Bava Kamma 41a — the Talmud in English

You might say ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

it is considered as though it had killed her

[as though it were the ox that killed her]

he informs us!

That is, it is a leniency with regard to bestiality: although death was caused through it, nevertheless the owners are not liable for ransom, and we do not consider the ox as though it were the one that killed the woman.

Rava said:

Always,

in a case

in which it mated with her and killed her,

it was concerning the act of mating itself that they said that the one that mated does not pay ransom;

and what is difficult for you:

why should it not pay, since

what difference is there whether it killed her with its horn, and what difference is there whether it killed her through mating!?

I can say to you:

the horn intends to cause damage, whereas this one intends for its own pleasure,

and if so, it is not included in “horn,” and the Torah made ransom liable only in the case of “horn.”

And we explain:

In what do

Abaye and Rava disagree, such that according to Abaye, when it killed her through mating, it is liable for ransom, whereas according to Rava it is not liable for ransom?

In the case of a foot that trod upon a child in the courtyard of the injured party,

that is, an ox that killed with “foot”:

According to Abaye: it pays ransom,

for in all the ox’s liabilities the Torah made its owners liable for ransom, whereas

according to Rava: it does not pay ransom,

for the Torah made ransom liable only in the case of “horn.”

Here the Gemara returns to the disagreement between Rav and Shmuel, whether an arena ox is fit with regard to the altar, and brings that

a beraita was taught in accordance with Rav,

that it is fit with regard to the altar:

For it was taught:

An arena ox is not liable to death, and

also

fit

is it

with regard to the altar,

because

it is as one who was compelled.

That is, it is as though the one who goaded it was the one who killed, and not the ox itself.

Mishna:

An ox that gored a person, and he died,

the person.

If an ox is

forewarned

to kill, it

pays ransom,

as it is stated [Exodus 21:29]: “And if the ox was a goring ox from yesterday and the day before yesterday, and its owner was warned and he did not guard it, and it killed a man or a woman. If ransom is imposed upon it, he shall give it.”

And

if it is

innocent,

it is

exempt from ransom,

as it is stated [there, 28]: “And when an ox gores a man or a woman and he dies, the ox shall surely be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten, and the owner of the ox is innocent. But if the ox was a goring ox ...,” and we expound there [on page 41b]: “innocent” from half-ransom, to teach that the innocent ox does not pay even half-ransom, and the law of ransom is not like payment for damage, of which the innocent ox pays half.

Both this and that,

whether innocent or forewarned,

are liable to death,

as it is stated: “And when an ox gores a man or a woman and he dies, the ox shall surely be stoned. But if the ox was a goring ox from yesterday and the day before yesterday, and its owner was warned and he did not guard it, and it killed a man or a woman, the ox shall be stoned.” Thus, both the innocent and the forewarned are stoned.

And likewise,

the same law applies—that the ox is liable to death whether it is innocent or forewarned— and when it is forewarned it pays ransom—

with regard to a son

[a minor] who was killed by an ox,

and likewise with regard to a daughter,

a minor, as it is stated [there, 31]: “Or if it gores a son or if it gores a daughter, according to this law shall it be done to him.”

And if

the ox gored

a slave or a maidservant

and they died, its owners do not pay ransom according to the value of the damager or the injured party, but rather:

he gives

a fine

of thirty sela

to the owners of the slave,

whether he is

the slave

worth one hundred maneh, or whether he is worth only one dinar,

as it is stated [there, 31]: “If the ox gores a slave or a maidservant, he shall give thirty shekels of silver to his master, and the ox shall be stoned.”

Gemara:

And we raise an objection concerning what is explained in our Mishna, that there is ransom only with a forewarned ox:

But

since we kill it when it is innocent

[since an innocent ox is stoned when it kills a person], if so, an ox that is

forewarned

to kill—which was testified concerning it for three days after each goring that it had killed a person—

how can you find such a case!?

For it should already have been stoned because of its first gorings!?

He said

he answered:

Rava said: Here we are dealing with

a case in which its forewarning did not come about through the actual killing of three people. Rather,

such as when they assessed it as capable of

killing

three people,

that is, it ran after three people on three days, and they fled from it, and they testified about this before the court and the owners after each pursuit, and the court assessed that, had these people not fled, it would have killed them.

Rav Ashi

disagrees with Rava’s answer, and

said: An assessment is nothing,

and it becomes forewarned only through the actual killing of three people.

Rather,

Rav Ashi explained,

here we are dealing with a case such as when

at first it

endangered three people

on three days, and they testified concerning it, but they did not kill it, since no person had yet died; and when it performed the fourth goring, the three died.

Rav Zevid said:

Here we are dealing with a case

such as when it killed three animals,

for which it is not stoned, but nevertheless it is forewarned with regard to killing.

And we raise an objection to this:

And

if

it is forewarned to

kill

an animal, does it become forewarned to

kill

a person!?

Rather, Rav Shimi said:

Here we are dealing with a case

such as when it killed three gentiles,

and the ox is not killed for killing a gentile.

And we raise an objection to this:

And

if

it is forewarned to

kill

gentiles, does it become forewarned to

kill

Israelites,

so that it pays ransom for them when it kills them!?

Rather, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

Here we are dealing with a case

such as when it killed three people who were tereifa,

and the ox is not killed for killing a tereifa, since it killed a “dead man” [a living person who is as dead].

And we wonder:

And

if

it is forewarned to

kill

a tereifa, does it become forewarned to

kill a whole person

!?

Rather, Rav Pappa said:

Here we are dealing with a case such as

it killed

the ox

and fled to the marsh, it killed

again

and fled to the marsh

[the ox killed, and fled to the marsh so that they would not kill it].

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said:

Here we are dealing with a case

such as when the refuters of the refuters were proven false—

That is, witnesses testified concerning it on the first day, and the witnesses were proven false, and the court exempted the ox from stoning; then other witnesses testified concerning it on the second day, and they were proven false; then witnesses testified concerning it on the third day, and on that same day witnesses also came who proved false the refuters of the first groups, and the testimony of the first witnesses was established, so that it was forewarned; and before the court had time to complete its judgment concerning the ox for death, the ox performed a fourth goring while it was still in its owner’s domain, and for this goring it pays ransom.

In the Gemara above, 24a, it states: “They raised a question before them: The ‘three days’ that it teaches [in the Mishna there: ‘Forewarned: anyone concerning whom testimony was given for three days’]—are they for forewarning the ox, or for forewarning the man? What practical difference is there? If three groups of witnesses come on one day [on one day they testify about three gorings on three days], if you say it is for forewarning the ox, it becomes forewarned; and if you say it is for forewarning the man, it does not become forewarned, for he can say [the owner of the ox]: ‘Only now are they testifying against me.’”

And we raise an objection:

This works well if “

for forewarning the ox”

we require,

for according to his view it becomes forewarned even when witnesses testify on one day concerning three gorings that occurred on three days,

well,

it is possible to explain the Mishna as was explained: that the refuters of the refuters were proven false.

But if we require forewarning of the man,

and testimony must be given before the owners after each goring, if so, the owners cannot be made liable in a case in which the witnesses were proven false, even though after all the gorings it became clear that they were truthful witnesses, since

he can say

[they will say]: The owners will say: At the time when the witnesses came,

I did not know

[I did not know] that they were truthful witnesses; and all my knowledge that my ox had gored was established only after it had performed three gorings, and this is not forewarning according to the one who says: “for forewarning the man”!?

And we answer: Here we are dealing with a case

such as when

the witnesses who testified concerning the ox’s gorings said:

Whenever your ox kills, he was standing beside it

[the owners were present at every goring of the ox], and if so, the owners knew the truth that the ox was forewarned.

Ravina said,

to resolve our Mishna in another manner:

Here we are dealing with:

a

case such as that the witnesses who testified concerning the ox’s gorings in order to make it forewarned

recognized the owner of the ox,

and they could testify before him that his ox had gored,

but

however

did not

they

recognize the

ox,

so that the court could not kill it; and after it performed a fourth goring, it became known that it was the ox that had gored on the three previous occasions, and its owners are liable for ransom.

And we raise an objection:

What could he have done

[what could the owners have done]? That is, since when they testified before the owners concerning the ox’s gorings they did not know which ox had gored, the owners did not know which ox they had to guard, and this is not forewarning!?

And we answer:

Because they say to him

the court:

You have a goring ox among your cattle; you should have guarded all your cattle [

you have a goring ox in your herd; you should have guarded the entire herd].

We learned in the Mishna:

Both this and this [

the innocuous and the forewarned one]

are liable to death:

The Sages taught: From the implication of what is stated "

If an ox gores a man or a woman, and he dies,

it shall surely be stoned

the ox,"

is it not the case that

I know that it is an unslaughtered carcass, and an unslaughtered carcass is forbidden in consumption!?

If so,

what does the verse come to teach "

and

he shall not eat its flesh,

and the owner of the ox is clean"?

The verse tells you

in its statement, “And he shall not eat its flesh,”

that if they slaughtered it after its verdict had been completed

for stoning,

it is forbidden in consumption.

For from the time its verdict for stoning was completed, it is forbidden.

I have derived only consumption;

until this point we have heard that it is forbidden from the time its verdict was completed, or even from the time it was stoned, only in consumption.

In benefit, from where

do we know that it is forbidden from the time its verdict was completed?

The verse comes to teach "

And he shall not eat its flesh,

and the owner of the ox is clean,"

as it explains and proceeds. And we explain:

What is the indication

how is the prohibition of benefit indicated by this verse?

Shimon ben Zoma says: Like a person who says to his fellow "

So-and-so has departed clean of his property, and he has no benefit of any kind from it."

And the owner of the ox, too, is “clean” of this ox, for he has no benefit of any kind from it.

And we challenge what we said, that an ox that is stoned is forbidden in consumption and benefit from the time its verdict was completed:

And from where is it "

he shall not eat its flesh" [

and likewise “and the owner of the ox is clean”] stated

in the case where they slaughtered it

after

its verdict had been completed,

and to teach us

that

it is

forbidden in consumption

and benefit from the time its verdict was completed!?

But

say that

in truth

where they slaughtered it after its verdict had been completed, it is permitted in consumption

and in benefit

it is—

and

if

this "

he shall not eat its flesh"

comes

for the case where they stoned it outright.

And as for what troubles you: Is it not an unslaughtered carcass, and an unslaughtered carcass is forbidden in consumption? I can say to you: To teach us

that

even

it is forbidden in benefit!?

That is, from where do we know that the verse “he shall not eat” its flesh comes to teach a prohibition after its verdict was completed? For one may say that, in truth, after its verdict was completed it is not forbidden, whereas the verse “he shall not eat its flesh” comes to teach a prohibition after stoning, and to innovate that it is forbidden in benefit. For although we indeed knew the prohibition of consumption because it is an unslaughtered carcass, nevertheless the Torah needed to forbid it in benefit.

And perhaps you will say: But “he shall not eat” is written, and how can a prohibition of benefit be derived from this? I can say to you:

As Rabbi Abbahu!

For Rabbi Abbahu said: Everywhere that it is stated "

he shall not eat"

or "

she shall not eat"

or "

you shall not eat,"

both a prohibition of consumption and a prohibition of benefit

are implied,

unless the verse specifies for you

permission for benefit

in the manner that it specified for you

permission for benefit

in the case of an unslaughtered carcass.

As the verse said: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass, [but] you shall give it to the stranger who is in your gates, and he shall eat it; or sell it to a foreigner.” For the giving and the selling are benefit. And since the verse needed to permit it in benefit, it is proven from here that if the verse had not permitted it, we would have forbidden the unslaughtered carcass in benefit, because it is said concerning it, “he shall not eat.”

And if so, in the case of an ox that is stoned, let us say that the verse in its statement “he shall not eat” comes to forbid it in benefit after it was stoned; and from where do we know the prohibition of consumption and benefit from the time its verdict was completed, before it was stoned!?

And we answer: It is impossible that the verse “he shall not eat” should come to teach the prohibition of benefit when it is stoned.

For

this principle

that “he shall not eat” teaches a prohibition of benefit applies only

where the prohibition of consumption and the prohibition of benefit emerge for us from the verse of "

he shall not eat" [

in a place where we are coming to learn both the prohibition of consumption and the prohibition of benefit from “he shall not eat”]—

but

here, where the prohibition of

consumption

emerges from "

the ox shall surely be stoned"

emerges,

for it is an unslaughtered carcass,

if it enters your mind that this

“he shall not eat its flesh”

comes to teach

a prohibition of benefit, then why did the verse use language of a prohibition of consumption, when it has meaning only with regard to benefit?

why did the verse use language of a prohibition against eating, when it has meaning only with regard to deriving benefit?

Let the Merciful One write

explicitly

“he shall not benefit.”

Alternatively, another reason may be stated why one cannot say that “he shall not eat” comes to teach a prohibition of benefit after stoning: It would have been sufficient for the verse to write "

shall not be eaten." "

he shall not eat." "

Its flesh"

which the verse added

why do I need it!?

Rather, certainly it comes to teach

that even though he made it like "

the flesh of a man,"

that they slaughtered it [

they slaughtered it and did not stone it], nevertheless it is

forbidden.

Mar Zutra raises an objection

another difficulty against the derivation of the prohibition of consumption and benefit from the time its verdict was completed:

And

say: This principle applies

that the verse forbade it before it became an unslaughtered carcass—