Bava Kamma 14b (יד:) — the Talmud in English

Indeed,

there are three general principles

; that is, with regard to their laws, there are three general principles:

a. In the domain of the injured party, he is liable for full damages even in the case of a tame ox.

b. In the domain of the one who caused the damage, he is exempt from everything.

c. In a jointly owned courtyard, he is exempt for damage caused by eating or trampling; and in the case of goring, a tame ox pays half the damages and a forewarned ox pays full damages.

However,

there are four general principles

: For there is a jointly owned courtyard in which one is exempt for damage caused by eating or trampling, and there is a jointly owned courtyard in which one is liable for such damage—for example, one designated for the injured party to place produce there, and for both parties to place their oxen there. Therefore, we learned four general principles.

Mishna:

This Mishna adds principles concerning the laws of damages, and the Gemara will explain what the Mishna intends with each principle and what it comes to exclude:

a.

Any

assessment of damages shall be only in

money

, and from orphans one collects only

items worth money,

namely, land and not movable property.

b. The assessment and the obligation are established

before a court

of experts,

on the basis of witnesses

who are

free men,

and

members of the covenant

, and not Canaanite slaves or gentiles.

c.

Women

are also

included in the laws of damages,

included in the laws of torts just as men are.

d.

And

there are times when

the injured party and the one who caused the damage

participate

in the payment

, as will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: “Any assessment in money.”

And the Gemara asks: What is

the meaning of

“any assessment in money”?

Rav Yehuda said

: This is its meaning:

This assessment,

the assessment of the damage,

shall be only in money

, meaning that the court assesses the damage in monetary value, and the one who caused the damage pays the injured party this sum. And the Gemara proves from this the ruling of the beraita:

We learned this

in this Mishna, namely, what the Sages taught in a beraita.

As the Sages taught:

A cow that

entered another person’s courtyard and

damaged

by trampling the

garment

belonging to the homeowner.

And a garment that damaged a cow

later, when this garment was lying in the public domain, the cow stumbled over it and was injured,

we do not say: Let the cow go out in exchange for the garment, and the garment in exchange for the cow!

That is, the owner of the garment should take, without an assessment, the cow that damaged his garment, and the owner of the cow should take, without an assessment, the garment that damaged his cow.

Rather, it is assessed in monetary terms.

The damages are assessed according to their monetary value, and the one who caused the greater damage pays the difference.

These words of the beraita are therefore the same as what we learned in our Mishna.

We learned in the Mishna:

items worth money.

And the Gemara cites a beraita that explains the words of the Mishna:

As the Sages taught: “Items worth money”

, as stated by the Mishna,

teaches that the court does not attend

to a claim for damages, to collect the payment of the damages from the one who caused them,

unless

the

one who caused the damage

has

property subject to a lien

[land], from which the payment can be collected.

But if the injured party precedes and seizes movable property

belonging to the one who caused the damage,

the court collects the payment for him from it

.

The Gemara explains why land is called “an item worth money”:

The Master said

in the beraita:

“Items worth money” teaches that the court attends only to property subject to a lien.

What indicates this?

How is “items worth money” understood as referring to land?

Rabba bar Ulla said: “Items worth money” means

something worth any amount of money

that will be paid for it.

What is that?

What is the thing concerning which it can be said that it is worth any price? It is:

something to which the law of exploitation does not apply.

That is, land, with regard to which the law of ona’a does not apply: If a person sold land at a price higher or lower than its true value, even if the discrepancy was greater than one-sixth, the sale stands, and neither the seller nor the buyer may retract from the sale; likewise, they need not return the excess money. This is the meaning of “worth any amount of money”: whatever price is paid for it is its value, and the excess need not be returned.

The Gemara asks: How can it still be understood that the reference is specifically to land? After all,

“slaves” and “documents” also

,

do not have

the law of

exploitation

, so do slaves and documents, too, count as “worth any amount of money” paid for them? The Gemara therefore offers another explanation:

Rather, Rabba bar Ulla said: “Items worth money” means

something acquired through

the act of acquisition of

money

, namely, land.

But it is still difficult: How can it be understood that the reference is specifically to land? After all,

slaves and documents

also

are

acquired through

the act of acquisition of

money

? Rather, Rav Ashi said: “Items worth money”

means something that is merely in the category of “worth money”; only with such property may the one who caused the damage pay,

and not money

itself.

And all these are money.

Slaves and documents, as well as all movable property, are considered “money” and not “items worth money.” For an object that can be moved from place to place can easily be converted into money, since one can bring it to a place where there is demand for it, sell it there, and receive money for it. Land, by contrast, remains fixed in its place. Therefore, land is considered only “worth money,” whereas all movable property, since it can easily be converted, is considered “money.”

But the Gemara raises a contradiction from another beraita against this beraita:

He raised a contradiction

between two beraitot,

Rav Yehuda bar Ḥinnana to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: It was taught

in this beraita:

“Items worth money” teaches that the court attends only to property subject to a lien.

The court attends to the collection of damages only from land.

But it was taught

in another beraita: It is stated, “He shall return the money to its owner,” and the verse is expounded:

“He shall return” includes items worth money and even bran

, meaning that damages may be paid with any movable object, even with “bran.” Thus, damages may be paid from movable property as well.

The Gemara answers:

With what are we dealing here?

The beraita that explains our Mishna and says that collection is made only from land is dealing with

orphans

—when the one who caused the damage has died and the payment is being collected from his orphans. In such a case, collection is made only from land that their father left them, and not from movable property, even if it belonged to their father. The beraita that includes even bran, however, is dealing with a case in which the one who caused the damage is alive, in which case collection may also be made from movable property.

The Gemara asks:

If

this beraita is speaking about

orphans

, then

say the latter clause,

which states:

“If the injured party precedes and seizes movable property, the court collects the payment for him from it.”

If

it is speaking about

orphans, why

does

the court collect the payment for him from it?

After all, the law is that the movable property of orphans is not encumbered for the payment of their father’s debts.

The Gemara answers:

As Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman

[in Ketubbot 84b]: Even though seizure by creditors from the movable property of orphans is ineffective, nevertheless, seizure is effective when

he seized it while the father was alive

, when the creditor seized it during the father’s lifetime.

Here too

, in the beraita that says that if the injured party precedes and seizes movable property the court collects the payment for him from it, we explain that it refers to a case in which the injured party

seized

the property

during the lifetime

of their father.

We learned in the Mishna: “Items worth money”

before a court.

The Gemara explains the Mishna’s intention and what it comes to teach:

“Items worth money before a court” means that the land of the one who caused the damage must be [in his possession] before the court. This comes to exclude

except for

the one who caused the damage who

sells his property

to others and spends the money he received in exchange for it,

and then goes to court

to litigate the payment of the damages, in which case the court does not collect from the land held by the purchasers.

The Gemara wonders:

Conclude from this

that if a person

borrowed

money from another person

and sold

his

property

[his land] after the loan and before repaying his debt,

and afterward the

lender came

to court

to litigate with the borrower concerning collection of the debt,

the court does not collect for him

—for the lender, from the borrower—

from them

, from the land that the borrower sold?! But the law is that the lender comes and collects from the purchasers; if so, in the case of one who caused damage and sold his property, the injured party should likewise collect from the purchasers!

Therefore, the Gemara explains the Mishna differently:

Rather,

the intention of the Mishna when it says “before a court” is to say that laws of damages whose payment is imposed as a fine must be adjudicated specifically “before a court of experts,” and it comes to exclude

a court of laymen

, which does not adjudicate cases involving fines.

We learned in the Mishna:

“On the basis of witnesses”

who are free men, who testify before the court concerning the damage caused by the one who caused it.

And the Gemara explains what the Mishna comes to teach:

“On the basis of witnesses” means that the matter became known to the court only through witnesses,

excluding one who admits liability for a fine, and afterward

witnesses came, in which case he is exempt.

If the one who caused the damage admitted before the court that he was liable to make the payment imposed upon him by the Torah as a “fine,” then even if witnesses subsequently come and testify concerning his liability, he is exempt as one who admits liability for a fine.

The Gemara asks:

Granted,

this interpretation works well

according to the one who says,

according to Rav, who holds that

one who admits liability for a penalty and afterward witnesses came

is indeed

exempt. But

however

according to the one who says,

according to Shmuel, who holds that

one who admits liability for a penalty and afterward witnesses came is liable, what can be said?

What is the Mishna coming to teach us? For it cannot be explained that the Mishna comes to exclude one who admits liability for a penalty and afterward witnesses came, who is exempt?