Bava Kamma 24b (כד:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, if you say

that three goring incidents on three days are required in order to establish the owner’s liability, by warning the owner after each incident in which his ox gores, and

to establish the person.

You are forced to say that each group came after the goring about which it came to testify, and that they did not all come together to testify.

And if so,

let the first of these groups say: We—how could we know

that after three days these others would come—

the other two groups, to testify that it had gored two more times—

and establish him as forewarned!

And since the members of the first group did not know that additional groups would come, their intention was only that the owner of the ox pay half-damages,

and they too should pay according to what they schemed, half-damages. Why, then, do we say that each group pays full damages?

Rav Ashi said: I presented this matter—

that it is evident from the beraita that when Rabbi Yehuda says three days, he means

before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: And

if three days are stated

to establish the ox, is that satisfactory?

And

here too, one can raise the following difficulty:

Let those

who testified

later

about the ox’s goring say:

How could we know

that two groups had testified before us about the ox’s goring? And is it the case

that everyone who stands in court comes to testify about an ox? We

thought that we were the only ones testifying about the ox that had gored, and

we came only to obligate the person to pay half-damages.

Why, then, does the beraita say that all the groups pay full damages?

And we answer: The beraita maintains that when Rabbi Yehuda says three days, he means that they are required to establish the ox, and it is speaking of a case in which the three groups came to testify on the same day,

and the first witnesses subtly hinted

to the later witnesses that they would come and testify after them. Therefore, we say that the later witnesses certainly knew about the earlier ones and intended to add to the earlier testimony and establish the ox as forewarned; therefore, all the groups pay full damages.

Rav Ashi said:

The beraita is speaking

when

the three groups of witnesses came

one immediately after the other,

so that each group certainly knew of the testimony of the group before it.

Ravina said:

We maintain that an innocuous ox that gores is sold, and its owner pays half-damages from the proceeds, whereas a forewarned ox is paid for from the owner’s superior assets. The beraita is speaking of a case in which the later witnesses

know

the

owner of the ox, but do not know the ox.

Therefore, when they came to testify, they certainly knew that they were coming to establish it as forewarned. For had they thought that it would be judged as an innocuous ox, why would they testify? They did not know the ox, and the owner would not be able to sell it. Therefore, when they were found to be conspiring witnesses, even the last group pays full damages.

And we explain:

Rather,

those witnesses who do not know the ox,

how can they establish it as forewarned?

For they say

in court:

“I have a goring ox; do you have

an ox

in your herd? You must guard the entire herd,”

and afterward it became clear that those witnesses were conspiring witnesses and sought to bring the owner to liability for full damages. Therefore, they too pay full damages.

A dilemma was raised before them: If one incites his fellow’s dog against another person, what is the halakha?

The sides of the dilemma are:

The inciter is certainly exempt,

because he merely causes the damage, and one who causes damage indirectly is exempt, but

what is the law concerning the dog’s owner?

Do we say that he can say to him

the injured party:

“What could I have done to it?”

And I am no worse than the inciter, who is exempt ,

Or perhaps we say to him,

the dog’s owner:

Since

you knew about your dog that if it is

if

they incite

it

against

human beings, it is influenced by this

and is incited, you had no right to leave it.

Rabbi Zeira said: Come and hear:

An ox that gored

and

was established as forewarned,

and

then ceased goring, returns to being

innocuous

from the time

that children stroke it and it does not gore—

according to Rabbi Meir in the Mishna.

And we infer:

This

means that if children stroke it and it

gores, the owner is liable

to pay as in the case of a forewarned ox. Evidently, one whose ox is incited—and the same applies to his dog—by another is liable.

And we reject this:

Abaye said: Perhaps

you should infer as follows:

This

means that if children stroke it and it

gores, it does not remain innocuous, and

nevertheless

he is not liable for that goring.

Thus, one whose dog is incited is always exempt.

Come and hear:

One who

incited against him—

against another person—

the dog,

or who

incited the snake against him, is exempt.

And we infer:

Is it not

the exemption stated here,

“exempt,”

referring to the

inciter, while the dog’s owner is liable?

No; say that even the inciter is exempt.

Rava said:

Even

if you should conclude

that the halakha is that

one who incites another’s dog against another person is liable,

the dog’s owner, if

he incited it—

the inciter

himself—the dog’s owner is exempt,

because the inciter acted himself,

What is the reason?

For we maintain with regard to one who places his utensils in the public domain and another person’s cow eats them, that the cow’s owner is exempt, because

“whoever acts abnormally”—

who placed his utensils in the public domain—

“and another comes and acts abnormally toward him”—

the cow that ate his utensils—

is exempt.

Here too, since the inciter acted improperly, if he was harmed as a result, the owner of the damaging animal is exempt from paying.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: It was stated in the name of Reish Lakish in accordance with your view,

for Reish Lakish said: Two cows

that were

in the public domain, one crouching and one walking, and the walking one kicked the crouching one; it is exempt,

because the crouching cow acted abnormally, since a cow does not normally crouch in the public domain. Therefore, if another came, acted abnormally, and kicked it, it is exempt.

But if the

crouching one kicked the

walking

cow, it is liable.

Evidently, Reish Lakish agrees with Rava that whoever acts abnormally and another then acts abnormally toward him is exempt.

He said to him,

Rava:

I

hold that in

that case—

where the walking cow kicked the crouching one—

I am certainly obligating

the walking cow that kicked,

for we say to it: When you have permission to walk—

to pass

over me,

but

you do not have permission to kick me.

Mishna:

An ox that causes damage on the property of the injured party—

as we learned above [15b], among the five categories of forewarned animals, it pays full damages even when the ox is innocuous—

how so?

It gored

the ox, that is, “horn”; or

it butted

[pushed with its body] intentionally in order to cause damage; or

it bit; or

or

it lay down

on utensils intentionally in order to damage them; or

it kicked—

all of these are derivatives of “horn,” for in these cases the Torah distinguished between an innocuous and a forewarned animal. Their laws, before the animal was established as forewarned, are therefore different:

If it did so

in the public domain,

it

pays half-damages.

But if it did so

on the property of the injured party:

Rabbi Tarfon says: Full damages

it pays, as he explains the reason below.

And the Sages say: Half-damages

alone it pays, since the Torah stated that an innocuous animal pays only half-damages, and there is no difference whether it did so on the property of the injured party or in the public domain.

Rabbi Tarfon said to the Sages:

But in the case of tooth and foot on the property of the injured party, it pays full damages. If so, the matter follows by a kal va-chomer: It should certainly be liable for full damages for horn on the property of the injured party, since:

And if in a case where Scripture was lenient

with regard to

tooth and foot in the public domain, where it exempts them,

that is, tooth and foot, concerning which Scripture was lenient in the public domain and exempted them entirely,

Scripture was stringent with them

in the property of the injured party

to pay full damages—

in a case where Scripture was stringent

with regard to

horn in the public domain, requiring it to pay half-damages,

that is, horn, concerning which Scripture was stringent in the public domain by requiring payment of half-damages,

is it not logical that we should be stringent with it on the property of the injured party and require full damages,

as with tooth and foot?

They said to him,

the Sages to Rabbi Tarfon: In any event, it pays only half-damages on the property of the injured party, since

“it is sufficient for what is derived from the law to be like the subject from which it is derived”

[it is sufficient for the derived case to be like the teaching case]. That is, since through the stringency of horn in the public domain you derive by a kal va-chomer that the payment is full damages on the property of the injured party, you may not make the liability there more stringent than the liability you established in the public domain.

Just as in the public domain it pays half-damages

alone,

so too on the property of the injured party—

half-damages

alone it pays.

He said to them,

Rabbi Tarfon to the Sages: