Bava Kamma 68b — the Talmud in English

For Rabbi Elazar said: ![](pamud.bmp "

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Know

here you have proof]

that an ordinary case of theft is the owners’ despair, for the Torah said: “He who slaughters or sells shall pay fourfold or fivefold”;

it follows that the Torah made him liable fourfold or fivefold for a sale,

and

behold,

perhaps he did not despair

perhaps he did not despair], and how did the Torah make every thief liable!?

Rather, is it not because we say: an ordinary case of theft is the owners’ despair?

It follows that Rabbi Elazar too holds that the Torah made him liable only after despair.

And we raise an objection against Rabbi Elazar:

But perhaps even though he did not despair

the Torah made him liable, and from where does Rabbi Elazar prove from this that an ordinary case of theft is the owners’ despair!?

They said

the members of the academy, explaining Rabbi Elazar’s view:

It should not enter your mind

that he should become liable before despair for a sale that accomplished nothing, because the Torah made a sale

analogous to slaughtering

liable!

Just as slaughtering, through which his actions benefited

his actions benefited], for the thief acquired even the meat through “change effected by an act,”

so too a sale

the Torah made liable only in a case

where his actions benefited.

And if

you say that the Torah made him liable for a sale even when it was

before despair,

behold,

what benefit did

his actions provide, since the sale does not exist, and it is as though he did not sell!?

We further raise an objection against Rabbi Elazar:

But perhaps

the Torah made him liable only in a case

where we heard that he despaired [we heard him say that he despaired] before the sale, and from where is it to be proven from this that “an ordinary case of theft is the owners’ despair”!?

before the sale; so how can one prove from this that “an ordinary theft involves the owners’ relinquishment of hope of recovering the item”?

They said

the members of the academy, explaining Rabbi Elazar’s view:

It should not enter your mind,

that the Torah made him liable only in a case where we heard of the owners’ despair, because:

A sale

analogous to slaughtering

the Torah made liable, and

just as slaughtering,

the Torah made liable even when he slaughtered

immediately [close immediately to his theft]

and even before he waited for the owners’ despair,

so too a sale

the Torah made liable even when he sold

immediately

without waiting for the owners’ despair.

He said

in astonishment

to him, Rabbi Yohanan

to Rabbi Elazar, who holds: the Torah made him liable only for a sale that benefited:

Theft of a person—

that the Torah said [Deuteronomy 24:7]: “When a man is found stealing a person from among his brothers, from the Children of Israel, and he deals with him as a slave and sells him, that thief shall die”—

shall prove

that there is no

there

owners’ despair [because no person despairs of himself]

that could make the sale an existing sale, and nevertheless

and

in any event

he is liable

if he sold him!

It follows

we learn from Rabbi Yohanan’s challenge

that Rabbi Yohanan holds

that the sale of stolen livestock

before despair entails liability

for fourfold or fivefold payment, even though his sale did not benefit him.

The following discussion is a third discussion addressing the law of despair, whether it acquires.

As for

after despair, what

is Rabbi Yohanan’s view? Does he hold that despair acquires or not?

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is liable,

and he proceeds to explain it.

And Reish Lakish said: He is exempt.

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is liable,

because he holds:

his liability

for a sale is

both before despair

as was explained above, that Rabbi Yohanan disagreed with Rabbi Elazar, who makes him liable only after despair,

and both after despair,

because despair does not acquire.

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt,

because he holds:

his liability is before despair, but after despair, he acquired

the theft,

and he slaughters his own, and he sells his own.

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish

who holds that despair acquires, from that which we learned [below 74b]:

A thief

an animal

and consecrated

it, the thief [in a manner in which his consecration takes effect, as he proceeds to explain],

and afterward slaughtered

the thief the animal, he

pays double payment

to the owners, since he stole it before the consecration,

but he does not pay fourfold or fivefold payment

to the owners, since he slaughtered that which belonged to the consecrated property, and he does not pay fourfold or fivefold even to the consecrated property.

But

when [when]

did the thief consecrate it?

If we say before despair

the thief consecrated it,

does it become consecrated

through the thief’s consecration!?

For “

And when a man consecrates his house as sacred,”

the Merciful One said: Just as “

his house”

belongs to him, so everything

that is

his

he can consecrate; but the thief cannot consecrate something that is not his.

Rather, it is obvious

that the Mishna is dealing with a case in which the thief consecrated it

after despair,

for even if despair does not acquire, the consecration takes effect either because of “change of designation,” since initially it was ordinary property and now it is consecrated property, or because of “change of domain,” since it changed from the domain of an ordinary person to the domain of the Most High.

And if so, it is proven that despair does not acquire [and the consecration takes effect only because of a change of designation or a change of domain], for:

And the reason that he consecrated

and slaughtered and sold after the consecration

is that he does not pay fourfold or fivefold payment,

and because

when he slaughtered, he slaughtered consecrated property

and not that of the person robbed.

But

if

he did not consecrate

the animal, then if

he slaughtered

he

pays fourfold or fivefold payment

to the person robbed, even though the owners had already despaired.

And if it should enter your mind that despair acquires, why does he pay

fourfold or fivefold when he slaughtered after despair!? For

he slaughters his own, he sells his own.

It is therefore proven from this Mishna that despair does not acquire, and this is difficult for Reish Lakish!?

He said to him

Reish Lakish to Rabbi Yohanan:

Despair indeed acquires, and this Mishna is dealing with a case before despair, and therefore the thief is liable for slaughtering if not for the consecration; and as for what is difficult for you—if so, how could the thief consecrate it?—I can say to you:

With what case are we dealing here:

For example, the owners consecrated it while it was in the thief’s possession

before they despaired, and the consecration took effect through the owners, and therefore the thief is exempt when he slaughtered it after the consecration from fourfold or fivefold payment.

And we raise an objection against Reish Lakish’s explanation:

Does it become consecrated

through the owners when the theft is not in their possession, but rather in the thief’s possession!?

But Rabbi Yohanan said:

If one robbed something and the owners did not despair: both of them

—the robber and the owners—

cannot consecrate;

this one

—the robber—

because it is not his, and this one

—the owners—

because it is not in his possession!?

And if so, it is impossible to interpret the Mishna in the manner that the owners consecrated it while it was in the thief’s possession, and as Reish Lakish interpreted it!?

They say

the members of the academy, in order to explain the view of Reish Lakish:

He -

Reish Lakish -

who follows the

tanna of

“the modest ones”,

who holds: the owners consecrate and effect other applications of sanctity to an item that was robbed or stolen from them, even though the stolen item is not in their possession.

As we learned:

A fourth-year vineyard—which requires redemption in order to eat its produce—they would mark during the Sabbatical year with clods of earth, in order to hint that it is possible to derive benefit from the produce only after redemption, like earth from which it is possible to derive benefit; and all this was during the Sabbatical year, when the produce is ownerless, and anyone who comes to take may come and take; but during the other years of the seven-year cycle they would not mark them, for if it was on account of thieves, so that they would not eat without redemption, there was no concern for this, since “feed the wicked and let him die”—whereas

the modest ones

[pious people] would

set aside the money

for the redemption of the fourth-year vineyard,

and

they would

say: Everything that is picked

[which had already been picked]

from this

by the thieves,

shall be redeemed with this money,

so as not to cause the thieves to stumble.

It is thus proven that according to this tanna it is possible to redeem produce that is not in the possession of the redeemer, but rather in the hands of thieves, and the same is true that the owners can consecrate it; and Reish Lakish holds like this tanna.

We further challenge the interpretation of Reish Lakish, who interpreted the Mishna—“If he stole and then consecrated it, he pays double payment”—as dealing with a case in which the owners consecrated it while it was in the thief’s possession:

A thief pays double payment only when, at the time of his being brought to court, the stolen item was in his possession, as it is stated: “If the theft shall surely be found in his hand, from an ox to a donkey to a live sheep, he shall pay two”; but if the thief returned the stolen item to the owners before he was brought to court, and it was no longer in his possession, then the court does not obligate him to pay double payment for the theft—

And behold

here, when the owners consecrated it while it was in the thief’s possession, it is as though

the principal returned to the owners,

and the thief does not pay even double payment, whereas in the Mishna we learned that when the owners consecrated it, he is exempt only from the fourfold and fivefold payment, but for double payment he is liable; and if it is as you say, that the owners consecrated it, why is he liable!?

And we answer: this Mishna deals

when

already

stood

the thief

in court

over the theft—before the owners consecrated it—and the court had already obligated him to pay the double payment, and he is no longer exempt from the double payment even if he were to return the principal to the owners.

And we challenge:

What are the circumstances,

how was the court ruling issued before the owners consecrated it!?

If they said

the court to the thief: “

Go out, give it to him

the double payment,” this cannot be said, for:

If so,

why specifically: he consecrated

[after the thief stood in court] and then slaughtered it, so that he is exempt from the fourfold and fivefold payment, when

even if he did not consecrate it, likewise he should not be liable

the thief for the fourfold and fivefold payment, since the court ruled to the thief, “Go out, give it to him”?

For

behold,

Rava said:

a. If the court said to the thief: “

Go out, give it to him,”

and the thief went and

slaughtered and sold

it, he is

exempt.

What is the reason?

Since they adjudicated it

the court

fully

[the court issued its ruling definitively],

and he slaughtered and sold it, he became a robber

who slaughtered and sold it [since his theft became known, and he holds it by force],

and

behold,

a robber does not pay the fourfold and fivefold payment.