Bava Kamma 112a — the Talmud in English

Before despair,

since the owners had not yet despaired of the stolen object, and therefore the sons had not acquired it, for change of possession alone does not effect acquisition.

Rav Adda bar Ahava taught this statement of Rami bar Hama with regard to this,

Rami bar Hama did not state his words concerning our Mishna, but concerning this beraita, as it was taught:

If their father left them

that he bequeathed to them

money of interest, even though they know that it is money of interest, they are not liable to return it

to the borrower who gave the interest to their father.

And concerning this

Rami bar Hama said: This is to say

from here there is proof that

the possession of an heir is considered equivalent to the possession of a purchaser,

and therefore they are not liable to return the interest, since the borrower had already despaired of it, and the heirs acquired it through despair and change of possession.

Rava said: In truth, I can tell you that the possession of an heir is not considered equivalent to the possession of a purchaser.

And here is different,

since the heirs are not obligated to return the interest, because

the verse says [Leviticus 25:36]

“

Do not take from him interest and increase,

and you shall fear your God, and your brother shall live with you.”

And from the end of the verse, “and your brother shall live with you,” we learn the law of returning interest, for the Torah said:

Return it to him

return the interest to him

so that he may live through it with you,

so that he will be able to live with you.

And we infer: Only

concerning him the Merciful One warned him,

the lender himself who took the interest and transgressed “Do not take from him interest and increase”—only he is warned to return the interest and fulfill “and your brother shall live with you.” But

concerning his son,

his son, who did not take the interest,

the Merciful One did not warn him

to return the interest.

And the Gemara explains:

The one who taught it

the statement of Rami bar Hama

with regard to the beraita, all the more so

does he hold that Rami bar Hama stated his words also

with regard to the Mishna,

for the reason that the sons are exempt from paying when their father left it to them is that the possession of an heir is considered equivalent to the possession of a purchaser.

Whereas

the one who taught it with regard to the Mishna,

holds that the words of Rami bar Hama were stated only concerning the Mishna.

But with regard to the beraita, Rami bar Hama teaches it like Rava,

for the reason is not that the possession of an heir is considered equivalent to the possession of a purchaser, but that we derive from the verse that the very obligation to return interest is imposed only upon the lender himself and not upon his heirs.

The Sages taught: One who steals and feeds his sons is exempt from paying.

If he left it before them,

he left the stolen object to them as an inheritance, and it still exists in their possession. If the sons are

adults,

they

are liable to pay.

And if they are

minors, they are exempt from paying,

since minors are not subject to judgment. And this is in accordance with the view of Sumakhos, as will be stated below.

And if they said

the

adult

sons to the robbed person:

We do not

know the accounts that our father settled with you,

and perhaps he paid you money in exchange for the stolen object,

they are exempt

from paying.

And we raise an objection: Is it because

they say, “We do not know,”

that they will be

exempt?

But it is certain that the object came into their father’s possession through theft, whereas the possibility that he paid him for the theft is only a doubt, and where one party has certainty and the other has uncertainty, the certain claim prevails?

And we answer:

Rava said: This is what it is saying: Adults who said, “We know the accounts that our father settled with you,”

and that he paid you for the stolen object,

and you have nothing left with him,

and he did not remain obligated to you for anything,

they are exempt

from paying, since they make this claim with certainty.

It was taught in another [beraita]: One who steals and feeds his sons is exempt from paying.

If he left it before them,

he bequeathed the stolen object to them

and they ate it, whether adults or minors, they are liable

to pay.

And we raise an objection:

Minors—are they liable?

Let it be no more than that they caused damage,

for even if minors entered the courtyard of the robbed person and caused damage there, they are not required to pay, as we learned above [87a]: “And when they injure others, they are exempt.” How, then, can they be made liable because they ate the stolen object?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: This is what it is saying: He left

their father

it before them, and they had not yet eaten it; whether adults or minors, they are liable

to return the stolen object, since once the stolen object exists, it is still in the possession of its owners, and they are liable to return it to them.

Rava said: If their father left them a borrowed cow, they may use it

the heirs

for the entire period of its borrowing,

for the entire duration of the time that their father borrowed the cow from its owners.

If it died,

the cow,

they are not

the sons

liable for its accidents.

For although their father would have been liable had it died in his possession, since a borrower is liable for accidents, nevertheless the sons are exempt, since they did not borrow it and did not accept upon themselves the obligation of safeguarding it.

Thinking

the sons thought that the cow

belonged to their father, and they slaughtered it and ate it, they pay the value of the meat at a reduced price

they pay only two-thirds of the price of the meat, for had they known that they would have to pay for the meat, they would not have purchased it at its full price.

If their father left them property serving as security

land,

they are liable to pay.

And the Gemara will immediately explain this.

There are those who teach it

the latter part, “If their father left them property serving as security,”

with regard to the first part

of Rava’s statement: If it died, they are not liable for its accidents. And concerning this Rava said that if their father left them land, they are liable to pay, because these lands had already become encumbered during their father’s lifetime for payment of the accident. For according to Rava, the borrower’s liability for accidents is imposed upon him from the time of the borrowing, and consequently from that time his property had already become encumbered for payment of the accident. This is not like the view of Rav Pappa, who will maintain below that the borrower’s liability for accidents takes effect only from the time of the accident.

And there are those who teach it with regard to the latter part

of Rava’s statement, concerning “they slaughtered it and ate it, they pay the value of the meat at a reduced price”: If their father left them land, they pay the full price of the meat.

And the Gemara explains:

The one who teaches it with regard to the first part

will hold that

all the more so

did Rava say this

with regard to the latter part,

concerning their slaughtering and eating it, that if their father left them land, they pay the full price of the meat.

And according to this view, Rava

disagrees

with

Rav Pappa,

for Rava holds that the borrower’s liability for accidents is imposed upon him from the time of the borrowing. Therefore, also in the first part, where the cow died, Rava said that if he left them land, it is encumbered from his lifetime for payment of the accident, whereas Rav Pappa holds that the payment liability takes effect only at the time of the accident.

And

the one who teaches it with regard to the latter part

holds that only there did Rava state the law of “If their father left them property serving as security,”

but with regard to the first part,

where the cow died, he

did not

say that if he left them land they would be liable to pay for the accident,

and this is the view of Rav Pappa,

for Rava holds like Rav Pappa, that the payment liability takes effect only at the time of the accident. At that point their father, the borrower, was no longer alive, so that he could become liable for the accident and his property could become encumbered for it. The sons, however, did not borrow the cow and did not accept upon themselves the obligation of safeguarding it.

And the Gemara brings that statement

that Rav Pappa said: If he had a stolen cow,

having stolen a cow on the eve of Shabbat,

and slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is liable

for the payments of four and five, because

he had already become liable for the theft before he came to the prohibition of Shabbat,

and there is no exemption here of “he stands exempt through the greater offense,” since for the principal he already became liable at the time of the theft, which was on the eve of Shabbat. As for the four-and-five payment, although he became liable for it only at the time of the slaughter, which was on Shabbat, nevertheless he is not exempt from it, because there is no exemption of “he stands exempt through the greater offense” with regard to liability for a fine, as explained in tractate Ketubot [34b]: Since every liability for a fine is a novelty introduced by the Torah, we do not apply to it “he stands exempt through the greater offense.”

There was a cow borrowed by him,

he borrowed a cow before Shabbat,

and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is exempt

entirely, because

the prohibition of Shabbat and the prohibition of theft come simultaneously.

For at the time of the slaughter on Shabbat, that is when he performs the act of robbery, for through it he takes it from the owners; and since he is liable to death for this slaughter, it is impossible to obligate him also in payment of the principal for the slaughter, for kam lei bid'rabba minei.

And it is likewise impossible to obligate him for the fine of four and five [times the value] [even though there is no exemption here on account of kam lei bid'rabba minei], because liability for double, and four and five, applies only to the actual thief who steals from the owners’ house, or to a watchman who makes a claim of theft; but with a borrower it does not apply that he should exempt himself through a claim of theft, for he is liable for the theft, and the slaughter that he performed is not an act of theft but an act of robbery. Therefore, liability for four and five does not apply to him. It follows that Rav Pappa’s view is that the borrower becomes liable only at the time of the accident, and we do not say that from the time of the borrowing the cow stands in his possession and he becomes liable to pay the principal to the owners; for if so, even when it was borrowed by him and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he should have become liable, since the borrowing took place before Shabbat.

The Sages taught:

It is written [Leviticus 5:23]: “

And he shall return the robbery that he robbed.”

What does

“that he robbed”

teach? For it is obvious that he must return what he robbed? Rather, it teaches that he

shall return

only if it is

like that which he robbed,

that the robbed item still exists. But if the robbed item does not exist, he is exempt from paying its value.

And certainly the robber himself is liable to pay for the robbed item even when it does not exist. Necessarily, the verse is speaking with regard to the sons of the robber, who are exempt from paying when the robbed item does not exist.

From here they said: One who robs and feeds his sons is exempt from paying.

He left it before them,

that he bequeathed the robbed item to them and it still exists,

whether

the sons are

adults, whether

they are

minors, they are liable

to return it.

In the name of Sumakhos they said:

sons who are

adults are liable.

Sons who are

minors are exempt.

The bar hamoh of Rav Yirmeya

the son of his father-in-law

shut the doors in front of Rav Yirmeya

he locked the door of his father’s house so that Rav Yirmeya would not be able to enter there, for Rav Yirmeya wanted to take the house for himself.

Rav Yirmeya came

to

before Rabbi Avin

to make a claim against his father-in-law’s son, who was preventing him from entering and taking possession of the house.

Rabbi Avin said:

:

He is claiming his own property

your brother-in-law! For the house belongs to him by inheritance, and he is acting lawfully by preventing you from entering there.

He said to him

Jeremiah:

But I have witnesses

I have witnesses

that I established possession of it during the lifetime of his father,

that I held possession of this house while his father was still alive, [for Rav Yirmeya claimed that the father had sold it or given it to him as a gift].