Bava Kamma 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara answers:

to include

that the Torah wrote the case of fire in order to include that fire is liable even for something that is not ordinarily subject to damage by it, such as

when it scorched his plowed field:

the fire burned and damaged his plowed land [the soil becomes hardened, and he must plow it again],

and singed his stones:

the fire ruined and damaged his stones. Had the damage caused by fire been derived from the other primary categories, we would not have known that fire is liable even for something that is not ordinarily subject to damage by it.

The Gemara now returns to explain the words of our Mishna:

We learned in our Mishna:

The common denominator among them

is that it is their manner to cause damage, and it is your responsibility to safeguard them; and when one of them causes damage, the damager is liable to pay compensation for the damage from the best land.

It follows from the words of the Mishna that it comes to include every damager, even a damager that cannot be considered a derivative of any one of the primary categories. Nevertheless, since it is its manner to cause damage and it is your responsibility to safeguard it, one is liable for the damage it causes. Therefore, the Gemara asks:

What does it come to include,

what damager does the tanna of the Mishna need to include through the common denominator among them?

Abaye said: It comes to include

the Mishna’s imposing liability for

his stone, his knife, and his burden that he placed on the roof, and they fell in an ordinary wind and caused damage.

This liability is derived through the common denominator, since it is their manner to cause damage, and so on.

The Gemara now discusses why it is necessary to derive their liability through the common denominator:

What are the circumstances,

what case is being discussed?

If they cause damage as they are moving,

if the stone and the knife caused damage while moving along their path, if so,

this is

a derivative of

fire!

For

what is different about fire

[in what way is fire different] that its special feature is

that it

causes damage through

an external force

[the wind] that

is involved in it,

and

it is

your property, and

the obligation of

safeguarding it

so that it does not cause damage is

upon you?

If so,

these too,

these [his stone, his knife, and his burden], also cause damage through

an external force

that

is involved in them,

since they cause damage with the assistance of the wind that caused them to fall from the roof,

and

they too are

your property, and

the obligation of

safeguarding them

so that they do not cause damage is

upon you. If so, just as one is liable for damage caused by fire, one is liable for these derivatives of fire as well, and there is no need to derive them and include them through the common denominator.

If so, just as one is liable for damage caused by fire, one is liable for these derivatives of fire as well; there is no need to derive and include them through the common feature.

Rather,

perhaps we should say that the case is one in which they caused damage

after they came to rest,

that is, after they came to rest on the ground, an ox or a donkey encountered them and was injured.

Even in this case, one must consider what the circumstances are:

If he rendered them ownerless,

if the case is one in which, before they caused damage, the owner rendered the stone and the knife ownerless, then

whether according to

the view of

Rav or whether according to

the view of

Shmuel, this is

a derivative of

a pit.

Rav and Shmuel disagreed below [28b] regarding an obstacle that one did not render ownerless: according to Shmuel, its liability is derived from the law of a pit, while according to Rav, one is liable for it under the law of an ox. But according to everyone, if one rendered the obstacle ownerless, it is a derivative of a pit.

Their liability is derived from a pit, since

what is different about a pit

[in what way is a pit different]

in that from the outset of its creation it is intended to cause damage,

from the moment it is created, it stands ready to cause damage,

and

it is

your property,

meaning that the damage comes about through your agency,

and

the obligation of

safeguarding them

so that they do not cause damage is imposed

upon you.

Thus,

these too,

these as well [his stone, his knife, and his burden],

from the outset of their creation

stand

to cause damage,

since from the moment he placed them, they are considered to stand ready to cause damage, because he placed them in a location where they would eventually fall in an ordinary wind, and he should have taken into account that they might fall and cause damage after falling.

And

they are

your property,

meaning that the damage comes about through your agency,

and

the obligation of

safeguarding them

so that they do not cause damage is imposed

upon you. Therefore, just as one is liable for a pit, one is liable for these as well; and since their liability is derived from a pit, there is no need to derive them through the common denominator.

If so, just as one is liable for a pit, one is liable for these as well. Since their liability is derived from a pit, there is no need to derive them through the common feature.

And

rather,

if the case concerns his stone, his knife, and his burden

which he did not render ownerless

[which he did not render ownerless], nevertheless it is difficult

for

the view of

Shmuel, who says that all of them

[even an obstacle that one did not render ownerless]

we derive from his pit

to impose liability. If so,

this is a pit,

this too is a derivative of a pit, and its liability is derived from a pit, so there is no need to derive it through the common denominator. The Gemara answers why their liability is derived through the common denominator:

Actually, it is referring to a case where he rendered them ownerless,

indeed, the case concerns his stone, his knife, and his burden, which he rendered ownerless, and which caused damage after coming to rest. Nevertheless, they must be derived through the common denominator, since

they are not analogous to a pit —

they are not entirely analogous to a pit, such that their liability can be derived from a pit, because this derivation can be refuted:

What is the special feature of a pit,

which is stringent,

that no external force is involved in it,

for the person himself created the obstacle without the addition of an external force, and therefore he is liable for it?

Can you say this with regard to these,

can you say this with regard to these [his stone, his knife, and his burden]

in which an external force is involved,

for, besides the person, an additional force [the wind] also participated in creating them as a damager. Therefore, they cannot be derived from a pit alone.

But one can respond:

Fire proves it!

For it too causes damage through an external force involved in it, and one is liable.

However, this derivation can also be refuted:

What is the special feature of fire,

which causes severe damage,

that it is its manner to move along and cause damage

Can you say this with regard to these, which do not move along and cause damage; rather, the injured party comes to them?

And regarding this one can respond: The obstacle of

a pit proves it!

For one is liable for this obstacle even though the obstacle of a pit does not move along and cause damage.

And the argument returns,

the arguments return upon themselves: once again, one can refute the derivation by saying, “What is the special feature of a pit, in that no external force is involved in it?”; “Fire proves it,” and so on.

Rather, ultimately it is demonstrated that neither the stringency of the law of fire nor the stringency of the law of a pit brings about the liability. Rather, it is their common denominator: It is their manner to cause damage, they are your property, their safeguarding is upon you, and one is liable. I too will bring his stone, his knife, and his burden: It is their manner to cause damage, they are your property, and their safeguarding is upon you; therefore one will be liable for them.

And according to Abaye, the Mishna comes to include this law when it says, “The common denominator among them.” The Gemara brings another answer as to what the Mishna comes to include:

Rava said: “The common denominator” that the Mishna states comes

to

include

[to include]

a rolling pit,

an obstacle that rolled to another location. For example, one places a stone in the public domain, and the stone does not cause damage where he placed it, but rather rolls

by the feet of a person or by the feet of an animal

to another location, and there it causes damage; the one who placed it is liable.

The Gemara discusses why the liability for this damage must be derived through the common denominator:

What are the circumstances,

what case is being discussed?

If he rendered it ownerless,

if the one who placed the stone rendered it ownerless, then

whether according to Rav

or

whether according to Shmuel,

who disagreed regarding an obstacle that one did not render ownerless, whether its liability is under the law of a pit or under the law of an ox, in any event both agree that if one rendered it ownerless,

this is

[it is a derivative of]

a pit!

And its liability is derived from a pit, because

what is the special feature of a pit

[in what way is a pit different]

in that from the outset of its creation it is intended to cause damage,

from the moment it is created, it stands ready to cause damage,

and

the obligation of

safeguarding it

so that it does not cause damage is imposed

upon you.

Thus,

these too,

the obstacles that constitute a “rolling pit,”

from the outset of their creation they are intended to cause damage

from the moment a person placed them in the public domain, they stood ready to cause damage,

and

the obligation of

safeguarding them

so that they do not cause damage is

upon you. Therefore, just as one is liable for a pit, the one who placed the stone, which is a rolling pit, is liable as well. There is no need to derive its liability through the common denominator.

Therefore, just as one is liable for a pit, one who places a stone, which is a rolling pit, is liable as well. There is no need to derive its liability through the common feature.

And

rather,

if the case is

that

the one who placed the stone

did not render it ownerless

[which he did not render ownerless], nevertheless it is difficult

for

the view of

Shmuel, who says that all of them

[including an obstacle that one did not render ownerless]

we derive from a pit

to impose liability. If so,

this is a pit.

This case too is a derivative of a pit, and its liability is derived from a pit, so there is no need to derive it through the common denominator.

The Gemara answers why its liability must be derived through the common denominator:

Actually, it is referring to a case where he rendered it ownerless,

the case indeed concerns one who placed the stone and rendered it ownerless. Nevertheless, its liability must be derived through the common denominator, since

it is not analogous to a pit,

it is not entirely analogous to a pit, such that its liability can be derived from a pit, because this derivation can be refuted:

What is the special feature of a pit,

which is stringent,

in that its actions caused it,

the action [digging] of the owner of the pit caused the damage.

Can you say this with regard to these,

with regard to a rolling pit,

whose actions did not cause it,

for the damage did not come about through the action of the person who placed it, but through the feet of a person or an animal that rolled it. Therefore, their liability cannot be derived from a pit alone.

But one can respond:

An ox

that causes damage

proves it.

For its owner is liable even though the damage was not caused by the actions of the person, but only by his property that caused damage.

However, this derivation can also be refuted:

What is the special feature of an ox,

which is stringent,

in that it is its manner to move along and cause damage

Can you say this with regard to a rolling pit, which causes damage in its place?

And regarding this one can respond: The obstacle of

a pit proves it!

For one is liable for it even though the obstacle of a pit does not move along and cause damage.

And the argument returns,

the arguments return upon themselves: once again, one can refute the derivation by saying, “What is the special feature of a pit, in that its actions caused it?”; and so on.

Rather, ultimately we say:

This one is not like that one,

the stringency of a pit is not like the stringency of an ox, and the stringency of an ox is not like the stringency of a pit. It is thus demonstrated that these stringencies do not bring about the liability; rather, their common denominator is that it is their manner to cause damage and their safeguarding is upon you.

And according to Rava, the Mishna comes to include this law when it says, “The common denominator among them,” and so on.

The Gemara brings another answer to the question of what the Mishna comes to include:

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

The common denominator stated by the Mishna comes

to include

those who place a hazard in the public domain with the authorization of the court: If something is damaged by it, the one who placed it there is liable, as in

that which was taught:

which we learned in a beraita:

All those whom

the Sages said are permitted to cause damage in the public domain, namely: They

open their drainage channels,

opening their pipes through which wastewater flows, so that it spills into the public domain,

and they clear out their caves,

throwing their refuse into the public domain,

have no authorization during the summer,

as they were not permitted to do this during the summer, because the street is attractive and this damages it; only

during the rainy season,

when the streets are dirty,

do they have authorization

to remove these things into the public domain. Even

though

the removal of the wastewater and refuse is done

with authorization, if

they

caused damage, they are liable; the people who poured them out

must

pay.

And the Gemara discusses why it was necessary to derive this liability from the common denominator:

What are the circumstances?

How is this case understood?

If they cause damage while moving,

if the case is one in which they caused damage as they moved, if so,

it is their force,

and their liability is on the grounds that a person caused damage; therefore, there is no need to derive their liability from the common denominator.

Rather,

perhaps we should say that the case is one

after they have come to rest,

in which they caused damage after coming to rest on the ground, at which point an ox or a donkey encountered them.

But this too must be examined: What is the case?

What are the circumstances?

How is this case understood?

If he declared them ownerless,

if the one who removed the refuse and wastewater declared them ownerless, if so,

according to Rav

and

according to Shmuel,

who disagree concerning a hazard that one did not declare ownerless, whether liability for it is under the category of a pit or of an ox, in any event they agree that if he declared it ownerless,

that is

[it is a derivative of]

a pit,

and its liability is derived from the liability for a pit, since

what is different about a pit

[what is the difference between a pit]

whose creation initially makes it fit to cause damage —

from the moment it is made, it is ready to cause damage—

and it is your property,

and the damage comes about through you,

and

the obligation of

guarding it is incumbent upon you. These too,

these refuse heaps as well,

their creation initially makes them fit to cause damage;

from the moment they come to rest, they stand ready to cause damage,

and they are your property,

and the damage comes about through you,

and

the obligation of

guarding them

is imposed

upon you.

Therefore, just as a pit entails liability, so too do these entail liability, and there is no need to derive their liability from the common denominator.

Rather,

let us say that the case is one

in which he did not declare them ownerless,

in which he did not declare the refuse and wastewater ownerless. Nevertheless, there is a difficulty

with

the method of

Shmuel, who says that all of them

[including a hazard that one did not declare ownerless]

we derive from his pit,

to hold him liable. If so,

this is a pit:

these too are derivatives of a pit, and there is no need to derive their liability from the common denominator.

The Gemara answers why their liability is derived from the common denominator:

Actually, it is a case where he declared them ownerless;

the case is indeed one in which the person who removed them declared them ownerless. Nevertheless, it was necessary to derive their liability from the common denominator, since

they are not comparable to a pit;

they are not entirely comparable to a pit, such that their liability could be derived from a pit, because this derivation can be refuted:

What is different about a pit,

which is more stringent,

since

its creation was

without authorization; say the same concerning these, which were done with authorization,

say that the removal of these objects into the public domain was done with authorization. If so, their liability cannot be derived from a pit alone.