Bava Kamma 117b (קיז:) — the Talmud in English

Regarding

Rabbi Yohanan

near the cave

where Rav Kahana had been buried.

He saw that

a snake had encircled it,

and saw that at the entrance to the cave there was a large snake that had formed itself into a circle and encircled the mouth of the cave, placing its tail in its mouth, so that no person could enter.

He said to it

Rabbi Yohanan said to the snake:

“Snake, snake, open your mouth,”

snake, snake, open your mouth,

“so that

the teacher may enter to his student,” but it did not open.

Rabbi Yohanan said to the snake:

“Let a colleague enter to his colleague,” but it did not open.

He said:

“Let a student enter to his teacher,” and it opened for him.

He pleaded for mercy and restored him to life,

Rabbi Yohanan pleaded for mercy on behalf of Rav Kahana and revived him.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan said to him:

“Had I known that this was the Master’s way, I would not have been upset,

if I had known that this was Rav Kahana’s way, I would not have taken offense.

Now let the Master come with us,”

now let the teacher come with us.

He said to him,

Rav Kahana said to him:

“If you can plead for mercy for me so that I will not die again, I will go with you; but if not—

I will not go.

If you can pray on my behalf that I will not die again if I cause you difficulty, I will go with you and remain beside you in the beit-midrash; but if not, I will not go with you.

Since the moment has passed

and a miracle has occurred,

it has passed,

and I will not go with you again, lest you become angry with me and I die once more. Rather, I will go home alive and will not remain beside you again, lest I die another time.”

And some explain that Rav Kahana said: Since the moment has passed and I have already experienced the suffering of death, I will not experience the suffering of death again, and I will not leave here.

He awakened him,

Rabbi Yohanan awakened Rav Kahana from his sleep,

he stood him up,

he set him upright,

he asked him about every difficulty he had and he resolved them for him,

Rabbi Yohanan presented to him all the difficulties he had, and Rav Kahana resolved them all for him.

This is what Rabbi Yohanan meant when he said: “I used to say, ‘It is yours,’

I used to say that the Torah of the people of Eretz Yisrael was yours,

“‘theirs’

that of the people of Babylonia

“‘is,’

as he had heard this from Rav Kahana, who had come up from Babylonia.

An incident occurred:

There was a certain person who showed an official the silk garment [

a person showed an extortionist a silk ornament ]

belonging to Rav Abba.

Rav Abbahu, Rav Ḥanina bar Pappi, and Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa were sitting, and Rav Ilai was sitting with them; they considered holding him liable

for merely speaking,

based on that which we learned:

a judge who

“rendered a judgment, acquitted the liable party and found the exempt party liable, declared the pure impure and declared the impure pure.”

The law is:

“what he did is done,”

and he cannot take back from the one whom he acquitted; rather,

“he shall pay”

the judge

“from his own pocket,”

which indicates that he is liable to pay even for a loss that he caused merely through speech.

Rav Ilai said to them: “This is what Rav said: and this is when he took the item and transferred it by hand,”

only then is the judge liable to pay for the loss.

They said to him,

to Rav Ilai:

“Go to Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim and Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat, for they adjudicate the law of indirect causation.”

He went to them, and they held him liable based on a Mishna,

as we learned in our Mishna:

“If it was because of the robber”

the extortionists seized the robbed field

“he is liable to provide him with”

the owner of the field

“another field.” And we established

this law in the Gemara

as referring to one who merely showed them the field,

as he himself did not rob it; rather, he heard from the royal palace that they intended to rob fields and showed them the property, saying: “Take this land belonging to so-and-so.”

This indicates that he is liable even for a loss that he caused merely through speech.

An incident occurred:

There was a certain man with whom another had deposited a silver cup;

his fellow had deposited a silver goblet with him,

thieves came up against him,

thieves came up to him,

he took it and gave it to them,

he took the silver cup and gave it to the thieves.

He came before

he came before

Rabbah, and Rabbah exempted him.

Abaye said to him: “Is this not a case of one saving himself with the property of another?”

and in such a case he is liable to pay.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: “We examine the matter: If he is a wealthy person,

he—

they came because of him;

we see that if he is a wealthy man, the thieves came because of him, and he is considered to have saved himself with another’s property and is liable.

But if not—

they came because of the silver cup;

if he is not considered a wealthy man, we say that they came because of the silver cup, and he is exempt from paying the depositor.

An incident occurred:

There was a certain man with whom

a deposit had been placed

there was a charity purse for the ransom of captives; thieves came up against him, he took it and gave it to them,

thieves came up to him, and he took the purse with the money and gave it to them.

He came

to litigate

before Rava

whether he was liable to pay for the purse that he had given to the thieves,

and Rava exempted him

from paying.

Abaye said to him: “Is this not a case of one saving himself with the property of another?”

for he saved himself by handing the purse with the money to the thieves.

He said to him,

Rava said to him: The money deposited with him was intended for the ransom of captives, and

“you have no ransom

of captives greater than this.”

An incident occurred:

There was a certain man who hastened and loaded his donkey onto a ferry before the people boarded the ferry,

he hurried and put his donkey onto the ferry that transported people across the river, before the people boarded the ferry ,

it was about to sink,

the donkey was about to cause the boat to sink,

a certain man came and drove

the donkey of that man into the river

a man came and pushed the donkey and threw it into the river

and it drowned.

He came

to litigate

before Rabbah

whether that man was liable for the donkey that he had drowned,

and Rabbah exempted him.

Abaye said to him: “Is this not a case of one saving himself with the property of another?”

and in such a case he must pay his fellow for his property.

He said to him,

Rabbah said to him:

“This one, from the outset,

the owner of this donkey from the beginning

was a pursuer,”

seeking to kill people, by loading the donkey onto a boat that was unsuitable for it.

Rabbah follows his own view, as Rabbah said:

a.

“A pursuer who was pursuing another to kill him and broke vessels, whether those of the pursued person or those of anyone else”—

“is exempt, since he is liable for his life,”

he is liable to be put to death through this pursuit, even if he does not kill the pursued person. As we learned in tractate Sanhedrin, one may save the pursued person by taking the pursuer’s life. Thus, the liability for payment and the liability for death arise simultaneously, and he is exempt under the principle of kam lei bid’rabba minei: he is exempt from monetary liability because at that same moment he incurs liability for death.

b.

“And a pursued person who broke the vessels of a pursuer”—

“is exempt, for his property should not be dearer to him than his body,”

for this pursued person is permitted to kill his pursuer, as it is stated: “If the thief is found breaking in” (Exodus 22:1). The Torah said: If someone comes to kill you, rise early and kill him first. Therefore, if he saves himself with the property of the pursuer, he is exempt.

“But”

if he saved himself with the property

“of anyone else”—

“he is liable, for it is prohibited to save oneself with another’s property.”

c.

“And a pursuer who was pursuing another pursuer in order to save

the pursued person

and broke vessels, whether those of the pursued person or those of anyone else”—

“is exempt, but not by law,”

he is exempt, for one who saves himself with another’s property is liable; all the more so, one who saves others with another’s property should be liable.

“Rather, if you do not say so,”

to exempt him,

“you will have no person who saves his fellow from a pursuer.”

Mishna:

If a river swept away

the robbed field and destroyed it—the field had been at the riverbank, and the river eroded and hollowed out the bank beneath it and spread into the field—

“he says to him,”

to the robbed person:

“Here is what is yours before you,”

for land cannot be robbed, and it was destroyed while in the possession of the robbed person.

It is necessary to preface this by explaining the interpretive principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization” among the Thirteen Principles by which the Torah is expounded:

There is the principle of “generalization and specification,” meaning that whenever one finds in the Torah a generalization followed by a specification, we interpret that the generalization includes only what is stated in the specification. And there is the principle of “specification and generalization,” meaning specification followed by generalization: we interpret that the generalization adds to the specification, and everything is included. The specification serves to reinforce the generalization, so that if there is something that would not be included by the generalization through any of the interpretive principles, the preceding specification causes the generalization to add to it and include everything; and one may not exclude anything from the generalization on the basis of a kal va-chomer, a gzera shava, or another principle.

There is an additional principle of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” which is composed of the first two principles, “generalization and specification” and “specification and generalization.” Therefore, it conveys the implications of both principles, and it is treated as analogous to both: it includes everything similar to the specification—corresponding to “specification and generalization”—and excludes everything not similar to the specification—corresponding to “generalization and specification.”

There are those who do not expound the Torah according to the meaning of “generalization and specification,” but according to the meaning of “inclusion and exclusion.” That is, instead of “generalization and specification,” “specification and generalization,” and “generalization, specification, and generalization,” they expound: “inclusion and exclusion,” “exclusion and inclusion,” and “inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion.”

The distinction between one who expounds according to “generalization and specification” and one who expounds according to “inclusion and exclusion” is as follows:

According to the one who expounds “generalization and specification,” the specification explains the generalization. According to the one who expounds “inclusion and exclusion,” the specification is not an explanation; rather, it is an exclusion that excludes some of the things included by the generalization and leaves some of them included.

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