Bava Kamma 37a — the Talmud in English

Orphans ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

do not require a prozbul,

for even without a prozbul, the Sabbatical year does not release their debt, because we are considered as the hand of the orphans, and it is incumbent upon us to seek their benefit. Therefore, their documents are considered as though they had been delivered and placed before the court, and it is not necessary to write a prozbul for them.

And so taught Rami bar Hama

in a beraita that was taught in the days of Rabban Gamliel:

For it was taught:

Orphans do not require a prozbul,

because

Rabban Gamliel,

who was the Nasi,

and his court [

which was an important court ]—

were the fathers of orphans.

And likewise in every generation, every important court in its generation is considered the father of orphans. Therefore, the debt documents of orphans are considered as though they had been delivered into the hand of the court, and they may collect their debts even without writing a prozbul for them.

An incident involving

Hanan the wicked [

a bad man, and his name was Hanan ], who

struck that man [

struck a certain person on his ear ],

came before Rav Huna

to ask him for his ruling:

He said to him

Rav Huna to Hanan:

Go, give him half a zuz [

go and give him half a zuz, which is a sela of the country ].

He had

Hanan had

a damaged zuz, and it could not be accepted [

Hanan had in his possession a zuz whose imprint was defective, and it was not readily usable in commerce ].

He wished to give him half a zuz from it [

and Hanan wished to pay from that zuz the half-zuz that he owed ], but

he did not have

any change to give Hanan.

He struck him

Hanan the wicked struck that person, a strike

again, and gave it to him,

he struck him again so that he would become liable for another half-zuz, and he gave him the entire zuz as payment for humiliation for the two strikes.

Mishna:

An ox that is forewarned to

gore

its kind [

it was forewarned to gore only oxen ],

but is not forewarned to

gore

what is not its kind [

other animals ]—

or if it was

forewarned with regard to a person, but is not forewarned with regard to an animal—

or if it was

forewarned to

oxen

that are small [

calves ],

but is not forewarned with regard to large ones—

in all these cases, if it gored

that to which it is forewarned,

then it

pays full damages.

And

if it gored

that to which it is not forewarned,

then it

pays half-damages,

like the law of an innocuous ox.

They said,

the students of Rabbi Yehuda asked

before Rabbi Yehuda: If it was

the ox

forewarned with regard to Sabbaths, but is not forewarned with regard to

the days of

the week,

what is its law?

He said to them

Rabbi Yehuda to his students:

With regard to Sabbaths,

its law is that of a forewarned ox, and it

pays full damages.

But

with regard to the weekdays,

its law is not that of a forewarned ox,

and it pays half-damages.

When does it [

this ox, which was forewarned with regard to Sabbaths ] return to being

innocuous? —

When it returns

from it after

three Sabbaths,

on which it sees oxen and does not gore them.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: An ox that is forewarned with regard to its kind but is not forewarned with regard to what is not its kind: for that to which it is forewarned it pays full damages, and for that to which it is not forewarned it pays half-damages. It is possible to explain the intention of our Mishna in all its parts, in what it said, “An ox that is forewarned with regard to this and is not forewarned with regard to that pays full damages for this and not for that,” in two ways:

The first: An ox that was forewarned with regard to what our Mishna mentioned is, by default, not considered forewarned with regard to those other entities or other times, so long as it was not forewarned with regard to them, even if we have no proof that it is not forewarned with regard to them. Therefore, it does not pay full damages when it damages other entities or at other times.

The second: An ox that was forewarned with regard to what our Mishna mentioned is, by default, forewarned with regard to everything. It is not forewarned with regard to others only if we know that it is not forewarned with regard to other entities or other times—for example, we saw that it did not gore the other entities or at the other times. Only then does it pay only for that to which it was forewarned.

And Rav Zevid and Rav Pappa disagreed about this matter.

And thus

it was stated:

Rav Zevid said: “

But is not forewarned”

we learned in our Mishna. That is, the Mishna deals only with one about whom we know that it is not forewarned with regard to other entities or other times.

Rav Pappa said: “

It is not forewarned”

we learned! That is, the Mishna teaches us that with regard to what it was forewarned, it was not forewarned with regard to others, and no proof is necessary that it did not become forewarned with regard to others.

The Gemara explains the practical difference between the two interpretations: And the Gemara explains the practical difference between the two interpretations:

Rav Zevid said, “

But is not forewarned”

we learned. And he deduces:

This implies that by default,

it is forewarned,

when we do not know its nature with regard to others,

and it is forewarned,

and it pays full damages even when it gored that with regard to which it was not forewarned.

Rav Pappa said, “

It is not forewarned”

we learned,

since

by default,

before we have ascertained that its nature is also to gore the others,

it is not forewarned

with regard to them, and it pays only half-damages if it gored them.

And the Gemara explains the reasoning of Rav Zevid and Rav Pappa:

Rav Zevid,

who holds that “but is not forewarned” we learned,

deduced

according to his interpretation

from

the

latter part

of our Mishna, as the Gemara explains.

But

Rav Pappa,

who holds that “it is not forewarned” we learned,

deduced

according to his interpretation

from

the

first part

of our Mishna, as the Gemara explains.

And the Gemara explains:

Rav Zevid deduced from the latter part,

from that

which it teaches

in the latter part of our Mishna:

Forewarned with regard to small ones but is not forewarned with regard to large ones. For that to which it is forewarned it pays full damages, and for that to which it is not forewarned it pays half-damages.

And Rav Zevid deduces:

Granted, if you say “

but is not forewarned”

it teaches,

that the Mishna is speaking of a case in which it is known that it does not gore the large ones, and accordingly,

by default,

when we have not seen that it does not gore the large ones,

it is forewarned

even with regard to large ones, then our Mishna properly needed to teach this part, because it contains a novelty—

for

this our Mishna teaches us,

that even from small ones [

which it is easy for it to gore ]

to large ones [

which it is difficult for it to gore ]

as well, by default, it is forewarned.

And this is the novelty in this part of the Mishna.

But if you say “

it is not forewarned”

it teaches,

and the Mishna teaches that by

default it is not forewarned,

then why did our Mishna need to teach the matter of small and large ones at all!?

For

now one can say: From small ones

of one species

to small ones

of another species

in general—

by default it is not forewarned,

since the tanna already taught us that forewarning with regard to one species is not forewarning with regard to a second species. Is it necessary to say that

from small ones to large ones,

even of the same species,

it is necessary to say that it is not forewarned!?

And Rav Pappa could say to you: Indeed,

it was necessary to teach us that from small ones to large ones of the same species it is not forewarned, even though we already knew that from one species to another it is not forewarned!

For it might enter your mind to say: Since it broke through against it

the ox

with regard to that species, it broke through against it; it makes no difference whether its large ones or its small ones,

that is, since the ox became accustomed to damaging this species, it damages it and no longer distinguishes between small ones and large ones—

therefore

this our Mishna teaches us

that from small ones to large ones

it is not forewarned.

But

Rav Pappa deduced from the first part

of our Mishna, that “it is not forewarned” we learned, from that

which it teaches

in the first part:

Forewarned with regard to a person is not forewarned with regard to an animal.

Granted, if you say “

it is not forewarned”

we learned, and

by default [

before we saw it goring an animal as well ]

it is not forewarned, the tanna properly needed to teach us this matter. For

this it teaches us: Even from a person to an animal as well, by default, it is not forewarned.

Although one might say that if it gores a person, who has a guardian angel, all the more so it will gore an animal, which does not have a guardian angel.

But if you say “

but is not forewarned”

it teaches, then

by default,

when we do not know that it is not forewarned with regard to others,

it is forewarned, although it did not gore them. This is difficult: what novelty is there in this? For

now one can say: From an animal

of one species

to an animal

of another species,

by default it is forewarned. If so,

from a person to an animal,

is it necessary to say that

it is forewarned!?

Certainly, the Mishna is not coming to innovate and say that with regard to something concerning which we know with certainty that it is not forewarned, it pays only half-damages. For that is obvious.

Necessarily, the novelty is the law of “by default”: if we did not know that it is not forewarned with regard to another thing, it is indeed forewarned with regard to it.

And if so, the part of the Mishna stating that one forewarned with regard to a person is, by default, forewarned with regard to an animal is something that need not be taught, since we have already heard that even from one species to another it is forewarned.

And Rav Zevid,

who holds that “but is not forewarned” it teaches,

could say to you: The first part,

which says, “Forewarned with regard to a person but is not forewarned with regard to an animal”—

refers to a return.

That is, our Mishna is not dealing with an ox that gored a person and is known not to gore animals, because in that there is indeed no novelty—neither in what the Mishna said, that it does not pay full damages for an animal, nor in the inference to be drawn from the Mishna that by default it is forewarned.

Rather, the Mishna deals with

a case in which it was forewarned with regard to a person and forewarned with regard to an animal,

having gored both these and those, and afterward

returned from the animal [

it returned from goring animals ], and, for example,

it stood beside an animal three times and did not gore [

it saw oxen three times and did not gore ].

And the Mishna teaches us that since after its return it is no longer forewarned with regard to an animal, it does not pay full damages for animals.

And there is a novelty in this, because

lest you say: Since it did not return

also

from a person [

since it did not return also from goring a person ],

the return with regard to an animal

alone

is not a return

even with regard to an animal—

this our Mishna teaches us

that the return with regard to an animal is, at any rate, a return.

Its return was effective in making it no longer forewarned with regard to an animal, and it is exempt for animals from full damages.

It was raised as an objection

to Rav Zevid, who holds that “but is not forewarned” we learned, according to whose view one who is forewarned with regard to a person is, by default, forewarned with regard to an animal, from that which was taught:

Sumakhos says: One forewarned with regard to a person

by default is

forewarned with regard to an animal, by means of a kal va-chomer:

And if with regard to a person,

who has a guardian angel, it is

forewarned,

with regard to an animal,

which does not have a guardian angel,

is it not all the more so

that it is forewarned with regard to it?

And we should infer:

By implication, the first tanna, “

it is not forewarned”

he says, so that by default it does not become forewarned with regard to an animal when we have not seen it goring animals. This is difficult for Rav Pappa!?

And we answer:

Sumakhos—

refers to a return!

That is, Sumakhos did not disagree about one who is forewarned with regard to a person by default, but about an ox that was initially forewarned with regard to a person and an animal, that returned from the animal but did not return from the person. According to the first tanna [as explained], its return with regard to the animal is effective, to exempt it from paying full damages for it.

And this is what he said to him,

Sumakhos

to the first tanna:

What

you say,

that

a return with regard to an animal is a return, meaning that if it returned from an animal it is no longer forewarned with regard to it, although it did not return from a person—on this I disagree with you, and I hold that

a return with regard to an animal is not a return, by means of a kal va-chomer from a person:

And if it did not return from a person, how much more so did it not return from an animal [

if it did not return from a person, it certainly did not return from an animal ].

Rav Ashi said: Come and hear

from the end of our Mishna, that “but is not forewarned” we learned—that is, in this wording no law is stated, but rather a reality: with regard to this matter it was not forewarned:

For we learned:

They said

his students

before Rabbi Yehuda: If it was forewarned with regard to Sabbaths but is not forewarned with regard to the weekdays.

He said to them: With regard to Sabbaths it pays full damages; with regard to the weekdays it pays half-damages.

Granted, if you say “

but is not forewarned”

it teaches, then when they said, “If it was forewarned with regard to Sabbaths but is not forewarned with regard to the weekdays,”

they were asking him a question [

they were asking him a question ]. These words are part of the question: that is, one who was forewarned with regard to Sabbaths but not with regard to the weekdays—what is his law?

And he,

Rabbi Yehuda,

was also answering them. That is, when Rabbi Yehuda said to them, “With regard to Sabbaths it pays full damages; with regard to the weekdays it pays half-damages,” this was an answer to their question.

But if you say: “

It is not forewarned”

it teaches, then it follows that when they said, “If it was forewarned with regard to Sabbaths but is not forewarned with regard to the weekdays,” they did not say this as a question, but established the law that it is not forewarned with regard to the weekdays. If so, is it that

they came to teach him [

and came to teach Rabbi Yehuda what the halakha is in this matter ]!?

Furthermore, another difficulty: If they established the halakha in their question, then

he,

Rabbi Yehuda,

what was he answering them [

what did Rabbi Yehuda answer them ]!? They themselves had already established the halakha in their question, that it is not forewarned with regard to the weekdays, and it is obvious that it pays half-damages on the weekdays.

Rabbi Yannai said:

Also

from the first part,

from all the sections preceding the question of Rabbi Yehuda’s students,

it is also precise

that “but is not forewarned” we learned!

For

indeed

it teaches

with regard to all three sections:

For that to which it is forewarned it pays full damages, and for that to which it is not forewarned it pays half-damages.

did they come to teach Rabbi Yehuda what the halakha is in this matter ]?

Furthermore,

if they themselves established the halakha in their question, then

he,

Rabbi Yehuda,

what was he answering them [

what did Rabbi Yehuda answer them]? They themselves had already established the halakha in their question: that the ox is not forewarned with regard to the weekdays, and it is obvious that it pays half damages on the weekdays.

Rabbi Yannai said:

Also

from the first clause,

from all the clauses preceding the question of Rabbi Yehuda’s students,

it can also be inferred

that “but is not forewarned” is what we learned!

For

it

teaches

with regard to all three clauses:

For that with regard to which it is forewarned, it pays full damages; and for that with regard to which it is not forewarned, it pays half damages.

If you say that “

and is not forewarned”

it teaches,”

it is well that the tanna needed to say this, for with regard to that for which it is forewarned, it pays full damages, and with regard to that for which it is not forewarned, it does not pay half-damages, because

it is explaining it:

it needed to inform us, by saying “and is not forewarned,” that ordinarily it is forewarned; therefore it needed to conclude his words and say: with regard to that for which it is not forewarned, it does not pay full damages.

But if you say that “

it is not forewarned”

it teaches,”

it has already

decided it;

the tanna of the Mishna has already established the law, that it is not forewarned except with regard to that for which it was forewarned, and if so,

what more [

was the tanna required to add] “

with regard to that for which it is forewarned, it pays full damages, and with regard to that for which it is not forewarned, it pays half-damages”!?

And

until now has it not informed us [

until this Mishna the tanna had not informed us]

that there it pays half-damages, and when forewarned it pays full damages!?

Rather, necessarily we learned “and is not forewarned,” and in accordance with Rav Zevid.

And the Gemara adds and explains:

And if you should say that Rav Pappa’s statement also applies,

even if you say that the halakha is in accordance with Rav Pappa, that we learned “it is not forewarned” [not in accordance with our inference], and it follows that it is heard from the Mishna that one forewarned with regard to its species is not forewarned with regard to a species other than its own, nevertheless, if it

gored an ox, a donkey, and a camel,

three different species,

it becomes forewarned with regard to all.

The Sages taught: It saw

the damaging ox

an ox,

and

gored

it, and again it saw

an ox

another and

did not gore

it, and again it saw

an ox

and

gored

it, and again it saw

an ox

and

did not gore it, and again it saw

it; then it again saw

an ox

and

gored it, and again it saw

it; then it again saw

an ox

and

did not gore,

the ox becomes

the

alternately forewarned one, with regard to oxen.

That is to say, from now on it will be forewarned with regard to the first ox that it sees, and with regard to the ox after it it will not be forewarned, and with regard to the ox after that it will be forewarned, and with regard to the ox after that it will not be forewarned, and so on; but with regard to other animals it is not forewarned at all.

The Sages taught: It saw an ox

and

gored

it, and again it saw

a donkey

and

did not gore

it, and again it saw

a horse

and

gored

it, and it saw

a camel

and

did not gore it,

it saw

a mule

and

gored it, and it saw

it; and it saw

a wild ass [

the wild donkey] and

did not gore—

it becomes

the damaging ox

alternately forewarned with regard to all.

They raised a dilemma before them,

the members of the academy were uncertain about two problems that are four: