Bava Kamma 14b — the Talmud in English

Indeed,

three general principles

there are; that is, with regard to their laws, there are three general principles:

a. In the domain of the injured party, he is liable for full damage even in the case of a tame ox.

b. In the domain of the damager, he is exempt from everything.

c. In a courtyard belonging to partners, he is exempt for Shen and Regel, while for Keren the tame one pays half-damage and the forewarned one full damage.

However,

in four places

they are. For there is a courtyard belonging to partners in which he is exempt for Shen and Regel, and there is a courtyard belonging to partners in which he is liable for Shen and Regel, such as one designated for the injured party for produce and for both of them for oxen. Therefore, we taught four general principles.

Mishna:

This Mishna adds general principles in the laws of damages, and in the Gemara it will be explained what the Mishna intends with each and every principle, and what it comes to exclude:

a.

Any

assessment of damages shall be only in

money.

And from orphans one collects only

something of monetary value,

lands and not movable property.

b. And the assessment and the obligation are made

before a court

of experts,

and by the testimony of witnesses

who are

free men,

and

members of the covenant,

and not Canaanite slaves or gentiles.

c.

And women

too are

included in the category of damage,

included in the laws of damages like men.

d.

And

there are times when

the injured party and the damager

participate

in the payment.

And as will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: “Any assessment in money.”

And the Gemara discusses: What is

the meaning of

“any assessment in money”?

Rav Yehuda said,

this is its meaning:

“This assessment,

the assessment of the damage,

shall be only in money,”

that the court will assess the damage at a monetary value, and the damager will pay the injured party this sum. And the Gemara proves from this the words of the beraita:

We learned this

in this Mishna what the Sages taught in the beraita.

For the Sages taught:

A cow that

entered another’s courtyard and

damaged

by trampling the

cloak

of the homeowner.

And a cloak that damaged a cow

and afterward, when this cloak was lying in the public domain, the cow encountered it and was injured,

we do not say: Let the cow go out for the cloak, and the cloak for the cow!

so that the owner of the cloak should take, without an assessment, the cow that damaged his cloak, and the owner of the cow should take, without an assessment, the cloak that damaged his cow.

Rather, it is assessed in money.

The damages are assessed according to their monetary value, and whoever caused the greater damage pays the difference.

These words of the beraita are thus exactly as we learned in our Mishna.

We learned in the Mishna:

something of monetary value.

And the Gemara brings a beraita that explains the words of the Mishna:

For the Sages taught: “Something of monetary value”

which the Mishna stated,

teaches that the court does not attend

to a claim for damages, to collect the payment of the damage from the damager,

unless

the

damager

has

property subject to responsibility [lands],

from which it is possible to collect.

But if the injured party preceded and seized movable property

of the damager,

the court collects it for him from them

as payment for the damage.

The Gemara explains why lands are called “something of monetary value”:

The master said

in the beraita:

“Something of monetary value”—this teaches that the court attends only to property subject to responsibility.

What is the implication?

How does “something of monetary value” refer to lands?

Rabba bar Ulla said: “Something of monetary value” means

a thing whose meaning is

a thing worth all money

that they will pay for it.

What is that?

What is the thing about which it can be said that it is worth every price? It is:

a thing to which there is no overreaching.

That is, lands, concerning which the law of “overreaching” was not stated: if a person sold land at a price higher or lower than its true value, even if the difference was more than a sixth, the sale stands, and neither the seller nor the buyer can retract from the sale; likewise, they do not have to return the excess money. And this is the meaning of “they are worth every money”: every price that one gives for them is their value, and he does not return the remainder to him.

The Gemara asks: Even so, how is it implied that the intention is specifically lands? After all,

“slaves” and “documents” also

also

do not have

the law of

overreaching,

and if so, are slaves and documents also “worth every money” that they will pay for them? Therefore the Gemara explains another interpretation:

Rather, Rabba bar Ulla said: “Something of monetary value” means

a thing acquired by

the acquisition of

the act of acquisition of

money,

and this is lands.

But it is still difficult: how is it implied that the intention is specifically lands? After all,

slaves and documents

also,

they too

are acquired by

the acquisition of

money.

? Rather, Rav Ashi said: “Items worth money”

Rather, Rav Ashi said: “Something of monetary value”

means a thing that is only in the category of “something of monetary value”; with this alone shall the damager pay,

and not money

itself.

And all these are money.

Slaves and documents, and likewise all movable property, are in the category of “money” and not “something of monetary value.” For a movable thing can easily be transferred from place to place, and one can bring it to a place where there is demand for it, sell it there, and receive money for it. This is not so with land, which is fixed in its place. Therefore land is considered only “something of monetary value,” whereas all movable property, since it is easy to convert, is considered “money.”

But the Gemara raises a contradiction from another beraita against this beraita:

He raised a contradiction to it [

he raised a contradiction between two beraitot],

Rav Yehuda bar Hinena to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: It was taught,

we learned in this beraita:

“Something of monetary value”—this teaches that the court attends only to property subject to responsibility.

The court attends to collect payment for damages only from lands.

And it was taught,

while, by contrast, in another beraita we learned: “Money he shall return to its owner,” and they expound:

“He shall return”—to include something of monetary value and even bran,

so that payment for damages may be made from every movable thing, even from “bran.” It follows that payment for damages may also be made from movable property.

And the Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing?

In the beraita explaining our Mishna, which says that one collects only from lands, we are dealing with

orphans,

when the damager died and they come to collect the payment for the damage from the orphans. In such a case, one collects only from lands that their father left them, and not from movable property, even though it belonged to their father. However, the beraita that includes even bran is dealing with a case in which the damager is alive, when it is possible to collect even from movable property.

The Gemara asks:

If

this beraita is speaking about

orphans,

if so,

say the latter clause,

which states:

“If the injured party preceded and seized movable property, the court collects it for him from them.”

If

it is speaking of

orphans, why [

why]

does the court collect it for him from them?

For the law is that the orphans’ movable property is not encumbered for payment of their father’s debts.

And the Gemara answers:

As Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman [in Ketubot 84b],

that even though seizure by creditors from the movable property of orphans is ineffective, nevertheless the seizure is effective when

he seized it while he was alive,

when the creditor seized it while the father was still alive.

And here too,

here also, in the beraita that says that if the injured party preceded and seized, the court collects it for him from them, we will explain that it refers to when

he seized

—the injured party—

during the lifetime

of their father.

We learned in the Mishna: something of monetary value

before the court.

The Gemara explains what the Mishna means and what it comes to teach us:

“Something of monetary value before the court” means that the damager’s lands should be [in his possession] before the court. And it comes to exclude

except for a

damager who

sells his property

to others and uses up the money he received in exchange for it,

and afterward goes to court

to litigate the payment of the damage, for the court does not collect from the lands in the possession of the purchasers.

And the Gemara is astonished:

Infer from this,

is it to be inferred from here that if a person

borrowed

money from his fellow,

and sold

his

property [lands] after the loan, before he repaid his debt,

[his land] after the loan and before repaying his debt,

and afterward came

the lender

to court

to litigate with the borrower over collection of the debt,

the court does not collect it for him,

for the lender from the borrower,

from them,

from the lands that the borrower sold?! But the law is that the lender comes and collects from the purchasers, and if so, also in the case of a damager who sold his property, the injured party should collect from the purchasers!

Therefore the Gemara explains the Mishna differently:

Rather,

the intention of the Mishna, which said “and before the court,” is to say that laws of damages whose obligation is by way of a fine must be adjudicated specifically “before a court of expert judges,” and it comes to exclude

except for a court of laymen,

which does not adjudicate laws of fines.

We learned in the Mishna:

“By the testimony of witnesses”

who are free men, who testify before the court concerning the damage that the damager caused.

And the Gemara explains what the Mishna comes to teach us:

“By the testimony of witnesses” means that the court learned of it only through witnesses,

excluding one who admits to a fine, and afterward

witnesses came, for he is exempt.

For if the damager admitted before the court to his obligation to pay, which the Torah imposed by way of a “fine,” then even if witnesses subsequently come and they too testify concerning his obligation, he is exempt as one who admits to a fine.

The Gemara asks:

Granted,

this interpretation fits well

according to the one who says,

according to Rav’s method, who maintains that

one who admits liability for a fine and afterward witnesses come,

indeed

is exempt. But

[but]

according to the one who says,

according to Shmuel’s method, who maintains that

one who admits liability for a fine and afterward witnesses come is liable, what is there to say?

What is there that the Mishna comes to teach us? For it is impossible to explain that the Mishna comes to exclude one who admits liability for a fine and afterward witnesses come, that he is exempt?