Bava Kamma 69a — the Talmud in English

b. And if the court said to him:

“You are obligated to give it to him”,

and he went and

slaughtered and sold it,

he

must pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

What is the reason?

Since the court had not issued a final ruling concerning him,

the court had not

concluded the matter,

[since there was no decisive judgment],

he is still a thief,

[the status of a thief still applies to him].

If so, this is difficult: Since according to Reish Lakish the Mishna is dealing with a case in which the thief stood trial before the owners consecrated the animal, then even if they had not consecrated it, the thief should have been exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment. Yet the Mishna indicates that he is exempt only if the owners consecrated it first!?

And we answer:

It is necessary for the Mishna to teach that if one stole an animal, the owners consecrated it, and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, he is exempt because it belongs to the hekdesh; rather, it is dealing with a case in which the owners consecrated it after

the court had told the thief

“They said to him: the court: “

— вору: «

You are obligated to give it to him”

only; for they had not yet finalized his judgment, by saying: “Go out and give it to him.” In such a case he is not a robber who would be liable for the slaughter had the animal not been consecrated; yet, on the other hand, since they had already told him: “You are obligated to give it to him,” he is no longer exempt merely because returning the principal to the owners through their consecration.”

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Rabbi Yohanan said: If one robbed another and the owners did not despair of recovering it,

both

—the robber and the owners—

cannot consecrate it: the one because it is not his,

,

а этот — потому что оно не находится в его владении.

And we challenge this:

Did Rabbi Yohanan really say this,

that a person cannot consecrate, and likewise cannot redeem through consecration, an object that is in the hands of a robber and not in the owners’ possession!?

But Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna, and

we

learned

in tractate Ma'aser Sheni:

A fourth-year vineyard,

which may be eaten through redemption,

was marked with clods of earth

[clumps of earth] placed around the vineyard, to inform people that it was forbidden to eat its produce without redemption—

And, incidentally, the Gemara explains the reason for this sign:

A sign like earth

[it is a sign to those who take from the produce that the vineyard is like earth],

just as one derives benefit from earth

[one derives benefit from it only later, when it is plowed, sown, and harvested],

so too this—

the fourth-year vineyard—

likewise, when it is redeemed, it is permitted to derive benefit from it

[after its redemption, one may benefit from it].

And

a vineyard

of orla,

which is entirely forbidden to benefit from, was marked

with potsherds

[fragments of roof tiles]—

And we explain:

A sign like potsherds: Just as one derives no benefit from potsherds

at all, not even later,

so too this

orla

has no benefit in it

[it has no benefit whatsoever].

And graves

were marked

with lime

because of ritual impurity, and we explain:

A sign of whiteness, like bones

[lime is white like bones],

and he dissolves

the lime in water

and pours it

around the grave,

so that it will become whiter

[because of the water, the lime becomes whiter and more conspicuous].

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said:

When are these words said—

that they marked fourth-year produce and orla—

in the Sabbatical year, when they are ownerless,

and whoever takes from there takes lawfully; therefore, one must prevent him from transgressing.

But during the other years of the Sabbatical cycle,

when whoever takes from there is wicked, they would not mark it, because of the saying: “

Feed it to the wicked and let him die.”

And

if

the modest,

pious people who wished to prevent everyone from transgressing,

would place money

for redemption

and say: Whatever is picked from this

shall be

redeemed with this money,

then no one would stumble through them.

Thus, there is an unattributed Mishna stating that a person can redeem produce that is in the hands of a robber, and the same should apply to consecrating it; this is difficult according to Rabbi Yohanan!?

And if you would say

to resolve this:

Who is the tanna of the modest?

Who is the tanna who taught the statement concerning “the modest”? It is not an unattributed Mishna; rather, it is a continuation of the words of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel

—they are his words.

And Rabbi Yohanan,

who said, “The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna,”

did not say that the halakha follows an unattributed statement of an individual—

In any event, this remains difficult, for

Rabba bar bar Hanna said that Rabbi Yohanan

himself said:

Whenever Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha follows him, except in

these three matters:

the guarantor, Sidon, and the final proof!?

If so, we maintain that a person can redeem an object that is not in his possession, and this is difficult according to Rabbi Yohanan!?

They said

to explain Rabbi Yohanan’s position:

Do not say

that the modest said: “

Whatever is picked from this,”

which implies that the redemption takes effect on what has already been picked and is in the thieves’ hands—

Rather, say that in the morning they would say: “

, что утром они говорили: «

Whatever will be picked from this

[everything that will eventually be picked] shall be redeemed from now,” and it follows that the redemption took effect while the produce was still in the owners’ possession; therefore, the redemption is effective.

And we challenge this:

Did Rabbi Yohanan really say this,

that the modest would say, “Whatever will be picked from this”!?

But Rabbi Yohanan said: The modest and Rabbi Dosa stated the same matter!

And

we find that

Rabbi Dosa

said “picked”

in the present tense!?

If so, the modest too must have said, “Whatever is picked”!?

As it was taught:

The law concerning the gleanings of the harvest is that when two stalks fall together, they are leket, which the Torah grants to the poor: “You shall not glean the leket of your harvest; you shall leave them for the poor and the stranger” [Leviticus—[unclear: the citation is incomplete in the source]. But if three stalks fall together at the time of harvesting, they are not leket; they belong to the homeowner. Since not all poor people are expert in these laws,

Rabbi Yehuda says: In the morning the homeowner stands and says: “

Everything that the poor pick today”—

even what is not legally leket—

shall be ownerless,”

so that the poor will not stumble.

Rabbi Dosa says: In the evening

he

says: “

Everything that the poor have picked

shall be ownerless.”

And since according to Rabbi Dosa it is impossible to effect the legal act before the gleaning, and the Modest Ones and Rabbi Dosa stated one thing, it is clear that even the Modest Ones effected the redemption only in such a manner that the redemption would take effect after the gleaning.

And we answer:

Reverse Rabbi Judah’s [opinion] for Rabbi Dosa

Rabbi Dosa is the one who stated Rabbi Judah’s words

and Rabbi Dosa’s [opinion] for Rabbi Judah

and Rabbi Judah is the one who stated Rabbi Dosa’s words]—and it follows that according to Rabbi Dosa, he would say, “Whatever they will glean,” and indeed: “The Modest Ones and Rabbi Dosa stated one thing”!

And we challenge this:

Why do you reverse the baraita?

Why do you reverse what is stated in the baraita, in order to reconcile Rabbi Yohanan’s statement: “The modest people—who would make their declaration in the morning—and Rabbi Dosa expressed the same view”?

On the contrary,

you should reverse Rabbi Yohanan’s statement

you should have reversed Rabbi Yohanan’s words

and say

that Rabbi Yohanan said as follows:

The modest people and Rabbi Yehuda

who, according to his view, would indeed make their declaration in the morning so that it would take effect immediately

expressed the same view!?

The members of the academy say

in response: The reason we reversed the baraita is not merely to reconcile Rabbi Yohanan’s statement, but because

the baraita necessarily must be reversed

it must be reversed for another reason; namely:

in this beraita

beraita

it teaches that Rabbi Judah holds that there is selection

“there is selection,” for according to his view he would say in the morning: “Whatever the poor will glean shall be ownerless,” and when the poor glean, we say: The matter was retroactively clarified that this was ownerless, even though the owner does not know of this in the morning, for perhaps they will not glean anything beyond what is legally theirs at all, and the ownerlessness did not take effect.

And

behold,

we have heard Rabbi Judah elsewhere, that he does not hold that there is selection

as he explains and proceeds; and because of this, we necessarily have to reverse the positions of the tannaim in the beraita, and say that according to Rabbi Judah, he did not render ownerless whatever the poor would glean, which is a law dependent on “selection”; rather, they would say after they had already gleaned that those fruits which had been gleaned would be ownerless.

For we learned

that Rabbi Judah holds: “There is no selection”: