Bava Kamma 115a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge:

But perhaps he needed the money and sold [the vessels]?

Perhaps he sold his vessels because of his distress, and now money has come to him and he wants to retract? And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: His name as a thief has gone out in the city!

It was stated: If one stole and sold, and afterward the thief was recognized,

that they found the thief of the vessels that are in the buyer’s possession.

Rav, in the name of Rav Hiyya, said: The law is with the first.

The owner of the house can summon to judgment only the thief and not the buyer, even though the thief has been found, and the buyer can go back and claim the money from him.

Rabbi Yohanan, in the name of Rabbi Yannai, said: The law is with the second

The owner of the house can also summon the buyer to judgment, and he returns the vessels to him for nothing; and there is no “enactment for the benefit of the marketplace” here, since he can claim the money back from the thief.

Rav Yosef said: And they do not disagree

the amoraim. For

here it is before despair,

what Rabbi Yohanan says,

the law is with the second,

because it is in a situation in which the owner of the house has not yet despaired of the theft, and therefore he can claim it from the buyer.

Here it is after despair,

what Rav says, and therefore

the law is with the first,

in a situation in which the owner of the house has already despaired of the theft, and the buyer acquired it through despair and change of possession. Therefore, the owners cannot claim it from him, but only from the first.

And both of them hold the position of Rav Hisda.

The two amoraim hold the law of Rav Hisda, who said at the beginning of the chapter: “If one robbed, and the owners did not despair, and another came and consumed it from him, if he wishes, he collects from this one; if he wishes, he collects from that one.” That is to say, the owners can claim the robbery not only from the robber, but even from the one who robbed it from him. And here too, the one who bought from the thief, even though he paid for it, is nevertheless considered a robber with regard to the owners; therefore they can claim the theft from him as long as they did not despair of it.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

And

if

they do not disagree,

Rav and Rabbi Yohanan,

but these are priestly gifts,

for one must give the foreleg, the cheeks, and the stomach from the animal to a kohen,

they are considered as before despair,

since the kohen does not despair of his portion of the animal,

and they do disagree,

and nevertheless Rav holds that if they robbed the gifts from the kohen and sold them to another person, the law is with the first?

For we learned

in tractate Hullin:

He said to him

the Israelite to the slaughterer:

Sell me the innards of the cow

that you slaughtered

and there were gifts in them,

the stomach remained among them,

he gives it to a kohen.

The Israelite is obligated to give the stomach to the kohen,

but he does not deduct anything from the money.

The seller does not reduce from the payment its value, since the buyer knew that the stomach was inside the innards, and the seller did not intend to sell it at all.

If he took it from him by weight,

if he bought the innards by weight, and the seller weighed the stomach for him as well,

he gives it to a kohen.

The buyer must give the stomach to the kohen, but

he deducts from the money.

The seller reduces from the payment the value of the stomach, since he sold him something that was not his.

And Rav said: They taught this

that if he took the stomach by weight, he is obligated to return it to the kohen and collect the payment from the slaughterer,

only when he weighed it for himself,

when the buyer himself weighed the stomach, because since the slaughterer did not touch it, he is not a litigant of the kohen, and the kohen cannot claim the stomach from him, but only from the buyer.

But

if

the slaughterer weighed it for him, the law is with the slaughterer.

The kohen can claim the stomach only from the slaughterer, because he robbed it from him. It follows that Rav holds that even before despair, the law is only with the first, who is the slaughterer? And we answer:

Say

that this is what Rav said:

The law is also with the slaughterer.

For the kohen can claim both from the slaughterer and from the buyer, because Rav admits that before despair the law is also with the second, in accordance with the view of Rav Hisda: “If he wishes, he collects from this one; if he wishes, he collects from that one.” And the Gemara explains: If so, what does Rav teach us? Is it not obvious that one may claim from the robber himself? All of Rav Hisda’s innovation is only that one may also claim from the second?

Lest you say: Priest­ly gifts cannot be robbed,

since the power of the kohen over them is strong, because he acquires them by virtue of the Most High, and wherever they are, they are in the possession of a kohen; therefore I might say that even if the slaughterer weighed them for him, he did not become a robber with regard to them, and the kohen’s law is only with the buyer.

It teaches us

Rav that priestly gifts can be robbed, and the kohen’s law is also with the slaughterer, because he robbed them. And we inquire:

And according to Abaye, who said

that Rav and Rabbi Yohanan

disagree,

for even before despair Rav holds that the law is only with the first,

in what

do they disagree?

And we answer:

In [the matter of] Rav Hisda.

Rav does not hold the law of Rav Hisda, that one may collect also from the one who took [the object] from the robber; rather, one can claim only from the robber, because the second can say to the owner of the house: “You are not my litigant.” Whereas Rabbi Yohanan holds in accordance with Rav Hisda: “If he wishes, he collects from this one; if he wishes, he collects from that one.”

Rav Zevid said:

The dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan is

in a case where the owners despaired while [the object was] in the buyer’s possession, but did not despair while [it was] in the thief’s possession.

The owners despaired only after the theft reached the buyer’s possession, and as long as it was in the thief’s possession they did not despair of it; it follows that the change of possession occurred before the despair.

And in this they disagree: One master,

Rabbi Yohanan,

holds:

specifically

despair and afterward change of possession acquires.

But

change of possession and afterward despair does not acquire.

Therefore the owners can claim also from the second, since he did not acquire it.

And the other master,

Rav,

holds: It makes no difference

for even if the change of possession occurred before the despair, he acquires it; therefore the law of the owner of the house is only with the first, since the second acquired it through change of possession and despair. But in a situation in which there was no despair at all, everyone agrees that the owners can collect even from the second, in accordance with Rav Hisda: “If he wishes, he collects from this one; if he wishes, he collects from that one.”

Rav Pappa said: With regard to a cloak, everyone agrees that he returns it to its owner.

Both of them agree in a situation in which the owners did not despair, that the buyer must return the cloak, that is, the theft itself, to the owners immediately and for nothing, and he cannot retain it until they return to him what he paid for it, in accordance with Rav Hisda. The dispute is only from whom the buyer collects the money that he paid for the theft.

And here they disagree over whether the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace was made for it.

They disagree whether, even in a situation in which the thief has been found, the Sages made “the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace,” so that the buyer takes from the owners what he paid for the theft; or perhaps they made “the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace” only when the thief is absent, but when the thief is present they did not make “the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace,” since the buyer can collect his money from the thief who sold him the theft.

Rav, in the name of Rabbi Hiyya, said: The law is with the first.

And Rav Pappa explains that this does not refer to the owner of the house, but to the buyer,

that the buyer’s law is that he should take money from the thief.

The buyer’s law is with the thief [who, with regard to him, is the first from whom he took it], and from him he collects his money,

and they did not make the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it

so that he should collect from the owners, since

the thief has been recognized and is found before us.

And Rabbi Yohanan, in the name of Rabbi Yannai, said: The law is with the second,

that is,

the buyer’s law is that he should take from the owner of the house

[who is the second with regard to him, whom he recognized only now], and from him he collects his money,

and they made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it,

even though the thief has been recognized. And we challenge:

And

if

Rav holds

that when the thief has been recognized,

they did not make the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it?

But Rav Huna was Rav’s student,

and Hanan the wicked [A0120]] [that was his name]

[that was his name]

stole a cloak and sold it,

he sold it.

He came before Rav Huna,

the owner of the house came before Rav Huna to claim his cloak from the buyer from the thief.

He said to him

Rav Huna

to that man,

to the owner of the house:

Go, redeem your pledge!

Go and redeem your pledge, that is, pay the buyer for what he paid for the cloak. Presumably, Rav Huna acted in accordance with the view of Rav, who was his teacher. It follows that Rav holds that they made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace even when the thief has been recognized? And we answer:

Hanan the wicked is different, since it is impossible to collect from him

because he is a violent person and the buyer cannot collect the payment from him,

it is considered as though the thief had not been recognized

It is as though the thief had not been found, in which case even Rav agrees that they made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace.

Rava said: If he is a notorious thief, they did not make the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it

since the buyer should have been careful and not bought anything from him, lest it be stolen. And we challenge:

But Hanan the wicked was notorious, and they made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for him?

And we answer:

Granted that he was notorious for wickedness,

that he was a person of evil deeds, but

he was not notorious for theft

that he was a thief; therefore the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace applies to him.

It was stated: If one stole and paid with it toward his debt.

The thief paid his debt with the theft. Or

if one stole and paid with it toward his store-credit debt.

He paid the shopkeeper his store-credit debt from the theft—

they did not make the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it.

The owners do not need to pay the creditor or the shopkeeper the debt that they lost in exchange for the theft.

And the reason is because

they say,

they say to the creditor and the shopkeeper:

“I did not give him anything on account of these.”

You did not pay for this theft; rather, even beforehand you lent him the money or extended him credit in your store, and in such a case they did not make the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace.

A mortgage,

one who lent to the thief against a stolen pledge. If it was

worth two hundred, [and he lent] one hundred,

that he lent him one hundred against a pledge worth two hundred,

they made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it,

the owners must pay the creditor the debt, since he lent only on the basis of this pledge.

But if it was

worth exactly the same,

that the pledge was worth only the amount of the loan—

Ameimar said: They did not make the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it,

since the usual practice is to lend less than the value of the pledge; and if he lent him the entire value of the pledge, it follows that he did not lend him on the basis of the pledge, but because he trusted him, and therefore they did not make the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it.

Mar Zutra said: They made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it.

And the halakha is: They made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it.

A sale,

a sale, if it was

worth exactly the same,

that he paid only the value of the object,

they made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it.

Worth one hundred, [and he paid] two hundred,

if the buyer paid two hundred for an object worth only one hundred—

Rav Sheshet said: They did not make the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it,

and the owners do not pay him even one hundred. For just as he gave him the extra one hundred as a gift, so too he gave him the one hundred corresponding to the value of the object as a gift and not for the object; therefore there is no enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it.

Rava said: They made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it.

And the owners pay him even two hundred, since it is the way of people sometimes to buy an object for more than its value.

And the halakha is: In all of them they made the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace for it

except

alone

for one who stole and paid with it toward his debt, and one who stole and paid with it toward his store-credit debt,

for then they did not make the enactment for the benefit of the marketplace.

Avimi bar Nazi, Ravina’s father-in-law,

Ravina’s father-in-law,

was lending to a certain man

he lent to a certain person

four dinars,

that person went and

stole a cloak, and brought it to him

and brought it to Avimi bar Nazi.

He lent him another four dinars,

Avimi then lent him another four dinars.

In the end the thief was recognized,

that is, it was revealed that the cloak was stolen, and the owners claim it from Avimi.

He came before Ravina

Avimi came before Ravina.

He said

to him:

The first ones,

the first four dinars, their law is like

one who stole and paid with it toward his debt,

since he lent them to him before he gave him the cloak,

and

therefore

he need not give him anything.

The owner of the cloak does not need to return those four dinars to you. But

these other four dinars,

the additional four dinars, you lent him against the cloak as a pledge, and therefore

take your dinar.

Take them from the owner of the cloak,

and then [return] the cloak

and return his cloak to him.

Rav Kahana challenged him: But perhaps the cloak was given to him with these

first dinars!?

Perhaps he intended to give him the cloak as repayment of the first debt, and consequently the law of the cloak is like

one who stole and paid with it toward his debt, one who stole and paid with it toward his store-credit debt.

Whereas the

last four dinars

he did not lend him at all against a pledge, but

he trusted him,

he trusted him

just as he had trusted him originally,

just as he had trusted him concerning the first four dinars, which he lent him without a pledge. And if so, the owner of the cloak will not need to pay him even the last four dinars?

The matter rolled along and reached Rabbi Abahu.

The matter rolled along and reached Rabbi Abahu,

he said: The halakha is like Rav Kahana!

Narshaha

a person from a place called Narash

stole a book,

a book,

sold it

sold it

to a Pafunayan

to a person from Pafunya

for eighty zuz,

for eighty zuz.

He went,

he went

the Pafunayan, and sold it to a bar-Mehozayan

to a person from Mehoza

for one hundred and twenty zuz.

In the end, the thief was recognized.

Abaye said: Let the owner of the book go and give the bar-Mehozayan eighty zuz.

The owner of the book will pay the bar-Mehozayan eighty zuz out of the one hundred and twenty that he paid for the book,

and take his book

and take his book from him.

And the bar-Mehozayan will go and take forty from the Pafunayan.

The bar-Mehozayan will take his remaining forty zuz from the Pafunayan, who sold him the book for one hundred and twenty.

Rava challenged him: Now, for one who buys from a thief, the marketplace enactment was applied to him; for one who buys from a buyer, is it necessary to say so!?

If the marketplace enactment was applied to one who buys from the thief, whereby he collects from the homeowner what he paid so that he will not have to litigate with the thief, all the more so the marketplace enactment should be applied to one who bought from the buyer who bought from the thief. And why should the owner of the book not pay the bar-Mehozayan the entire one hundred and twenty zuz that he paid for the book and not have to litigate with the Pafunayan who sold it to him?

Rather, Rava said: Let the owner of the book go and give the bar-Mehozayan

the owner of the book will pay the bar-Mehozayan

one hundred and twenty zuz, and take his book,

he will take his book from him.

And let the owner of the book go and take forty from the Pafunayan, and eighty from the Narshaha.

The owner of the book will collect from the Pafunayan the forty zuz that he profited on the book, and the remaining eighty zuz he will collect from the thief, the Narshaha, who sold the book and profited eighty zuz from it.

Mishna:

Two were walking along the road,

this one came with his barrel of wine, and this one came with his jug of honey.

The barrel of honey cracked,

and the honey began to flow from it, and the price of honey is higher than the price of wine.

And this one poured out,

the owner of the barrel of wine,

his wine, and rescued the honey,

by pouring it

into it,

into the wine barrel, which had been emptied in order to receive the expensive honey.