Bava Kamma 37a (לז.) — the Talmud in English

Orphans

do not require a prozbol,

because even without a prozbol, the Sabbatical year does not cancel their debt, since we are regarded as acting on behalf of the orphans and are obligated to seek their benefit. Therefore, their promissory notes are considered as though they have been delivered and are standing before the court, and it is unnecessary to write a prozbol for them.

And likewise Rami bar Ḥama taught

in a beraita taught in the days of Rabban Gamliel:

As it was taught:

Orphans do not require a prozbol,

because

Rabban Gamliel,

who was the Nasi,

and his court [

which was an important court ]—

were the fathers of orphans.

And likewise, in every generation, every important court of its generation is considered the father of orphans. Therefore, the promissory notes of orphans are considered as though they have been delivered into the hands of the court, and they may collect their debts even without writing a prozbol for them.

An incident involving

Ḥannan the Wicked [

a wicked man, whose name was Ḥannan ], who

struck a certain man [

struck a particular man on his ear ].

He came before Rav Huna

to ask him what his judgment was:

He said to him,

Rav Huna said to Ḥannan:

Go and give him half a zuz [

go and give him half a zuz, which is a sela of the country ].

He had

Ḥannan

a worn zuz, and it could not be spent [

Ḥannan possessed a zuz whose imprint was inferior, and it was not readily accepted in commerce ].

He wanted to give him half a zuz from it [

and Ḥannan wanted to pay the half-zuz he owed from that zuz ], but

he did not have

any change to give Ḥannan.

He struck him

Ḥannan the Wicked struck that man, another blow,

and gave it to him,

striking him again in order to become liable for another half-zuz, and he gave him the entire zuz as payment for the humiliation caused by the two blows.

Mishna:

An ox that is forewarned to

gore

its own kind [

it was forewarned to gore oxen בלבד ],

but is not forewarned to

gore

a different kind [

other animals ]—

Or it was

forewarned with regard to a person, but not forewarned with regard to an animal—

Or it was

forewarned with regard to

oxen

that are small [

calves ],

but was not forewarned with regard to large ones—

In all these cases: if it gored

the type with regard to which it was forewarned,

it

pays full damages.

And

if it gored

a type with regard to which it was not forewarned,

it

pays half-damages,

as is the law of an innocuous ox.

They said,

the students of Rabbi Yehuda asked

before Rabbi Yehuda: What is the law if

the ox was

forewarned with regard to Sabbaths, but was not forewarned with regard to

the weekdays’

days?

What is its legal status?

He said to them,

Rabbi Yehuda said to his students:

With regard to Sabbaths,

its status is that of a forewarned ox, and

it pays full damages.

But

with regard to weekdays,

its status is not that of a forewarned ox,

and it pays half-damages.

When does it [

this ox, which was forewarned for Sabbaths ] again become

innocuous?—

When it returns

from goring for

three Sabbaths,

when it sees oxen on those Sabbaths but does not gore them.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: An ox that is forewarned with regard to its own kind but is not forewarned with regard to a different kind: for the type with regard to which it is forewarned it pays full damages, and for the type with regard to which it is not forewarned it pays half-damages. The intent of our Mishna in all its clauses may be interpreted in two ways, with regard to its statement, “An ox that is forewarned for this and is not forewarned for that pays full damages for this but not for that”:

The first: An ox that was established as forewarned with regard to the category mentioned by our Mishna is, by default, not considered forewarned with regard to other categories or other times, so long as it has not been established as forewarned for them, even if we have no proof that it is not forewarned for them. Therefore, it does not pay full damages when it damages other categories or at other times.

The second: An ox that was established as forewarned with regard to the category mentioned by our Mishna is, by default, forewarned with regard to everything. It is considered not forewarned for other categories only if we know that it is not forewarned for those other categories or times—for example, when we saw it not goring those categories or at those times. Only then does it pay full damages only for the category for which it was forewarned.

Rav Zevid and Rav Pappa disagreed about this matter.

And so

it was stated:

Rav Zevid said: “

But is not forewarned”

we learned in our Mishna. That is, the Mishna deals only with an ox known not to be forewarned with regard to other categories or times.

Rav Pappa said: “

It is not forewarned”

we learned!

That is, the Mishna teaches us that although it was forewarned with regard to these, it was not forewarned with regard to others; no proof is required that it did not become forewarned with regard to the others. The Gemara explains the practical difference between the two interpretations:

Rav Zevid said, “

But is not forewarned”

we learned.

And he infers:

By default,

when we do not know its nature with regard to others,

it is forewarned, and it pays full damages even when it gored something for which it had not been established as forewarned.

and it pays full damages even when it gored that with regard to which it was not specifically forewarned.

Rav Pappa said, “

It is not forewarned”

we learned,

since

by default,

before we have established that its nature is to gore others as well,

it is not forewarned

with regard to them, and it pays only half-damages if it gored them.

The Gemara explains the rationale of Rav Zevid and Rav Pappa:

Rav Zevid,

who maintains that “but is not forewarned” is what we learned,

inferred

his interpretation

from

the

latter clause

of our Mishna, as the Gemara explains.

Whereas

Rav Pappa,

who maintains that “it is not forewarned” is what we learned,

inferred

his interpretation

from

the

first clause

of our Mishna, as the Gemara explains.

The Gemara explains:

Rav Zevid inferred from the latter clause,

from that

which it teaches

in the latter clause of our Mishna:

Forewarned with regard to small ones but not forewarned with regard to large ones.

For the type with regard to which it is forewarned it pays full damages, and for the type with regard to which it is not forewarned it pays half-damages.

Rav Zevid infers:

Granted, if you say that “

but is not forewarned”

is what it teaches, meaning that the Mishna speaks of a case where it is known that the ox does not gore large animals; accordingly,

meaning that the Mishna is speaking of a case where it is known that the ox does not gore large oxen, then

by default,

when we have not seen that it does not gore large animals,

it is forewarned even with regard to large animals. It is therefore well that our Mishna needed to teach this clause, because it contains a novelty—

for

for

this it teaches us

our Mishna:

Even from small ones [

which are easy for it to gore ]

to large ones [

which are difficult for it to gore ],

by default as well, it is considered forewarned.

This is the novelty of this clause of the Mishna.

But if you say that “

it is not forewarned”

is what it teaches, and the Mishna teaches that

and the Mishna teaches that by

by default it is not forewarned, then why did our Mishna need to teach the matter of small and large animals at all?!

now one can say: From small ones

For

now, one could say that from small ones

of one species

to small ones

of another species

in general,

by default it is not forewarned, since the tanna already taught us that forewarning with regard to one species is not forewarning with regard to another species. Would it be necessary to say that

as the tannaitic authority has already taught us that being forewarned with regard to one species does not make it forewarned with regard to a second species. Is it necessary to say that

from small ones to large ones,

even when they are of the same species,

it is necessary to say that it is not forewarned!?

And Rav Pappa could say to you:

Indeed, it

was necessary to teach us that from small ones to large ones of the same species it is not forewarned, although we already knew that from one species to another it is not forewarned!

that is, since the ox became accustomed to damaging this species, it damages it and no longer distinguishes between small ones and large ones—

For it might enter your mind to say: Since it broke through with regard to that species,

the ox

has broken through with regard to that species; it makes no difference whether they are its large ones or its small ones,

meaning, once the ox has become accustomed to damaging this species, it damages that species without distinguishing between small and large—

therefore

it teaches us

our Mishna

that

from small ones to large ones

it is not forewarned.

But

Rav Pappa inferred from the first clause

of our Mishna, that “it is not forewarned” is what we learned, from that

which it teaches

at the beginning:

Forewarned with regard to a person is not forewarned with regard to an animal.

Granted, if you say that “

it is not forewarned”

we learned, and

by

by default [

before we have seen it goring an animal as well ]

it is not forewarned, it is well that the tanna needed to teach us this matter.

For

this it teaches us: Even from a person to an animal as well, by default, it is not forewarned.

This is despite the possibility of saying that if it gores a person, who has a mazal, all the more so it will gore an animal, which does not have a mazal.

But if you say that “

but is not forewarned”

is what it teaches, then

from a person to an animal,

by default,

when we do not know that it is not forewarned with regard to others,

it is forewarned, even though it has not gored them. What novelty is there in this?

What, then, is the novel point? For

Now, one could say that from an animal

of one species

to an animal

of another species,

by default, it is forewarned.

If so,

from a person to an animal,

is it

necessary to say that it is forewarned!?

Certainly, the Mishna is not coming to teach that with regard to something for which we know with certainty that the ox is not forewarned, it pays only half-damages. That is obvious.

Necessarily, the novelty concerns the default case: if we do not know that it is not forewarned with regard to another matter, it is indeed forewarned with regard to it.

If so, the clause of the Mishna stating that an ox forewarned with regard to a person is, by default, forewarned with regard to an animal is unnecessary, since we have already learned that even from one species to another it is forewarned.

And Rav Zevid,

who maintains that “but is not forewarned” is what it teaches,

could say to you: The first clause,

which states, “Forewarned with regard to a person but not forewarned with regard to an animal”—

is referring to a reversal.

That is, our Mishna is not discussing an ox that gored a person and is known not to gore animals, since in that case there is no novelty—neither in the Mishna’s statement that it does not pay full damages for an animal, nor in the inference that by default it is forewarned.

Rather, the Mishna is discussing

a case where it was forewarned with regard to a person and forewarned with regard to an animal,

having gored both people and animals, and then

reverted with regard to animals [

it reverted from goring animals ], for example,

when it stood before an animal three times and did not gore it [

it saw oxen three times and did not gore them ].

The Mishna teaches us that since, after its reversion, it is no longer forewarned with regard to animals, it does not pay full damages for animals.

There is a novelty here, because

one might have said: Since it did not revert

also

with regard to a person [

since it did not revert from goring people either ],

the reversion with regard to animals

alone

is not a reversion,

even with regard to animals—

it teaches us

our Mishna

that a reversion with regard to animals is nevertheless a reversion.

Its reversion was effective in making it no longer forewarned with regard to animals, and it is exempt from full damages for them.

He raised an objection

to Rav Zevid, who maintains that “but is not forewarned” is what we learned, so that according to his view an ox forewarned with regard to a person is, by default, forewarned with regard to an animal, from that which was taught:

Sumakhos says: An ox forewarned with regard to a person,

by default, is

forewarned with regard to an animal, by means of a kal va-chomer:

And if with regard to a person,

who has a mazal, it is

forewarned,

with regard to an animal,

which does not have a mazal,

is it not all the more so

that it is forewarned with regard to it?

And we should infer:

By implication, the first tanna, “

it is not forewarned”

is saying, meaning that by default it does not become forewarned with regard to an animal when we have not seen it goring animals. This poses a difficulty to Rav Pappa!?

And if it did not return from a person, how much more so did it not return from an animal [

And we answer:

Sumakhos—

is referring to a reversal!

That is, Sumakhos did not disagree concerning an ox that is by default forewarned with regard to a person. Rather, he disagreed concerning an ox that was initially established as forewarned with regard to both a person and an animal, that reverted with regard to the animal but did not revert with regard to the person. According to the first tanna [as explained], its reversion with regard to the animal is effective, exempting it from paying full damages for it.

And this is what he said to him,

Sumakhos said to

the first tanna:

What

you say,

that

a reversion with regard to an animal is a reversion—

you say that if it reverted with regard to an animal, it is no longer forewarned with regard to it even though it did not revert with regard to a person. In this I disagree with you, holding that

a reversion with regard to an animal is not a reversion, by means of a kal va-chomer from a person:

And if it did not revert with regard to a person, with regard to an animal is it not all the more so [

if it did not revert with regard to a person, surely it did not revert with regard to an animal ]?

Rav Ashi said: Come and hear

from the end of our Mishna, which indicates that “but is not forewarned” is what we learned; that is, this wording does not state a law but a fact—that it was not established as forewarned with regard to this matter:

For we learned:

They said,

his students

before Rabbi Yehuda: What is the law if an ox was forewarned with regard to Sabbaths but was not forewarned with regard to weekdays?

He said to them: With regard to Sabbaths it pays full damages; with regard to weekdays it pays half-damages.

Granted, if you say that “

but is not forewarned”

is what it teaches, then when they said, “What is the law if it was forewarned with regard to Sabbaths but was not forewarned with regard to weekdays,”

they were merely asking him a question [

they were asking him a question ]. Those words are part of the question: What is the law of one that was forewarned for Sabbaths but not for weekdays?

they were asking him a question ]. These words form part of the question: What is the law concerning one who was forewarned with regard to Shabbat but not with regard to the weekdays?

And he,

Rabbi Yehuda,

was likewise answering them.

That is, when Rabbi Yehuda said to them, “With regard to Sabbaths it pays full damages; with regard to weekdays it pays half-damages,” this was an answer to their question.

But if you say: “

It is not forewarned”

is what it teaches, then when they said, “What is the law if it was forewarned with regard to Sabbaths but not forewarned with regard to weekdays,” they were not asking this as a question; rather, they were establishing the law that it is not forewarned with regard to weekdays. If so,

Were they

were they teaching it to him [

did they come to teach Rabbi Yehuda what the halakha is in this matter ]!?

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty: If they established the halakha in their question, then

he,

Rabbi Yehuda,

what was he answering them [

what did Rabbi Yehuda answer them ]!? They themselves had already established the halakha in their question—that it is not forewarned with regard to weekdays—and it is obvious that it pays half-damages on weekdays.

Rabbi Yannai said:

Also

from the first clause,

from all the clauses preceding the question of Rabbi Yehuda’s students,

it can likewise be inferred that “but is not forewarned” is what we learned!

that “but is not forewarned” is what we learned!

For

it

teaches

with regard to all three clauses:

For the type with regard to which it is forewarned it pays full damages, and for the type with regard to which it is not forewarned it pays half-damages.

If you say that the phrase

“and it is not accustomed”

is taught,

then it is well: the tanna had to say that for the matter to which it is accustomed it pays full damages, and for the matter to which it is not accustomed it does not pay half-damages, because

it is explaining it:

it had to teach us, by stating “and it is not accustomed,” that ordinarily it is accustomed; therefore it had to conclude its statement and say: for a matter to which it is not accustomed, it does not pay full damages.

But if you say that

“it is not accustomed”

is taught,

then it has already

been determined:

the tanna of the Mishna has already established the law, that it is accustomed only to the matter to which it has become accustomed. If so,

what more [

did the tanna need to add ] “for the matter to which it is accustomed it pays full damages, and for the matter to which it is not accustomed it pays half-damages”!

For the animal toward which it is forewarned, it pays full compensation, and for the animal toward which it is not forewarned, it pays half compensation”?

And

has it not been taught to us until now [

before this Mishna the tanna had not taught us ]

that for the former it pays half-damages, whereas an accustomed animal pays full damages!?

Rather, it is necessarily the case that we learned “and it is not accustomed,” in accordance with Rav Zevid.

The Gemara adds and explains:

And if you should say that Rav Pappa’s ruling also applies,

even if you say that the halakha is in accordance with Rav Pappa, who says that we learned “it is not accustomed” [rather than according to our initial inference], and it follows from the Mishna that an animal accustomed to its own species is not accustomed to a different species, nevertheless, if

it gored an ox, a donkey, and a camel,

three different species, it

becomes accustomed to all.

The Sages taught: If it saw

the damaging ox

an ox,

and

gored

it; and then it again saw

an ox

and

did not gore

it; and then it again saw

an ox

and

gored

it; and then it again saw

an ox

and

did not gore it;

and then it again saw

an ox

and

gored it;

and then it again saw

an ox

and

did not gore,

the ox becomes

the animal

accustomed intermittently, to oxen.

That is, from now on, it will be accustomed to the first ox it sees, not accustomed to the ox following it, accustomed to the ox after that, not accustomed to the ox following it, and so on; but it is not accustomed at all to other animals.

The Sages taught: If it saw an ox

and

gored

it; and then it again saw

a donkey

and

did not gore

it; and then it again saw

a horse

and

gored

it; and it saw

a camel

and

did not gore it;

it saw

a mule

and

gored it; and it saw

it; and it saw

a wild ass [

a wild donkey ] and

did not gore —

the damaging ox becomes

the damaging ox

accustomed intermittently to all.

They raised a dilemma before them:

the members of the academy were uncertain about two issues, which are four: