Bava Kamma 5b — the Talmud in English

It was difficult for the tanna:

“Let the Merciful One write two, and let the other come from them.”

That is, although it has been explained that an ox and mav'eh cannot be learned from one another, it is still difficult: why should the Torah write only these two, and we would learn fire from them?

He then said: “One cannot come from one of two,”

therefore he added and said that even from both of them together fire cannot be learned, since they have a shared severe characteristic: they possess living force, whereas fire does not. Therefore, had the Torah not written fire, it would not have been possible to learn it from an ox and mav'eh.

The Gemara clarifies that in truth, in order to learn the liabilities of the primary categories, it was not necessary to write all of them:

Rava said: “And all of them”

[all the primary categories of damage],

“when you cast a pit among them,”

when you cast a pit among them—that is, if you combine a pit with another primary category—

“they all come by the common aspect,”

they can be learned from them—the liability of all the remaining primary categories—from the common aspect among them.

“Except for a horn”—

apart from a horn, which cannot be learned by the common aspect from a pit and the other primary categories,

“because it can be refuted”—

the learning can be refuted and rejected:

“What is true of all of them”

[all the primary categories]

“is that they are forewarned from the outset”—

their way is to cause damage from the outset. Can you say this concerning a horn, whose way is not to cause damage at the beginning, until it becomes forewarned?

The Gemara adds that according to one opinion it is possible to learn even a horn:

“And according to the one who says, on the contrary, a horn is superior,”

according to the approach that says the opposite—that a horn has a greater stringency than the other primary categories,

“for”

the goring of a horn is done out of

“its intention to cause damage,”

if so,

“even a horn also comes”

even a horn would be learned from a pit and another primary category.

The Gemara asks:

“Rather,”

if so, since the liability of all the primary categories could have been learned from a pit and another primary category,

“for what halakhic purpose did the Merciful One write them?”

For what need did the Torah write each of the primary categories separately?

And the Gemara answers:

“For their laws.”

The Torah wrote each primary category separately in order to teach us the special laws that apply to each of the primary categories and not to the others.

The Gemara specifies:

“A horn”

the Torah wrote—in order

“to distinguish between”

a

“non-forewarned”

[the first three gorings], for which one pays only half-damage,

“and”

between a

“forewarned”

[the fourth goring and onward], for which one pays full damage.

“Tooth and foot”

the Torah wrote

“to exempt them”

when they caused damage

“in the public domain,”

and one is liable for them only when they caused damage in the property of the injured party.

“A pit”

the Torah wrote, in order

“to exempt through it vessels,”

for if vessels fell into the pit and broke, the owner of the pit is exempt.

“And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who makes one liable for damage to vessels in a pit,”

who holds [in the beraita below, 53b] that a pit is liable for damage to vessels—and according to him it is impossible to explain that the Torah wrote a pit in order to teach that one is exempt for vessels—one must say that the Torah wrote a pit in order

“to exempt through it a person,”

for if a person fell into the pit and died, the owner of the pit is not liable.

And the law of

“man,”

who damages his fellow, the Torah wrote in order

“to make him liable for four things”:

pain, medical expenses, loss of livelihood, and humiliation [as explained above, 4b]. But concerning the other primary categories [for which one is liable on account of “his property that caused damage”], if they damaged a person, the owner of the damaging property is exempt from these payments.

“Fire”

the Torah wrote

“to exempt through it that which is concealed.”

That is, the one who ignites the fire is exempt for garments and the like that were concealed inside the stack that was burned.

“And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who”

disagreed with the Sages in the Mishna [below, 61b] and

“makes one liable for damage caused by concealed objects in a fire,”

according to him it is impossible to explain that the Torah wrote fire in order to exempt through it that which is concealed; if so,

“what does it come to include?”

What does the Torah come to include? That is, for what purpose did it write the law of the primary category of fire?