must provide the lender with a convenient possibility of collecting his debt, because if not, he will lock his door and be unwilling to lend, so too it is necessary to adjudicate cases of damages in order to lock the door before robbers and those who cause damage. If so, with regard to damages

caused by a person to a person and by a person to an ox as well,

we act as the agents

of the judges of Eretz Yisrael,

just as it is with admissions and loans.

The difficulty returns: What is the difference between this case and that one!?

They said

[the members of the academy answered]: We do not act as their agents with regard to damages caused by a person, since

when we act as their agents

of semukhim it is

in a matter with which we are familiar

and we know how much he is liable to pay.

But

in a matter with which we are not familiar,

such as here, where we must appraise and evaluate the damage,

we do not act as their agents.

They said

[the members of the academy asked]:

With regard to an ox that damages an ox and an ox that damages a person as well, are we not unfamiliar with the matter,

since the damage must be appraised in the marketplace?

Rather,

you say that there is no difficulty in evaluating the damage, because

go out and see

[go out to the marketplace and see]

how much

[the Bach]

oxen are sold for in the marketplace.

If so, with regard to damages

caused by a person to a person and by a person to an ox as well, go out and see for how much slaves are sold in the marketplace,

why is this not collected in Babylonia!?

And furthermore,

the following difficulty arises: If we act as their agents in every matter whose value is known, then

double payment

[for theft]

and payment of fourfold and fivefold

[when one steals an ox or a sheep and then slaughters or sells it]

whose rates are fixed

[whose values are fixed and known, so that no special appraisal is required]

we should act as their agents!

But we have established: Cases of fines are not adjudicated in Babylonia!?

They said

[the members of the academy answered]:

When we act as their agents—

with regard to monetary obligations; with regard to fines, we do not act as their agents,

and double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment are payments of a “fine,” not a “monetary obligation.”

And we raise a difficulty: Damages

caused by a person to a person and

likewise payment of

“degradation”

in the case of rape and seduction [the amount by which the girl’s value decreases because she has changed from a “virgin” to a “non-virgin”]

is monetary;

should we not act as their agents!?

And we answer:

When we act as their agents, it is in a matter that is common

[a matter that occurs frequently]. Therefore, with regard to damages caused by an ox, which are common, we act as their agents. But

a person who damages a person, which is not common—

we do not act

as their agents.

And we raise a difficulty:

What of humiliation,

which is common—should we not act as their agents!? They said

the members of the academy:

So too

as you say,

indeed! For

Rav Pappa collected

[collected and paid out]

four hundred dinars for humiliation.

And we raise a difficulty:

But the ruling of Rav Pappa is not in force

[we do not hold in accordance with Rav Pappa],

for

he

Rav Hisda sent to Rav Naḥman

a question concerning the collection of payment for “humiliation,”

and he sent him

Rav Naḥman sent to Rav Hisda:

Hisda, Hisda,

how can it be that

a fine

is being collected in Babylonia!?

From this it follows that “humiliation” is not collected in Babylonia, but why? It is a common matter, so let us act as their agents!? And we conclude:

Rather, we act as their agents in a matter that is common

[a matter that commonly occurs]

and there is

[there is]

in it

also

a loss of principal

[a monetary loss].

But a matter that is common and there is no

[there is not]

loss of principal in it,

we do not act as their agents.

Alternatively

[likewise]:

A matter that is uncommon but involves a loss of principal—we do not act as their agents.

Therefore, with regard to a person who damages a person, although it involves a loss of principal

and monetary loss, for he diminished his monetary value,

since it is uncommon—

we do not act as their agents,

in accordance with Rava, who said: The payment for a person who damages a person is not collected in Babylonia.

And

humiliation

also,

, although it is common, since it involves no loss of principal—

we do not act as their agents

and we do not collect it in Babylonia, as Rav Naḥman sent to Rav Hisda.

The Gemara now returns to what was cited [on page 84a] in the name of Rava: Damages caused by an ox to an ox are collected in Babylonia.

And we are astonished:

And

when

an ox damages an ox,

they adjudicate the case and

collect

its damages

in Babylonia!?

But

he

Rava said: Damages caused by an ox are not collected

[the damages]

in Babylonia.

Whom did it damage

[whom did the ox damage]?

If you say

[if you interpret it]

that it damaged

the ox

a person,

the following difficulty arises for you:

Why specifically

did Rava mention

an ox that damaged a person

and say that it is not collected in Babylonia?

Even when a person damages a person, it is likewise not collected in Babylonia!?

And yet it would have been preferable for Rava to state his ruling with regard to a person who injured another person, rather than with regard to an ox that injured a person, since a person injuring another person is more common than an ox injuring a person. And if compensation for damage caused by a person to another person is not collected in Babylonia, all the more so compensation for damage caused by a person to an ox should not be collected there. Why, then, did Rava specifically state his ruling with regard to an ox that caused damage!?

Rather, it is obvious that it is referring to an ox that caused damage, and it teaches:

and Rava says:

It is not collected in Babylonia,

but how could Rava state above that compensation for an ox that injured an ox is collected in Babylonia!?

They said

the scholars of the academy offered this resolution:

An ox that gored or caused damage intentionally is called a “tam ox” during the first three times that it does so, and it pays only “half-damages”; this payment is a fine [above, 15b]. After three times, the ox becomes a “muad ox,” and if it gores again, its owner pays “full damages”; this payment is monetary and is not a fine.

The tam

to which Rava referred when he said that it is not collected in Babylonia, refers

to a

“ox”

that is a tam,

and a “fine” is not collected in Babylonia.

Here,

when Rava says that compensation for an ox that injured an ox is collected in Babylonia, he is referring

to a

“ox”

that is a muad,

and damage caused by an ox to another ox is common, so it is collected in Babylonia.

And we raise an objection:

But

Rava

said: An ox does not

become

a muad in Babylonia,

because an ox becomes a muad only through a court, and in Babylonia the ox is not brought before a court. If so, there cannot be a “muad ox” in Babylonia. With regard to what, then, did Rava say that compensation for damage caused by an ox to another ox is collected in Babylonia!?

They said

the scholars of the academy offered this resolution: For example,

the tam was made a muad

the ox became a muad in the Land of Israel

and

afterward

they brought it here

they brought it to Babylonia; and compensation for damage caused by this muad ox, which is a monetary obligation, is collected in Babylonia.

And we raise an objection:

But

a muad ox that came from the Land of Israel to Babylonia

is an uncommon matter, and concerning an uncommon matter, you said

above

that we do not act as agents

of the judges possessing semikha. Why, then, is compensation for it collected in Babylonia!?

And we answer: Rather, for example,

the scholars there came

judges possessing semikha came from the Land of Israel to Babylonia

and declared it a muad

for the ox

here in Babylonia.

And we raise an objection:

Ultimately, it is an uncommon matter

in such a case,

and you said that with regard to an uncommon matter we do not act as agents!?

And we conclude:

Rather, when Rava said

that compensation for damage caused by an ox to another ox is collected in Babylonia, he meant

the tooth

an ox that caused damage for its own benefit

and the foot

an ox that caused damage in the course of walking

which are deemed forewarned from the outset,

and the matter is common, so we act as agents of the judges possessing semikha.

We learned in the Mishna:

Pain—

if he burned him with a spit or a nail,

even on his fingernail, in a place where it does not cause a wound.

And when he burned him or struck him “on his fingernail,” he caused him no damage that diminished his value. It follows that the tanna of the Mishna holds: “

Pain that is not

in a

place of damage”

is compensated

he is required to pay for it.

Who is the tanna

who taught the Mishna?

Rava said:

It is

the opinion of Ben Azzai

that is expressed in our Mishna.

As it is taught:

It is stated [Exodus 21:25]: “And you shall give … a burn in place of a burn, a wound in place of a wound, a bruise in place of a bruise.”

Rabbi says: “Burn” was stated first.

Ben Azzai says: “Bruise” was stated first.

And the Gemara proceeds to explain this:

With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi holds: “Burn”

even

that there is no

wound in it

is implied, and if the Torah had stated only: “a burn in place of a burn,” and had not stated: “a bruise in place of a bruise,” I would say that he is always liable for the pain, whether or not he caused a wound.

Therefore,

Therefore,

the Merciful One wrote

also

“bruise,”

in order

to reveal concerning “burn,”

that is, to explain what was stated initially, “burn,”

that when it contains a wound, there is

a liability to pay for his pain;

but if not

if it does not contain a wound,

there is no

payment.

For if you would say that even without a “bruise” he is liable to pay for the pain of the burn, then “a bruise in place of a bruise” is superfluous. For if he pays for “burn,” all the more so he pays for “bruise.” You may conclude from this that there is no obligation to pay compensation for pain in the case of a burn that does not involve a wound.

For Rabbi holds that there is no obligation to pay compensation for “pain” unless he is also obligated to pay for “medical treatment.” Along with the payment for medical treatment, he also pays for the pain. But “not in a place of a wound,” where there is neither damage nor medical treatment, but pain alone, he is not liable to pay.

; And regarding what the beraita teaches, that “burn” was stated first, this is what it means: Had “bruise” not been stated at the end of the verse, we would have interpreted the beginning of the verse as referring to a mere burn, even without a wound.

And Ben Azzai holds:

The ordinary meaning of

“burn”

implies that it contains a wound,

and had the verse not added and said, “a bruise in place of a bruise,” I would say that he is liable only for a burn accompanied by a wound.

Therefore,

the Merciful One wrote: “bruise”

at the end of the verse, in order

to reveal concerning “burn”

stated at the beginning of the verse, that it refers even to a burn

that does not contain a wound.

And regarding what the beraita teaches, that “bruise” was stated first, this is what it means: Had “bruise” not been stated at the end of the verse, we would have interpreted the beginning of the verse as referring to a burn accompanied by a wound.

Accordingly, Ben Azzai holds that compensation for pain is paid even when it is not in a place of damage, whereas Rabbi holds that compensation for pain is paid only when it is in a place of damage. And the tanna of our Mishna is Ben Azzai, not Rabbi.

Rav Pappa challenged this

raised an objection to this

and said: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable

reason dictates that Rabbi’s and Ben Azzai’s opinions should be interpreted opposite to Rava’s explanation:

For according to Rava, although Rabbi arranged the Mishnayot, this Mishna was taught contrary to his opinion. Yet logic dictates that the Mishna should be established in accordance with Rabbi’s opinion!?

Furthermore, according to Rava, the “first” mentioned by Rabbi and Ben Azzai refers to what we might have thought had the Torah not added “a bruise in place of a bruise.” Surely it is more reasonable to say that the tanna’im explained the final conclusion, after “bruise” had been stated in the Torah.

Therefore, the beraita should be interpreted as follows:

Rabbi says

the end of the verse, “bruise,” proves to us that

“burn”

without a “bruise”

was stated first

at the beginning of the verse.

For Rabbi

holds:

The ordinary meaning of

“burn”

implies that it contains a wound,

and

the Merciful One wrote “bruise”

at the end of the verse

to reveal concerning “burn”

stated at the beginning, that it refers even to a burn

that does not contain a wound.

Ben Azzai says:

The end of the verse proves to us that “burn” accompanied by a

wound was stated first.

For Ben Azzai

holds:

The ordinary meaning of

“burn”

even

implies that it does not contain a wound.

Therefore,

the Merciful One again wrote “bruise”

at the end of the verse,

to reveal concerning “burn”

stated at the beginning

that when it contains a wound—

yes; but if not—

no.

And when the beraita teaches that “burn” or “bruise” was “stated first,”

they stand upon the final conclusion

that is, how “burn,” which was stated “first,” is interpreted in light of the end and conclusion of the verse.

And our Mishna, which holds that compensation for pain is paid even when it is not in a place of damage, follows Rabbi, not Ben Azzai.

Alternatively,

there is another explanation of the dispute between Rabbi and Ben Azzai:

Everyone

both Rabbi and Ben Azzai, agrees that the ordinary meaning of

“burn,” whether it contains a wound or does not contain a wound, is implied.

The Torah is expounded and interpreted through thirteen hermeneutical principles and methods of derivation. One of them is the principle of a general statement followed by a specific statement: the general statement contains only what is included in the specific statement. That is, if the Torah first writes a “general statement” that includes multiple particulars, and then the verse returns and mentions one “specific” item from that general statement, we learn and say that this specific item was mentioned only to explain the general statement: the law of the “general statement” applies only to that specific item mentioned by the Torah.