Bava Kamma 72a — the Talmud in English

It is because

I do not eat ox meat

I did not eat ox meat; that is to say: I did not examine the matter’s reasoning carefully enough.

Rava again raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

But rather,

now, according to your retraction,

what is different about the first clause

of our Mishna, that he is liable to pay even if he did not yet stand trial, and the court obligates him only for part of the payment,

and what is different about the final clause

of our Mishna, where he slaughtered after his father died and he does not pay four and five, and the simple reason is that he is not liable for the entire slaughter, because part of the animal belongs to him; yet “the Merciful One said: even five half-cattle”?!

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

This is the distinction:

the first clause—

at the time of the slaughter the entire animal was stolen in his possession—he is liable, because

we apply to him:

“and he slaughtered it”

entirely in a prohibited manner

the entire act of slaughter was performed with a stolen and prohibited object].

And although at the time of the payment obligation—that is, at the time of standing trial—we cannot obligate him for the entire payment, since he himself inherits part of it, this does not matter to us, for the Merciful One said, “He shall pay five cattle,” and even “he shall pay five half-cattle.”

But

the final clause—

where already at the time of the slaughter a portion was acquired by him—he is exempt, because

we do not apply to him

“and he slaughtered it”

“entirely in a prohibited manner,”

that is to say: since the Torah said, “and he slaughtered it,” and not “and he slaughtered,” it implies that the slaughter must be entirely in prohibition.

We learned in the Mishna:

one who slaughters and it is found to be a tereifa,

one who slaughters non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard pays the payment of four and five:

Rav Ḥavivi of Meḥoza said to Rav Ashi: Infer from this—

from our Mishna, which obligates four and five for slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard, although through the slaughter the animal became prohibited for benefit—

“slaughtering exists only at the end”

slaughter is called slaughter only at the end of the slaughter], and the animal became prohibited only at the completion of the slaughter, while at the time of the slaughter he slaughtered something permitted.

For if

“slaughtering exists from the beginning until the end,”

then why is he liable for four and five for slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard? For

once he slaughtered a small amount of it

immediately when he began slaughtering],

he prohibited

the animal for benefit because of “non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard,” and if so,

the rest he is not slaughtering as the owner’s

he is not slaughtering what belongs to the owners].

He said—

he rejected

him—

Rav Ḥavivi—

Rav Huna, son of Rava:

And see further there what he wrote on the basis of this, and his words will be brought in note 11, section b; and see further in Zekher Yitzḥak, section 39.

In truth, slaughtering exists from the beginning until the end, and indeed, when he slaughtered part of it, the animal became prohibited; but nevertheless,

when he is made liable, it is for that small amount

his liability for four and five is for that small amount that he slaughtered].

Rav Ashi said to him

to Rav Huna, son of Rava:

Do not reject it

as you rejected it, because

“and he slaughtered it”

we require it in its entirety, and

if you obligate him only for part of the slaughter, then

there is not

“he slaughtered it in its entirety.”

But it is difficult

for our Mishna, for if so it follows from it: slaughtering exists only at the end?!

He said to him,

Rav Ashi:

This is what Rav Gamda said in the name of Rava:

our Mishna deals with

a case where he slaughtered part of the windpipes outside, and completed them

to the majority of the animal’s windpipes

inside.

There are those who formulate it—

this matter of Rav Ḥavivi and Rav Ashi—

with regard to this

that was stated:

Rabbi Shimon said in the name of Rabbi Levi the Elder:

“slaughtering exists only at the end,”

slaughter is called slaughter only at the end of the slaughter.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

“slaughtering exists from the beginning until the end.”

Rav Ḥavivi of Meḥoza said to Rav Ashi:

Let us say,

is it possible that

Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard are not prohibited by Torah law,

there is no Torah prohibition either in slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard or in benefiting from them after their slaughtering?!