Bava Kamma 111b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who robs, and feeds his sons,

who fed them what he robbed from others.

Or,

and placed it before them

the robbed item: he did not give them the robbed item during his lifetime, but rather bequeathed it to them after his death, and then they ate it,

they are exempt

they

from paying

for what they ate.

For they did not rob anything from the owners, and the obligation to return the robbery rests upon them only through their father, who has already died. And although their father left them movable property as an inheritance, they are not obligated to pay from those assets, because the law is that when a debtor dies and leaves behind only movable property, the movable property of the orphans is not liened for payment of their father’s debt. [But if the robbed item still existed, the orphans would be obligated to return it to the owners].

And if it was an item with a lien,

that is, if their father left them lands, which are an item with a lien,

they are obligated to pay,

even though they already ate the robbed item, because these lands had already been liened, from the time their father was alive, to his creditor, who is the one robbed.

Gemara:

Rav Hisda said: [If one] robbed, and the owners did not despair

still, of the robbed item,

and another came and ate it from him,

from the robber, who had robbed the robbed item from him and ate it,

whether he wishes to collect from this one, he collects; whether he wishes to collect from that one, he collects.

The owners may collect payment for the robbery from whichever one they wish: either from the robber or from the one who ate the robbed item.

What is the reason?

Why can he collect the robbery also from the one who merely ate it, although he did not rob it?

Because

as long

as

the owners have not despaired

of the robbed item,

it remains in the domain of its master,

it is still as though it stands in the owners’ domain, and this one who came and ate the robbed item is as though he now robbed it from the owners. Therefore, the owners are permitted to collect the robbery from him.

And we raise an objection against Rav Hisda:

we learned

in our Mishna:

One who robs and feeds his sons, or places it before them, they are exempt from paying.

But according to Rav Hisda, who says, “whether he wishes to collect from this one, he collects; whether he wishes to collect from that one, he collects,” why should the one robbed not be able to collect the robbery also from the sons, who ate the robbed item?

And we answer:

Rav Hisda can say to you: When that [Mishna] was taught,

the Mishna speaks where the sons ate the robbed item

after despair,

when the owners had already despaired of it, for then Rav Hisda agrees that the owners cannot collect except from the robber himself, and not from the one who ate it from him, since the owners despaired before the eating.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he placed it before them, they are exempt from paying.

Rami bar Hama said: This indicates

from here a proof that

the domain of an heir is considered like the domain of a purchaser.

The heir’s domain from the robber is considered a domain different from the robber’s, and this is a change of possession with regard to the robbed object, just as the domain of a purchaser [who acquires] from the robber is considered a different domain with regard to its being considered a change of possession in the purchaser’s hands.

For according to Rami bar Hama, the Mishna speaks where the robbed item is still lying before the sons and was not eaten by them, and nevertheless they are exempt from returning it to the owners, because they acquired it through despair [as we established the Mishna above, that the owners had already despaired of the robbery] and through a change of possession.

Rava said:

There is no proof from the Mishna. For in fact

the domain of an heir is not considered like the domain of a purchaser,

and the heirs indeed did not acquire the robbery, since inheritance is not considered a change of possession, and despair alone does not acquire it.

And with what are we dealing here?

The reason the Mishna exempts the heirs from paying when their father placed it before them is that it speaks

when they ate it.

The orphans ate the robbed item after their father’s death, and then the one robbed cannot sue them, since they did not rob it from him.

And we raise an objection:

But from the fact that the final clause teaches

of the Mishna, “

if

it was an item with a lien, they are obligated to pay,”

and the Gemara understands that the intention of the Mishna is that if the robbed item was a thing recognizable to the public, and people always see it, such as a garment or land, the heirs are obligated to return it to the owners for the honor of their father, so that people will not say, “This is the garment that so-and-so, their father, robbed.”

By implication

we learn this,

the first clause,

that also the first clause of the Mishna

is dealing with a robbery that exists.

The robbed item still exists and was not eaten, and this is difficult for Rava, who established the Mishna as speaking where the heirs ate the robbed item?

And we answer:

Rava can say to you:

This is not the intention of the Mishna in the final clause, but rather

this is what the tanna says

in the Mishna:

If their father left them property subject to a lien,

for he bequeathed them lands, then they are

obligated to pay

even though they ate the robbed item, because those lands had been liened to the one robbed from their father’s lifetime. And in fact the Mishna speaks where the orphans ate the robbed item.

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi taught Rabbi Shimon his son,

Rabbi taught and explained to Rabbi Shimon his son that our Mishna, which says that if the robbed item was an item with a lien they are obligated to pay,

does not

speak of a case where the robbed item was

an actual item with a lien,

namely lands,

but even

if it was

a cow, and he plows with it,

or

a donkey, and he drives it behind him,

which everyone sees and knows was the one robbed’s,

they are obligated to return it, for the honor of their father.

It follows that Rabbi holds that the Mishna speaks where the robbery exists?

And we answer:

Rather, Rava said: When I die,

when I die,

Rabbi Oshaya will come out to meet me,

he will come out to meet me, since

I establish the Mishna in accordance with him.

Because I regularly explain anonymous Mishnayot, which Rabbi stated without explaining, in accordance with baraitot that Rabbi Oshaya taught.

For Rabbi Oshaya taught: One who robs and feeds his sons, they are exempt from paying.

If he placed before them a robbery that exists,

that he left the robbery to them, and it still exists, since they did not eat it after his death, and the one robbed demands the robbery from them,

they are obligated

to return it, because the domain of an heir is not considered like the domain of a purchaser, and here there is no change of possession, but only despair, which does not acquire a robbery.

If the robbery does not exist,

for they ate it after his death,

they are exempt from paying

since they did not rob it.

If their father left them property subject to a lien,

for he bequeathed them lands,

they are obligated to pay

because these lands are liened to the one robbed for the debt of returning their father’s robbery.

And Rava holds: Since the baraita explains the law of “their father left them property subject to a lien,” that the intention is not that the robbery exists and [they must return it] because of the honor of their father, but that he left them lands liened for payment of the robbery, if so, the Mishna too must be explained in this manner, and there is no concern that Rabbi explained the Mishna in another manner.

The master said

in the baraita:

If the robbery does not exist, they are exempt.

And we examine it:

Shall we say that this is a refutation of Rav Hisda,

who said that if another came and ate the robbed item, whether he wishes to collect from this one, he collects; whether he wishes to collect from that one, he collects? And according to his words, why should the sons not be obligated to pay when they ate the robbed item?

And we answer:

Rav Hisda can say to you: When that [baraita] was taught, it was after despair.

The sons ate the robbed item after the owners had already despaired of it, and then Rav Hisda too agrees that the one robbed cannot collect except from the robber himself.

The master said: If the robbery exists, they are obligated to pay.

And we examine it:

Shall we say that this is a refutation of Rami bar Hama,

who holds that the domain of an heir is considered like the domain of a purchaser? If so, why are they obligated to pay when the robbery exists? After all, they acquired it through despair and a change of possession?

And we answer:

Rami bar Hama can say to you: When that [baraita] was taught: