Bava Kamma 73b (עג:) — the Talmud in English

The Sages hold: within the time required for speech

is not considered speech,

and therefore, although they are retroactively disqualified from the time of the testimony concerning the slaughter, the testimony concerning the theft is not nullified.

But

if

Rabbi Yosei holds: “

Within the time required for speech is considered speech.”

And we raise an objection from the body of the beraita:

But

does

Rabbi Yosei hold: “

Within the time required for speech is considered speech”!?

But didn’t we learn:

a. If an unconsecrated animal and an animal designated as an olah were standing before him, and he said of the unconsecrated animal: “This is a substitute for an olah”; or if an animal designated as a shelamim was standing before him, and he said: “This is a substitute for a shelamim”; and likewise with regard to all the other offerings, the animal assumes the sanctity of the offering for which he substituted it, as the Torah states [Leviticus 27:10]: “And if he shall make substitution of an animal for an animal, then both it [the animal that was initially sacred] and its substitute shall be sacred.”

b. And if two animals, one an olah and the other a shelamim, were standing before him, and he said of the unconsecrated animal: “

This is a substitute for an olah, a substitute for a shelamim,”

the law is that

this is a substitute for an olah.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says:

a.

If this was

his intention—to say: “A substitute for an olah, a substitute for a shelamim”—

the one making the substitution intended

this

at the outset,

then

since it is impossible to assign two designations simultaneously,

his

words take effect,

and he must wait until it develops a blemish, after which half is sold for the value of an olah and half for the value of a shelamim.

b.

And if he said

at first: “

A substitute for an olah,”

and

later

reconsidered and said: “

A substitute for a shelamim,”

this is a substitute for an olah

as he said initially.

And we consider it [

and the members of the academy had already raised the following difficulty] :

“Reconsidered”!?

But

obviously

he cannot retract his initial words, which had already taken effect

And Rav Pappa said: We are speaking of one who reconsidered within the time required for speech,

and even so, he cannot retract his statement.

Thus, Rabbi Yosei holds: “Within the time required for speech is not considered speech.” How, then, could Rabbi Yosei say in the beraita that “within the time required for speech is considered speech,” and therefore we say: “When part of testimony is invalidated, all of it is invalidated”!?

They said

the members of the academy to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Yosei’s statements:

There are two

measures of

the time required for speech

.

One: the time required for a student to greet his teacher,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain, which is a longer interval.

And one: the time required for a teacher to greet his student,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain, which is a shorter interval.

And

when Rabbi Yosei does not hold that “within the time required for speech is considered speech,” this applies only within “

the time required for

the time required for a student to greet his teacher,”

namely: “

Peace upon you, my teacher and master,”

which is longer

than the second “time required for speech.”

But within

the time required for a teacher to greet his student,

which is

“Peace upon you,”

this “time required for speech”

is considered

so even according to Rabbi Yosei. The beraita is dealing with this situation, and therefore Rabbi Yosei holds there: “Within the time required for speech is considered speech.”

Rava said:

Witnesses—

who testify concerning a person that he is liable to the death penalty—

whose testimony was contradicted [

after the court had concluded the case on the basis of their initial testimony], by other witnesses who said: That person is not liable to the death penalty,

and ultimately

they were also

found to be conspiring witnesses

with regard to that testimony, as witnesses testified, saying: “You were with us”—

These conspiring witnesses

are executed

as they plotted, even though their testimony had already been nullified—through the contradiction—before they were found to be conspiring witnesses.

The reason is

that contradiction is the beginning of a conspiracy, but it has not yet been completed.

Rava said: From where do I say this

—that contradiction is the beginning of a conspiracy? From that

as it was taught:

a. One who blinds the eye of his slave, or knocks out his tooth, must have the master set him free.

b. If one blinds the eye of his slave and afterward knocks out his tooth, or knocks out his tooth and afterward blinds his eye, the master sets him free on account of his first injury, and pays him the value of his second injury.

c. Two witnesses came and said: “

We testify concerning so-and-so that he blinded the eye of his slave”—

and the law is that the slave must be set free—

and

also

knocked out his tooth

after blinding his eye,” and the master is liable to pay him the value of his tooth—

For the master says so,

meaning that he is pleased with their testimony, and the Gemara proceeds to explain why he is pleased with it.

And it turns out that

the witnesses

are conspiring witnesses

with regard to all their testimony; the conspiring witnesses

pay the value of an eye to the slave,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

But

what are the circumstances of

this beraita?

If you say as it is taught,

perhaps you will say that the beraita is to be understood literally, namely,

that there is no

group other than this one, and there is no

other group

that says: “The event did not occur”—this cannot be said, for three reasons:

a. How could we have learned: “

They pay the value of an eye to the slave”?

But is it the case that

after they have had him set free [

after the witnesses had removed him from the master] because of blinding his eye,

they must pay the value of his eye [

they must pay the slave the value of his eye]!?

b.

Furthermore: They must pay the master the value of the entire slave [

they must pay the master the value of a complete slave], since they came to remove him from the master through their testimony, and they were found to be conspiring witnesses!?

c.

Furthermore: How could we have learned:

“

For the master says so,”

which implies that the master is pleased with this testimony that they gave!? But

is the master pleased [

is the master pleased with this testimony] that removes his slave from his ownership and additionally obligates him to pay the value of his tooth!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the event occurred as follows:

For example, two witnesses came

at first,

two witnesses [

two witnesses],

and said: “

So-and-so

knocked out the tooth

of his slave, and the law is that the slave must be set free, and afterward

blinded his eye,”

so that he must—

according to their testimony—

have the master pay him [

and the master must add]

the value of his eye.

And two intermediate witnesses came [

and two additional witnesses came, and these are the ones mentioned in the beraita],

and said: At first he removed his

eye, and

eye, and afterward [

and afterward] knocked out his

tooth,

and the implication is

that he need pay him only the value of his tooth [

he is liable to pay only the value of his tooth]. And it turns out

that the first witnesses contradict the intermediate witnesses [

the first witnesses contradict the intermediate witnesses], meaning the second witnesses, who were found to be conspiring witnesses through the testimony of the final witnesses.

And that is

what we taught: “

For the master says so,”

meaning:

he is pleased with what they say,

the intermediate false witnesses [their testimony is beneficial to him], for their testimony reduces the burden of payment imposed upon him according to the testimony of the first pair.

Once the beraita has been explained, Rava proves that “contradiction is the beginning of hazama,” for

and it teaches

in the beraita:

And the intermediate ones were found to be conspiring witnesses; they pay the value of an eye to the slave,

for their testimony was disproved through hazama, whereas the testimony of the first witnesses, who obligate the master to pay the value of an eye, is the true testimony. These witnesses, who testified that the injury to the eye occurred first, thereby causing the slave to go free, sought to deprive the slave of the additional value of an eye beyond the value of a tooth; therefore, they pay the value of an eye to the slave.

It follows

that we may infer: “

Contradiction is the beginning of hazama,”

for if not, the intermediate witnesses were already contradicted from the outset, and we should not have obligated them on account of hazama.

He

refuted

Abaye

Rava’s proof from this beraita that “contradiction is the beginning of hazama”:

No,

not as you interpreted the beraita: that the witnesses mentioned in the beraita were initially contradicted by another pair who stated the opposite. Rather, this pair mentioned in the beraita, who said, “He blinded his eye and afterward knocked out his tooth,” was the first pair to appear before the court, and the court completed the ruling on the basis of their testimony. And what are we dealing with here?

In a case

where

the witnesses who exposed this pair as conspirators

reversed the order and exposed them as conspirators [that is, they exposed them as conspirators and reversed the order of events],

meaning: at first they exposed them as conspirators concerning their testimony, and added: “Indeed, the master blinded his eye and knocked out his slave’s tooth,” but the order was reversed; that is, he first knocked out his tooth and afterward blinded his eye. And thus the beraita is to be understood: “ We testify concerning so-and-so that he blinded his slave’s eye and knocked out his tooth,” and they thereby seek to obligate the master to free him and pay him the value of his tooth, “for the master says so,” meaning: the master is pleased with the testimony of these false witnesses, since according to their testimony he owes the slave only the value of a tooth, whereas in truth he owes him the value of an eye; “ And they were found to be conspiring witnesses” with regard to their testimony. However, the witnesses who exposed them as conspirators affirm that the slave is indeed to go free, but that the master must pay the slave the value of an eye, since he first knocked out his tooth and afterward blinded his eye. And the law is: “ They pay the value of an eye to the slave,” whom they sought to deprive through their false testimony; but they do not pay the master the value of the slave, because it was true that the slave was entitled to go free, as the witnesses who exposed them as conspirators affirm.

Abaye continued and said:

From where?

From where can I learn that the witnesses who exposed them as conspirators both disproved their testimony and reversed the order?