Bava Kamma 111b (קיא:) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who robs, and feeds his sons,

having fed them what he robbed from others.

Or

he placed it before them

the stolen item—not giving it to them during his lifetime, but bequeathing it to them after his death, after which they ate it—

they are exempt

they

from paying

for what they ate.

For they did not rob anything from the owners, and the obligation to return the stolen item rests upon their father, who has already died. And although their father left them movable property as an inheritance, they are not obligated to pay from those assets, because the law is that when a creditor dies and leaves only movable property, the movable property of the orphans is not liened for payment of their father’s debt. [But if the stolen item still existed, the orphans would be obligated to return it to the owners].

And if it was an item for which there is responsibility,

that is, if their father left them land, which is an item for which there is responsibility,

they are obligated to pay,

even though they had already eaten the stolen item, because those lands had been liened, from the time their father was alive, to one of his creditors, namely, the person who was robbed.

Gemara:

Rav Ḥisda said: If one robbed an item, and the owners did not despair

of recovering the stolen item,

and another person came and ate it,

from the robber, who had robbed it from him and eaten it,

the owner may collect from whichever one he wishes; he may collect from whichever one he wishes.

The owners may collect payment for the stolen item from whomever they wish, whether from the robber or from the one who ate the stolen item.

What is the reason?

Why can he collect the stolen item even from the one who merely ate it, although he did not rob it?

Because

as long as

all the time

the owners did not despair

of recovering the stolen item,

it remains in its master’s domain,

it is still considered as though it were in the owners’ domain, and the one who came and ate the stolen item is considered as though he had now robbed it from the owners. Therefore, the owners are entitled to collect the stolen item from him.

And we raise an objection to Rav Ḥisda:

we learned

in our Mishna:

One who robs and feeds his sons, or places it before them, they are exempt from paying.

But according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that the owner may collect from whichever one he wishes, why should the person who was robbed not be able to collect the stolen item from the sons as well, since they ate the stolen item?

And we answer:

Rav Ḥisda could have said to you: When that was taught,

the Mishna is speaking of a case in which the sons ate the stolen item

after despair,

when the owners had already despaired of recovering it. In that case Rav Ḥisda agrees that the owners can collect only from the robber himself and not from the one who ate it from him, since the owners despaired before the eating.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he placed it before them, they are exempt from paying.

Rami bar Ḥama said: This indicates

that there is proof that

an heir’s domain is considered like a purchaser’s domain.

The heir’s domain, with respect to the robber, is considered a domain different from that of the robber; this is therefore a change of domain with respect to the stolen object, just as the domain of a purchaser [who acquires it] from the robber is considered a different domain, so that it is regarded as a change of domain in the purchaser’s possession.

For according to Rami bar Ḥama, the Mishna is speaking of a case in which the stolen item was still lying before the sons and had not been eaten by them, and nevertheless they are exempt from returning it to the owners, because they acquired it through despair [as we established above, that the Mishna is speaking of a case in which the owners had already despaired of the stolen item] and through a change of domain.

Rava said:

There is no proof from the Mishna. For in fact,

an heir’s domain is not considered like a purchaser’s domain,

and the heirs did not acquire the stolen item, since inheritance is not considered a change of domain, and despair alone does not effect acquisition.

And with what are we dealing here?

The reason the Mishna exempts the heirs from paying when their father placed it before them is that it is speaking

when they ate it.

The orphans ate the stolen item after their father’s death, in which case the person who was robbed cannot sue them, since they did not rob it from him.

And we raise an objection:

But from the fact that the latter clause states

of the Mishna, “

If

it was an item for which there is responsibility, they are obligated to pay,”

the Gemara understands that the Mishna means that if the stolen item was something recognizable to the public and always seen, such as a garment or land, the heirs are obligated to return it to the owners for the sake of their father’s honor, so that people will not say, “This is the garment that so-and-so, their father, stole.”

By inference

we learn from this

that the first clause,

the first clause of the Mishna as well,

is dealing with a case in which the stolen item exists.

The stolen item still exists and was not eaten, and this is difficult for Rava, who established the Mishna as referring to a case in which the heirs ate the stolen item.

And we answer:

Rava could have said to you:

This is not the meaning of the latter clause of the Mishna. Rather,

this is what the tanna means

in the Mishna:

If their father left them assets for which there is responsibility,

that is, he bequeathed them land, then they are

obligated to pay

even though they ate the stolen item, because those lands had been liened, from their father’s lifetime, to the person who was robbed. The Mishna is indeed speaking of a case in which the orphans ate the stolen item.

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi taught it to Rabbi Shimon his son:

Rabbi taught and explained to his son Rabbi Shimon that our Mishna, which says that if the stolen item was something for which there is responsibility they are obligated to pay,

does not

refer to a case in which the stolen item was

literally an item for which there is responsibility,

namely, land,

but even

if it was

a cow with which he plowed,

or

a donkey with which he transported a load,

as everyone sees and knows that it belonged to the person who was robbed,

they are obligated to return it, for the sake of their father’s honor.

This shows that Rabbi holds that the Mishna is speaking of a case in which the stolen item exists.

And we answer:

Rather, Rava said: When I die,

when I pass away,

Rabbi Oshaya will come out to greet me,

he will come out to greet me, because

I resolve the Mishna in accordance with his view.

This is because I regularly resolve the anonymous Mishnayot taught by Rabbi, which he did not explain, in accordance with the beraitot taught by Rabbi Oshaya.

For Rabbi Oshaya taught: One who robs and feeds his sons, they are exempt from paying.

If he placed an existing stolen item before them

he left the stolen item to them, and it still exists, since they did not eat it after his death, and the person who was robbed demands the stolen item from them,

they are obligated

to return it, because an heir’s domain is not considered like a purchaser’s domain, and there is no change of domain here, only despair, which does not effect acquisition of a stolen item.

If the stolen item does not exist

because they ate it after his death,

they are exempt from paying

since they did not rob it.

If their father left them assets for which there is responsibility

that is, he bequeathed them land,

they are obligated to pay

because those lands are liened to the person who was robbed for the debt of returning the stolen item belonging to their father.

Rava holds that since the beraita explains the law of “their father left them assets for which there is responsibility” as not referring to a case in which the stolen item exists and they must return it for the sake of their father’s honor, but rather to a case in which he left them lands liened for payment of the stolen item, the Mishna should likewise be interpreted in this manner. There is therefore no concern that Rabbi explained the Mishna in a different way.

The Master said

in the beraita:

If the stolen item does not exist, they are exempt.

And we consider this:

Shall we say that this is a refutation of Rav Ḥisda,

who said that if another person came and ate the stolen item, the owner may collect from whichever one he wishes? According to him, why should the sons not be obligated to pay when they ate the stolen item?

And we answer:

Rav Ḥisda could have said to you: When that was taught, it was after despair.

The sons ate the stolen item after the owners had already despaired of recovering it, in which case Rav Ḥisda also agrees that the person who was robbed can collect only from the robber himself.

The Master said: If the stolen item exists, they are obligated to pay.

And we consider this:

Shall we say that this is a refutation of Rami bar Ḥama,

who holds that an heir’s domain is considered like a purchaser’s domain? If so, why are they obligated to pay when the stolen item exists? Surely they acquired it through despair and a change of domain.

And we answer:

Rami bar Ḥama could have said to you: When that was taught: