Bava Kamma 117b — the Talmud in English

Concerning

Rabbi Yohanan

with regard to the cave

where they buried Rav Kahana.

He saw that there was ![](pamud.bmp "

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a snake encircling it,

he saw that at the entrance of the cave there was a large snake that made itself like a wheel and encircled the mouth of the cave, and placed its tail in its mouth, and no person was able to enter.

He said to it

Rabbi Yohanan said to the snake:

“Snake, snake, open your mouth,

snake, snake, open your mouth

so that

the master may enter to the student,” but it did not open.

Rabbi Yohanan said to the snake:

“Let a colleague enter to a colleague,” but it did not open.

He said:

“Let a student enter to the master.” It opened for him.

He prayed for mercy and restored him,

Rabbi Yohanan requested mercy for Rav Kahana and revived him.

He said to him

Rabbi Yohanan said:

“Had I known that this was the way of the master, my mind would not have been weakened,

if I had known that this was Rav Kahana’s way, I would not have taken offense.

Now, let the master come with us,”

now let the master come with us.

He said to him

Rav Kahana said:

“If you are able to pray for mercy for me that I will not die again, I will go with you; but if not—

I will not go.

If you can pray for me that I will not die again if I trouble you, I will go with you and stand beside you in the beit-midrash, but if not, I will not go with you,

since the time has changed,

and a miracle has occurred,

it has changed,

and I will no longer go with you, lest you become angry with me and I die another time; rather, I will go to my house alive and will no longer stand beside you, lest I die another time.

Some explain that Rav Kahana said: Since the time has changed and I have already received the suffering of death, I will not again receive the suffering of death, and I will not go from here.

He awakened him,

Rabbi Yohanan awakened him from his sleep,

he stood him up,

he made him stand,

he asked him every uncertainty that he had and he resolved them for him

Rabbi Yohanan posed to him all the uncertainties that he had, and Rav Kahana resolved all of them for him.

This is what Rabbi Yohanan said: “I would say, ‘It is yours,’

I would say that it was the Torah of the people of the Land of Israel,

‘theirs’

of the people of Babylonia

it is,”

for he had heard this from Rav Kahana, who had come up from Babylonia.

An incident:

A certain man who pointed out a silk garment [

there was a man who pointed out to an extortionist a silk ornament ]

belonging to Rav Abba.

Rav Abbahu, Rav Hanina bar Pappi, and Rav Yitzhak Nappaḥ were sitting, and Rav Ilaa was sitting with them; they thought to obligate him

for mere speech,

from that which we learned:

a judge who

judged the case, acquitted the liable person and found the entitled person liable, deemed the pure impure and deemed the impure pure.

The law is:

“What he did is done”

and he cannot take it from the one whom he acquitted, but

“he shall pay”

the judge

from his own house,

it follows that he is liable to pay even for a loss that he caused through mere speech.

Rav Ilaa said to them: Thus said Rav: “And this is when he took it and gave it with his hand,”

only then is the judge liable to pay the loss.

They said to him

to Rav Ilaa:

“Go to Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim and Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat, for they judge the law of dina de-garmei.”

He went to them, and they obligated him from the Mishna,

which we learned in our Mishna:

“If because of the robber”

extortionists seized the robbed field

“he is liable to establish for him”

for the owner of the field

“another field.” And we established

and established this law in the Gemara

as: ‘he pointed out, he pointed out,’

that he himself did not rob it, but heard from the king’s house that they were seeking to rob fields and showed them: Take this land belonging to so-and-so.

It follows that he is liable also for a loss that he caused through speech alone.

An incident:

A certain man with whom another had deposited a silver cup,

for his fellow had deposited a silver cup with him,

thieves came up against him,

thieves came up to him,

he took it and gave it to them,

he took the silver cup and gave it to the thieves.

He came before

he came before

Rabbah, and he exempted him.

Abaye said to him: “But this is one who saves himself with the money of his fellow!”

And in this manner he is liable to pay.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: “We see: If he is a wealthy person,

he—

they came with regard to him,

we see: if he is a wealthy man, the thieves came because of him, and he is considered one who saves himself with the money of his fellow and is liable,

but if not—

they came with regard to the silver,

and if he is not considered a wealthy man, we say that they came because of the silver cup, and he is exempt from paying the depositor.

An incident:

A certain man with whom there had been deposited [

that had been deposited with him ]

a purse for the redemption of captives; thieves came up against him, he took it and gave it to them,

thieves came up to him, he took the purse with the money and gave it to them.

He came

he came to litigate

before Rava

whether he was liable to pay for the purse that he had given to the thieves,

he exempted him

from paying.

Abaye said to him: “But this is one who saves himself with the money of his fellow!”

for he saved himself by handing over the purse with the money to the thieves.

He said to him

Rava said: the money that had been deposited with him was for the redemption of captives, and

“you have no redemption”

“of captives greater than this.”

An incident:

A certain man who went ahead and brought his donkey onto the ferry before people boarded the ferry,

he went ahead and brought his donkey onto the ferry that transports people across the river before the people boarded the ferry ,

it was about to drown,

the donkey stood ready to sink the boat,

a certain man came and saved

it, the donkey of that man, and cast it into the river

a man arrived and pushed the donkey and cast it into the river

and it drowned.

He came

he came to litigate

before Rabbah

whether that man was liable for the donkey that he drowned,

he exempted him.

Abaye said to him: “But this is one who saves himself with the money of his fellow!”

And in this manner he is liable to pay his fellow for his property.

He said to him

Rabbah said:

“This one, from the outset,”

the owner of this donkey from the beginning

was a pursuer

to kill people, by bringing the donkey onto a boat unsuitable for it.

Rabbah follows his reasoning, for Rabbah said:

A.

“A pursuer who was pursuing his fellow in order to kill him and broke vessels, whether those of the pursued or those of any person”—

“is exempt, for he is liable with his life”

he is liable with his life through this pursuit, even if he does not kill the pursued, as we learned in Sanhedrin: it is possible to save the pursued by taking the life of the pursuer. It follows that the monetary liability and the liability of death come simultaneously, and he is exempt by the law of kam lei be-derabba minei, for he is exempt from the monetary liability since at that same moment he incurs the liability of death.

B.

“And a pursued person who broke the vessels of a pursuer”—

“is exempt, so that his property should not be dearer to him than his body,”

for this pursued person is permitted to kill his pursuer, as it is stated: “If the thief is found tunneling” [Exodus 22:1]. The Torah said: If he comes to kill you, rise early to kill him. Therefore, if he saved himself with the property of a pursuer, he is exempt.

“But”

if he saved himself with the property

“of any person”—

“he is liable, for it is forbidden to save oneself with the money of one’s fellow.”

C.

“And a pursuer who was pursuing another pursuer in order to save”

the pursued person

“and broke vessels, whether those of the pursued or those of any person”—

“is exempt, but not by law”

he is exempt, for one who saves himself with the money of his fellow is liable; all the more so, one who saves others with the money of his fellow ought to be liable,

“but if you do not say so”

to exempt him,

“you have no person who will save his fellow from the pursuer.”

Mishna:

“If a river swept away”

the robbed field and destroyed it—for the field had been at the bank of the river, and the river eroded and dug beneath the bank and spread into the field—

“he says to him”

to the robbed person:

“Here is yours before you,”

for land cannot be robbed, and it was destroyed under the authority of the robbed person.

It is necessary to precede and explain the measure “generalization, specification, and generalization” from the thirteen measures by which the Torah is expounded:

There is a measure of “generalization and specification,” meaning: wherever in the Torah you find a generalization followed by a specification, we interpret that the generalization includes only what was specified in the specification. And there is a measure of “specification and generalization,” meaning: a specification followed by a generalization; we interpret that the generalization adds to the specification, and everything is included. The specification served to strengthen the generalization, so that if there is something that would not have been included through the generalization by force of one of the measures, the specification that preceded it makes the generalization add to it and include everything, and you may not exclude anything from the generalization because of a kal va-chomer, gzera shava, or another measure.

There is an additional measure of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” and it is composed of the first two measures, “generalization and specification” and “specification and generalization.” Therefore, it implies both measures, and it is treated as resembling both: to include everything resembling the specification—which is like “specification and generalization”—and to exclude everything that does not resemble the specification—which is like “generalization and specification.”

There are those who do not expound the Torah in the meaning of “generalization and specification,” but in the meaning of “multiplication and limitation”; that is, instead of “generalization and specification,” “specification and generalization,” and “generalization, specification, and generalization,” he expounds: “multiplication and limitation,” “limitation and multiplication,” and “multiplication, limitation, and multiplication.”

The distinction between whether one expounds “generalization and specification” or expounds “multiplication and limitation” is as follows:

One who expounds “generalization and specification”: the specification is the interpretation of the generalization. But one who expounds “multiplication and limitation”: the specification is not an interpretation, but a limitation that excludes part of the things that were included and leaves part of them.

And from now it will be explained what the difference between them is:

That everywhere, one who expounds “klal u-prat,” there is in the generalization only what is in the specification, and you have no right to add and include even something resembling the specification; whereas one who expounds “ribui u-mi'ut” included everything, and excluded something that does not resemble the specification.

And one who expounds “klal u-prat u-klal,” the specification is an explanation of the generalization, and there is in the generalization only what is in the specification; and the last generalization, which returned and generalized, came only to add something resembling the specification. But one who expounds “ribui u-mi'ut u-ribui” included everything and excluded only something that does not resemble the specification, except that it returned and included even that which does not resemble it; and it did not exclude from the specification except one thing that is more distant, and Scripture entrusted it to the Sages to know which thing is fit to be excluded.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One who robs a field from his fellow and a river washes it away—

he is obligated to provide him with another field; these are the words of Rabbi Elazar. And the Sages say: He says to him, “Here is yours before you.”

With regard to what do they disagree?

Why does Rabbi Elazar hold that he is obligated, whereas the Sages hold that he is exempt?

Rabbi Elazar expounded

the verse by the method of

ribui u-mi'utei:

As it is stated concerning one who denies a deposit [Leviticus 5:21]: “When a person sins and commits a trespass against the Lord

and denies to his fellow”—

an inclusion,

“in a deposit”—

an exclusion,

[there 24]

“from all that he will swear concerning it falsely”—

he again included,

and since he

included, excluded, and included—

we interpret that he

included everything.

And what did he include?

And what are the things that were included?

He included every matter,

even real estate for which one is obligated concerning an oath and restitution.

And what did he exclude? He excluded

only

deeds,

which are not themselves money, for a deed is nothing but a simple piece of paper.

We learn from this verse that it is possible to rob land, for if it were not applicable to rob it, the law of restitution would not be applicable to it.

And the Sages expound

the verse by the measure of

klal u-pratei:

“And denies

to his fellow”—

a generalization,

“in a deposit”—

a specification,

“or from all

that he will swear concerning it falsely”—

he returned and generalized,

so then, there is here

a generalization, a specification, and a generalization.

And therefore

you reason only

to include every matter that resembles

the nature of the specification.

Just as the specification

is

a movable object whose substance is money, so too every movable object whose substance is money

was included for liability concerning an oath and restitution.

Real estate, which is not movable, is excluded.

Slaves, which were likened to real estate, are excluded.

Deeds are excluded—

for even though they are movable, they are not themselves money.

If so, according to the Sages, real estate was not included for an oath and restitution, and the Sages hold that land cannot be robbed. Therefore, if the land was destroyed while the robber was holding it, he is exempt, since it was destroyed while in the domain of the robbed party.

And we raised an objection:

But it was taught in a beraita: One who robs a cow and a river washes it away—

is obligated

the robber

to provide him with a cow; these are the words of Rabbi Elazar. And the Sages say: He says to him, “Here is yours before you.”

With regard to what do they disagree there?

There it is speaking about a cow, which is movable and whose substance is money; so why, according to the Sages, is the robber exempt? After all, the cow was destroyed while in the robber’s domain.