Bava Kamma 77b (עז:) — the Talmud in English

And Reish Lakish said

to explain why it is considered significant that it had a time when it was fit, from the moment it was slaughtered, despite the fact that it is forbidden to derive benefit from it:

Because

Rabbi Shimon would say: A cow may be redeemed

even

on top of its pyre,

meaning: even after the cow was slaughtered in accordance with the law on top of the arrangement of wood upon which it is slaughtered, it can still be redeemed—if one found another cow more beautiful than it—and thereby be rendered permitted for deriving benefit. Since at that time it was fit to be redeemed, we therefore say in this regard: “Anything destined to be redeemed is considered as already redeemed,” and it is as though it was fit to contract ritual impurity between its slaughter and the sprinkling of its blood.

Apparently,

it is therefore demonstrated that according to Rabbi Shimon:

“Anything destined to be redeemed is considered as already redeemed.”

The Gemara now returns to the explanations of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish concerning the difficulty raised against Rabbi Shimon, who obligates one who steals consecrated property from its owner’s premises and slaughters it: “But this is an unfit slaughter,” since it is slaughter outside the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Yochanan explained the case as one involving slaughter inside the courtyard for the sake of the owner, for example, where the blood was spilled; or alternatively, slaughter inside the courtyard not for the sake of the owner. Reish Lakish explained it as a case of one who slaughters blemished animals outside the courtyard. The Gemara explains:

Granted, Rabbi Yochanan did not say

the explanation of

Rabbi

Shimon ben Lakish,

because

he sought to establish our Mishna [

because Rabbi Yochanan wished to establish our Mishna

even with unblemished animals],

whereas according to Reish Lakish our Mishna deals only with blemished animals, which is a forced explanation.

But for what reason did Reish Lakish not say like Rabbi Yochanan,

who established the Mishna even with unblemished animals!?

He can say to you,

He can say to you,

Reish Lakish: Since it is stated

“and he slaughtered it or sold it” [“and he slaughtered it or sold it”], slaughtering was juxtaposed to selling, and selling to slaughtering, in order to teach us:

Wherever it applies to selling, it applies to slaughtering [

an animal to which “or sold it” applies is one for which “and he slaughtered it” also entails liability],

and

however,

wherever it does not apply to selling, it does not apply to slaughtering.

And these consecrated animals,

unblemished ones,

since when one sells consecrated animals, it is not considered a sale,

as sale does not apply to consecrated animals, since unblemished consecrated animals cannot be redeemed, therefore

they do not apply

even

to slaughtering.

But blemished consecrated animals can be sold, since the one who redeems them acquires them.

And

the Gemara explains that the dispute here between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish—whether the Torah made one liable only for an animal to which both slaughter and sale apply—

they followed

And

the Gemara explains that the dispute here between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, whether the Torah imposed liability only for an animal to which both slaughtering and selling apply,

follows

their respective approaches [

they followed here their respective positions]: For it was stated: With regard to one who sells a tereifa, according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one is not liable for slaughtering it, since “it is an unfit slaughter,”

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagreed:

He is

Rabbi Yochanan said:

He is

liable,

and although selling does not apply to slaughtering in this case, he is liable for selling it.

And Reish Lakish said:

He is

exempt

even for selling it,

since it does not apply to slaughtering,

as it is an “unfit slaughter”; therefore

it does not apply even

to selling.

Thus Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagreed for the same reason that caused them to disagree in their explanations of our Mishna.

Thus Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagreed for the same reason that underlies their disagreement in explaining our Mishna.

Rabbi Yochanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish—who holds that since slaughtering does not apply, selling does not apply—from that which was taught in a beraita:

The ox for which the Torah imposed liability for slaughtering and selling includes all animals of this species: both large ones [called “bulls”] and small ones [called “calves”], both males and females. And the “sheep” for which the Torah imposed liability includes both the species of sheep and the species of goats, both large ones [called “rams and he-goats”] and small ones [called “sheep and goats”], both males and females.

If one stole

an animal of

mixed species,

born from a he-goat [the species of goat] that mated with a ewe,

and slaughtered it.

Or if he stole

a tereifa and sold it—

In either case, he

pays the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Is it not—

this beraita—

the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Apparently,

it is demonstrated:

even though it does not apply

to a tereifa

with regard to slaughtering,

nevertheless

it does apply

to a tereifa

with regard to selling.

He said to him,

Reish Lakish to Rabbi Yochanan:

No,

not as you explained it, that this beraita is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; rather,

it is the opinion of the Rabbis,

who impose liability for slaughtering a tereifa as well.

And we raise a difficulty against this:

If

this beraita

is the opinion of the Rabbis,

then why did we learn: “a tereifa and sold it,” which implies that he is liable specifically if he sold it!?

And is it so that

a tereifa applies to selling, but to slaughtering

[slaughtering]

does not apply!?

But according to the Rabbis, he is liable even for slaughtering a tereifa.

The Gemara returns and questions the difficulty:

But rather, what

do you intend to prove on the basis of this difficulty—that this beraita is the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon? But according to your words, there is likewise a difficulty with the first clause of the beraita: “If one stole a mixed-species animal and slaughtered it,” which also implies that he is liable specifically for slaughtering it, but not for selling it:

For is it so that

a

mixed-species animal applies to slaughtering, but not to selling!?

Rather,

necessarily—and even according to your approach—

the tanna stated slaughtering

of a mixed-species animal,

and the same law applies to selling

a mixed-species animal. If so,

say the same regarding the Rabbis:

if you establish the beraita according to the Rabbis, you can say that concerning a tereifa

he stated selling

a tereifa,

and the same law applies to slaughtering

a tereifa.

And Rabbi Yochanan—who inferred from the fact that the beraita states selling and not slaughtering in the case of a tereifa that it is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon—

can say

to resolve the difficulty, so that the same objection should not arise concerning a mixed-species animal:

What is this [

what difficulty is there]!?

Granted, if you say

that this beraita

is the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon, then it is understandable that the tanna mentioned only slaughtering in the case of a mixed-species animal, because

since he stated tereifa in one [

since in the case of a tereifa he necessarily had to state only one of them, slaughtering or selling], therefore he

also stated

mixed-species animals

in one [

the tanna consequently stated only one case concerning mixed-species animals as well], and the tanna chose slaughtering because it is mentioned first in the Torah.

But if you say that it is the opinion of the Rabbis,

then the tanna should have stated both slaughtering and selling, and

we should combine them and teach them together [

the tanna should combine mixed-species animals and tereifot] and state as follows:

“If one stole a mixed-species animal or a tereifa” [

or a tereifa], and

slaughtered them or sold them” [

or sold them],

he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment.

And we conclude: Indeed,

there is a difficulty

from this beraita for Reish Lakish, for it certainly implies that this beraita is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and nevertheless one is liable for selling a tereifa.

And we raise a difficulty concerning what was taught in the beraita: If one stole

a

mixed-species animal

and slaughtered it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment:

But it is written: “When a man steals an ox or a

sheep,”

it is written

in the passage concerning slaughtering and selling,

and

indeed,

Rava said:

This

is a binyan av [

the expression “binyan av”]:

Everywhere that it is stated

“sheep,”

it serves only to exclude a mixed-species animal,

such as a he-goat that mated with a ewe. Although “sheep” includes both the goat species and the sheep species, nevertheless its father and mother must both be sheep, or its father and mother must both be goats.

If so, in the passage concerning slaughter and sale, where the Torah said: “An ox or a sheep,” we should have excluded a hybrid!?

If so, in the passage concerning slaughtering and selling, where the Torah stated “an ox or a sheep,” we should have excluded a mixed-species animal!?

And we answer:

Here,

in the context of slaughtering and selling,

the verse says: “When a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five cattle in place of the ox and four sheep in place of the sheep.” As explained above, 67b, it should have said: “When a man steals an ox and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five cattle in its place and four sheep in place of the sheep.” Thus, “or a sheep” is superfluous—

Rather, it is stated for this purpose:

“or”

in order

to include a mixed-species animal.

We raise a difficulty:

And

is it really the case that

every

“or”

comes to include

a mixed-species animal

?

But it was taught: It is written [Leviticus 22:27]: “An ox or a sheep or a goat, when it is born, shall remain seven days under its mother, and from the eighth day onward it will be acceptable as an offering, a fire-offering to the Lord.” And we derive: “

An ox or a sheep,”

the Torah made the word “or” superfluous in order to teach:

excluding a mixed-species animal,

which is unfit as a sacrifice.

excluding a hybrid,

And for this reason it is stated

“or a goat,” in order to teach:

excluding an animal resembling another species,

which resembles neither its father nor its mother, such as one born from a ram and a ewe but resembling a goat.

Thus, we derive from the superfluous “or” the exclusion of a mixed-species animal, whereas concerning slaughtering and selling you derive from “or” the inclusion of a mixed-species animal!?

He said

and answered

Rava:

Here,

in the context of theft, slaughtering, and selling, the “or” is expounded

in accordance with the subject matter of the verse, and

here

as well,

with regard to consecrated animals, the “or” is expounded

in accordance with the subject matter of the verse.

Here, with regard to theft, where it is written:

“an ox or a sheep,”

the first

is a large domesticated animal and the second is a small domesticated animal, and

you cannot exclude mixed-species animals from between them [

they do not interbreed and produce offspring]. Therefore, mixed-species animals are excluded by themselves, and if so:

you cannot exclude a hybrid from between them

—[because they do not interbreed and produce offspring with each other]. Therefore, the hybrid is excluded on its own, and if so:

Or

to include mixed species

it comes. However,

with regard to sacrificial animals, as it is written,

the “or” between

“lamb and goat”

since

both are small livestock, and

you can exclude mixed species from between them,

because they mate with one another and give birth; it follows that mixed species have still not been excluded. If so: “

Or

serves to exclude.