Bava Kamma 48a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

But if

according to your words, that the litigant is

the owner of the ox ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location") then:

what is [the meaning of] “with permission,” and what is [the meaning of] “without permission”!?

That is to say: what is the reason for the distinction between whether the owner of the produce brought his produce into the owner of the courtyard’s domain with the owner’s permission, and whether it was without the owner’s permission? And what difference does it make to the owner of the ox whether it was with permission or not

!? There are

those

who say

to explain the distinction:

If he brought them in

“with permission”

of the owner of the courtyard,

it becomes—

the eating by the foreign ox—

an eating [classified as] tooth in the damaged party’s domain,

because the owner of the courtyard, when he permitted him to bring his produce into his courtyard, transferred to him a place in his courtyard,

and tooth in the damaged party’s domain is liable.

But if he brought them in

“without permission”

of the owner of the courtyard,

it becomes

like

tooth in the public domain, and tooth in the public domain is exempt.

Ta shma,

that the acceptance of complete safeguarding is on the part of the owner of the courtyard, from that which was taught in a beraita:

If one brought his ox into the courtyard of the homeowner without permission, and an ox came from another place and gored it, he is exempt

from paying the value of the ox; and immediately the Gemara will explain who is exempt.

But if he brought it in with permission, he is liable.

But

who is

“exempt”

and who is

“liable”?

And is it

not that the owner of the courtyard is exempt, and the owner of the courtyard is liable!?

It is thus proven that the owner of the courtyard accepts complete safeguarding upon himself, even from external factors.

And we answer:

No,

not as you explained, but

the owner of the ox

that gored

is exempt, and the owner of the ox

that was gored is liable because of “horn.”

And we challenge this:

if so, what is [the meaning of]

“with permission,”

and what is [the meaning of]

“without permission”?

That is to say: what is the reason for the distinction between with permission and without permission? After all, we are dealing with damage by “horn,” for which the owner of the ox is liable even in the public domain !?

There are

those

who say: whom does this [beraita] follow?—

this beraita—

It is Rabbi Tarfon, who says: [for] a changed horn in the damaged party’s courtyard, he pays full damage,

full damage [rather than a horn in the public domain, which pays only half-damage when tame].

And this is what it says: If the ox that was damaged entered

with permission

of the owner of the courtyard,

it becomes a horn in the damaged party’s courtyard,

because the owner of the courtyard transferred a place in his courtyard to the owner of the ox that was damaged,

and

the owner of the ox that caused the damage pays

full damage.

And if the ox that was damaged entered

without permission, it becomes

like

a horn in the public domain, and it pays only half-damage

when tame.

There was an incident involving

a certain woman who entered to bake in a certain house; the goat of the owner of the house came, ate the dough, became bloated, and died;

[an incident involving a woman who brought dough into her fellow’s house in order to bake it, and the owner of the house’s goat came and ate the dough, and the goat overheated as a result and died],

Rava obligated her to pay the value of the goat

[Rava obligated the owner of the dough to pay the value of the goat].

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say that it disagrees with Rav,

does this law stated by Rava differ from Rav’s law,

for Rav said

concerning one who brought his produce without permission, and the homeowner’s animal ate it and died, that he is exempt, because

it becomes that it should not eat!?

They said,

the members of the academy:

How can these be compared!?

There,

in Rav’s statement, where the produce was brought

without permission, he did not accept upon himself—

the owner of the produce—

the safeguarding

[the safeguarding] of the homeowner’s animal.

Here,

in Rava’s incident, where the woman brought in the dough

with permission, she accepted upon herself—

the woman—

the safeguarding

of the goat.

And we challenge that which we said, that when she brought it in with permission, she accepted upon herself the safeguarding of the homeowner’s property, so that it would not be damaged by what she brought in:

And how is this different from the woman who entered to grind wheat by the homeowner without permission, and his animal ate it

[and] the homeowner’s animal is exempt; but if it was damaged, she is liable?

And it implies:

the reason is [that it was] without permission

that the woman is liable if the homeowner’s animal was damaged by her wheat;

but

if she brought it in

with permission, she is exempt,

the woman, and we do not say: the woman accepted upon herself the safeguarding of the homeowner’s animal, so that it would not be damaged by what she brought in !?

They said,

the members of the academy: There is a distinction between a woman who brings in wheat to grind it and a woman who brings in dough to bake it:

To grind wheat: since she does not require privacy at all, the owners of the courtyard do not need to remove themselves, and the safeguarding rests upon them

[since she does not need a private place, it follows that the owners of the courtyard do not need to withdraw from there, and the safeguarding of their animal so that it not be damaged rests upon them]—

But to bake, since she requires privacy, the owners of the courtyard remove themselves; therefore the safeguarding rests upon her,

[but when she enters to bake and uncovers her arms, she requires a private place, and the owners of the courtyard are compelled to withdraw from there; therefore the safeguarding of their animal rests upon her].

We learned in the Mishna:

If one brought his ox into the homeowner’s courtyard:

Rava said:

One who

brought his ox into the homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and it dug

the ox

pits, ditches, and caves:

The owner of the ox is liable for damage to the courtyard

that was damaged because of the pits,

and the owner of the courtyard is liable for damage caused by the pit

that was dug by the ox, if he rendered his domain ownerless.

And

even though the master said:

“When a man digs a pit,”

and not an ox [that digs] a pit—

here,

where the pits were dug in his courtyard,

since that other person is obligated to fill them, and he did not fill them, it is considered as though he dug them, [since the owner of the courtyard is obligated to close his pits and did not do so, it is considered as though he dug them], and therefore he is liable for their damage

!?

And

further

Rava said: If one brought his ox into the homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and it damaged the homeowner, or the homeowner was damaged by it,

for example, he stumbled over it,

he is liable,

the owner of the ox.

But if

it lay down

the ox,

he is exempt.

And it implies that if the ox lay down on vessels and damaged them, or the homeowner stumbled over it while it was lying down, then the owner of the ox is exempt. And we wondered about this:

And

is it so that

because it lay down, he is exempt,

the owner of the ox!?

He said,

explaining,

Rav Pappa:

What is [the meaning of]

“it lay down”?

That it deposited

the ox

droppings

in the homeowner’s courtyard,

and they dirtied

with them

the homeowner’s vessels.

And because

they became

the

droppings—

a pit

of the owner of the ox—

and we do not find a pit for which he is liable for vessels.

And we challenge:

This works well according to Shmuel, who said

above, 28b,

“Every obstacle is a pit,”

and even though he did not render it ownerless; if so, it is understandable that he is exempt concerning the vessels.

But according to Rav, who said

[there], that it is not considered a “pit”

until he renders it ownerless,

but if he did not render it ownerless, it is not a “pit” but an “ox,”

what can be said!?

For it cannot be said that he is exempt because a “pit” is exempt concerning vessels, since, as it is an “ox,” why should he not be liable concerning the vessels?

They said,

the members of the academy, to resolve this:

Ordinary droppings—he renders them ownerless.

And

further

Rava:

A person entered

the

homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and caused damage

with his hands

to the homeowner, or the homeowner

was damaged by him,

because he stumbled over him,

he is liable,

the one who entered; but if

the homeowner damaged him

with his hands,

he is exempt,

the homeowner—and he proceeds to explain it.

Rav Pappa said:

We said

that if the homeowner damaged him with his hands, he is exempt

only when he did not know about him

[the homeowner did not know that there was a person in his courtyard, and he damaged him],

but

if

he knew about him,

and

the homeowner damaged him, he is liable,

the homeowner.

And we interpret:

What is the reason

the owner of the house is liable when he knew of him, even though he entered without permission?

Because he said to him

the one entering said to the owner of the house:

Although you have permission to remove me, you do not have permission to injure me,

even though you have the authority to remove me from your courtyard, you do not have permission to injure me.

And Rava and Rav Pappa went

who exempted the owner of the house when he injured [him] directly when he did not know of his presence in the courtyard—

according to their own reasoning

according to their position!

For Rava said, and some say Rav Pappa: