Bava Kamma 47b — the Talmud in English

3. If

a person brought

his

ox into the courtyard of the homeowner ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

without permission, and the ox of the homeowner gored

the ox that entered,

or bit

the ox

[with] the dog of the homeowner,

then the homeowner is

exempt

from payment for the damage caused by the ox, because he should not have brought it in.

And if

it gored [the ox that entered]

the

ox of

the homeowner,

then the owner of the ox is

liable

for the damage caused to the ox of the homeowner.

And if

the ox that entered fell

the ox that entered

into his pit

of the homeowner

and fouled

the

water,

then the owner of the ox is

liable

for payment of the value of the water in the pit.

And if

his father or his son—

of the homeowner—

were inside it

of the pit into which the ox that entered fell, and it killed them, then the owner of the ox

pays the ransom.

And if he brought

the ox

with permission,

then

the owner of the courtyard is liable

for the damage caused by the ox that entered, and in accordance with the two interpretations explained above.

Rabbi

disagrees with the Sages, who make the owner of the courtyard liable for safeguarding when he brought [the animal] in with his permission, even though he did not explicitly undertake safeguarding, and

says: In all of them,

he is not liable

the homeowner

until the homeowner undertakes to safeguard.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “The potter who brought his pots into the courtyard of the homeowner without permission, and the animal of the homeowner broke them, is exempt; but if [the homeowner’s animal] was injured by them, the owner of the pots is liable.” It might have entered our minds that just as, according to the Sages, the owner of the courtyard accepts responsibility for safeguarding the pots against damage by his animal, so too the owner of the pots accepts responsibility for safeguarding the animal of the homeowner against damage by his pots. And therefore the Gemara asks:

The reason is that [he brought them] without permission

that the owner of the pots is liable for damage caused to his animal by the animal of the owner of the courtyard;

but

if he brought his pots

with permission, the owner of the pots is not liable for damage caused by the animal of the owner of the courtyard, and we do not say: “The owner of the pots accepted upon himself the safeguarding of the animal of the owner of the courtyard” [And we do not say: The owner of the pots accepted upon himself the safeguarding of the animal of the owner of the courtyard, so that it would not be injured by his pots]—

And if so, this [Mishna] is according to Rabbi, who says

in the latter clause concerning the owner of the courtyard:

“In every case, by implication he did not accept upon himself safeguarding” [Until a person explicitly says that he accepts safeguarding, he does not accept safeguarding upon himself].

в заключительной части Мишны о хозяине двора:

если человек не выразил это прямо, он не принимает на себя обязанность хранения

Пока человек прямо не сказал, что принимает на себя обязанность хранения, он не принимает ее на себя] —

For according to the Sages who disagreed with him and hold: even by implication the owner of the courtyard accepted safeguarding upon himself so that his ox would not damage the pots, likewise when the owner of the pots brought his pots with permission, he accepted safeguarding upon himself so that his pots would not damage the animal of the owner of the courtyard.

But

let us say the latter clause [the middle clause]:

[the middle clause]

“If he brought [them] with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable”

for damage to the pots caused by the animal of the owner of the courtyard, because by implication he accepted safeguarding of the pots against damage by his animal; and this latter clause

comes according to the Sages, who say: “By implication also he accepted

safeguarding upon himself” [Even without explicitly stating it, a person accepts safeguarding upon himself]—

And if so, the first clause contradicts the latter clause!?

Furthermore,

let it be difficult: Behold, in the latter clause of our Mishna we learned:

“Rabbi says:

In all of them he is not liable until the homeowner undertakes to safeguard”—

And if so, it follows that

the first clause and the latter clause are Rabbi

is,

and the middle clause is the Sages’ case!?

Rabbi Zeira said:

Break it apart [Break apart our Mishna]:

the one who taught this [the first clause]

did not teach this [the middle clause together with the latter clause], and there is a dispute in the view of the Sages as to whether they disagree with Rabbi; and this is the explanation of the Mishna:

The first tannai says: “The potter who brought his pots into the courtyard of the homeowner without permission … and if [the homeowner’s animal] was injured by them, the owner of the pots is liable”; but if he brought [them] with permission, he is exempt according to everyone, because by implication, whenever he did not explicitly state it, the owner of the pots did not accept safeguarding upon himself for his pots, so that they would not damage the animal of the homeowner; and the same law applies when the animal of the homeowner broke them, that the owner of the courtyard is not liable until the owner of the courtyard explicitly undertakes safeguarding.

The latter tannai says: There is a dispute between Rabbi and the Sages concerning this matter: “If he brought [them] with permission, and the animal of the homeowner broke them, the owner of the courtyard is liable,” according to the Sages; and the same law applies if the animal of the homeowner was injured by them, that the owner of the pots is liable, because each one accepted safeguarding upon himself so that he would not damage the other. “Rabbi says: ‘In all of them he is not liable until the homeowner undertakes to safeguard,’” and the same law applies that the owner of the pots is not liable for damage caused by the animal of the owner of the courtyard until the owner of the pots undertakes to safeguard.

Rava said:

All of it—

the first clause and the middle clause—

is according to the Sages, and what is difficult for you concerning the first clause, which implies: if he brought [them] with permission, the owner of the pots did not accept safeguarding upon himself, as you assumed that it is Rabbi and not the Sages, is not so:

And

because when he brought [them]

with permission, the owner of the courtyard accepted the safeguarding of the pots, even if they were broken by the wind, because when he said to him, “Bring [them] in,” his intention was: “Bring [them] in and I will safeguard them for you,” but the owner of the pots does not accept safeguarding upon himself at all—

We learned in the Mishna: “He brought his produce into the courtyard of the homeowner” “The homeowner” without permission, and the animal of the homeowner ate it, he is exempt; but if [the homeowner’s animal] was injured by it, the owner of the produce is liable: Rav said: They taught that if [the homeowner’s animal] was injured by it, the owner of the produce is liable only when it slipped on them,

а если тебе трудно объяснить первую часть, из которой следует, что если он внес с разрешения, хозяин горшков не принимает на себя обязанность хранения, и ты поэтому предположил, что это мнение Рабби, а не Мудрецов, то это не так:

Ибо

когда он внес их

с разрешения, хозяин двора принял на себя хранение горшков, даже если они были разбиты ветром, поскольку, сказав ему: «Вноси», он имел в виду: «Вноси, и я буду хранить их для тебя». Но хозяин горшков вообще не принимает на себя обязанность хранения —

the animal of the homeowner;

but if it ate

from them excessively and died as a result,

he is exempt

the owner of the produce.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because the owner of the produce can say:

It should have

your animal

not eaten.

свободен

хозяин плодов.

Rav Sheshet said

concerning Rav’s words:

I say that Rav said this statement while dozing and lying down [I think that Rav said this while he was dozing], and this is because it is proven in a beraita not according to his words,

as it was taught:

One who places poison before the animal of another,

behold he is

exempt under human laws, and liable under the laws of Heaven. Behold, it implies:

It is poison

that is exempt because

it is not usual for it to eat [It is not its practice to eat it],

but

produce that it is usual for it to eat [which it normally eats] and it ate from it excessively,

he is liable even under human laws—

And

if according to Rav’s words, it is difficult:

Why

is the owner of the produce liable, when

it should have not eaten!?

They said

the members of the academy, to resolve Rav’s words:

The same law applies

that

even produce too is exempt under human laws,

because it should have not eaten,

and this teaches us

the tannai of the beraita by stating “poison”:

for even poison, which it is not usual for it to eat, he is liable

he is

under the laws of Heaven, [For even concerning poison, which it is not supposed to eat, he is liable under the laws of Heaven].

And if you wish, say

to resolve [it]:

“

Poison”

also,

as we learned in the beraita, does not refer to recognizable poison; rather, here with what are we dealing?

With afrazta [A0189]]a type of produce that is poison for an animal],

таннаем барайты тем, что он упомянул «смертельный яд», состоит в следующем:

that is, fruit

that it normally eats, and nevertheless he is exempt under human laws, because “it should have not eaten,” and this is according to Rav’s view.

законам Небес,

The following refutes

Rav from that which was taught:

A woman who entered to grind wheat at the house of the homeowner

without permission, and the animal of the homeowner ate them,

then the homeowner

is

exempt.

And

if [the animal] was injured

by them, the animal of the homeowner,

the woman is liable.

Раву из того, что учили в барайте:

Женщина, которая вошла молоть пшеницу к хозяину двора

без разрешения, и животное хозяина двора съело ее,

то хозяин двора

свободен.

А

если оно получило повреждение

от них — животное хозяина двора —

обязана

женщина.

And it might enter your mind that she was injured by them through excessive eating, and therefore we ask:

And why

is the woman liable!?

Let us say: “

She should not have eaten.”

They said

the members of the academy to reconcile Rav’s words:

And is the

beraita

superior to the Mishna, which we established as referring to slipping on them!?

Can we not also interpret the beraita as Rav interpreted our Mishna, that it deals only with a case where she slipped on them, and not with a case where she ate excessively and died?

And we are astonished at the one who raised the objection:

And the one who raised it—what did he raise it for?

What occurred to him to raise this objection, when it is obvious that the beraita can be interpreted like the Mishna!?

And we answer:

He can say to you,

the one who raised the objection:

Granted, the Mishna,

which

teaches: “

If she was injured by them,”

can properly be interpreted as

that she slipped on them,

because excessive eating is not called injury caused by the produce, since it was the excessive eating that caused it.

But here,

in the beraita, which

teaches: “

If she was injured”

without qualification,

and it does not teach: “If she was injured

by

them,”

it is eating that it teaches,

that is: every injury caused by the produce is included, even excessive eating.

But the other one,

the one who answered,

can say to you:

It makes no difference

whether it teaches: “She was injured by them,” and it makes no difference whether it teaches: “She was injured” without qualification; in either case it can be interpreted as referring to slipping on them, and not to eating them.

Ta shma,

a beraita that is a

The one who brought his ox into the courtyard of the homeowner without permission, and it ate

the ox

wheat

belonging to the owner of the courtyard,

and it discharged

[defecated]

and died—the owner of the courtyard is exempt

from liability.

But if he brought it in with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable

for the ox’s damage.

And why

is the owner of the courtyard liable for the ox’s eating!? But

it should have been—

the ox—

not to eat!?

Rava said:

But is it from bringing it in

with permission

which includes the owner of the courtyard’s accepting custodianship,

or

bringing it in

without permission that you are asking

[this]!?

But when the owner of the ox brought his ox in

with permission,

the owner of the courtyard

accepted responsibility for guarding his ox

the owner of the courtyard,

and even if it strangled

the ox

itself,

for he is a complete custodian, and a custodian cannot claim: “It should have not eaten.”

It was asked of them:

Where the owner of the courtyard accepted upon himself

the owner of the courtyard

custodianship

[guardianship],

what is the law?

That is: concerning this which we learned in our Mishna according to the Sages, that if a person brought his property into the domain of the owner of the courtyard, the owner of the courtyard accepted custodianship upon himself and is liable for damage caused by the property of the one who brought it in, and likewise this is Rabbi’s view where he explicitly accepted custodianship upon himself—which custodianship does the owner of the courtyard accept upon himself?

Is it only custodianship

of his own that he accepted upon himself,

custodianship so that his property should not damage his fellow’s property?

Or perhaps: he accepted upon himself even general custodianship,

that is: it is complete custodianship that he accepted, and even for damage that came to the property of the one who brought it in from another source, the owner of the courtyard must pay like other custodians?

Ta shma,

that it is complete custodianship:

For Rav Judah bar Simon taught, in the damages of the academy of Karna:

If he brought his produce into the courtyard of the homeowner without permission, and an ox came from another place and ate it, he is exempt

from paying the value of the produce, and the Gemara will immediately explain who is exempt.

But if he brought it in with permission, he is liable

to pay the value of the produce.

But

who

“exempt”

and who

“liable,”

whom did the tanna intend is exempt when this was without permission, and liable when this was with permission? Is it

not the owner of the courtyard who is exempt, and the owner of the courtyard who is liable!?

We have thus learned that the owner of the courtyard accepts complete custodianship upon himself, even from external factors, and not specifically from his own property.

They said

the members of the academy:

No,

not as you interpreted it, but:

the owner of the ox is exempt

from the value of the produce,

and the owner of the ox is liable

for their value, because he damaged them through Shen.