Bava Kamma 17b (יז:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

My uchili v Mishne: «Kakim obrazom noga mu'edet lomat po puti svoego dvizheniya? Zhivotnoe prirucheno idti svoei obychnoy postupyu i razbivat».

Ravina skazal Rave: «Noga — eto noga, a zhivotnoe — eto zhivotnoe!»

Ved «noga mu'edet» oznachaet to zhe samoe, chto «zhivotnoe mu'edet»; zachem zhe Mishna povtorila «zhivotnoe mu'edet»?

Skazal emu

Rava:

«Tannai perechislyaet avot i perechislyaet toladot».

Vnachale tannai v Mishne priv el zakon «noga mu'edet», chtoby obyasnit zakon av ushcherba nogi, o kotorom govorit Tora: zhivotnoe, nastupayushchee svoei nogoi po puti dvizheniya. Zatem tannai snova priv el zakon «zhivotnoe mu'edet», chtoby obyasnit toladot nogi, k kotorym zhivotnoe prirucheno idti svoei obychnoy postupyu i razbivat predmety telom, sher sty u ili gruzom, kotoryi na nem nahoditsya.

Ravina snova sprosil Ravu:

«No togda»,

po tvoemu tolkovaniyu,

v kontse

[slova Mishny nizhe, na liste 19b]

skazano,

chto my uchili v nei:

«Shen priruchena

est to, chto ei podhodit.

Zhivotnoe prirucheno

est plody i ovoshchi». Ved «shen priruchena» i «zhivotnoe prirucheno» oznachayut odno i to zhe. Zachem zhe Mishna snova povtorila «zhivotnoe prirucheno»? Zdes nelzya obyasnit, chto Mishna snachala perechislila avot, a zatem povtorila ikh, chtoby obyasnit toladot, tak kak

kakie zdes avot i kakie toladot?

Kak mozhno obyasnit v slovah Mishny avot i toladot, ved to, chto Mishna povtorila — «zhivotnoe prirucheno est plody i ovoshchi», — yavlyaetsya samim av ushcherba shen, a ne tolad oi? Tak zhe Mishna snova povtorila tot zhe samyi av, i voznik a et vopros: zachem ona eto sdelala?!

On otvetil emu v shutochnoy forme

— Rava otvetil Ravine so smeshkom —

i skazal emu: «Ya razreshil odnu trudnost, a ty razreshi druguyu»,

to est ya razreshil trudnost s pervoi Mishnoi, a ty razreshi trudnost so vtoroi.

Teper Gemara obyasnyaet:

«No v chem zhe prichina?»

Kakova v deistvitelnosti prichina togo, chto v prodolzhenii Mishna povtorila: «shen priruchena» i «zhivotnoe prirucheno»?

Rav Ashi skazal: «Tannai privodit shen dikogo zhivotnogo i privodit shen domashnego zhivotnogo».

Mishna prishla soobshchit nam, chto i dikoe zhivotnoe, kotoroe est, otnositsya k av ushcherba shen. Poetomu ona povtorila: «shen priruchena», imeya v vidu dikoe zhivotnoe, kotoroe est; a slova tannaya «zhivotnoe prirucheno» otnosyatsya k domashnemu zhivotnomu, kotoroe est.

Prichina, po kotoroi Mishna dolzhna byla soobshchit nam eto, nesmotrya na to chto dikoe zhivotnoe tozhe vh od it v ponyatie «zhivotnoe», takova:

Tak kak

moglo by pridti v golovu,

chto, poskolku v svyazi s ushcherbom shen v Tora

napisano: «I pustit svoe zhivotnoe

i ono pasetsya na pole drugogo»

napisano

[Sh mot 22:4], i obyazannost ustanovlena v svyazi s «ego zhivotnym», to est s domashnim zhivotnym, kotoroe est, my by skazali, chto tolko

domashnee zhivotnoe,

kotoroe est plody drugogo cheloveka,

da, ego vladelets obyazan platit za ushcherb, no

the Torah obligates its owner to pay for the damage, but

dikoe zhivotnoe,

kotoroe est,

net,

Tora ne obyazala ego vlade ltsa platit. Po etomu

ona soobshchaet nam, chto tannai povtoril v Mishne, chtoby soobshchit nam, chto

that the tanna repeated the statement in the Mishna in order to teach us that

dikoe zhivotnoe

takzhe

vh od it v ponyatie domashnego zhivotnogo,

i d ikoe zhivotnoe, kotoroe est, obyazano po zakonu shen.

Gemara sprashivaet:

«Esli tak»,

esli Mishna skazala «shen priruchena», chtoby nauchit nas o «shen dikogo zhivotnogo», a «domashnee zhivotnoe prirucheno», chtoby nauchit nas o «shen domashnego zhivotnogo»,

ved

poskolku osnovnoi zakon shen v Tora raz yasnen v svyazi s domashnim zhivotnym, zakon shen domashnego zhivotnogo

nuzhno bylo privesti vpervuyu ochered,

to est tannai dolzhen byl snachala privesti ego, a uzhe potom zakon shen dikogo zhivotnogo, poskolku ono dobavleno k ponyatiyu domashnego zhivotnogo. Pochemu zhe Mishna vpervye obyasnyaet «shen dikogo zhivotnogo»?

Gemara otvechaet:

«To, chto prikhodit k nemu iz drashi, osobenno lyubimo emu».

Zakon shen dikogo zhivotnogo, poskolku ego obyazannost ne vyrazhena pr yamo v Tora, a vyvoditsya iz drashi, osobenno dorog t annayu. Poetomu on postavil ego pervym v Mishne.

No Gemara vozrazhaet na etot otvet:

«Esli tak»,

esli Mishna snachala privodit to, chto ne ukazano v Tora, potomu chto eto osobenno lyubimo,

to i v nachale zdes sleduet snachala privesti to, chto ne napisano v Tora?!

Tak zhe i v nashei Mishne, gde povtoryayutsya «noga priruchena» i «zhivotnoe prirucheno», i raz yasneno, chto snachala Mishna obyasnyaet zakon av ushcherba, a zatem povtoryaet ego, chtoby obyasnit zakon toladot — zhivotnoe prirucheno idti svoei obychnoy postupyu i razbivat telom i t. p. Ved toladot ne ukazany pr yamo v Tora, a vyvodyatsya iz av, tak pochemu zhe Mishna ne privodit snachala toladot?

Gemara otvechaet:

«Kak mozhno sravnivat?!»

Kak mozhno sravnivat sleduyushchuyu Mishnu o shen s nashei Mishnoi?

«Tam i to i drugoe

— avot».

Tam, v sleduyushchei Mishne, i shen dikogo zhivotnogo, i shen domashnego zhivotnogo vh od yat v av ushcherba shen. Poskolku oba yavlyayutsya avot,

to, chto prikhodit k nemu iz drashi, osobenno lyubimo emu,

i poetomu tannai privodit vpervuyu ochered to, chto ne napisano pr yamo.

No

zdes,

v nashei Mishne, kotoraya prishla obyasnit av ushcherba i toladot, razve mozhno skazat, chto

on ostavit av i priv edet tolad u?!

Razve tannai ostavit av ushcherba i snachala priv edet ego tolad u?!

I eshche odin otvet:

«Esli hochesh, skazhi tak»

— esli hochesh, obyasni tak:

«Poskolku on zakonchil na noge, on nachal s nogi».

Poskolku tannai v Mishne v kontse predydushchei glavy [9b] upom yanul nogu — «noga priruchena», — a ne «zhivotnoe prirucheno», on nachal etu Mishnu s «nogi priruchena».

Teper Gemara privodit bara ytu, razyasnyayushchuyu slova Mishny:

«Uchili mudretsy»,

uchili mudretsy v bara yte:

«“Zhivotnoe prirucheno idti svoei obychnoy postupyu i razbivat” — kakim obrazom?»

«Zhivotnoe, voshedshee vo dvor postradavshego i prichinivshee ushcherb telom po

svoemu dvizheniyu, a

svoei sher sty u

po

puti dvizheniya

— kogda sosudy ceplyalis za ego sher st i, ono ta shch ilo ih za soboi, i oni razbilis, ili esli ono prichinilo ushcherb pri dvizhenii

sed lom, kotoryi byl na nem,

i gruzom, kotoryi byl na nem

[gruzom v ego sum e],

i uzdoi

[uzdoi]

vo rtu, i kolokolchikom

[kolokolom]

na ego shee, i

takzhe

osel

prichinivshii ushcherb

svoim gruzom

po puti dvizheniya,

platit

vladelets

polnyi ushcherb».

Sumakhos says,

if the animal projected

pebbles,

and they caused damage, its owner pays full damages. This is because Sumakhos disagrees with our Mishna and maintains that for damage caused by pebbles one pays full damages.

And

so too,

a pig that was rooting

with its snout

in a garbage heap and caused damage ,

its owner pays

its owner

full damages.

But the Gemara was astonished by Sumakhos’s statement:

If the pig

caused damage, is it not obvious!?

It is obvious that its owner pays full damages, like any animal that caused damage in its ordinary manner. Why, then, does the beraita cite this case in the name of Sumakhos?

The Gemara replies:

Rather, say [that is, amend and teach] Sumakhos’s statement as follows: A pig that was rooting in a garbage heap, and while rooting

projected

particles from the garbage,

and they caused damage

through their impact,

its owner pays full damages.

But the Gemara rejects this:

Pebbles—who mentioned them?

Who mentioned them in the beraita? And why does the beraita bring here the opinion of Sumakhos, who disagrees and maintains that for damage caused by pebbles one pays full damages?

The Gemara replies:

The beraita is incomplete,

the beraita is phrased incompletely,

and this is what it teaches:

and this is how it should be taught:

Pebbles in the animal’s ordinary manner,

an animal that, while walking, projected pebbles and they caused damage, although this is its ordinary manner [and is therefore not unusual like keren],

pays

the owner only

half the damages. And

so too,

a pig that was rooting in a garbage heap and projected

pebbles with its snout,

and they caused damage, its owner pays

the owner

half the damages.

Sumakhos says: For pebbles, and for a pig that was rooting in a garbage heap and projected pebbles and caused damage, its owner pays full damages.

The Gemara now brings additional beraitot dealing with the law of pebbles:

The Sages taught: If chickens were flying from one place to another and broke vessels,

if they broke them

with their wings,

by their wings touching the vessels,

the owner pays

the owner of the chickens

full damages.

Since this is their ordinary manner, it is a derivative of regel. But if they broke the vessels

with the wind generated by their wings,

by wind blown from their wings, since the damage was not caused by the chicken’s body but only by its force, this is merely pebbles,

and the owners pay

the owners only

half the damages.

Sumakhos says:

Even if they caused damage through the wind generated by their wings,

the owner pays full damages.

For in his view, even for damage caused by pebbles one pays full damages.

It was taught in another beraita,

in another beraita we learned:

If chickens were dancing [

dancing ]

on dough, or [

or on ]

on produce, and soiled

the dough and produce,

or pecked

at them with their beaks,

the owner pays

the owner

full damages.

But if

they raised

the chickens

earth or pebbles

with their feet or wings, and these caused damage to the dough and produce,

the owners pay

the owners

full damages.

It was taught in another beraita,

in another beraita we learned:

If a chicken was flying from one place to another, and wind emerged from beneath its wings and broke vessels,

since the damage was not caused through its body but through its force,

the owner pays

the owner

half the damages,

as is the law of pebbles.

The Gemara establishes:

The anonymous ruling accords with the Rabbis.

The tanna who taught the last beraita did not mention the dissenting opinion of Sumakhos, but stated the ruling anonymously in accordance with the Rabbis. It may be inferred from this that this is the halakha.

The Gemara clarifies why, according to the Rabbis, one pays only half the damages for pebbles:

Rava said:

Granted, Sumakhos holds that one’s force is considered like one’s body.

Sumakhos’s method is understandable, since he maintains that damage caused by one’s force [such as pebbles] is like damage caused by one’s body; the law of one’s force is like the law of one’s body, and therefore even when the damage is caused by force, one pays full damages.

But the Rabbis,

who maintain that for damage caused by one’s force [pebbles] one pays only half the damages—what do they maintain? This is not understood.

For

if

they maintain that the law of one’s force

is considered like one’s body,

then

he should have to pay the entire damages,

and one should pay full damages for “pebbles.”

And if

they maintain that one’s force

is not considered like one’s body,

and therefore one pays only half the damages, this is difficult:

why should he pay even half the damages!?

We find payment of half the damages only for an unusual act [keren]. But for damage that occurs in the animal’s ordinary manner, such as pebbles, we do not find in the Torah a law of half damages. If pebbles are not considered damage caused by the animal’s body, which would obligate full damages, then the owner should be entirely exempt!?

The Gemara brings Rava’s resolution:

Rava reconsidered and said,

Rava returned and said:

Actually,

the Rabbis maintain that one’s force

is considered like one’s body. And the half damages for pebbles,

the fact that they maintain that for pebbles one pays only half the damages, although this is like damage caused by the animal’s body,

is a received halakhic tradition,

this halakha was received from Moshe our teacher at Sinai.

The Gemara now brings a principle stated by Rava concerning laws of damages:

Rava said: Anything that in the case of a zav is impure,

meaning a situation in which a zav renders another impure, namely, when the zav touches another person or object, in such a situation,

with regard to damages,

meaning when the damage is caused by the animal’s body, its law is that

the owner pays full damages.

Anything that in the case of a zav is pure,

meaning a situation in which the zav does not render another impure, such as when the zav throws an object at another, in such a case

with regard to damages,

for example, when an animal throws an object at vessels and damages them, the owner pays only

half the damages.

The Gemara asks:

And

if so,

did Rava come to teach us the law of pebbles!?

Did Rava come to teach us that for pebbles one pays half the damages? We already learned this in the Mishna and in the beraita?!

The Gemara replies:

No, Rava

came to teach the law of

a wagon pulling a carriage.

He came to teach that if an animal was pulling a carriage, then, with regard to ritual impurity, if the carriage on which the zav is sitting passed over vessels, the vessels become impure under the law of “the seat of a zav”; similarly, with regard to damages, if an animal pulled a carriage over vessels and they were damaged, this is considered damage caused by its body, and the owner pays full damages.

However, if the carriage projected pebbles from beneath it, in which case the zav would not render the vessels impure, then with regard to damages as well its law is that of pebbles, and the owner pays only half the damages.

The Gemara brings the continuation of the above beraita:

The Sages taught: If chickens were pecking [

pecking with their beaks ]

at a cord

attached to a

bucket, and the cord broke and the bucket broke, the owner pays

the owner of the chickens

full damages

for the bucket. Since the bucket broke through the breaking of the cord, this is not considered damage caused by pebbles.

The Gemara raises a question concerning the law of pebbles:

Rava inquired [

he was uncertain ]

of the following:

The law of pebbles that we learned, according to which one pays half the damages, concerns a case in which an animal projected pebbles that struck a vessel and broke it. What is the law if

the animal stepped

on a vessel

but did not break it, and it rolled

as a result of the stepping

to another place and broke?

That is, the animal struck the vessel itself, and because of the impact it rolled to another place, where it broke. The beginning of this act was performed by its body, when it stepped on and struck the vessel, while its conclusion was performed by its force, when the vessel rolled elsewhere and broke there.

What is the law?

Is it considered pebbles, so that the owner pays only half the damages, or does the owner pay full damages?

The two sides of the uncertainty are as follows:

Does

the beginning determine the matter,

so that we follow the beginning of the act, when the animal stepped on the vessel,

and it is its body,

and therefore the act was performed by its body and the owner is liable for full damages?

Or perhaps, the breaking determines the matter,

or perhaps we follow the breaking itself, which occurred elsewhere,

and these are pebbles,

since the breaking was caused by the animal’s force, and its law is that of pebbles, for which one pays half the damages.

The Gemara considers the matter: Why not

resolve it from Rabba’s statement,

for Rabba said: If one threw

a person

a vessel from the roof, and another came and broke it with a stick

while it was in the air,

before it reached the ground—

he is exempt

the one who broke it with the stick, before it broke on its own. This is because

we say to him [

we say to the owner of the vessel ]:

You broke a broken vessel [

you broke a vessel that was already broken ] with your stick, since it was destined to break when it reached the ground. If so, it follows from Rabba’s statement that we follow the initial factor that caused the object to break, and not the factor that actually broke it. Since it was ultimately destined to break once the vessel reached the ground, the matter is considered as though it was broken by the one who threw it from the roof, and not by the one who broke it with a stick. We may therefore resolve from there the case where one trampled on a vessel, it rolled to another location, and broke: it is considered to have broken as a result of the trampling itself, which was the initial factor, and he must pay full damages.

The Gemara rejects this: Rabba’s statement cannot resolve Rava’s question, because although

it was obvious to Rabba

that we follow the initial factor,

to Rava it was a question.

The Gemara attempts to resolve the matter from a baraita:

Come and hear

we learned in a baraita:

Dancing [

the dancing of chickens ],

is not

considered

forewarned

to cause damage in this manner.

And some say: This is

considered

forewarned

to cause damage in this manner.

And we raised a difficulty: Is

dancing, can it enter your mind [

that it should be understood as the baraita plainly states, that it is not forewarned to cause damage in this way? But it is the manner of chickens to dance, so why should it not be considered forewarned to cause damage in this manner?

Rather,

this must be understood as referring to

dancing and splashing,

where the chicken danced on the vessel and propelled it to another location, where it broke, as in the case about which Rava was uncertain.

And in this they disagree [

and this is the dispute between the first tanna and the one who says “some say” ],

as one [

the one who says “some say” ]

holds that we follow the initial factor,

and the first factor [the dancing] is considered to have broken the vessel—that is, the chicken’s own force—and the owner of the chicken must pay full damages, as in the case of an animal that is forewarned,

while the other [

the first tanna ]

holds that we follow the actual breaking of the vessel [

we follow the factor that actually broke the vessel]. The vessel’s being propelled and striking the ground is what causes the damage to be paid for, and since this occurred only through its force, the owner of the chicken is not liable for full damages as in the case of an animal that is forewarned, but only for half-damages, as in the case of pebbles.

If so, the dispute between the first tanna and the one who says “some say” should resolve Rava’s question.

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

this cannot be resolved from here, because it is possible to explain that the dispute in that baraita is not about the matter that Rava raised, but about a different matter.