Bava Kamma 67b (סז:) — the Talmud in English

Even "

stolen"

has no remedy;

and to teach:

A stolen animal is not fit for an offering

whether before despair of recovery, or whether after despair of recovery.

This proves that despair does not effect acquisition, for if it did effect acquisition, the animal would not be disqualified.

Rava said:

From here

we can learn that despair does not effect acquisition, for the Torah excluded it: "

his offering"

and not the stolen animal—

that is, for example, where one stole an animal and consecrated it as an offering.

But

when

did the Torah exclude it?

If you say: Before despair,

then

it is obvious

that it is disqualified, because it does not belong to him and he therefore cannot consecrate it; so

why do I need a verse

to disqualify it?

Rather, is it not

the Torah's exclusion referring to a case where one stole an animal and consecrated it

after despair,

for then the consecration takes effect because of "change of designation" or "change of possession" following despair?

And learn from this: Despair

alone

does not effect acquisition,

because if despair did effect acquisition, there would no longer be any basis for disqualifying it, since at the time of consecration it would already have belonged to him.

And Rava concludes:

Learn from this

that despair does not effect acquisition in the case of a stolen item.

And we raise an objection: This proof had already been presented by Abaye to Rabba above on 66b,

but Rava

himself

was the one who said

there, in rejecting the proof, that the verse does not come to exclude one who stole an animal and consecrated it, but rather refers to a case

where he stole another person's offering,

and teaches us that the offering does not fulfill its owner's obligation!?

The Gemara resolves this difficulty in two ways:

Alternatively, you can say: He retracted—

Rava retracted his earlier statement.

And alternatively, you can say: One of them—

one of these two traditions—was stated by

Rav Pappa,

who was Rava's student; he

said it,

but the listener erred and thought that he had said it in the name of his teacher. Thus, there is no longer a difficulty from one statement of Rava against another.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the measure of the payments of four and five

applies only to an ox and a sheep, as it is stated: "When a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five cattle for the ox and four sheep for the sheep":

And we ask:

But why

does he pay four and five only for an ox and a sheep!?

Let us derive

a gzera shava, "

ox, ox"

from Shabbat,

as it is stated concerning Shabbat [Deuteronomy 5:14]: "And the seventh day is Shabbat for the Lord your God; you shall perform no labor, you, nor your son, nor your daughter, nor your servant, nor your maidservant, nor your ox, nor your donkey, nor any of your animals"—

And it is stated:

Just as there,

with regard to Shabbat,

wild animals and birds are like them,

the ox and donkey,

so too here,

all animals,

wild animals and birds are like them,

the ox and sheep!?

He said—

Rava

answered:

Because

the verse says: "

ox and sheep" "

ox and sheep"

twice,

["an ox or a sheep ... for the ox ... for the sheep"], to teach:

Ox and sheep—

yes:

one is indeed liable fourfold and fivefold for them, but

not any other creature:

one is not liable fourfold and fivefold for it, even if he slaughtered or sold it.

The scholars said

to raise an objection:

Which "

ox and sheep"

is superfluous!?

If you say that "

ox and sheep"

at the end

of the verse is

superfluous, for let the Merciful One write: "

When a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five cattle in its place and four sheep in its place"

[and not: "for the ox ... for the sheep"]—

That cannot be said, because:

Had the Merciful One written it this way, I would have said: He must pay nine for each one

[for I would then have said: One who slaughters or sells an ox or a sheep pays nine—five cattle and four sheep].

And if you would say that indeed "

ox and sheep" at the end is superfluous, because there is no need to teach that he does not pay nine, since

it is written "

in its place" "

in its place" twice, and

one "

in its place"

is superfluous

to teach that he does not pay nine—

That is not so, because

that

"in its place"

which is superfluous

is needed for another exposition,

as will be explained, and therefore "ox and sheep" at the end is not superfluous, since it comes to teach that he does not pay nine.

As it was taught in a beraita: Could it be that one who stole an ox worth one hundred dinars shall pay in its place

five oxen

that are emaciated

[thin and close to death] and thereby be exempt!? Therefore

the verse states: "

in its place" "

in its place"

twice.

Rather,

say that "

ox and sheep"

at the beginning

of the verse is

superfluous, for let the Merciful One write: "

When a man steals

and slaughters or sells it, he shall pay five cattle for the ox and four sheep for the sheep"—

and let Him not write "when a man steals an ox or a sheep." The superfluous phrase would then teach: For an ox and a sheep, yes—one is liable fourfold and fivefold—but not for other animals.

That too cannot be said, because:

Had the Merciful One written it this way, I would have said: He is not liable until he steals two and slaughters them

[he is not liable until he steals an ox and a sheep and slaughters them]; therefore the Torah says: "When a man steals an ox or a sheep."

And if so, which "ox and sheep" is superfluous to teach us: For an ox and a sheep, yes; for any other creature, no!?

And we answer: Indeed, "ox and sheep" at the beginning is superfluous. As for your difficulty—that it is needed to teach us that he is liable even if he did not steal two and slaughter them—

and slaughters it

is written,

which implies: slaughter

of one

alone; he need not slaughter two in order to become liable.

And

we still ask: "Ox and sheep" at the beginning is not superfluous, for had the verse not stated it,

I might have said

that he is not liable for sale

until he steals

the

two of them and sells them

[until he steals two and sells them]!?

And we answer:

and sells it

is written,

which implies: sale

of one

alone.

And

we still ask:

I might have said that the verse states "ox and sheep" at the beginning for this reason: otherwise

the verse would not have stated it, and

I might have said

that he is not liable

until he steals two: one he slaughters and one he sells

[he is not liable until he steals two, slaughters one, and sells the other]; therefore the Torah says: "When a man steals an ox or a sheep"!?

And we answer: "

or sells it"

is written,

and "or" indicates division.

And I might still have said—if the verse had not stated "when a man steals an ox or a sheep" at the beginning—

until he steals

the

two of them and slaughters one while leaving one, or sells one while leaving one

[he is liable only for stealing two, and becomes liable through slaughtering or selling one of them, while he does nothing to the second].

Therefore the verse states "ox or sheep" at the beginning to teach that this is not so. If so, it is not superfluous, and the difficulty still remains: Let us derive "ox, ox" from Shabbat!?

Rather,

the Gemara explains the superfluous words as teaching that we do not derive "ox, ox" from Shabbat to make one liable fourfold and fivefold for all domesticated animals, wild animals, and birds: "

Ox"

at the end, and "

sheep"

at the beginning,

are

superfluous, for let the Merciful One write: "

When a man steals an ox and slaughters or sells it, he shall pay five cattle in its place and four sheep for the sheep"—

But

ox

at the end and

sheep

at the beginning—why do I need them!?

Thus,

learn from this

from the superfluity of these two words:

For an ox and a sheep, yes—

one is indeed liable fourfold and fivefold for them, but

not for any other creature

and we do not derive "ox, ox" from Shabbat!

We learned in the Mishna:

One who steals after a thief does not pay double payment:

The following passage is the second passage concerning the law of despair.

Rav said:

This was taught only—

in our Mishna, where one who steals after a thief does not pay double payment at all, not even to the first thief—

but

when the second thief stole

before the despair

of the original owners,

but

if the second thief stole

after the despair

of the original owners, then

the first thief acquired it

through despair,

and the second thief,

who stole it from him,

pays double payment to the first thief.

Rav Sheshet said:

I say that Rav stated this tradition while dozing and lying down

[I think that Rav said these words while he was nodding off and lying down], for it can be proved that despair does not effect acquisition!

For

there is

a beraita:

Rabbi Akiva said:

Why did the Torah say that one who slaughters or sells pays fourfold and fivefold payment? Because he became rooted

[he struck roots]

in sin.

Until the slaughter, the animal still existed and belonged to its owners; it was merely not in their possession. But once he slaughtered it, it left its owner's possession entirely, for even the meat that still exists after the slaughter was acquired by the thief through the "change effected by an action" of slaughter; and likewise, when he sold it, he removed it from its owner's possession, since the purchaser acquired it through a "change of possession."

But

when—

in what circumstance did the Torah say that one who sells the stolen item is liable, such that Rabbi Akiva says that through it he became rooted in sin—