Bava Kamma 115a (קטו.) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

But perhaps he needed the money and sold them

—perhaps he sold all his utensils under pressure, and now money has become available to him and he wishes to retract? And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: His name as a thief had already become known in the city!

It was stated: If one stole and sold, and afterward the thief was identified,

meaning that they found the thief of the utensils that are in the buyer’s possession.

Rav, citing Rav Hiyya, said: The claim is with the first.

The owner may bring the thief, but not the buyer, to court, despite the fact that the thief has been found; and the buyer may then return and claim the money from him.

Rabbi Yohanan, citing Rabbi Yannai, said: The claim is with the second

—the owner may also bring the buyer to court, and the buyer returns the utensils to him without payment. There is no takkanat ha-shuk in this case, since he can reclaim the money from the thief.

Rav Yosef said: They do not disagree

—the amoraim.

Here, it is before despair,

which is the circumstance addressed by Rabbi Yohanan,

the claim is with the second,

because the owner had not yet despaired of recovering the stolen item, and therefore he may claim it from the buyer.

Here, it is after despair,

which is the circumstance addressed by Rav, and therefore

the claim is with the first,

because the owner had already despaired of recovering the stolen item, and the buyer acquired it through despair and change of possession. Therefore, the owner cannot claim it from him, but only from the first party.

And both of them accept the ruling of Rav Hisda.

Both amoraim accept the ruling of Rav Hisda, who said at the beginning of the chapter: “If one robbed another and the owners had not despaired, and another person came and consumed it, the owners may collect from either this one or that one.” That is, the owners may claim the stolen item not only from the robber but also from the one who took it from him. Here too, although the person who bought from the thief paid for it, with regard to the owner he is nevertheless considered a robber, and therefore the owner may claim the stolen item from him as long as he had not despaired of it.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

But

if

they do not disagree

—Rav and Rabbi Yohanan—

what about the gifts of the priesthood,

the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw that must be given from the animal to the priest?

They are comparable to a case before despair,

since the priest does not despair of his portion of the animal,

and yet they disagree,

for Rav nevertheless maintains that if someone robbed the priest of the gifts and sold them to another person, the claim is with the first.

As we learned

in tractate Hullin:

If he said

—the Israelite said to the slaughterer—

“Sell me the innards of the cow

that you slaughtered!”

And there were gifts among them,

the maw remained among them,

he must give them to the priest.

The Israelite must give the maw to the priest,

but he does not deduct its value from the money.

The seller does not reduce the payment by the value of the maw, since the buyer knew that the maw was inside the innards, and the seller had not intended to sell it at all.

If he purchased them from him by weight,

if he bought the innards by weight and the seller also weighed the maw for him,

he must give it to the priest.

The buyer must give the maw to the priest, but

he deducts its value from the money.

The seller reduces the payment by the value of the maw, since he sold him something that did not belong to him.

And Rav said: They taught

that when he took the maw by weight he must return it to the priest and collect the payment from the slaughterer,

only when he weighed it for himself,

meaning that the buyer himself weighed the maw. Since the slaughterer did not touch it, he is not a litigant of the priest, and the priest cannot claim the maw from him, but only from the buyer.

But

if

the slaughterer weighed it for him, the claim is with the slaughterer.

The priest can claim the maw only from the slaughterer, since he robbed it from him. It follows that Rav maintains that even before despair, the claim is only with the first party, the slaughterer. And we answer:

Say

that this is what Rav said:

The claim is also with the slaughterer.

The priest may claim from both the slaughterer and the buyer, since Rav concedes that before despair the claim is also with the second party, in accordance with the view of Rav Hisda, that the owners may collect from either one. The Gemara explains: If so, what is Rav teaching us? It is obvious that one may claim from the robber himself; the entire novelty of Rav Hisda’s ruling is only that one may also claim from the second party.

Lest you say: The gifts of the priesthood cannot be robbed,

because the priest has a stronger claim to them, since he acquires them by virtue of the authority of Heaven, and wherever they are, they are considered to be in the priest’s possession. Therefore, one might have said that even if the slaughterer weighed them for the buyer, he does not become a robber with regard to them, and the priest’s claim is only with the buyer.

It teaches us

Rav’s ruling: The gifts of the priesthood can be robbed, and the priest’s claim is also with the slaughterer, since he robbed them. And we raise a question:

But according to Abaye, who said

that Rav and Rabbi Yohanan

disagree,

and that even before despair Rav maintains that the claim is only with the first party,

with what

do they disagree?

And we answer:

With regard to Rav Hisda’s ruling.

Rav does not accept Rav Hisda’s ruling that one may collect from the person who took the item from the robber; rather, one may claim only from the robber, because the second party can say to the owner: “You are not a litigant of mine.” Rabbi Yohanan, by contrast, agrees with Rav Hisda, that the owners may collect from either one.

Rav Zevid said:

The disagreement between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan is

in a case where the owners despaired while the item was in the buyer’s possession, but did not despair while it was in the thief’s possession.

The owners despaired only after the stolen item had reached the buyer, whereas while it was in the thief’s possession they had not despaired of it. Thus, the change of possession occurred before the despair.

And this is the matter over which they disagree: One Master,

Rabbi Yohanan,

maintains:

only

despair followed by a change of possession effects acquisition.

But

a change of possession followed by despair does not effect acquisition.

Therefore, the owners may also claim from the second party, since he did not acquire it.

And the other Master,

Rav,

maintains: It makes no difference

—even if the change of possession occurred before the despair, the buyer acquires it. Therefore, the owner’s claim is only with the first party, since the second acquired it through a change of possession and despair. But where there was no despair at all, everyone agrees that the owners may collect even from the second party, in accordance with Rav Hisda’s ruling that they may collect from either one.

Rav Pappa said: With regard to a cloak, everyone agrees that it returns to its owner.

Both agree that where the owners had not despaired, the buyer must immediately return the cloak—that is, the stolen item itself—to the owners, without payment. He may not retain it until they repay him what he paid for it, in accordance with Rav Hisda’s ruling. They disagree only with regard to whom the buyer collects the money he paid for the stolen item.

And here, they disagree with regard to whether the takkanat ha-shuk was enacted for it.

They disagree whether, even when the thief has been found, the Sages enacted the takkanat ha-shuk, allowing the buyer to take from the owners what he paid for the stolen item; or perhaps they enacted the takkanat ha-shuk only when the thief is absent, but when the thief has been found they did not enact it, since the buyer can collect his money from the thief who sold him the stolen item.

Rav, citing Rabbi Hiyya, said: The claim is with the first.

Rav Pappa explains that this does not refer to the owner, but to the buyer,

for the buyer’s legal claim is that he should take the money from the thief.

The buyer’s legal claim is against the thief—from whom he was the first to take the item—and he collects his money from him.

The takkanat ha-shuk was not enacted for it,

so that he could collect from the owners, since

the thief was identified and is present before us.

And Rabbi Yohanan, citing Rabbi Yannai, said: The claim is with the second,

that is,

the buyer’s legal claim is that he should take the money from the owner

—who is the second party with regard to him, since the buyer has recognized him only now—and he collects his money from him.

And the takkanat ha-shuk was enacted for it,

even though the thief was identified. And we raise an objection:

But

if

Rav maintains

that when the thief has been identified,

the takkanat ha-shuk was not enacted for it,

yet Rav Huna was Rav’s student,

and Hanan the evil one

—that was his name—

stole a cloak and sold it,

selling it.

He came before Rav Huna,

as the owner came before Rav Huna to claim his cloak from the person who had bought it from the thief.

He said to

him—Rav Huna said

to that man,

the owner:

“Go and redeem your pledge!”

Go and redeem your pledge, meaning: pay the buyer what he paid for the cloak. Presumably Rav Huna acted in accordance with the view of Rav, who was his teacher. It follows that Rav maintains that the takkanat ha-shuk was enacted even when the thief has been identified. And we answer:

Hanan the evil one is different, since there is no possibility of collecting from him

because he was a violent man, and the buyer could not collect the payment from him.

It is comparable to a case where the thief was not identified,

as though the thief had not been found, in which case even Rav agrees that the takkanat ha-shuk was enacted.

Rava said: If he is a notorious thief, the takkanat ha-shuk was not enacted for it,

because the buyer should have been careful and not purchased anything from him, lest it be stolen. And we raise an objection:

But Hanan the evil one was notorious, and the takkanat ha-shuk was enacted for him!

And we answer:

Granted, he was notorious for wickedness,

for being a man of evil deeds, but

he was not notorious for theft,

for being a thief; therefore, the takkanat ha-shuk applies to him.

It was stated: If one stole and paid his debt with it.

The thief paid his debt with the stolen item. Or

if one stole and paid his store debt with it.

He paid the shopkeeper the debt he had incurred on credit with the stolen item—

the takkanat ha-shuk was not enacted for it.

The owners need not pay the creditor or the shopkeeper the debt they lost in exchange for the stolen item.

The reason is

that they say

to the creditor or shopkeeper:

“I did not give him anything on account of that item.”

You did not pay for this stolen item; rather, you had lent him the money earlier or had extended him credit in your store. In such a case, the takkanat ha-shuk was not enacted.

A mortgage,

meaning one who lent money to the thief against a stolen item as collateral. If it was

worth two hundred, for one hundred,

meaning that he lent him one hundred against collateral worth two hundred,

the takkanat ha-shuk was enacted for it,

and the owners must pay the creditor the debt, since he lent the money solely on the basis of this collateral.

But if it was

equal for equal,

meaning that the collateral was worth only the amount of the loan—

Ameimar said: The takkanat ha-shuk was not enacted for it,

because the usual practice is to lend less than the value of the collateral. If he lent the full value of the collateral, he must have lent the money not on the basis of the collateral but because he trusted him; therefore, the takkanat ha-shuk was not enacted for it.

Mar Zutra said: The takkanat ha-shuk was enacted for it. [

And the halakha is: The takkanat ha-shuk was enacted for it].

A sale,

meaning a sale: If it is

equal for equal,

meaning that he paid only the value of the item,

the takkanat ha-shuk was enacted for it.

Worth one hundred, for two hundred,

meaning that the buyer paid two hundred for an item worth only one hundred—

Rav Sheshet said: The takkanat ha-shuk was not enacted for it,

and the owners do not pay him even one hundred. Just as he gave him the additional one hundred as a gift, so too he gave him the one hundred corresponding to the value of the item as a gift and not in exchange for the item; therefore, the takkanat ha-shuk does not apply.

Rava said: The takkanat ha-shuk was enacted for it.

And the owners pay him even two hundred, since it is common to purchase an item at times for more than its value.

And the halakha is: In all of these cases, the takkanat ha-shuk was enacted for it

except

for

one who stole and paid his debt with it, or stole and paid his store debt with it,

for in those cases the takkanat ha-shuk was not enacted.

Avimi bar Nasi, Ravina’s father-in-law,

Ravina’s father-in-law,

was lending money to a certain man.

He lent money to a certain person—

four dinars;

that same person went and

stole a cloak and brought it to him.

He brought it to Avimi bar Nasi.

He lent him another four dinars,

Avimi now lent him an additional four dinars.

Ultimately, the thief was identified,

meaning that it became known that the cloak was stolen, and the owners claimed it from Avimi.

He came before Ravina,

Avimi came before Ravina.

He said

to him:

“The first ones,

the first four dinars, are treated as

one who stole and paid his debt with it,

since you lent them to him before he gave you the cloak;

and

therefore

he need not give him anything.

The owner of the cloak need not return those four dinars to you. But

these other four dinars,

the additional four dinars, you lent him against the cloak as collateral; therefore

take your money.

Take it from the owner of the cloak,

and return the cloak,”

returning his cloak to him.

Rav Kahana challenged him: But perhaps he gave him the cloak in exchange for those first dinars

that he owed him!?

Perhaps he intended to give him the cloak as repayment of the first debt, in which case the cloak is treated as

one who stole and paid his debt with it, or stole and paid his store debt with it.

And as for the

last four dinars,

he did not lend them to him against collateral at all; rather,

he merely trusted him,

he trusted him

just as he had trusted him initially,

just as he had trusted him regarding the first four dinars, which he lent him without collateral. If so, the owner of the cloak will likewise not have to pay him the last four dinars?

The matter came around and reached Rabbi Abbahu.

The matter came around and reached Rabbi Abbahu,

and he said: The halakha is in accordance with Rav Kahana!

A resident of Narash

a person from a place called Narash

stole a book,

a book,

and sold it

sold it

to a resident of Paphunya

to a person from Paphunya

for eighty zuz,

for eighty zuz.

He went,

he went,

and the resident of Paphunya sold it to a resident of Mehoza

to a person from Mehoza

for one hundred and twenty zuz.

Eventually, the thief was identified.

Abaye said: Let the owner of the book go and give the resident of Mehoza eighty zuz.

The owner of the book should pay the resident of Mehoza eighty zuz out of the one hundred and twenty that he paid for the book,

and take his book

and take his book from him.

And the resident of Mehoza should go and take forty from the resident of Paphunya.

The resident of Mehoza should take the remaining forty zuz that he paid from the resident of Paphunya, who sold him the book for one hundred and twenty.

Rava raised an objection to him: Now, if the market regulation was applied to one who buys from a thief, is it necessary to say that it was applied to one who buys from a purchaser!?

If the market regulation was applied to one who buys from the thief, enabling him to collect from the homeowner what he paid so that he would not have to litigate with the thief, all the more so the market regulation should be applied to one who bought from someone who bought from the thief. And why should the owner of the book not pay the resident of Mehoza the full one hundred and twenty zuz that he paid for the book, so that he would not have to litigate with the resident of Paphunya who sold it to him?

Rather, Rava said: Let the owner of the book go and give the resident of Mehoza

the owner of the book should pay the resident of Mehoza

one hundred and twenty zuz, and take his book,

he should take his book from him.

And let the owner of the book go and take forty from the resident of Paphunya, and eighty from the resident of Narash.

The owner of the book should collect from the resident of Paphunya the forty zuz that he profited from the book, and he should collect the remaining eighty zuz from the thief from Narash, who sold the book and profited eighty zuz from it.

Mishna:

Two people were traveling along the road,

one carrying a barrel of wine, and the other carrying a jug of honey.

The barrel of honey cracked,

and the honey began to flow from it, and honey is more expensive than wine.

This one poured out

the owner of the barrel of wine

his wine and saved the honey

by pouring it

into it,

into the wine barrel, which he had emptied in order to receive the valuable honey.