Bava Kamma 117a — the Talmud in English

After he left

After Rav Naḥman left,

Rav Yosef said to Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya: What difference does it make to you?

What difference in the law do you derive from this?

Is it a law or a fine?

He said to him: If it is a law,

that the informer must pay,

we derive from it,

we learn from this act of Rav Naḥman to other cases of indirect causation of damage.

If it is a fine,

that Rav Naḥman fined him because he was accustomed to doing so —

we do not derive from it.

We do not learn from this act to other cases.

And from where do you say,

and from where do you say

that we do not derive from a fine?

As it was taught in a beraita: At first, they would say: One who renders

his fellow’s pure things impure [such as teruma]—which from then on is fit only to be burned,

and one who pours

his fellow’s wine as an offering for idolatry—whereby the wine becomes forbidden in benefit—even though his damage is not perceptible, he is liable to pay for his damage.

After some time,

they returned

the Sages

to say: Even one who mixes,

if he mixed his fellow’s non-sacred produce with teruma, thereby reducing the monetary value of the non-sacred produce, since from then on the produce is fit to be sold only to kohanim, he must pay his fellow for his damage.

And it is precise from the beraita: Only because

they returned—

yes,

he is liable to pay. But if

they had not returned, he would not

have been liable to pay.

What is the reason

that we would not learn from one who renders impure and one who pours to obligate one who mixes to pay?

Is it not

is it not

because it is a fine, and we do not derive from a fine?

Rather, they impose a fine only in the specific manner in which the Sages fined.

And it is demonstrated from the beraita that we do not learn from an obligation of a fine in one place to impose an obligation also in similar circumstances.

And we reject this:

No,

it cannot be proven from the beraita that one does not derive an obligation from a fine. Rather, the reason that we would not have learned the case of one who mixes from one who pours is that

at first they thought

that only

a substantial loss did the Sages take into account

when fining him—for example, one who renders teruma impure, who caused a substantial loss, since the teruma is no longer fit to be eaten. But

a minor loss,

such as one who mixes, where the produce is still fit to be eaten by kohanim and is forbidden only to Israelites,

they did not take into account

when fining him.

And in the end they thought

that

they also took into account a minor loss.

And we object:

Is that so!

You cannot explain it this way—that at first they did not take into account fining him for causing a minor loss, and in the end they returned to fine him for a minor loss.

For

the father of Rabbi Avin taught

a beraita in a somewhat different version from the version brought above, and according to his version there is no room for this explanation. This is his version:

At first they would say: One who renders impure and one who mixes

is liable to pay the damage;

they returned to say: Even one who pours

is liable to pay.

Now one who pours causes a greater loss than one who mixes, and nevertheless only because

they returned

the Sages to obligate him to pay,

yes,

he is liable to pay, but if

they had not returned

to obligate him,

not

would one who pours have been liable for his damage.

What is the reason

that we would not learn about one who pours, even though he causes a greater loss, from one who mixes—is it

not because we do not derive from a fine!

And we reject this:

No,

this is not the reason that we would not have learned to obligate one who pours to pay from the fact that one who mixes is liable.

Rather, the reason that at first we would not have obligated one who pours is that

at first they thought in accordance with Rabbi Avin,

who says that one who pours is exempt because of kam lei bidraba minei.

And in the end they thought in accordance with Rabbi Yirmeya,

who says that there is no exemption of kam lei bidraba minei for pouring.

And now the Gemara explains the dispute between Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Yirmeya:

One of the thirty-nine labors forbidden on Shabbat is the labor of carrying, and included in this prohibition is also carrying an object four cubits in the public domain. In order to become liable, two conditions are required: a. uprooting the object from the place where it was resting; b. placing the object after it has been carried. If he did not perform these two acts, he does not transgress the labor of carrying.

At first they thought in accordance with Rabbi Avin, for Rabbi Avin said: One who throws

on Shabbat

an arrow

in the public domain

from the beginning of four

cubits

to the end of four

cubits

and tears

the arrow

silk garments [

garments]

as it travels—

is exempt

from paying for the garments that he tore.

For the uprooting

when he uprooted the arrow from the place where it was resting

is necessary for the placing, and he becomes liable for his life

for uprooting the arrow and placing it four cubits away. And since between the uprooting of the arrow and its placing he tore the garments, it turns out that the act of Shabbat and the act of tearing occur simultaneously, and he is exempt from payment by the law of kam lei bidraba minei, whereby he is exempted from the monetary obligation through the liability to death that he incurred at that time. And we do not say that from the time of the tearing, before the arrow came to rest, he became liable monetarily for tearing the garment, while he becomes liable for his life only when the arrow comes to rest.

And the same applies to one who pours the wine: Even though he is not serving idolatry at the time he lifts the wine, since lifting the wine is necessary for pouring it, the liability to death for idolatry and the obligation to pay for the loss of the wine come simultaneously, and he is exempt from payment because of the liability to death.

And in the end

the Sages changed their view and

thought in accordance with Rabbi Yirmeya, for Rabbi Yirmeya said: From the moment of lifting

when he lifted it with the intention of stealing it

he acquires

the wine and

becomes liable monetarily,

but

becomes liable for his life

because of idolatry

only at the time of pouring.

And since the liability to death is not at the time of the monetary obligation, he is not exempt from the monetary obligation because of the liability to death.

Rav Huna bar Yehuda happened to come to

a place called

Bei Avioni, he came before Rava, who said to him

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava:

Has any case come before you

to adjudicate before you?

He said to him: A case came before me involving an Israelite whom gentiles compelled and who showed them his fellow’s property, and I obligated him

to pay his fellow for the loss that he caused him.

He said to him: Return the case to its owner;

retract the ruling by which you decided to obligate him.

As it was taught

that we learned in a beraita:

An Israelite whom gentiles compelled and who showed them his fellow’s property—

is exempt, but if he took it and handed it over himself—

he is liable,

since he saved himself with his fellow’s property. And in the case that you adjudicated, he did not take it and hand it over himself.

Rabba said

If he showed it on his own initiative

without the coercers compelling him to show it ,

it is considered as though he took it and handed it over himself

and he is liable.

A case:

A certain man was compelled by gentiles, and he pointed out wine

and pointed to his wine,

which belonged to Rav Mari, son of Rav Pinḥas, son of Rav Ḥisda. They said to him: Carry it and bring it with us

carry and bring this wine with us to the king’s palace,

and he carried it and brought it with them

and he carried and brought the wine with them.

It came

this case came

before Rav Ashi, and he exempted him

he exempted him from payment.

The Rabbis said to Rav Ashi,

why did you exempt him?

But it was taught: If he carried it and handed it over himself—

he is liable!

and in this case, after all, he himself carried the wine with the coercers to the king’s palace.

He said to them: These words

this law applies specifically

where they did not initially set him over it

where the coercers did not initially compel him regarding the property, but rather he went and took it and handed it over to them,

but where they initially set him over it

where the coercers compelled him and set him over the wine in order that he show it to them—

it is considered completely burned

the property is considered as though it had been burned, for this property was already lost to its owners, and at the moment when he showed them the wine and caused its loss, he was exempt; and when he carried the wine with them, it was the coercers’ wine that he carried.

Rabbi Abbahu raised an objection to Rav Ashi:

We learned in a beraita:

A coercer said to him: Hand me a bundle

[a bundle]

of this sheaf or this cluster of grapes, and he handed it to him—

he is liable!

And even though the coercer is standing over the property, since he carried it and handed it over himself, he is liable. It is apparent from the beraita that he is liable if he carried and handed it over himself even when they are coercing him regarding the property.

And he answers:

What are we dealing with here?—

For example, he is standing

the coercer is standing

on the two banks of the river

on the two sides of the river: the coercer is on one side of the river and the sheaf is on the other side, so that if he does not hand the sheaf over into the coercer’s hand, the coercer cannot take it. Therefore, in that case he is liable for handing it over into the coercer’s hand.

It is also precise, for it teaches, “Hand me”

the property

and it does not teach, “Give me”

the property;

infer from this

that it is speaking of a river across which he must hand it to him, and for that reason he is liable.

A case:

A certain fish- or animal-trap

[a fish- or animal-net]

over which two people were quarrelling

[two people quarrelled over it],

this one said, “It is mine,” and this one said, “It is mine,”

[this one says it is mine and this one says it is mine].

One of them went and handed it over to the king’s treasury

[one of them went and handed the net over to the king’s treasury].

Abaye said: He can

that one

say, “When I handed it over, I handed over my own”

[I handed over what was mine] to the king’s treasury.

Rava said to him: Is everything in his power?

Can he make such a claim? After all, they are litigating over the net, and it is not in his possession until he proves that it is his.

Rather, Rava said: We excommunicate him

[we ostracize him],

until he brings it and stands for judgment

[until they bring it to the court and he stands trial] to determine whether it is his.

A case:

A certain man who wished to point out his fellow’s straw

[there was a man who wished to hand his fellow’s straw over to coercers]

came before Rav, who said to him

Rav:

“Do not point it out, and do not point it out.”

[Do not hand it over, and do not hand it over.]

He said to him

to Rav:

“I will point it out, and I will point it out.”

[I will hand it over, and I will hand it over.]

Rav Kahana was sitting before Rav

at that time,

he seized him by the neck

[by his neck]

from him,

he broke his neck and killed him.

Rav recited over him:

[Isaiah 51:20]

“Your sons have fainted

[from lack of bread and water, deaths of hunger and sword]

they have lain at the head of all the streets

[and there is no one to bury them]

like a wild ox in a net

[like a wild ox caught in a net, which remains where it was caught and cannot move from its place]

‘What is this wild ox

[wild ox, the wild ox]

once it has fallen into a net

[the trapping net]

there is no compassion for it; so too, property of a Jew, once it has fallen into the hands of gentiles, there is no compassion for it.’

Rav said to Rav Kahana

who had killed the informer:

“Kahana, until now there were Persians who were not particular about bloodshed

[until now there were Persians here who were not particular about bloodshed] and did not punish the killer, but

now there are Greeks who are particular about bloodshed and say, ‘A murderer shall be killed.’”

[and now there are Greeks here who are particular about bloodshed and say, “A murderer shall be killed.”]

Therefore

“Arise, go up”

[go up]

“to the Land of Israel, and accept upon yourself that you will not raise difficulties”

[and accept upon yourself not to raise difficulties]

to Rabbi Yoḥanan for seven years.”

He went and found

[he went and found]

Reish Lakish, who was sitting and reviewing the day’s lecture for the Rabbis

he was repeating to them what Rabbi Yoḥanan had expounded that day, because Reish Lakish was a great sage, and after they had all heard it from the teacher, he would repeat it and establish it in their minds.

He said to them

Rav Kahana said to the Rabbis:

“Where is Reish Lakish?”

They said to him: “Why?”

He said to them: “This difficulty and this difficulty, and this answer and this answer,”

these are the difficulties that I have to raise and these are the answers that I have to give concerning the lesson.

They told Reish Lakish

Rav Kahana’s words.

Reish Lakish went and said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: “A lion has come up from Babylonia; let the Master examine the lecture for tomorrow”

so that the teacher would prepare tomorrow’s lesson well.

The next day they seated him in the first row

[they seated Rav Kahana in the first row] of those sitting

before Rabbi Yoḥanan,

for there were seven rows of students sitting before Rabbi Yoḥanan, each one behind the other.

He said

Rabbi Yoḥanan

a teaching

[one statement]

and he did not raise a difficulty

Rav Kahana raised no difficulty against it; Rabbi Yoḥanan said

a teaching

another one

and he did not raise a difficulty.

And each time Rabbi Yoḥanan said a statement and Rav Kahana did not raise a difficulty against it,

they moved him backward

they moved him one row backward, until they moved him

seven rows

[rows]

until they seated him in the last row

[until he sat in the last row].

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: “The lion whom you mentioned”

and by whom you called Rav Kahana,

“has become a fox!”

Rav Kahana said

Rav Kahana:

“May it be the will [of Heaven] that these seven rows should be the substitute for seven years,

may it be the will that these seven rows through which they moved me backward should be considered a substitute for the seven years

that Rav said to me”

for Rav decreed that I should not raise difficulties to Rabbi Yoḥanan.

He rose to his feet,

Rav Kahana stood on his feet,

he said to him

Rav Kahana said to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

“Let the Master return to the beginning”

let the teacher repeat the beginning of his words.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

Rabbi Yoḥanan

a teaching, and he raised a difficulty

Rav Kahana, and so he raised a difficulty against every statement that he said, until

he seated him in the first row,

for they again seated him in the first row before Rabbi Yoḥanan.

Rabbi Yoḥanan continued and

said a teaching

and Rav Kahana continued

to raise difficulties.

Rabbi Yoḥanan was sitting on seven cushions

[he was sitting on seven cushions].

Because of the difficulty that Rav Kahana raised against him,

they pulled out one cushion from beneath him

[they removed one cushion from beneath him].

Again

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

Rabbi Yoḥanan

a teaching, and Rav Kahana raised a difficulty against it

Rav Kahana, and they removed another cushion from beneath him,

until they pulled out all the cushions from beneath him

[until they removed all the cushions beneath him],

until he sat

on the ground

[until Rabbi Yoḥanan sat on the ground].

Rabbi Yoḥanan was an old man, and his eyebrows were drooping,

Rabbi Yoḥanan was an old man, and his eyebrows were large and covered his eyes.

He said to them

to his attendants:

“Raise my eyes and let me see him,”

raise my eyebrows so that I can see Rav Kahana.

They raised them with silver forceps,

they raised his eyebrows with silver forceps.

He saw that his lips were split,

Rabbi Yoḥanan saw that Rav Kahana’s lips were split [and this was because of an injury, for his lip had been torn].

He thought

Rabbi Yoḥanan thought that

he was laughing at him,

that Rav Kahana was laughing at him.

His mind was distressed

Rabbi Yoḥanan’s

and his soul departed

Rav Kahana’s, for he died because of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s displeasure.

The next day Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the Rabbis: “Did you see that Babylonian, how he acted?”

Did you see what that Babylonian did to me?

They said to him: “That is his way,”

that is Rav Kahana’s way, and it was not laughter.