Bava Kamma 41b (מא:) — the Talmud in English

Where he examined a flint

[stone]

and slaughtered with it, he rendered it like stoning

[for it appears like stoning with stones, and not like slaughtering]—

But where he slaughtered it with a knife, it is not so

it is forbidden to eat and derive benefit from it!?

They said

to reject and resolve the objection:

Is it so

that

a knife is written in the Torah

[is a knife stated in the passage concerning slaughtering]!?

And

surely

we learned in the Mishna: One who slaughters with a hand sickle, with a flint, or with a reed, his slaughtering is valid!

And we raise an objection:

And now, once he derives

both

the prohibition against eating and

both

the prohibition against deriving benefit, from “

He shall not eat its flesh,”

since it has been explained that this verse teaches a prohibition after the ox has been convicted, and it also innovates for us the prohibition against eating, which we did not know previously, it follows that the phrase “he shall not eat” also includes a prohibition against deriving benefit [for only if the verse were not needed for the prohibition against eating could one conclude that it came to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit; but now that the prohibition against eating is also learned from this verse]—

then “

and the owner of the ox is free,”

which was mentioned above as teaching the prohibition against deriving benefit,

why do I need it

[what does it come to teach]!? We already know the prohibition against deriving benefit from “he shall not eat.”

And we answer: “And the owner of the ox is free” does not come to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit from the ox’s flesh, for indeed we already know this from “he shall not eat.” Rather,

for

the prohibition against

deriving benefit from its hide

it comes, both once it has been convicted and once it has been stoned.

The verse had to teach us the prohibition against deriving benefit from its hide because

it might enter your mind to say that,

since it is written, “He shall not eat its flesh,” only

its flesh is forbidden for benefit, but its hide is permitted

[it will be permitted]

for benefit.

Therefore

it teaches us “

and the owner of the ox is free” that the hide too is forbidden for benefit.

And we raise an objection:

And according to those tannaim

[Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, and Rabbi Akiva],

who derive this “

and the owner of the ox is free”

for another exposition

[according to the method of these tannaim, who take this verse]

for another exposition

[to exempt a harmless ox from half a ransom, or to exempt an ox from payment for miscarried fetuses, or to exempt a harmless ox from half the value of a slave],

as we shall say later

[as explained on this page and the following page], according to their view, does it not follow that

from where do they derive the prohibition against benefiting from its hide

that it is forbidden?

And we answer: They derive the prohibition against deriving benefit from the hide of an ox that is stoned

from “

and he shall not eat”

the

flesh,” for this comes to include

the prohibition against

the accessory to its flesh

which is also forbidden for benefit. And

what is it

[what is the accessory to its flesh]? It is

its hide.

The Gemara explains the view of the one who disagrees with those tannaim. According to him, “and the owner of the ox is free” must necessarily come to teach the prohibition against benefiting from its hide. But the objection arises: Why is this necessary? Let it be derived from the word “the”:

And this tanna—

who disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, and Rabbi Akiva—

does not expound

“the”

as an inclusive term anywhere. Consequently, “and the owner of the ox is free” is needed to teach the prohibition against benefiting from its hide.

As it was taught

in a beraita, that there is one who does not expound “the” as an inclusive term:

Shimon the Imsonite—and some say Neḥemya the Imsonite—was

initially

expounding every “

the”

in the Torah as inclusive terms, which come to include something. However,

as coming to include something. However,

when he reached “

the Lord

your God you shall fear,”

he withdrew

from expounding them, because he feared including anything else and equating it with reverence for the Omnipresent.

His students said to him: “Rabbi! What will become of all the ‘the’s that you expounded?”

He said to them: “Just as I received reward for expounding, so I received reward for withdrawing.”

Until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: “

The Lord

your God you shall fear”

to include Torah scholars,

so that the reverence for one’s teacher should be like the reverence for Heaven.

The Sages taught:

It is written in the passage concerning ransom: “

And the owner of the ox is free.”

Rabbi Eliezer says:

The verse comes to teach that one should not say that when a harmless ox kills a person, its owner pays half a ransom, just as when it causes damage he pays half the damage. Rather,

free

means that the owner of the harmless ox that killed is

free from half a ransom,

and pays nothing.

He said

in astonishment

to him, Rabbi Akiva:

Why was it necessary for the Torah to exempt a harmless ox from paying ransom?

After all, it itself is paid for only from its body;

if the harmless ox were liable for half a ransom, the ransom would be collected only from its body, just as half the damage is collected from its body. If so, the owners could say to the heirs of the deceased:

Bring it—

the harmless ox—

to the court, and it will pay you!

[The court will collect the ransom from its body and pay you]!

In other words, ransom cannot be collected, since the ox is destined to be stoned; how, then, can ransom be collected from it!?

He said

in reply

to him, Rabbi Eliezer

to Rabbi Akiva:

Do you think that my ruling is such, that my exposition

[that this is what I expounded]

concerns one who is liable to death?

Do you really think that I expounded the verse in order to exempt a harmless ox that is liable to death from ransom!?

My ruling

[the exposition that I expounded to exempt it]

is only to exempt it from payment of ransom

when

it killed

the ox

a person on the testimony of one witness or on the admission of the owners,

when there were not two witnesses to testify concerning its goring, but only one witness testified, or the owners admitted it. In such a case the ox is not killed, and the verse was needed to exempt it from liability for ransom! And we raise an objection: “

On the admission of the owners”!? Is it necessary for the verse to exempt a harmless ox from liability for ransom based on the owners’ admission? Just as half-damage is a fine, so too half a ransom—which is payment of the injured party’s monetary value, like damages—is merely a fine.

Did the verse need to exempt a docile ox from liability for ransom based on the owners’ admission? Just as half-damages is a penalty, so too half a ransom—which is payment for the injured party’s loss, like damages—is merely a penalty.

But

he is one who admits to a fine!

A person is not made liable for a fine on the basis of his admission!?

And we answer:

He maintains

Rabbi Eliezer, who gave this answer to Rabbi Akiva, that

ransom is atonement,

and therefore one can make him liable on the basis of his admission.

It was taught in another baraita,

in which we learned another baraita: Rabbi Eliezer gave Rabbi Akiva an additional answer:

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva!

Do you really

regard me as saying that my ruling in this matter concerns

the ox

that is liable to death!?

My ruling concerns only an

ox that

intended to kill an animal, but

mistakenly

killed a person,

in which case the ox is not liable to death, and the verse had to exclude it from kofer.

Or, in a case where the ox intended

to kill a gentile, but killed a Jew.

Or where it intended

to kill a fetus, but killed a viable child.

In all these cases it is not liable to death, since it did not intend to kill one who is subject to liability, and the verse therefore had to exclude it from kofer. And since the answer in the second baraita is better than the answer in the first baraita, the Gemara now raises a question concerning the order of these two answers:

Which did

Rabbi Eliezer say to Rabbi Akiva

first [

which answer did he give him first]? Did he give him the less effective answer first, or did he give him the better answer first?

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rava:

It was the answer concerning one who

intended

to kill one who is not subject to the death penalty that he

said to him

Rabbi Eliezer to Rabbi Akiva

first,

as it is the better answer.

Whereas

Rav Tavyomi said in the name of Rava:

It was the answer concerning one who

killed

on the testimony of the owner and one witness that he

said to him first,

as it is the less effective answer.

And the Gemara explains their reasons:

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rava: The answer concerning one who

intended

he said to him first; this may be compared

to what?