Bava Kamma 24b — the Talmud in English

But if you say

that three goring incidents on three days are required in order to warn the owners after each goring, that his ox has gored, and

to establish the man as forewarned.

It necessarily follows that each group came after the goring about which it came to testify, and that they did not all come together to testify.

And if so,

let the first ones say: We—how did we know

that these would come after three days—

the other two groups, to testify that it gored two more times,

and establish it as forewarned!

And since the members of the first group did not know that further groups would come, their intention was only that the owner of the ox should pay half-damage,

and they too should pay according to what they plotted, half-damage; so why do we say that each group pays full damage?

Rav Ashi said: I stated this teaching—

that it is proven from the beraita that the three days that Rabbi Yehuda says refer to establishing the ox as forewarned—

before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: And

if three days were stated

for establishing the ox as forewarned, is it satisfactory?

And

here too, one can raise a difficulty:

Let those

who testified

later

about the ox’s goring

say: How did we know

that two groups had testified before us about the ox’s goring? And is it the case

that everyone who stands in court to testify about an ox comes, we

thought that we were the only ones testifying about the ox that had gored, and

we came to obligate the man for half-damage

so why do we say in the beraita that all the groups pay full damage?

And we answer: The beraita maintains that the three days that Rabbi Yehuda says were stated for establishing the ox as forewarned, and it is speaking of a case where the three groups came to testify on one day, and

they hinted hints

the first witnesses to the last witnesses that they would come and testify after them, therefore we say that certainly the last ones knew about the first ones and intended to add to the testimony of the first ones and make the ox forewarned; therefore all the groups pay full damage.

Rav Ashi said:

The beraita is speaking

when

the three groups of witnesses came

in succession,

one after the other, and certainly each group knew of the testimony of the one before it.

Ravina said:

We hold that an innocuous ox that gored is sold, and half-damage is paid from its money, whereas a forewarned ox pays from the superior property; and the beraita is speaking of a case where the last witnesses

recognize

the

owner of the ox, but do not recognize the ox .

Therefore, when they came to testify, they certainly knew that they were coming to make it forewarned. For if they thought that we would judge it as an innocuous ox, what reason would they have to testify? For they do not recognize the ox, and the owner would not be able to sell it. Therefore, when they were found conspiring, the last group too pays full damage.

And we explain:

But

those witnesses who do not recognize the ox,

how do they establish it as forewarned?

For they say

in court:

You have a goring ox

among

your cattle; you must guard the entire herd,

and afterward it became clear that those witnesses were conspiring and wished to bring him to liability for full damage; therefore they too pay full damage.

They raised a dilemma before them: One who incites another’s dog against his fellow, what is the law?

And the sides of the doubt are:

The inciter is certainly exempt,

because he does nothing but cause damage, and indirect causation in cases of damage is exempt, but

what is the law of the dog’s owner?

Do we say that he can say to him

to the injured party:

What can I do about it?

And I am no worse than the inciter, who is exempt,

Or perhaps we say to him

to the dog’s owner,

since

you knew concerning your dog that

if

they incite

it

against him

against human beings, it is influenced by this

and is incited, you were not permitted to leave it.

Rabbi Zeira said: Come and hear:

An ox that gored

and

was established as forewarned

and

ceased goring returns to being

innocuous from the time

that

children stroke it and it does not gore—

according to Rabbi Meir in the Mishna.

And we infer:

Here,

if children stroke it and it

gores, it is liable,

the owners must pay according to the law of a forewarned ox. It follows that one whose ox—and the same applies to his dog—was incited by another is liable.

And we reject this:

Abaye said: Perhaps

this is what you should infer:

Here,

if children stroke it and it

gored, it does not become innocuous, and

nevertheless

for that goring it is not liable,

and indeed one whose dog was incited is exempt.

Come and hear:

One who

incited it—

against his fellow—

the dog,

or one who

incited the snake against it, is exempt.

And we infer:

Is it not

that which it teaches,

“is exempt,”

refers to the

inciter, while the dog’s owner is liable?

No; say that even the inciter is exempt.

Rava said:

Even

if you should conclude

that the halakha is that

one who incites another’s dog against his fellow is liable,

the dog’s owner, if

he incited it—

the inciter

himself, is exempt,

the dog’s owner,

What is the reason?

For we hold concerning one who places his objects in the public domain and his fellow’s cow eats them, that the cow’s owner is exempt, because

whoever changes—

who placed his objects in the public domain—

and another comes and changes it—

the cow that ate his objects—

is exempt .

Here too, since the inciter acted unlawfully, if he was injured as a result, the owner of the damager is exempt from paying.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: It was stated in the name of Reish Lakish in accordance with your view,

for Reish Lakish said: Two cows

that were

in the public domain, one crouching and one walking, and the walking one kicked the crouching one, it is exempt,

because the crouching one changed from the ordinary practice—for it is not the way of a cow to crouch in the public domain; therefore, if another came and changed and kicked it, it is exempt.

But if the

crouching one kicked the

walking

cow, it is liable.

It follows that Reish Lakish agrees with Rava: whoever changes, and another comes and changes it, is exempt.

He said to him,

Rava:

I

hold

in that case,

where the walking one kicked the crouching one,

I obligate

the walking one that kicked,

for we say to it: When you have permission to walk—

to pass

over me,

but

to kick me you have no permission.

Mishna:

An ox that causes damage in the domain of the injured party—

as we learned [above, 15b] among the five forewarned categories, that it pays full damage even when the ox is innocuous—

how:

It gored,

the ox, that is, “horn,” or

pushed

with its body, with intention to cause damage], or

bit,

or

lay down

on objects with intention to damage them, or

kicked,

for all these are derivatives of “horn,” for concerning it the Torah distinguished between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox; therefore, their law—before they were established as forewarned—is distinct:

If it did so

in the public domain,

this one

pays half-damage.

But if it did so

in the domain of the injured party:

Rabbi Tarfon says: Full damage

it pays, as he proceeds to explain the reason.

And the Sages say: Half-damage

alone it pays, for the Torah said that an innocuous ox pays only half-damage, and there is no difference whether it did so in the domain of the injured party or whether it did so in the public domain.

Rabbi Tarfon said to the Sages:

But with regard to tooth and foot in the domain of the injured party, it pays full damage; if so, the matter follows by a kal va-chomer, that it should also be liable for full damage for horn in the domain of the injured party, since:

And just as in a place where the verse was lenient

the Written Torah

concerning tooth and foot in the public domain, making them exempt,

that is, just as tooth and foot, concerning which the Written Torah was lenient in the public domain, exempting them entirely,

it was stringent concerning them

the Written Torah

in the domain of the injured party, to pay full damage—

in a place where it was stringent

the Written Torah

concerning horn in the public domain, to pay half-damage,

that is, horn, concerning which the Written Torah was stringent in the public domain, requiring half-damage,

is it not the law that we should be stringent concerning it in the domain of the injured party, to pay full damage,

as with tooth and foot?

They said to him,

the Sages to Rabbi Tarfon: In any event, it pays only half-damage in the domain of the injured party, for

“it is sufficient for what is derived from the law to be like what teaches it” [

it is sufficient for what is learned to be like what teaches it]. That is: Since by virtue of the stringency of horn in the public domain you learn by kal va-chomer, then even in the domain of the injured party do not make it more stringent than the stringency you imposed upon it in the public domain, and

just as in the public domain, half-damage

alone it pays,

so in the domain of the injured party—

half-damage

alone it pays.

He said to them,

Rabbi Tarfon to the Sages: