Bava Kamma 17b — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “In what manner is the leg forewarned? To break while walking in its usual manner. The animal is forewarned to walk in its usual manner and to break.”

Ravina said to Rava: “This is leg, this is animal!”

“The leg is forewarned” has the same meaning as “the animal is forewarned”; for what purpose did the Mishna repeat, “the animal is forewarned”?

He said to him

Rava:

The tanna taught primary categories, and he taught derivatives.

The tanna in the Mishna first taught the law of “the leg is forewarned” in order to explain the primary category of damage of leg, about which the Torah speaks, namely, an animal trampling with its leg while walking in its usual manner. And the tanna then repeated the law of “the animal is forewarned,” in order to explain the derivatives of “leg,” that the animal is forewarned to walk in its usual manner and to break objects by means of its body, its hair, and a load upon it.

And Ravina again asked Rava:

But if so,

according to your explanation,

the latter clause [

the words of the Mishna below, on 19b ],

which teaches,

which we learned in it,

“The tooth is forewarned

to eat what is suitable for it.

The animal is forewarned

to eat fruits and vegetables,” one must ask: “The tooth is forewarned” and “the animal is forewarned” have one meaning; for what purpose did the Mishna repeat and duplicate again, “the animal is forewarned”? Here you cannot explain that the Mishna first taught the primary categories and repeated them in order to explain the derivatives, since

what primary categories are there, and what derivatives are there?

How can one explain primary categories and derivatives in the words of the Mishna? For what the Mishna repeated, “the animal is forewarned to eat fruits and vegetables,” is the primary category of damage of tooth, and not a derivative, and if so, the Mishna repeated and duplicated that very same primary category of damage; it is difficult, for what purpose did it do this?!

He was answering him jokingly,

Rava answered Ravina with a joke,

and he said to him: “I explained one; you explain one,”

I explained one Mishna, and you explain one Mishna [that is, I explained the first Mishna, and you explain the second Mishna].

And now the Gemara explains:

And what is the reason,

what is truly the reason that the Mishna below repeated and said, “the tooth is forewarned” and “the animal is forewarned”?

Rav Ashi said: “The tanna taught the tooth of an animal, and he taught the tooth of an animal.”

The Mishna comes to teach us that even an animal that eats is included in the primary category of damage of tooth. Therefore it repeated and duplicated, saying “the tooth is forewarned,” with reference to an animal that eats. Whereas what the tanna said, “the animal is forewarned,” refers to an animal that eats.

And the reason that the Mishna needed to teach us this, even though an animal is included within “animal,” is:

For

it might enter your mind to say

perhaps we might have thought to say: since concerning tooth that causes damage,

“and he sends forth his animal”

“and it consumes in another’s field,”

it is written [

Exodus 22:4 ], that the obligation is stated concerning its “animal,” as the obligation is stated concerning its “animal,” which is a domesticated animal, that ate. Therefore, we might have said that only

a domesticated animal

that eats another person’s fruit,

yes,

the Torah obligated its owner concerning payment of damages, but

an animal

that ate,

no,

the Torah did not obligate its owner to pay. Therefore

it teaches us

the tanna returned and duplicated the wording in the Mishna, to teach us

that an animal

also

is included within “animal,”

and even an animal that eats is liable on account of tooth that causes damage.

The Gemara asks:

If so,

if so, since the Mishna said “the tooth is forewarned” to teach us about the tooth of an animal, and wrote “the animal is forewarned” to teach us about the tooth of a domesticated animal,

then,

since the primary law of tooth is explained in the Torah with regard to a domesticated animal, then the tooth of a domesticated animal

should have been taught first,

the tanna should have taught this first, and only afterward taught the law of the tooth of an animal, since it is included by derivation within “domesticated animal”; why did the Mishna precede by explaining “the tooth of an animal”?

The Gemara answers:

This one, which comes to him through a derivation, is dear to him.

This matter—the tooth of an animal—since its liability is not explicit in the Torah but is learned through a derivation, is dear to the tanna, and therefore he placed it first in the Mishna.

But the Gemara asks about the answer:

If so,

if this is so, that the Mishna teaches first a matter that is not explicit in the Torah because of its being dear, then

in the first clause too, let it teach that which is not written explicitly, first!?

Also in our Mishna, which repeated “the leg is forewarned” and “the animal is forewarned,” and it was explained that the Mishna first explained the law of the primary category of damage and then repeated it in order to explain the law of the derivatives—that the animal is forewarned to walk in its usual manner and to break with its body, and so on—the derivatives are not explicit in the Torah, but are learned from the explicit primary category. If so, why did the Mishna not teach the derivatives first?!

The Gemara answers:

How can these be compared!?

How can you compare the following Mishna concerning tooth with our Mishna?

There, both this and that —

are primary categories.

There, in the following Mishna, both the tooth of an animal and the tooth of a domesticated animal are included within the primary category of damage of tooth. Since both are primary categories, therefore

this one, which comes to him through a derivation, is dear to him,

therefore what is not explicit is dear to the tanna, to teach it first.

But

here,

in our Mishna, which comes to explain the primary category of damage and the derivatives, can one say that

he abandons the primary category and teaches the derivative!?

Would the tanna abandon the primary category of damage and teach the derivative first?!

And another answer:

If you wish, say:

if you wish, say in explanation:

Since he concluded with leg, he began with leg.

Since the tanna in the Mishna at the conclusion of the previous chapter [9b] mentioned “leg” [“the leg is forewarned”] and did not say “the animal is forewarned,” therefore the tanna began the Mishna with “the leg is forewarned.”

And now the Gemara brings a beraita explaining the words of the Mishna:

The Sages taught:

the Sages taught in a beraita:

“The animal is forewarned to walk in its usual manner and to break”—how so?

An animal that entered the injured party’s courtyard and caused damage with its body while walking, and

likewise if it caused damage

with its hair

while

walking,

for vessels became attached to its hair, and it dragged them and they broke, or if it caused damage while walking

with the saddle upon it,

and with the load upon it [

with the load in its pack ],

and with the bit [

with the bridle ]

in its mouth, and with the bell [

a bell ]

upon its neck, and

likewise

a donkey

that caused damage

with its load

while walking in its usual manner,

the owners pay

the owners

full damages.

Somkhus says,

if the animal sprayed

pebbles,

and they caused damage, he pays full damage. Since Somkhus disagrees with our Mishna and holds that for damage caused by pebbles he pays full damage.

And

so too,

a pig that was rooting

with its snout

in a refuse heap, and caused damage ,

pays

its owner

full damage.

But the Gemara was astonished at Somkhus’s words:

If the pig

caused damage, is it not obvious!?

For it is obvious that its owner pays full damage, like any animal that caused damage in its ordinary manner; and for what purpose does the beraita bring this in the name of Somkhus?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, say [that is, say and teach] in Somkhus’s words: A pig that was rooting in a refuse heap, and while rooting

sprayed

splinters from the refuse heap,

and caused damage

through them,

pays full damage.

But the Gemara rejects:

Pebbles—who mentioned them by name?

Who mentioned them in the beraita? And why does the beraita bring here the view of Somkhus, who disagrees and holds that for pebbles he pays full damage?

The Gemara answers:

Something is missing,

the beraita is stated in an abbreviated formulation,

and this is what it teaches,

and this is how it should be taught:

Pebbles in its ordinary manner,

an animal that, while walking, sprayed pebbles and they caused damage, even though it is its ordinary manner [and this is not unusual like Horn],

pays

the owner only

half damage. And

so too,

a pig that was rooting in a refuse heap and sprayed

pebbles with its snout,

and caused damage, pays

the owner

half damage.

Somkhus says: Pebbles, and a pig that was rooting in a refuse heap and sprayed and caused damage, pays full damage.

And now the Gemara brings additional beraitot dealing with the law of pebbles:

The Sages taught: Roosters that were flying from place to place and broke vessels,

if they broke them

with their wings,

through their wings touching the vessels,

pays

the owner of the roosters

full damage.

Since this is their ordinary manner, it is a derivative of Foot. But if they broke the vessels

with the wind in their wings,

through wind that blew from their wings, since the damage was not done by the body of the rooster but only by its force, this is only pebbles,

and they pay

the owners only

half damage.

Somkhus says:

Even if they caused damage with the wind in their wings,

he pays full damage.

For according to him, even for damage caused by pebbles he pays full damage.

Another beraita was taught,

in another beraita we learned:

Roosters that were dancing [that is,

dancing]

on dough, and [or

on]

on fruits, and soiled

the dough and the fruits,

or pecked

at them with their beaks,

pays

the owner

full damage.

But if

they raised

the roosters

dust or pebbles

with their feet or wings, and these caused damage to the dough and the fruits,

they pay

the owners

full damage.

Another beraita was taught,

in another beraita we learned:

A rooster that was flying from place to place, and wind emerged from beneath its wings and broke vessels,

since the damage was not done through its body but through its force,

pays

the owner

half damage,

as is the law of pebbles.

And the Gemara establishes it:

The anonymous formulation is according to the Rabbis.

The tannaitic authority who taught the last beraita did not mention the dissenting view of Somkhus, but stated it anonymously according to the Rabbis; and it may be inferred from this that this is the halakha.

And the Gemara clarifies why, according to the Rabbis, he pays only half damage for pebbles:

Rava said;

it is understandable according to Somkhus, for he holds that his force is considered like his body.

Somkhus’s method is understandable, since he holds that damage done through his force [such as pebbles] is like damage done through his body, because the law of his force is like the law of his body; therefore, even when it is done through his force, he pays full damage.

But the Rabbis,

who hold that for damage done through his force [pebbles] he pays only half damage—it is not understood what they hold.

For

if

they hold that the law of his force is

considered like his body,

then

he should have to pay the entire damage,

he should have to pay full damage for “pebbles.”

And if

they hold that his force is

not considered like his body,

and therefore he pays only half damage, it is difficult:

should he not pay even half damage!?

He should not pay even half the damage, because we find payment of “half damage” only in something unusual [Horn]; but damage whose occurrence is ordinary, such as pebbles, we do not find in the Torah a law of half damage. And if the pebbles are not like damage that it causes with its body, so as to obligate him in full damage, he should be entirely exempt!?

And the Gemara brings that Rava resolves it:

Then Rava said,

Rava returned and said:

In fact,

the Rabbis hold that its force is

considered like its body. And half damage for pebbles,

what they hold—that for pebbles he pays only half damage, even though it is like damage done with its body—

is a received halakha,

thus the halakha was received from Moses our teacher at Sinai.

And now the Gemara brings a principle that Rava stated concerning damages:

Rava said: Anything that is impure in the case of a zav,

in a situation in which a zav renders another impure, namely, when the zav touched another person, in such a situation,

in damages,

that is, when it caused damage with its body, its law is that it

pays full damage.

Anything that is pure in the case of a zav,

in a situation in which a zav does not render another impure, such as when the zav threw an object at another, in such a situation

in damages,

such as when the animal threw something at vessels and damaged them, it pays only

half damage.

The Gemara asks:

And

for

Rava, did he come to teach us pebbles!?

Did Rava come to teach us the law that “pebbles” entail half damage? We already learned this in the Mishna and in the beraita?!

The Gemara answers:

No, Rava

came to teach the law of

a wagon pulling a cart.

He came to teach us that if an animal was pulling a cart, then, with regard to this, if a cart on which the zav is sitting passed over vessels, the vessels became impure by the law of “the seat of the zav”; likewise, with regard to damages, if an animal pulled a cart over vessels and they were damaged, its law is like damage done with its body, and it pays full damage.

However, if the cart sprayed pebbles from beneath it, in which situation the zav does not render [the vessels] impure, likewise with regard to damages its law is that of pebbles, and he pays only half damage.

The Gemara brings the continuation of the above beraita:

The Sages taught: Roosters that were pecking [that is,

pecking with their beaks]

at a rope

attached to a

bucket, and the rope was severed and the bucket broke, pays

the owner of the roosters

full damage

for the bucket, since the bucket broke through the severing of the rope, and this is not considered damage caused by pebbles.

The Gemara raises a doubt concerning the law of pebbles:

He raised a difficulty [that is,

he was uncertain]

Rava:

The law of pebbles that we learned, that he pays half damage, speaks of a case where the animal sprayed pebbles that struck a vessel and broke it. What is the law if

it stepped

the animal

on a vessel and did not break it, and it rolled

because of the stepping

to another place and broke?

That is, if it struck the vessel itself and, through the force of its impact, it broke in another place: this act began through its body, for it stepped on and struck the vessel, and ended through its force, because it rolled to another place and broke there.

What is [the law]?

Is its law that of pebbles, and he pays only half damage, or perhaps he pays full damage?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Whether

we follow the beginning,

whether we follow the beginning of the act, when it stepped on the vessel,

and it is its body,

and this was done with its body, so he is liable for full damage.

Or perhaps, we follow the breaking of the vessel,

or perhaps we follow the breaking itself, which occurred in another place,

and they are pebbles,

and the breaking was done through its force, so its law is that of pebbles, which entails half damage.

And we deliberate about it: Why should he not

resolve it from Rabbah,

for Rabbah said: [If one] threw

one person

a vessel from the roof, and another came and broke it with a stick

while it was in the air, before it reached the ground—

before it reached the ground—

he is exempt

the one who broke it with a stick before its breaking. Because

we say to him [that is,

we say to the owner of the vessel]:

You broke a broken vessel [that is,

you broke a broken vessel] with your stick, for it was destined to break when it reached the ground. If so, it is apparent from Rabbah’s words that we follow the first factor that caused the object to break, and not the factor that actually broke the object; and since it will ultimately break when the vessel reaches the ground, the matter is considered as though the one who threw it from the roof broke it, and not the one who broke it with a stick. And let us resolve from there the case of one who trampled a vessel, and it rolled to another place and broke: it is considered to have broken because of the trampling itself, which is the first factor, and he must pay full damage.

And the Gemara rejects: The question of Rava cannot be resolved from Rabbah’s words, since although

for Rabbah it is obvious

that we follow the beginning,

for Rava it is a question.

The Gemara attempts to resolve it from a beraita:

Come and hear

what we learned in a beraita:

dancing

[the dancing of chickens],

is not

considered

accustomed

to cause damage in this manner.

And some say: This is

considered

accustomed

to cause damage in this manner.

And we raised it as a difficulty: Is

dancing, does it enter your mind

[that you should interpret the beraita according to its plain meaning, that it is not accustomed to cause damage in this way]? But it is the way of chickens to dance, so why should it not be considered accustomed to cause damage in this manner?

Rather, is it not

necessary to interpret it as referring to

dancing and projecting

, meaning that the chicken danced on the vessel and projected it to another place, and it broke there, like the case about which Rava was uncertain?

And in this they disagree

[and in this the first tanna and the “some say” disagree]:

one says

[the “some say”]

that we follow the beginning,

and the first factor [the dancing] is considered to have broken the vessel, namely, the chicken’s body; and the owner of the chicken is liable to pay full damage, according to the law of one that is accustomed.

And the other says

[the first tanna]

that we follow the breaking of the vessel

[we follow the factor that actually broke the vessel]; and the fact that the vessel was projected and struck the ground is what makes the payment of the damage due. And since this occurred only through its force, the owner of the chicken is not liable for full damage according to the law of one that is accustomed, but only for half-damage according to the law of pebbles.

And if so, the question of Rava can be resolved from the dispute between the first tanna and the “some say.”

And the Gemara rejects:

No

; you cannot resolve it from here, because in that beraita it is possible to explain that they did not disagree about the matter concerning which Rava was uncertain, but disagreed about another matter.