Bava Kamma 6a — the Talmud in English

The Gemara answers:

to include,

the Torah wrote the fire in order to include that fire is liable even for something that is not fit for it to damage, such as

it scorched his plowed furrow,

the fire burned and damaged his plowed earth [the earth hardens, and he must plow again],

and singed his stones,

the fire spoiled and damaged his stones. And had the damage of fire been learned from the other primary categories, we would not have known to hold the fire liable even for something that is not fit for it.

And now the Gemara returns to explain the words of our Mishna:

We learned in our Mishna:

the common feature among them

is that it is their way to cause damage, and their safeguarding is incumbent upon you, and when it causes damage, the damager is liable to pay compensation for damage from the best of the land.

And from the words of the Mishna it follows that it comes to include every damager, even a damager that cannot be considered a derivative of one of the primary categories; nevertheless, since it is its way to cause damage and its safeguarding is incumbent upon you, one is liable for its damage. Therefore, the Gemara asks:

To include what?

Which damager does the tanna of the Mishna need to include from the common feature among them?

Abaye said: To include,

the Mishna comes to hold one liable for

his stone, his knife, and his burden that he placed on the roof, and they fell through an ordinary wind and caused damage.

And this liability is learned from the common feature, since it is their way to cause damage, and so forth.

The Gemara now discusses why it is necessary to learn their liability from the common feature:

What are the circumstances?

How is this case being discussed?

If they cause damage while they are going,

if it is speaking of a case in which the stone and the knife caused damage in the course of their movement, if so,

this is

a derivative of

fire!

For

what is different about fire

[what is different about fire] that its particular stringency is

that it

causes damage through

another force

[the wind] that

is involved in it,

and

it is

your property, and

the obligation of

safeguarding it

so that it does not cause damage is

upon you;

if so,

these also,

these [his stone, his knife, and his burden], also cause damage through

another force

that

is involved in them,

for they cause damage with the assistance of the wind that caused them to fall from the roof,

and

they too are

your property, and

the obligation of

safeguarding them

so that they do not cause damage is

upon you. If so, just as one is liable for the damage of fire, one is liable even for these derivatives of fire, and there is no need to learn them and include them from the common feature.

If so, just as one is liable for damage caused by fire, one is liable for these derivatives of fire as well; there is no need to derive and include them through the common feature.

Rather, perhaps we shall say that it is speaking of a case in which they caused damage

after they had come to rest,

after they had come to rest,

meaning, after they came to rest on the ground, an ox or a donkey stumbled upon them and was injured.

Here too one must discuss what the circumstances are:

If he declared them ownerless,

if it is speaking of a case in which, before they caused damage, the owner declared the stone and the knife ownerless, then

whether according to

the view of

Rav or whether according to

the view of

Shmuel, this is,

they are a derivative of

a pit. [

Rav and Shmuel disputed below [28b] concerning an obstacle that had not been declared ownerless: according to Shmuel, we learned its liability from the law of a pit, and according to Rav, one is liable for it under the law of an ox. But according to everyone, if he declared the obstacle ownerless, it is a derivative of a pit.]

And their liability is learned from a pit, for

what is different about a pit

[what is different about a pit]

that from the beginning of its making it is intended for damage,

from the beginning of its making it stands ready to cause damage,

and

it is

your property,

meaning, the damage comes about through you,

and

the obligation of

safeguarding them

so that they do not cause damage is imposed

upon you.

Here,

these also,

these too [his stone, his knife, and his burden],

from the beginning of their making

stand

for damage,

from the beginning of placing them, the matter is considered to stand ready to cause damage, since he placed them in a place where they would ultimately fall through an ordinary wind, and he should have taken into account that they would fall and cause damage after their fall.

And

they are

your property,

meaning, the damage comes about through you,

and

the obligation of

safeguarding them

so that they do not cause damage is imposed

upon you.

If so, just as a pit is liable, these too are liable; and since their liability is learned from a pit, there is no need to learn them from the common feature.

And

rather,

if it is speaking of his stone, his knife, and his burden

that he did not declare ownerless

[that he did not declare them ownerless], nevertheless it is difficult

for

the method of

Shmuel, who said: all of them

[even an obstacle that he did not declare ownerless]

we learned from his pit

to hold him liable. If so,

this is a pit,

this too is a derivative of a pit, and its liability is learned from a pit, and there is no need to learn it from the common feature. The Gemara answers why their liability is learned from the common feature:

In fact, it is where he declared them ownerless,

it is indeed speaking of his stone, his knife, and his burden that he declared ownerless, and they caused damage after they came to rest; nevertheless, it is necessary to learn them from the common feature, since

they are not similar to a pit —

they are not truly similar to a pit, such that we should learn their liability from a pit, for this learning can be refuted:

What is there in a pit,

which is stringent,

that no other force is involved in it,

for the person himself created the obstacle without the addition of an external force, and therefore he is liable for it.

Can you say the same concerning these,

can you say the same concerning these [his stone, his knife, and his burden]

in which another force is involved,

for, besides the person, an additional force [the wind] also participated in creating them as a damager? Therefore, they cannot be learned from a pit alone.

Rather, it can be answered:

Fire will prove it!

For it too causes damage through another force involved in it, and it is liable.

But this learning too can be refuted:

What is there in fire,

which is a severe form of damage,

for it is its way to go and cause damage;

can you say the same concerning these, which do not go and cause damage, but rather the damaged party comes to them?

And concerning this one can answer: The obstacle of

a pit will prove it!

For this obstacle does not go to cause damage, and yet it is liable.

And the case returns,

the arguments repeat themselves; again one can refute: What is there in a pit, in which no other force is involved, and so forth; fire will prove it, and so forth.

Rather, ultimately it is proven that neither the stringency of the law of fire nor the stringency of the law of a pit causes the law; rather, it is the common feature among them: it is their way to cause damage, they are your property, their safeguarding is incumbent upon you, and they are liable. I too will bring his stone, his knife, and his burden: it is their way to cause damage, they are your property, and their safeguarding is incumbent upon you, and they will be liable.

And this law is what the Mishna, according to Abaye, comes to include when it says, “the common feature among them.” And the Gemara brings another answer as to what the Mishna comes to include:

Rava said: “The ‘common feature’ that the Mishna stated comes

The “common feature” stated by the Mishna comes

to include

[to include]

a rolling pit,

an obstacle that rolled to another place. For example, one who places a stone in the public domain, and the stone did not cause damage in the place where he placed it, but the stone rolled

by the feet of a person and by the feet of an animal

to another place, and caused damage there; the one who placed it is liable.

And the Gemara discusses why it is necessary to learn the liability for this damage from the common feature:

What are the circumstances?

How is it speaking?

If he declared it ownerless,

if the one who placed the stone declared it ownerless, then

whether according to Rav

and

whether according to Shmuel,

who disputed concerning an obstacle that he did not declare ownerless, whether its liability is under the law of a pit or under the law of an ox, nevertheless both agree that if he declared it ownerless,

this is

[it is a derivative of]

a pit!

And its liability is learned from a pit, for

what is different about a pit

[what is different about a pit]

that from the beginning of its making it is intended for damage,

from the beginning of its making it stands ready to cause damage,

and

the obligation of

safeguarding it

so that it does not cause damage is imposed

upon you,

here

these also,

the obstacles that are a “rolling pit,” are also

from the beginning of their making intended for damage,

from the time that a person placed them in the public domain, they stand ready to cause damage,

and

the obligation of

safeguarding them

so that they do not cause damage is

upon you. Therefore, just as a pit is liable, the one who places a stone, which is a rolling pit, is liable. And there is no need to learn its liability from the common feature.

Therefore, just as one is liable for a pit, one who places a stone, which is a rolling pit, is liable as well. There is no need to derive its liability through the common feature.

And

rather,

if it is speaking

of

the one who placed the stone

not declaring it ownerless

[that he did not declare it ownerless], nevertheless it is difficult

for

the method of

Shmuel, who said: all of them

[even an obstacle that he did not declare ownerless]

we learned from a pit

to hold him liable. And if so,

this is a pit.

This case too is a derivative of a pit, and its liability is learned from a pit, and there is no need to learn it from the common feature.

And the Gemara answers why it is necessary to learn its liability from the common feature:

In fact, it is where he declared it ownerless,

it is indeed speaking of the one who placed the stone declaring it ownerless; nevertheless, it is necessary to learn it from the common feature, since

it is not similar to a pit,

it is not truly similar to a pit, such that we should learn its liability from a pit, for this learning can be refuted:

What is there in a pit

which is stringent

for its acts caused it,

the action [its digging] of the owner of the pit caused the damage;

can you say the same concerning these,

concerning the rolling pit,

that its acts did not cause it,

for the damage did not come through the action of the person who placed it, but through the feet of a person and an animal that rolled it; therefore, their liability cannot be learned from a pit alone.

Rather, it can be answered:

An ox

that causes damage

will prove it.

For its owner is liable even though the damage was not done through the actions of the person, but only through his property that caused damage.

But this learning too can be refuted:

What is there in an ox,

which is stringent,

for it is its way to go and cause damage;

can you say the same concerning a rolling pit, which causes damage in its place?

And concerning this one can answer: The obstacle of

a pit will prove it!

For one is liable for it even though the obstacle of a pit does not go and cause damage.

And the case returns,

the arguments repeat themselves; again one can refute: What is there in a pit, for its acts caused it, and so forth.

Rather, ultimately we say:

This one is not like that one,

the stringency of a pit is not like the stringency of an ox, and likewise the stringency of an ox is not like the stringency of a pit. It is proven that these stringencies do not cause the law; rather, the common feature among them is that it is their way to cause damage and their safeguarding is incumbent upon you.

And this law is what the Mishna comes to include, according to Rava, when it says, “the common feature among them,” and so forth.

The Gemara brings an additional answer: what does the Mishna come to include?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

The common feature that the Mishna stated comes

to include

[to include] one who places an obstacle in the public domain with the authorization of the court: if others are injured by it, the one who placed it is liable, as in

that which was taught,

which we learned in a beraita:

All those concerning whom the Sages said

that they are permitted to cause damage in the public domain—and they are:

those who open their gutters,

who open their channels that pour wastewater, so that it spills into the public domain,

and those who clear out their caves,

who cast their refuse into the public domain—

in the summer days they have no permission,

they did not permit them to do this during the summer days, because the street is pleasant and this damages it, but only

during the rainy days,

when the streets are dirty then,

they have permission

to take [these things] into the public domain. Even

though

the removal of the wastewater and refuse is carried out

with permission, if

they

caused damage, they are liable

the ones who pour them

to pay.

And the Gemara discusses why it was necessary to learn this liability from the common feature:

What are the circumstances?

How is this case being discussed?

If they cause damage while moving,

if the case is that they caused damage in the course of their movement, if so,

it is his force,

and their liability is on account of a person who causes damage, and there is no need to learn their liability from the common feature.

Rather,

perhaps we shall say that the case is

after they came to rest,

that they caused damage after they had come to rest on the ground, at which point an ox or a donkey stumbled over them.

But also concerning this there is room to discuss what the case is:

What are the circumstances?

How is this case being discussed?

If he abandoned them,

if the one who took them out abandoned the refuse and wastewater, if so,

whether according to Rav

and

whether according to Shmuel,

who disagreed concerning an obstacle that one did not abandon, whether his liability is by the law of a pit or of an ox, in any event they agree that if he abandoned them,

this is

[it is a derivative of]

a pit,

and its liability is learned from the pit, for

what is different about a pit

[in what way is the pit different]

that the beginning of its making is for causing damage —

from the beginning of its making it is ready to cause damage—

and it is your property,

and the damage comes about through you,

and

the duty of

guarding it is upon you. These too,

these refuse heaps as well,

the beginning of their making is for causing damage,

from the time they come to rest they stand ready to cause damage,

and they are your property,

and the damage comes about through you,

and

the duty of

guarding them

is imposed

upon you; therefore, just as the pit is liable, these too are liable, and there is no need to learn their liability from the common feature.

Therefore, just as a pit is liable, these too are liable, and there is no need to derive their liability from the common denominator.

Rather,

let us say that the case is

that he did not abandon them,

that he did not abandon the refuse and wastewater; nevertheless, it is difficult

for

the method of

Shmuel, who says that all of them

[including an obstacle that one did not abandon]

we learned from his pit,

to make him liable, and if so,

this is a pit;

these too are a derivative of a pit, and there is no need to learn their liability from the common feature.

The Gemara answers why their liability is learned from the common feature:

Actually, it is that he abandoned them;

the case is indeed that the one who took them out abandoned them, but nevertheless it was necessary to learn their liability from the common feature, since

they are not comparable to a pit,

they are not entirely comparable to a pit, such that their liability can be learned from the pit, for this learning can be refuted:

What is there about a pit

that makes it more severe,

since

its creation was carried out

without permission, whereas you will say concerning these, that they were with permission,

you will say this concerning these, whose removal into the public domain was carried out with permission, and if so, their liability cannot be learned from the pit alone.