Bava Kamma 73b — the Talmud in English

The Rabbis hold: within the time required for speech

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is not considered speech,

and therefore, although they are retroactively disqualified from the time of the testimony concerning the slaughter, the testimony concerning the theft is not annulled.

And

if

Rabbi Yosei held: “

within the time required for speech is considered speech.”

And we raise an objection from the body of the beraita:

And

is it so that

Rabbi Yosei held: “

within the time required for speech is considered speech”!?

And it was taught:

a. If an unconsecrated animal and a burnt offering were standing before him, and he said concerning the unconsecrated animal, “This is a substitute for a burnt offering,” or if a peace offering was standing before him and he said, “This is a substitute for a peace offering,” and likewise with regard to all the other offerings, the animal becomes consecrated with the sanctity of the offering for which he substituted it, for thus the Torah said [Leviticus 27:10]: “And if he shall indeed substitute animal for animal, then it and its substitute shall be holy.”

b. And if two animals, one a burnt offering and the other a peace offering, were standing before him, and he said concerning the unconsecrated animal: “

This is a substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering,”

the law is that

this is a substitute for a burnt offering.

The words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says:

a.

If this was what

he intended to say: “A substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering,”

the one who substitutes intended

to say this

from the outset,

then

since it is impossible to assign two designations simultaneously,

then

his words stand,

and he must wait until a blemish occurs in it, and he sells half of it for the value of a burnt offering and half for the value of a peace offering.

b.

And if he said

at first: “

A substitute for a burnt offering,”

and

again

reconsidered and said: “

A substitute for a peace offering,”

this is a substitute for a burnt offering

as he said at first.

And we raised the question about it [

and the members of the academy had already raised a difficulty concerning this]:

“Reconsidered”!?

But

it is obvious

that he cannot retract his initial words, which had already taken effect!?

And Rav Pappa said: We are saying that he reconsidered within the time required for speech,

and even so he cannot retract his words.

Thus, Rabbi Yosei holds: “Within the time required for speech is not considered speech.” How, then, did Rabbi Yosei say in the beraita that “within the time required for speech is considered speech,” and therefore we say: “Testimony that was partially annulled is entirely annulled”!?

They said

the members of the academy, to reconcile the contradiction between Rabbi Yosei’s statements:

There are two

measures of

within the time required for speech

there are:

One: the time required for a student’s greeting to his teacher,

as he proceeds to explain, which is a longer period of time.

And one: the time required for a teacher’s greeting to his student,

as he proceeds to explain, which is a shorter period of time.

And

when Rabbi Yosei does not have

“within the time required for speech is considered speech” except within “the

time required for a student’s greeting to his teacher,”

that is: “

Peace to you, my teacher and my master,”

which is extensive,

for it is longer than the second “within the time required for speech.”

But within

the time required for a teacher’s greeting to his student, which is “

which is

Peace to you,”

this “within the time required for speech”

he has

even according to Rabbi Yosei, and the beraita is dealing with this case. Therefore Rabbi Yosei held there: “Within the time required for speech is considered speech.”

Rava said:

Witnesses—

who testify concerning a person that he is liable to receive the death penalty—

whose testimony was contradicted [

after the court had completed the judgment on the basis of their initial testimony], by other witnesses, saying: That person is not liable to receive the death penalty,

and finally

also

were found conspiring

concerning that testimony, for witnesses testified, saying: “You were with us.”

These are conspiring witnesses;

they are put to death

as they intended, and although their testimony had already been nullified—through the contradiction—before they were found conspiring.

And the reason is because

contradiction is the beginning of conspiracy, except that it was not completed.

Rava said: From where do I say it—

that contradiction is the beginning of conspiracy—from this

as it was taught:

a. One who blinds the eye of his slave, or knocks out his tooth, the master must emancipate him.

b. If he blinds the eye of his slave and afterward knocks out his tooth, or if he knocks out his tooth and afterward blinds his eye, the master emancipates him because of his first injury, and pays him the value of his second injury.

c. Two witnesses came and said: “We testify concerning so-and-so that he blinded the eye of his slave”—

and we testify concerning so-and-so that he blinded the eye of his slave—

and the law is that the slave is to be emancipated—

and

also

knocked out his tooth

after he blinded his eye,” and the master is liable to pay him the value of his tooth—

For the master says this, for the master says so,

that is, he is pleased with their testimony, and he proceeds to explain why he is pleased with this.

And it turned out that

the witnesses

were found conspiring

concerning all their testimony; the conspiring witnesses

pay the value of the eye to the slave,

as he proceeds to explain.

But

what are the circumstances

of this beraita:

If you say as it is taught,

perhaps you will say that the beraita is to be explained literally, for example,

there is no

group except this one, and there is no

other group

saying, “The event did not occur in this manner”—this cannot be said, for three reasons:

a. How did we learn: “

They pay the value of the eye to the slave”?

And is it so that

after they emancipate him [

after the witnesses removed him from the master] because they blinded his eye—

they must pay the value of his eye [

they must pay the slave the value of his eye]!?

b.

And furthermore: They must pay the master the value of the entire slave [

they must pay the master the value of a complete slave], for they came to remove him from the master through their testimony, and they were found conspiring!?

c.

And furthermore:

How did we learn:

“For the master says so,”

which implies that the master is pleased with this testimony that they gave!? But

is the master pleased [

is the master pleased with this testimony] that emancipates his slave and additionally obligates him to pay the value of his tooth!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the event occurred as follows:

For example, two came

at first,

two witnesses [

two witnesses],

and they said: “

A certain man

knocked out the tooth

of his slave, and the law is that the slave is to be emancipated, and afterward he

blinded his eye,”

so that he must—

according to their testimony—

give the master [

and the master must add]

the value of his eye.

And two middle witnesses came [

and two additional witnesses came, and they are the ones mentioned in the beraita],

and they said: At first he removed his

eye, and

eye, and afterward [

and afterward] knocked out his

tooth,

and to say concerning this:

he need pay him only the value of his tooth [

he is liable to pay only the value of his tooth], and it follows

that the first witnesses contradict the middle witnesses [

the first witnesses contradict the middle witnesses], that is, the second witnesses who were found conspiring through the final witnesses.

And this is

what we taught:

“For the master says so”,

meaning:

“it is agreeable to him in what they say”

the intermediate false witnesses [it is agreeable to him through their testimony], for they come to reduce the burden of payments imposed upon him according to the testimony of the first group.

And once the beraita has been explained, Rava proves that “contradiction is the beginning of hazama,” for

and it teaches

in the beraita:

“And they were found to be scheming witnesses, the intermediates; they pay the value of an eye to the slave,”

for their testimony was subjected to hazama, whereas the testimony of the first witnesses, who obligate the master to pay the value of an eye, is the true testimony; and these witnesses, who testified that the injury to the eye was the first one, through which he goes out to freedom, came to cause the slave to lose the excess value of an eye over a tooth, and therefore they pay the value of an eye to the slave.

Thus

you may infer:

“contradiction is the beginning of hazama,”

for if not, the intermediate witnesses were contradicted from the outset, and we should not have obligated them on account of hazama.

He

rejected

Abaye

Rava’s proof from this beraita that “contradiction is the beginning of hazama”:

No,

not as you explained the beraita: that those witnesses mentioned in the beraita were initially contradicted by another group that said the opposite. Rather, this group mentioned in the beraita, which said, “He blinded his eye and afterward knocked out his tooth,” was the first group that came before the court, and they concluded the judgment on its basis. And with what are we dealing here?

With a case such

that

the witnesses who exposed this group as schemers

reversed their testimony and exposed them as schemers [

that is, they exposed them as schemers and reversed them, exposing them as schemers and reversing the order of the events], meaning: at first they exposed them as schemers regarding their testimony, and added to say: “Indeed, the master blinded his eye and knocked out his slave’s tooth,” except that it occurred in the reverse order, namely: first he knocked out his tooth and afterward blinded his eye. And thus the beraita is interpreted: “ We testify concerning so-and-so that he blinded his slave’s eye and knocked out his tooth,” and they come to obligate the master to release him and pay him the value of his tooth, “for the master says so,” meaning: the master is pleased with the testimony of these liars, for according to their testimony he owes the slave only the value of a tooth, whereas according to the truth he owes him the value of an eye; “ and they were found to be schemers” regarding their testimony, but the witnesses who exposed them as schemers affirm that indeed the slave’s law is that he goes out to freedom, except that the master is obligated to pay the slave the value of an eye, because first he knocked out his tooth and afterward blinded his eye; and the law is: “ They pay the value of an eye to the slave,” whom they sought to cause to lose through their lie, but they do not pay the slave to the master, because it was true that his law was to go out to freedom, as the witnesses who exposed them as schemers affirm.

Abaye adds and says:

From where?

From where do I learn that the witnesses who exposed them as schemers both exposed them as schemers and reversed the order?