Bava Kamma 71b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Granted, according to the one who says:

the work of Shabbat is

by Torah law, on account of this ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

the Rabbis exempted [that is why the Sages exempted], namely, Rabbi Shimon, because it is slaughter that is unfit by Torah law.

But according to the one who says

that even according to Rabbi Yohanan the sandal-maker, the work of Shabbat is forbidden only

by rabbinic law,

then it is again difficult:

why did the Rabbis exempt

the thief from the four and five when he slaughtered on Shabbat? For by Torah law it is fit slaughter, and by law he should be liable for the four and five!?

They said

the members of the academy:

When the Rabbis exempted

in the beraita, it was only

with regard to the other

the other cases mentioned in the beraita—

That is,

with regard to idolatry:

when he slaughtered by means of another for idolatry, because it is slaughter that is unfit by Torah law.

And a stoned ox,

because it is forbidden for benefit by Torah law, and its slaughter is slaughter that is unfit.

The Gemara further explains the beraita brought in it, in which Rabbi Meir obligates one who slaughters by means of another for idolatry:

And why does Rabbi Meir obligate one who slaughters for idolatry

when

once he slaughtered a small amount of it, it became forbidden to him

for benefit [since he began slaughtering for idolatry—before the sender became liable on account of slaughter —the animal had already become forbidden] because of idolatrous offering?

And if so,

the other one is one forbidden for benefit—

And

it is not its owner’s that he slaughtered [it is no longer slaughter of the owners’ animal], for he had already lost it before the slaughter, and it became forbidden to him

and why should the thief be liable for the four and five for the slaughter that followed!?

He said

he answered,

Rava:

Our Mishna is dealing

with

a case where

he says,

the one who slaughters: “I am not slaughtering for the sake of idolatry from the beginning of the slaughter, but

it is at the completion of the slaughter [that is: I]

serve it,”

and if so, the animal did not become forbidden until he finished slaughtering.

The Gemara further raises a difficulty against the beraita:

a stoned ox—

since it is forbidden for benefit—

it is not his

the one robbed’s

that he slaughters,

the thief, so why is he liable for it!?

He said

he answered,

Rava:

a. Below, 76a, we learned:

One who steals consecrated property from the house of the owners is exempt. What is the reason? “And he steals from the house of the man,” and not from the house of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Shimon says: If he stole consecrated property for which they are liable [that is, the owners are liable to give the Sanctuary another animal in place of this one if the animal is stolen, lost, or dies], the thief is liable to pay double for the theft and four and five if he slaughtered it. Rabbi Shimon’s reason is: Since the owners are liable for it, when he slaughters it, he slaughters what belongs to its owner, for an object that causes monetary liability [such as this animal, which causes him monetary liability, since he would otherwise be liable to provide another in its place] is considered money; that is, it is like his own.

b. The Sages taught above, 44b: An ox that killed—

Before its judgment was completed [to be stoned] ... if its guardian returned it to the house of its owner, it is returned; but once its judgment was completed—and the ox became forbidden for benefit, according to the law of an ox whose judgment was completed to be stoned, as explained above, 41a—if its guardian returned it to the house of its owner, it is not returned.

Rabbi Yaakov says: Even once its judgment was completed, if its guardian returned it to the house of its owner, it is returned; however, even according to Rabbi Yaakov, he is exempt only if the ox returned to the house of its owner, but if the ox did not return to the house of its owner, even if the ox was subject to an unavoidable accident, the guardian—even if he is an unpaid guardian—is liable to pay its value.

c. It follows from what is explained in sections a and b that if a person stole an ox whose judgment had been completed for stoning from the guardian’s house, his law would depend on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages, and on the dispute between Rabbi Yaakov and the Sages; for according to Rabbi Yaakov, who says that the guardian can return it and be exempt even after its judgment was completed, and if he does not return it he is liable for the replacement value of the entire ox, the ox is “an object that causes monetary liability,” and according to Rabbi Shimon the thief would be liable.

Here—

in the beraita that obligates one who steals a stoned ox and slaughters it to pay the four and five—

what are we dealing with? For example, where they handed it over

the owners handed over the ox

to a guardian, and it caused damage

the ox injured a person and killed him

in the guardian’s house,

and it was warned in the guardian’s house

and

also

its judgment was completed

for the ox to be stoned

in the guardian’s house,

and the ox became forbidden for benefit—

and it was stolen from the guardian’s house

and the thief slaughtered it; therefore, according to Rabbi Meir, the thief is liable to pay the guardian for the slaughter—

and

because

Rabbi Meir agrees with Rabbi Yaakov, and

also

agrees with Rabbi Shimon.

He agrees with Rabbi Yaakov, who said: Even once its judgment was completed, if its guardian returned it to its owners,

behold, it is

returned,

and although the ox is forbidden for benefit, he can return it and be exempt.

And he agrees

Rabbi Meir also

with Rabbi Shimon, who said: An object that causes monetary liability is considered money.

For we learned: Rabbi Shimon says: “

consecrated property for which he is liable,”

that is, one who steals consecrated property from the house of owners who are liable for it, he is

liable,”

therefore,

for it is proven that according to Rabbi Shimon,

an object that causes monetary liability is considered money.

Rav Kahana said: I stated the teaching

above, in which we explained that our Mishna, which obligates one for slaughtering on the Day of Atonement, even though he is liable for lashes, follows the view of Rabbi Meir, who holds: “He receives lashes and pays” —

before Rav Zevid of Nehardea,

and I challenged him:

Can you establish the Mishna as Rabbi Meir, and not as Rabbi Shimon [how is it possible to explain our Mishna as Rabbi Meir] and not as Rabbi Shimon, who generally holds: “He does not receive lashes and pay”!?

who generally holds: “One is not flogged and made to pay”?

But it teaches in the latter clause

of our Mishna: “

Rabbi Shimon exempts in these two cases,”

by inference,

necessarily,

that throughout the entire Mishna—

including “one who slaughtered on the Day of Atonement pays fourfold and fivefold payments”—

he concedes

that Rabbi Shimon agrees with it, even though he generally holds: “He does not receive lashes and pay”!?

He said to him

Rav Zevid of Nehardea to Rav Kahana:

No,

it is not as you inferred, that Rabbi Shimon concedes in every law of our Mishna; rather,

by inference, he concedes

Rabbi Shimon

in the case of one who slaughtered and sold for medicinal purposes and for dogs,

since it is a proper slaughtering.

But Rabbi Shimon always disagrees even concerning the first clause, in the case of one who slaughtered on the Day of Atonement, for according to his view he does not receive lashes and pay.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who stole from his father, and slaughtered and sold

and afterward his father died, pays fourfold and fivefold payments:

Rava asked Rav Naḥman:

a. The fourfold and fivefold payments for slaughtering and selling are a fine, and one who admits to this liability is exempt from paying, for “one who admits to a fine is exempt.”

b. And if

one stole an ox belonging to two partners, and slaughtered it, and admitted to one of them

alone, and was exempt from paying him,

what

is the law concerning whether he pays half of the fourfold and fivefold payment to the partner to whom he did not admit?

The Gemara explains the sides of the doubt:

Shall we say: “

Five cattle

he shall pay”

the Merciful One said, and not “

five halves of cattle

he shall pay”?

Or perhaps: “

Five cattle

he shall pay”

the Merciful One said, and even “

five halves of cattle

he shall pay”?

He said to him

Rav Naḥman to Rava: “

Five cattle

he shall pay”

the Merciful One said, and not “

five halves of cattle

he shall pay.”

Rava raised an objection to him

Rav Naḥman from our Mishna:

One who stole from his father, and slaughtered and sold, and afterward his father died, pays fourfold and fivefold payments—

But here, since his father died,

before he stood in judgment,

it is as though he had already admitted to one of them

before he stood in judgment

it is considered,

for he does not become liable at the time of standing in judgment for the entire “five cattle,” since he himself inherits one share of the payment,

and

nevertheless

it teaches: He pays fourfold payments

and fivefold payments.

It follows that the Torah said even, “he shall pay five halves of cattle,” and this is a difficulty against Rav Naḥman!?

He said

he answered

to him

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

Here,

in our Mishna,

with what are we dealing? For example, his father stood

with him

in judgment, and he became liable to pay the full fourfold and fivefold payment to his father before his father died.

Rava again challenged Rav Naḥman:

But

if he slaughtered before his father died and

did not stand in judgment

before his father died,

what

is the law—according to your words—that he

does not pay fourfold and fivefold payments!?

If so, instead of teaching in the latter clause [below, 74b]:

below, on page 74b]:

One who stole from his father and he died, and afterward slaughtered and sold, does not pay fourfold and fivefold payments,

because at the time of the slaughtering he was one of the owners of the stolen property—

let the tan[n]ay divide

the tan[n]ay

in his own case [let the tan[n]ay divide in the same manner as in the first clause], namely, when he slaughtered before his father died, and say as follows:

let the tan distinguish in the same manner as in the first clause—namely, when he slaughtered the animal before his father died—and let him say as follows:

When are these words stated—

that he is liable to pay when he slaughtered before his father died—

when he stood in judgment

for his slaughtering before his father died;

but

if he

did not stand in judgment

for his slaughtering,

he does not pay fourfold and fivefold payments,

because “the Merciful One said five cattle and not five halves of cattle,” and it is impossible to obligate him at the time of standing in judgment for the entire fourfold and fivefold payment!?

He said to him

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

This too,

the tan[n]ay could have divided in this manner, but

since he stated the first clause [since the tan[n]ay taught in the first clause]: “

because the tan taught in the first clause: “

One who stole from his father, and slaughtered and sold, and afterward his father died,”

therefore

he stated

the tan[n]ay in

the latter clause as well: “

One who stole from his father, and his father died, and afterward he slaughtered and sold.”

In the morning [the next morning of that day], Rav Naḥman retracted his words, and

Rav Naḥman retracted his statement, and

he said to him

to Rava: “

Five cattle

he shall pay”

the Merciful One said, and even “

five halves of cattle

he shall pay”; and whether he admitted to one of the partners, or whether he slaughtered and sold his father’s [animal] and his father had not brought him to judgment and his father died, the court obligates him to pay a share of the fourfold and fivefold payment.

Rav Naḥman further said to Rava:

And this—that I did not tell you in the evening [and that I did not give you this answer yesterday]—

[and why I did not give you this answer yesterday evening]—