Bava Kamma 105a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge:

If so:

if, as we explain, the beraita is dealing with a case where their father left them property under lien, and they are obligated to pay from those properties the value of the theft, then when they denied the theft, they denied money that was in their possession, and the difficulty returns to its place:

he should also pay the fifth on account of his own oath!?

on account of his own oath?!

Said

Rab Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua,

said:

Because one does not pay a fifth for denying a lien on real estate.

Rava said

to resolve the difficulty that the Gemara raised: “And let us obligate his son to pay a fifth on account of his oath”:

The beraita is actually dealing with a case in which the stolen object still exists, except that

here

in the beraita

with what are we dealing?

For example, there was a purse [

a bag, a wallet]

belonging to his father

in which the stolen object was,

deposited with others, and therefore:

therefore:

He pays the principal

the son,

for it is there, [

the stolen object exists]; however,

he does not pay the fifth

the son,

for when he swore

that his father had not stolen,

in truth [

truly]

he swore,

for he did not know

that the stolen object was present in that purse.

We learned in the Mishna:

he forgave him ...

except for less than the value of a peruta of the principal

he need not go after him:

Rav Pappa said:

They taught

in our Mishna that he need not go after him to return to him less than the value of a peruta

only

in a case

where the stolen object does not exist,

and he owes him money of less than the value of a peruta—

But

if

the stolen object

itself still

exists, he must go after him

to return it to him, even if only less than a peruta remains of it, because

we are concerned: perhaps it will increase in value

and be worth a peruta.

Some say [

there are those who say] that this is what

Rav Pappa said:

It is no different whether the stolen object exists, and it is no different whether the stolen object does not exist; he need not go after him,

because

for the possibility that it will

increase in value, we are not concerned.

Rava said:

one who steals a bundle of vegetables worth a peruta, and its value decreases and stands at less than a peruta, is obligated to return it if it exists, and if it does not exist, he must pay according to its value at the time of the theft. And not only that, but if

he stole three bundles for three perutot, and their value decreased and stood at two,

even

if he returned to him

already

two,

and he had already fulfilled the mitzva of restoration through those two bundles, nevertheless

he is obligated to return another one to him,

that is, the bundle itself if it exists, or its value at the time of the theft if it does not exist.

And the tanna teaches likewise,

and our tanna [in the Mishna above, in this chapter, page 96b] supports Rava’s words: one who steals something worth a peruta is obligated to return its value, even if its value decreased and it is again no longer worth a peruta; for we learned:

“One who stole leavened bread and Passover passed over it, he says to him

‘Behold

it is yours before you,’”

and it follows:

The reason is that it is present before him [

the matter applies only when the leavened bread is still present],

but

if

it is not

the leavened bread

present before him,

he is obligated to return its value, for it follows that if he cannot say to the one robbed, “Behold, it is yours before you,” and because the leavened bread was forcibly taken from him, he is not exempt from paying for the theft; we learn:

Even though now

during Passover

it is not money,

for it is not worth a peruta, nevertheless

since initially

at the time of the theft

it was money, he must pay [

he must pay]—

Here too,

when he stole a bundle and it stood at a peruta,

even though now it is not worth a peruta, since initially

at the time of the theft

the bundle was

worth a peruta,

he must pay [

he must pay].

Rava raised a question: He stole two bundles for one peruta, and returned to him only one of them—what is the law?

Is the obligation still imposed upon him to return the second bundle, despite the fact that it is not worth a peruta?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Do we say: now,

behold now, once he returned one bundle, there is again

no theft with him,

he no longer has in his possession the measure of a theft, which is a peruta, and he is exempt from returning the second bundle?

Or perhaps: this one he has not returned,

for he has still not returned the

theft that had been with him.

For the entire theft had the value of a peruta, and he returned only one bundle worth half a peruta; it follows that the theft still exists with him, and he must also return the second bundle.

He returned

and Rava returned and

resolved

his question, and said:

There is no theft here,

since the remaining bundle is not worth a peruta, and therefore

there is no restoration here.

The Gemara was astonished at understanding his words: behold,

if there is no theft here,

then

there is restoration here.

For he returned one bundle, and he is no longer obligated to return more, according to Rava; why, then, did Rava say that there is no restoration here!?

And the Gemara explains that

this is what

Rava

said:

Even though there is no theft here,

there is no fulfillment of the mitzva of restoration here,

for he returned only one bundle out of the two that he stole.

The Gemara brings additional matters, concerning a nazir and concerning the impurity of a tent, in which Rava had doubts and resolved his doubts in a similar manner.

And Rava said: Behold, they said: A nazir who shaved

all the hair of his head when he completes his naziriteship, for at that time he is obligated to shave all the hair of his head,

and left two hairs, he has done nothing.

For leaving two hairs causes him to be considered as one who has not been shaved.

Rava raised a question:

if

the nazir shaved

one hair

of the two

that he left,

and

afterward

one hair fell out

a hair

by itself,

one hair

what is the law?

Is he still obligated to shave [when his hairs grow], because shaving is not considered shaving with fewer than two hairs? Or did he fulfill his obligation through shaving one hair out of the two, since at the time that he shaved it there were two hairs on his head, and once he shaved it, there no longer remained a measure of two hairs in him, and he is no longer considered one who has not been shaved?

He said to him,

objecting,

Rav Aha of Difti to Ravina,

concerning Rava’s doubt: Is it that

a nazir who shaved

his hairs

one by one—is that what Rava is asking—whether his shaving was effective, since he did not shave two hairs at once? Surely it is obvious that it has the designation of shaving. Therefore, when he comes to shave the last two hairs one by one, there was here a measure of shaving. Thus, when he shaved one hair from among the two, shaving the hair was thereby accomplished, and now, when one hair remains, which does not prevent the shaving, it does not matter to us if it fell out by itself?

He said to him,

Ravina:

It is necessary;

Rava’s doubt was in a case

such that

initially

one hair fell

a hair

of them,

of the two that remained,

and

afterward he

shaved

the

one

that remained.

And the doubt is:

Do we say: now,

now, when he shaved the last hair remaining on his head after the shaving,

at least, there is no measure

of hair on his head, and he accomplished the shaving through the last one?

Or perhaps: this,

the shaving of the last hair,

is not shaving, for initially,

when he stopped shaving,

he had left two hairs,

and at that time he had not accomplished the shaving,

and now, when he shaved, there were not two hairs,

and this is not shaving of hair!

He returned and resolved it,

and Rava returned and resolved his question: since he shaved the last hair,

there is no hair here,

and therefore

there is no shaving here.

The Gemara was astonished:

If there is no hair here,

behold,

there is shaving here!

And it explains:

this is what

Rava

said:

Even though there is no hair here,

there is no fulfillment of the mitzva of shaving here,

because he did not shave the hair of a head that contained a measure of two hairs.

And now the Gemara brings Rava’s doubt in a similar manner concerning the impurity of a tent over a corpse.

The impurity of a corpse found inside a house spreads to every place in the house, except for a place with a barrier between it and the corpse. Therefore, a house that has an upper story above it, and there is a hole [called an opening] from the house to the upper story above it, the impurity of the corpse in the house passes to the upper story through the hole, unless they seal the hole, as will be explained.

If they sealed the hole [the opening] by means of a vessel, then if it is a vessel susceptible to impurity, it does not form a barrier before the impurity; only if it is a broken vessel, which is not susceptible to impurity, can it form a barrier before the impurity.

And Rava said: Behold, they said: A jug that was perforated,

in a manner that it is no longer susceptible to impurity,

and they sealed it

the perforation

with lees

of wine, so that the jug was sealed [but it is not considered, by virtue of the sealing with lees, a complete vessel susceptible to impurity], and they placed the jug over the opening, and smeared around the entire hole so that there was no open space between the house and the upper story,

they saved it,

the upper story, from the impurity of the corpse in the house beneath it. For the vessel itself forms a barrier before the impurity, and the sealing of the perforation in the vessel with lees is also considered a sealing that prevents the passage of impurity.

Rava raised a question:

if he

sealed

the perforation of the jug with

half of it [

clay, which is a sealing suitable for the vessel, and not with lees, which are not considered a sealing of the vessel],

what is the law?

That is to say, is sealing half the perforation sufficient to make it a vessel susceptible to impurity, because from now the vessel no longer has the measure of a perforation, and the vessel placed over the opening will again not form a barrier before the impurity in the house? Or perhaps sealing half a perforation is not considered a sealing, for he did not seal most of it?

Rav Yemar said to Rav Ashi:

Is it

not our Mishna, as we learned: “A jug that was perforated, and they sealed it with lees, they saved it”?

But if there are no lees there, and he

stopped up

the perforation of the jug

with a branch,

a wooden branch, the jug does not form a barrier before the impurity, because the perforation is not completely sealed when a branch is placed in it,

until he smears

clay around the branch, to seal the air space completely.

If there were

in the perforation of the jug

two

branches, the sealing is not effective to form a barrier before the impurity,

until he smears

and seals the air spaces

from the sides

of the branches,

and

also

between one branch and its fellow.

And Rav Yemar infers:

The reason

that the sealing is effective is because

he smeared.

But if he did not smear, it is not

effective—the sealing of the branch in the perforation of the jug.

And

why

is the sealing of the branch in the perforation of the jug not effective even without any smearing at all?

And

behold,

let it be

the sealing of the branch in the perforation

as when he sealed

just as he sealed with clay

half of it

of the perforation of the jug, concerning which you raised the doubt whether it should be considered a sealing of the perforation for its repair, so that it can become susceptible to impurity; likewise, the sealing of the branch in the perforation should be considered a barrier before impurity, even if the branch does not seal the entire perforation.

Rather, necessarily, the entire perforation must be sealed in order to consider it sealed.

And the Gemara rejects this:

They say: Is that comparable!?

What is the comparison!?

There,

with a branch,

if he does not smear

around it,

it does not stand,

the sealing of the branch will not stand at all, but will fall, and this is not a sealing.

But if he

sealed

and stopped up

half of it

with clay,

in something that stands,

in the place where he set the clay, it

stands,

the sealing of the clay remains permanently, and therefore Rava raised the doubt whether such sealing of half the perforation is sufficient.

And he said

further

Rava:

Behold, they said

in the Mishna below, 96b: “

One who stole leavened bread and Passover passed over it, he says to him, ‘Behold, it is yours before you’,”

and if he cannot say, “Behold, it is yours before you,” for example, if it was forcibly taken from him, he must pay according to its value at the time of the theft, as was explained above.

And if so,

Rava asked [

he raised a doubt]

Rava: