Bava Kamma 35a — the Talmud in English

He too

who ignited a stack,

also

is speaking of an ignition

that he did not need,

for he had no need of it.

And

even so,

it teaches

that the person who ignites

is exempt

from the damage

because he is judged with his life

that is, he is liable to death.

And it is proven that one who ignites without need is liable, in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu, and not in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, who said: all those who cause damage on

Shabbat are exempt.

No,

the intention of the tanna is not to equate the person with the ox, to make him liable to death and exempt him from money in the same case in which the ox is liable financially. For in truth, the law of a person who ignites is not similar to that of an ox: a person is liable to death and exempt from payment only when he ignites for a purpose, whereas an ox is liable even when it ignites without a purpose. Rather, on the contrary, the intention of the Mishna is to juxtapose the law of the ox with the law of the person; that is, the owner of the ox is liable even in the case where

his ox

ignited

the stack

in a manner analogous to him

in which the person who ignites is liable. And this is the comparison:

And this is the comparison:

just as he,

the person himself, is not liable to death for the ignition except at a time

when he needed it,

when he wants the fire for its ashes,

so too his ox,

what is written in the Mishna, that his ox that ignited the stack is liable, is speaking [even] of an ox that ignites the stack in a case

when he needed it,

when he requires the ashes.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

How can you find it

that his ox needs to ignite a stack?

Rav Avya said to him: Here, with what are we dealing? With an intelligent ox

a clever one,

that developed a bite [

a wound ]

on its back, and it wants to burn it

it wants to burn a stack

and roll in the ashes

so that it can rub itself in the ashes at the place of the bite.

And from where do we know

how it is possible to know, concerning an ox that ignites a fire, that this was its intention?

For after it burned it

the stack,

it rolls in the ashes

it went to rub itself in the ashes, and in this case it can be assumed that from the outset it burned the stack for this purpose.

And the Gemara objects:

Is there

an intelligent ox

of this sort,

which knows how to prepare such a remedy for itself?

And the Gemara answers:

Yes!

Indeed, we find a case of an intelligent ox that healed itself.

There was this ox that was in the house of Rav Pappa

an ox that was in the house of Rav Pappa,

whose teeth were hurting

because it suffered from pain in its teeth ,

it entered, kicked away the cover of the vessel, and drank beer

it pushed away with its feet the cover of the vessel containing the beer and drank from the beer

and was healed

it was cured of the pain in its teeth.

Thus we find a case in which the ox knew how to bring a remedy for its illness.

The Gemara discusses Rabbi Yohanan’s statement that all the ox’s damages brought in the Mishna are in the same manner as the person’s damages.

The Rabbis said before Rav Pappa:

Can you say

that the Mishna should be explained in such a manner that the damage caused by

his ox

is

analogous

to the damage caused by

himself,

the person himself?

But it teaches: “His ox that caused humiliation is exempt, whereas he who caused humiliation is liable.”

And if it is said that the tanna presents the ox that caused damage in a manner analogous to the person who causes damage, it is difficult: How can we explain “his ox that caused humiliation” as analogous to him, the person himself who causes humiliation? For a person is liable for humiliation when he intends to humiliate, whereas concerning an ox intending to humiliate,

how can you find it? How can one find a circumstance in which the ox intends to humiliate? It has no understanding for this.

Rav Pappa said to them: Our Mishna is speaking of a person who does not intend to humiliate, but only intends to cause damage; and likewise, regarding the ox that caused humiliation, it is not speaking of one that intended to humiliate, but only

for example, it intended

the ox

to cause damage.

For a person is liable for humiliation payments even without intending to humiliate, provided that he intends to cause damage; and likewise, regarding the ox that caused humiliation, it is speaking of one that intended only to cause damage. Yet the person is liable for humiliation, whereas the ox is not.

For the master said:

A person who

intended to cause damage

and humiliated his fellow

, even though he did not intend to humiliate,

is liable for the humiliation.

And the Gemara brings another answer as to how to reconcile what is stated in the Mishna, “He ignited the stack on Shabbat is exempt [from payment] because he becomes liable through his life,” with Rabbi Yohanan’s words that one who ignites and causes damage on Shabbat is exempt.

Rava said:

In fact, the Mishna is speaking of an ox that ignited the stack without a purpose, and likewise, in an analogous case, regarding a person who ignites a stack, it is speaking of one who ignited without a purpose, and he is entirely exempt from death, since all those who cause damage on Shabbat are exempt.

And that which is stated in the Mishna, “exempt [from payment] because he becomes liable through his life,” which implies that he is liable to death—for if not, why is he exempt from payment? Furthermore, the expression “he becomes liable through his life” implies that he is liable to death—

This is because in

the Mishna

it is speaking of an ox and a person who ignited a stack

inadvertently,

and concerning this it is stated in the Mishna that when an ox ignites a stack inadvertently, its owner is liable for payment, but a person who ignites inadvertently is exempt from payment. [Although he is exempt from death for two reasons: a. he did not ignite for a purpose; b. he ignited inadvertently.]

And

the reason for this is

as the school of Hezekiah taught:

For the school of Hezekiah taught:

It is stated in Leviticus [24:21]: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death.” That is, one who strikes an animal is liable to pay, but one who strikes a person and kills him does not pay the value of the killed person; rather, he becomes liable to death. The Sages expounded from the fact that it was stated together in the same verse, “

one who strikes a person and one who strikes an animal,”

“one who strikes a person and one who strikes an animal,”

that there is a juxtaposition between them for several laws.

Just as

just as a person who

strikes an animal, no distinction was made concerning it,

the Torah did not mention a distinction between the various manners of striking. And it follows that

whether

he struck the animal

inadvertently

or

whether

he struck it

intentionally,

in every case he is liable. Likewise, Scripture made no distinction

between

one who strikes an animal

with

intention to

one who strikes by mistake,

who does not intend

to do so,

and it follows that even one who struck an animal unintentionally is liable. Likewise, Scripture made no distinction

between

one who struck the animal by

“

the downward motion,”

when he lowers the hand holding the axe from above downward [which is the ordinary manner of striking],

and

one who strikes an animal by

the upward motion,

when he raises his hand upward and strikes the animal in an unusual manner,

and it follows that even by the upward motion he is liable. For we find no source in the Torah

to exempt him

from paying

from paying

money

if he struck an animal inadvertently, unintentionally, or by the downward motion.

Rather,

on the contrary, from the fact that we find no source to exempt him in all these cases, it is reasonable that the Torah’s intention is

to make him liable for money

despite his being inadvertent, unintentional, or acting by the downward motion. And just as one who strikes an animal is liable in every manner of striking,

so too

one who strikes a person

who is liable to death and exempt from payments is exempt from payments in every form of striking. And

one

shall not distinguish in his case between

one who struck his fellow

inadvertently and

one who struck him

intentionally,

or

between intending and not intending,

or

between the downward motion and the upward motion. For even if he struck him inadvertently, unintentionally, or by the upward motion, it is impossible

to make him

liable for money,

for the striking of a person was juxtaposed to the striking of an animal in order to equate inadvertence with intentional action, intending with not intending, and the downward motion with the upward motion;

rather,

just as in striking an animal he is liable in all cases, so in striking a person the Torah said

to exempt him from money.

It follows that one who strikes his fellow inadvertently, although he is not liable to death according to the law of an inadvertent act, is nevertheless exempt from payments, since Scripture made no distinction between inadvertence and intentional action, and in every case he is exempt from payments.

And from here: any prohibition for which one becomes liable for death, if one transgresses it unintentionally, one is not liable to pay the monetary obligations.

Therefore, Rava established what is stated in the Mishna, “He who ignited the stack on Shabbat is exempt because he makes himself liable,” as referring to a case in which he ignited the stack unintentionally, so that he is exempt from payments, because this transgression—the ignition of a stack on Shabbat—for which one who performs it intentionally is exempt from payments, has no distinction between intentional and unintentional with regard to exemption from payments.

And through this Rava resolves Rabbi Abbahu’s difficulty against Rabbi Yohanan: according to Rabbi Yohanan, one who causes damage through kindling is exempt, whereas in the Mishna it is stated that one who ignites the stack on Shabbat is liable to death?!

For indeed, what is stated in the Mishna, “makes himself liable,” means that in the ignition of a stack there is some manner in which one can become liable for death—for example, if he ignited it intentionally and he needs its ashes—and one who commits a transgression for which it is possible to become liable for death is exempt from payments even if he transgressed the transgression without becoming liable for death.

And for this reason the Mishna exempted one who ignites a stack without a purpose, because this transgression is one for which it is possible to become liable for death.

The Rabbis said to Rava: Can you establish it as unintentional?!

Is it possible to interpret our Mishna as referring to one who ignites the stack unintentionally

? But

in our Mishna, concerning this one who ignited the stack, it is stated that he is exempt

—“because he is judged with his life,” it teaches—

and it is proven that it is referring to one who ignited it intentionally and became liable to death.

And Rava explains: the tannai in our Mishna

said this: Since

if he had ignited the stack

intentionally,

he would have been

judged with his life—and what are the circumstances,

how is it possible that one who ignites a stack is liable for the kindling

? For he needs its ashes,

that he is igniting it for the ashes that he needs

—now,

at present, when he ignited the stack

unintentionally,

or when he does not need its ashes, although he is not liable to death, nevertheless he is

exempt

from payments

.

Mishna:

a.

An ox

belonging to one person,

that was pursuing another ox

belonging to another person,

and was injured,

the pursued ox.

This one,

the injured party,

says, “Your ox caused the damage.” And this one,

the owner of the pursuing ox,

says, “No indeed,

rather, it was injured against a rock,

that it rubbed itself against a wall and was injured

.

The one who seeks to extract from his fellow bears the burden of proof.

b.

There were two,

two oxen belonging to two people,

pursuing

one

ox

belonging to a third person,

and the injured party brought a claim against them

, “This one says, ‘Your ox caused the damage,’ and this one says, ‘Your ox caused the damage.’”