Bava Kamma 74a — the Talmud in English

From the seifa

of the beraita deals

with reversal and hazama,

it is evidently the case that

the reisha too deals with reversal and hazama!

For the seifa states

of the beraita:

“We testify concerning so-and-so that he knocked out the tooth of his slave”

first

and

afterward

“blinded his eye, for the slave says so,”

because this testimony, which brings about his release and entitles him to the payment for an eye, is favorable to him,

“and they were found to be zomemim, they pay the value of an eye to the master.”

But

what are the circumstances? If the latter witnesses do not concede to them any injury at all

[if the mazimim do not confirm at all that the master injured the slave] and that the slave’s law is to go free—this cannot be said, for:

If so,

they should have to pay him the value of the entire slave to the master

[we should have to obligate the mazumim to pay the value of the entire slave that they sought to cause the master to lose].

Rather, it is obvious

that the beraita is dealing with a case in which

they all concede the injury

[all the witnesses who came before us concede that the master indeed injured his slave], and the slave’s law is to go free. Therefore, the nizomim cannot be obligated to pay the value of the slave, since even the truthful witnesses confirm that his law is to go free—

And the reason they pay the value of the eye to the master is that the group confirming the release reverses the order and says that he blinded his eye first and knocked out his tooth afterward, and he is liable only for the value of a tooth—

And it is necessary to explain the seifa as referring to those witnesses who confirm the injury and reverse the order as not having come before the mazumim. For if they had indeed come before them and testified that the master was liable to the slave only for the value of a tooth, then the fact that the group of mazumim came to obligate him for the value of an eye would no longer help, because we would not obligate him on account of the doubt; and if so, no liability of “as he plotted” rests upon them even if they were found to be zomemim, since the judgment was not concluded on their testimony, and witnesses do not become zomemim until judgment has been concluded on their testimony.

And

if so, it is necessarily the case that in the seifa we are dealing with a situation in which, after the testimony mentioned in the beraita, other witnesses came

who reversed it and made them zomemim,

and thus the seifa of the beraita is explained as follows:

A group of witnesses first came and said: “We testify concerning so-and-so that he knocked out the tooth of his slave and afterward blinded his eye,” and they obligate the master to release the slave and pay him the value of his eye, “for the slave says so”—that is, this testimony of these liars is favorable to him, since they entitle him to the value of an eye, whereas in truth he is entitled only to the value of a tooth; “and they were found to be zomemim” concerning their testimony. But the mazimim witnesses confirm that the slave’s law is indeed to go free, except that the master is obligated to pay the slave only the value of a tooth, because he first blinded his eye and afterward knocked out his tooth; and the law is: “

They pay—the zomemim—the value of an eye to the master,” whom they wrongly sought to cause to lose it.

Since the seifa of the beraita deals with “reversal and hazama,” the reisha too must be explained in this manner, and there is no source for Rava from this beraita that “contradiction is the beginning of hazama.”

The Gemara further explains both the reisha and the seifa:

What are the circumstances,

when did the act occur according to the testimony of the group that reverses the order?

If the latter ones delay behind these latter witnesses

[if the last group testifying about the act that occurred in reverse says that it occurred after the testimony of the first witnesses before the court] , this cannot be said, for:

Still

there is a difficulty:

they should have to pay the value of the slave to the master

[the zomemim should pay the value of the slave to the master]. For although, at the time they come to pay for the loss of the slave, the master would in any event have had to release his slave because of the testimony of the latter witnesses, nevertheless they should pay the master the full value of the slave, because:

When they obligate the man, the man is still not one liable

[when they testified to obligate the master to release his slave, he was still not obligated to release his slave], since the act had not yet occurred at all.

Rather,

necessarily

these latter witnesses advance the act

[the witnesses who reverse the order place the act] before the arrival of the mazumim witnesses at the court, so that at the time of the false testimony the master was already obligated, even according to the truth, to release his slave; and therefore they are exempt.

The Gemara further explains:

And if he did not stand

the master

in court

to obligate him to release the slave before the testimony of the mazumim witnesses, this too cannot be said, for:

Still

there is a difficulty:

they should have to pay him the value of the entire slave to the master, [A0085][the mazumim witnesses should pay the value of the entire slave, even though an act similar to what they testify about had already occurred], because

the man still

the man still

[the master]

is not obligated

[no obligation to release him has taken effect] until he is brought to court, whereas these who came to testify falsely before the court, so that it would obligate him to release the slave, are as though they caused him to lose an entire slave.

Rather,

necessarily

that, according to the testimony of those who reverse the order, the master had already

stood

in court

for judgment

concerning the slave’s release, and therefore they are exempt from payment for the entire slave.

Said

Rabbi Aha son of Rabbi Ika, wondering,

to Rav Ashi: From where is Rava’s inference

[the source in this beraita for Rava’s inference that “contradiction is the beginning of hazama”—from the reisha or from the seifa]?

If you say, from the reisha

of the beraita, as the Gemara explained above: witnesses first came and obligated the master for the value of an eye, and then witnesses came and obligated him only for the value of a tooth and were found to be zomemim, and it is stated in the beraita that the witnesses pay the value of an eye to the slave—thus, they are liable under “as he plotted” even though they had already been contradicted?

But in the

reisha, are the middle ones contradicted

[is there here a contradiction of the middle, nizomim witnesses]?

But

since, if they were not made zomemim

[if the middle ones had not been made zomemim],

their testimony would stand like theirs, and we would render judgment like them, for

indeed

one hundred is included within two hundred

[their testimony would be accepted as they stated it, namely, that he is liable for the value of a tooth only, since the value of a tooth is included within the value of an eye]—

Therefore

:

it is the first ones who are contradicted; the middle ones are not contradicted in any way, [A0133][it follows that it is the testimony of the first ones that was contradicted, since we do not render judgment against the master for the value of an eye as they stated, whereas the middle ones are not contradicted, since their testimony is accepted], and this is not a contradiction that would remove from them the law of “as he plotted”!

[получается, что опровергнуто свидетельство первых свидетелей: мы не взыскиваем с господина стоимость глаза, как они утверждали; средние же не опровергнуты, поскольку их свидетельство принимается], и это не такое опровержение, которое лишило бы их статуса свидетелей, подлежащих закону «как замышляли»!?

He said to him

Rav Ashi to Rabbi Aha son of Rabbi Ika: It is not as we initially thought—that Rava’s proof was from the reisha itself, that “contradiction is the beginning of hazama”; rather,

Rava held:

From the reisha

we are necessarily required to explain it

with three groups,

namely, the first group that contradicts the witnesses nizomim who come after them, the group of nizomim, and the group of mazimim, as the necessity of explaining it this way was clarified above in the Gemara—

If so,

the seifa too is with three

groups, but in a different order, as will be explained

; and

if so,

Rava inferred

Rava

from the seifa

that “contradiction is the beginning of hazama,” for the seifa, with three groups, is explained as follows:

a.

For example, two came

[two witnesses came]

and said: He knocked out his tooth and

afterward

blinded

his

eye, and we concluded the judgment on the basis of their testimony

[the court concluded the judgment as they said], to release the slave and pay the value of an eye to the slave.

b.

And two other ones came and said

[two others came and said]: It was not so; rather,

he blinded his eye and

afterward

knocked out his tooth, for they contradict these first ones

[they contradict the first ones], and the testimony of the first ones is nullified through this contradiction, since on account of the doubt we do not obligate the master to pay the value of the eye.

c. And then a third group came to make the first group zomemim,

and the first ones were found to be zomemim

[and the first ones were found to be zomemim]; and the law is:

they pay

the first ones

the value of an eye to the master,

since they came to cause him to lose it wrongfully.

And according to the explanation given for the seifa of the beraita, it is proven from it that “contradiction is the beginning of hazama,” for:

And if it enters your mind that

“contradiction is not the beginning of hazama,”

why do they pay

the first ones,

for they were contradicted from the outset

[they were first contradicted] before they were made zomemim by the third group, by the middle witnesses, and their testimony was nullified.

Rather, conclude from this

from the final clause: “

denial is the beginning of refutation.”

The Gemara adds to explain that just as Rava’s proof is not from the first clause and not according to the Gemara’s initial reasoning,

as was explained, so too Abaye’s objection to Rava’s proof is not as the Gemara explained it above, but:

And Abaye could say to you

to reject this proof:

Granted, the first clause

of the baraita, indeed

it is not sufficient unless there are three groups

[it cannot be explained without three groups], for necessarily, before the refuted group came and said: “The eye and afterward the tooth,” there was another group that was more stringent against him and said: “The tooth and afterward the eye,” and because of this:

For it teaches

in the first clause, “for

the master says so,”

and it is impossible that the master would rejoice at testimony that comes to remove his slave from his possession and obligate him in payment for the tooth, unless another testimony had preceded it that was more stringent against him than this testimony, namely, that it said: “The tooth and afterward the eye,” for then he indeed rejoices at the second testimony.

But why do I need the final clause

to explain it with

three groups,

for it can be explained with only two groups, such as where they reversed their statements and refuted them, as the Gemara explained above—

And if [you say this is] because we learned in the baraita: “

for the slave says so,”

then

a slave of any sort says

[and the slave says: I desire any testimony whatsoever],

for

he

is pleased that he should go out to freedom

[for he desires to go out to freedom], meaning: let them say whatever they will, provided that they take me out to freedom.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection against it

Rabbi Zeira raised a difficulty against the substance of the baraita that we learned in it: that one who knocks out his slave’s tooth and afterward blinds his eye, or who blinds his eye and afterward knocks out his tooth, the slave goes out to freedom, and the master pays his slave for the second limb:

It is an established principle for us that a person becomes liable for a fine only if they brought him to judgment and the court obligated him, and the emancipation of a slave because of a tooth and an eye is a fine. If so,

say

we ought to say: