Bava Kamma 77b — the Talmud in English

And Reish Lakish said

to explain why it is significant that it had a time of fitness, from when it was slaughtered, whereas it is forbidden to derive benefit from it:

For

Rabbi Shimon used to say: A cow may be redeemed

even

upon its pyre,

that is: even after the cow was slaughtered lawfully upon a pyre of wood upon which it is slaughtered, it can still be redeemed—if he found another more beautiful than it—and permitted for benefit; and since at that time it was fit for redemption, therefore we say concerning this matter: “Whatever stands to be redeemed is considered as redeemed,” and it is as though it had been fit to receive ritual impurity between the slaughter and the sprinkling of its blood.

It follows

that it is proven that according to Rabbi Shimon: “

Whatever stands to be redeemed is considered as redeemed.”

Here the Gemara returns to the explanations of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish concerning the difficulty raised against Rabbi Shimon, who obligates one who steals consecrated animals from the possession of their owner and slaughters them for the fourfold and fivefold payment: “But is this not an unfit slaughter?”—for it is slaughter outside [the Temple courtyard]. Rabbi Yochanan explained it as slaughter inside for the sake of the owners, for example, the blood was spilled; or: slaughter inside not for the sake of the owners. Reish Lakish explained it as one who slaughters blemished animals outside; and the Gemara explains:

Granted, Rabbi Yochanan did not say as

the explanation of

Rabbi

Shimon ben Lakish,

because

he sought to establish our Mishna

[because Rabbi Yochanan wanted to establish our Mishna]

even with unblemished animals,

whereas according to Reish Lakish our Mishna deals only with blemished animals, and this is a forced explanation.

But Reish Lakish—for what reason did he not say like Rabbi Yochanan,

who established it even with unblemished animals?!

He can say to you,

Reish Lakish: Since it is stated:

“And he slaughtered it and sold it” [“and he slaughtered it or sold it”], slaughter was juxtaposed to sale and sale to slaughter, in order to teach us:

and he slaughtered it or sold it”—the slaughter was compared to the sale, and the sale to the slaughter, to teach us:

Wherever it exists with regard to sale, it exists with regard to slaughter

[an animal with regard to which “or sold it” applies, one is liable for it under “and he slaughtered it”],

and

however,

wherever it does not exist with regard to sale, it does not exist with regard to slaughter.

And these consecrated animals

unblemished,

since when one sells consecrated animals it is not a sale,

since sale does not apply to consecrated animals, for there is no redemption for unblemished consecrated animals, therefore

they do not exist

even

with regard to slaughter.

But consecrated animals that are blemished can indeed be sold, for the one who redeems them acquires them.

And

the Gemara explains that what Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disputed here—whether the Torah made one liable only for an animal to which both slaughter and sale apply—

they went

in this

according to their positions

[they followed here their positions]:

For it was stated: One who sells a tereifa, according to Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that one is not liable for its slaughter, since “it is an unfit slaughter,” Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disputed it:

Rabbi Yochanan said:

This one is

liable,

and although it does not exist with regard to slaughter, he is liable for it if he sold it.

And Reish Lakish said:

This one is

exempt

even for its sale,

since it does not exist with regard to slaughter,

for it is an “unfit slaughter,” therefore

it does not exist

even

with regard to sale.

to selling.

It follows that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disputed for the same reason on account of which they disputed in explaining our Mishna.

Rabbi Yochanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish—

who holds: Since it does not exist with regard to slaughter, it does not exist with regard to sale—from that which was taught:

An ox concerning which the Torah made one liable for slaughter and sale—that is, all animals of this species, whether large [called “bulls”] or small [called “calves”], whether males or females; and “a sheep” concerning which the Torah made one liable—that is, whether of the species of sheep or of the species of goats, whether large [called “rams and he-goats”] or small [called “sheep and goats”], whether males or females.

One who stole

an animal of

mixed species,

born from a he-goat [the species “goat”] that mated with a ewe,

and slaughtered it.

Or one who stole

a tereifa and sold it—

In both this case and that case, he

pays the fourfold and fivefold payment.

Is it not—

this beraita—

Rabbi Shimon’s [teaching], it follows

that it is proven:

even though it does not exist

for a tereifa

with regard to slaughter,

nevertheless

it exists

for a tereifa

with regard to sale.

He said to him,

Reish Lakish to Rabbi Yochanan:

No,

not as you explained, that this beraita is Rabbi Shimon’s, but

the Rabbis’

[teaching]—who make one liable for a tereifa even for its slaughter—it is.

And we raise an objection to it:

If

this beraita

is the Rabbis’,

then why did we learn: “A tereifa and he sold it,” which implies that specifically if he sold it, he is liable for it!?

And is it so that

a tereifa exists with regard to sale, but with regard to slaughter

[slaughter]

it does not exist!?

But according to the Rabbis, he is liable even for the slaughter of a tereifa.

The Gemara again wonders at the objection:

But rather, what

do you wish to prove from this objection, that this beraita is

Rabbi Shimon’s!? But according to your words as well, the first clause of the beraita is difficult: “One who stole a mixed-species animal and slaughtered it,” which likewise implies that he is liable specifically for slaughter and not for sale:

For is it so that

For is it so that

a mixed-species animal exists with regard to slaughter, but with regard to sale it does not exist!?

Rather,

necessarily—and even according to your method—

the tanna taught slaughter

of a mixed-species animal,

and the same law applies to sale

of a mixed-species animal; and if so,

let us say that according to the Rabbis as well,

that is: if so, even if you establish it according to the Rabbis, you can say that concerning a tereifa

he taught sale

of a tereifa,

and the same law applies to slaughter

of a tereifa.

And Rabbi Yochanan—

who established from the fact that we learned sale and not slaughter concerning a tereifa that it is Rabbi Shimon—

can say to you

to resolve that this difficulty should not likewise be raised concerning a mixed-species animal:

What is this

[and what difficulty is it]!?

Granted, if you say

that this beraita

is Rabbi Shimon’s, then it is understandable that the tanna taught only slaughter concerning a mixed-species animal, because

since he stated tereifa in one [

since he taught a tereifa in one

[since concerning a tereifa he necessarily had to teach only one of them: slaughter or sale], therefore

he taught

also

a mixed-species animal in one

[therefore the tanna also taught only one case concerning a mixed-species animal], and the tanna chose slaughter because it is stated first in the Torah.

But if you say that it is the Rabbis’,

then the tanna should have taught both slaughter and sale, and

let him combine them and teach them

[let the tanna combine the mixed-species animal and the tereifa] and teach as follows:

One who stole a mixed-species animal and a tereifa

[or a tereifa], and

slaughtered them and sold them

[or sold them]

pays the fourfold and fivefold payment.

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult

from this beraita for Reish Lakish, for it certainly implies that this beraita is Rabbi Shimon’s, and nevertheless he is liable for selling the tereifa.

And we raise an objection concerning what we learned in the beraita: One who stole

a mixed-species animal

and slaughtered it pays the fourfold and fivefold payment:

But “When a man steals an ox or a

sheep”

is written

in the section of slaughter and sale,

and

behold,

Rava said:

This

is a foundational derivation

[the expression “foundational construction”]:

Every place where it is stated

“

sheep,”

it serves only to exclude a mixed-species animal, such as a he-goat that mated with a ewe; and although “sheep” includes both the species of goats and the species of sheep, nevertheless its father and mother must be sheep, or its father and mother must be goats.

And if so, in the section of slaughter and sale, where the Torah said: “And an ox or a sheep,” we should have excluded a mixed-species animal!?

And we answer:

Here it is different—

with regard to slaughter and sale—

for the verse says: “When a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters it or sells it, five cattle shall he pay in place of the ox and four sheep in place of the sheep,” and it was explained above, 67b, that it should have said: “When a man steals an ox, and slaughters it or sells it, five cattle shall he pay in its place and four sheep in place of the sheep,” and it follows that “or a sheep” is superfluous—

the verse says: “When a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five cattle in place of the ox and four sheep in place of the sheep.” As explained above, 67b, it should have said: “When a man steals an ox and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five cattle in its place and four sheep in place of the sheep.” Thus, “or a sheep” is superfluous—

but it is stated for this purpose: “

or”

in order

to include a mixed-species animal.

And we ask:

And

is it so that

every “

or”

comes to include

a mixed-species animal

it

comes [for this purpose]!?

But it was taught:

It is written [Leviticus 22:27]: “An ox or a sheep or a goat, when it is born, shall be seven days under its mother, and from the eighth day onward it shall be accepted as an offering, a fire-offering to the Lord,” and we expound: “

An ox or a sheep,”

Scripture made the word “or” superfluous in order to teach:

excluding a mixed-species animal

which is unfit for an offering.

And for this reason it says

“or a goat”

in order to teach:

excluding an animal resembling another species,

which resembles neither its father nor its mother, such as one born from a ram and a ewe that resembles a goat.

It follows that we expound the superfluous “or” to exclude a mixed-species animal, whereas concerning slaughter and sale you expound “or” to include a mixed-species animal!?

Said

and resolved

Rava:

Here—

concerning theft, slaughter, and sale—the “or” is expounded

from its context, and

also

here—

concerning consecrated animals—the “or” is expounded

from its context.

Here, concerning theft, for it is written: “

an ox or a sheep,”

which

one is a large animal and the other a small animal, and

you cannot exclude a mixed-species animal from between them

[they do not interbreed with each other and give birth]; therefore mixed-species animals are excluded on their own, and if so:

Or"

to include kilayim

it comes. But

concerning consecrated offerings, as it is written

the “or” between "

a sheep and a goat"

that

both are small livestock, and

you can exclude kilayim from among them,

for they breed with one another and give birth; it is found that kilayim have still not been excluded, and if so: "

Or"

is to exclude it.