Bava Kamma 72a (עב.) — the Talmud in English

It is because

“I did not eat the meat of an ox”

[I did not eat ox meat], meaning: I did not examine the matter’s taste carefully enough.

Rava then returned and challenged Rav Naḥman:

Rather,

now, according to your retraction,

what is the difference between the first clause

of our Mishna, in which he is liable to pay even if he did not yet stand trial, and the court obligates him to pay only part of the payment,

and what is the difference between the latter clause

of our Mishna, concerning one who slaughtered after his father died, in which he does not pay fourfold or fivefold, whose simple reason is that he is not liable for the entire slaughter, since part of the animal belongs to him—for Scripture said, “Even five half-oxen,” did it not!?

Rav Naḥman said to him,

to Rava:

This is the distinction:

The first clause—

where, at the time of the slaughter, the entire animal was stolen and in his possession—he is liable, because

we apply to him the phrase:

“And he slaughtered it”

entirely in a state of prohibition

[the entire act of slaughter was performed on an object that was stolen and prohibited].

Even though at the time the payment became due—that is, when he stood trial—we cannot obligate him to pay the entire payment, since he himself inherited part of it, this does not matter, because Scripture said, “He shall pay five cattle,” and even “he shall pay five half-oxen.”

But

the latter clause—

where, already at the time of the slaughter, part of the animal was owned by him—he is exempt, because

we do not apply to him

“and he slaughtered it”

entirely in a state of prohibition;

that is, since the Torah said “and he slaughtered it,” and not “and he slaughtered,” it implies that the slaughter must be entirely performed in a state of prohibition.

We learned in the Mishna:

“One who slaughters and it is found to be a tereifa”,

one who slaughters non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard pays fourfold or fivefold payment:

Rav Ḥavivi of Meḥoza said to Rav Ashi: We can conclude—

from our Mishna, which obligates one to pay fourfold or fivefold payment for slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard, even though through the slaughter the animal becomes prohibited for benefit—

“The slaughter is considered to exist only at the end”

[the slaughter is called slaughter only at the conclusion of the slaughtering], and the animal becomes prohibited only upon completion of the slaughter; thus, at the time of the slaughter that he performed, it was still permitted.

For if

“the slaughter exists from beginning to end,”

then why is he liable for fourfold or fivefold payment for slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard?

Once he slaughtered a small amount of it

[as soon as he began slaughtering],

he prohibited it

for benefit because of “non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard”; and if so,

he is slaughtering the remainder not as the owner’s animal

[he is not slaughtering the owner’s animal].

He said—

he refuted

him—

Rav Huna, son of Rava, said this

to Rav Ḥavivi:

And see further there what he wrote on the basis of this, and his words will be brought in note 11, section b; and see further in Zekher Yitzḥak, section 39.

In fact, the slaughter exists from beginning to end, and indeed once he slaughtered part of it, the animal became prohibited; nevertheless,

when he is held liable, it is for that small amount

[his liability for fourfold or fivefold payment is for that small portion that he slaughtered].

Rav Ashi said

to Rav Huna, son of Rava:

Do not refute it

as you refuted it, because

“and he slaughtered it”

requires the entire act, and

if you hold him liable only for part of the slaughter, then

there is no

“and he slaughtered it” in its entirety.

Rather, there is a difficulty

from our Mishna, for if so, it implies that the slaughter is considered to exist only at the end!?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

This is what Rav Gamda said in the name of Rava:

Our Mishna is dealing with

a case where he slaughtered part of the identifying organs outside, and completed them

to the majority of the animal’s identifying organs

inside.

There are those who teach it—

this exchange between Rav Ḥavivi and Rav Ashi—

in connection with this

which was stated:

Rabbi Shimon said in the name of Rabbi Levi the Elder:

“The slaughter is considered to exist only at the end,”

the slaughter is called slaughter only upon completion of the slaughter.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

“The slaughter exists from beginning to end.”

Rav Ḥavivi of Meḥoza said to Rav Ashi:

Let us say,

is it possible that

Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard are not prohibited by Torah law,

meaning that there is no Torah prohibition either in slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard or in deriving benefit from them after their slaughter!?