Bava Kamma 105a (קה.) — the Talmud in English

:

If so, as we explained—that the beraita is discussing a case in which their father left them property subject to a lien, and they are obligated to pay the value of the stolen item from those assets—then, when they denied the theft, they denied money that they had in their possession, and the original difficulty returns:

he should also pay the fifth,

on account of his own oath?!

He said—

he answered—

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

Because one does not pay a fifth for denying an obligation secured by a lien on land.

Rava said,

to resolve the difficulty raised by the Gemara: “Let us obligate the son to pay a fifth on account of his own oath”:

The beraita is indeed discussing a case in which the stolen item still exists; rather,

here,

in the beraita,

what are we dealing with?

For example, there was a pouch [תיק, ארנק]

belonging to his father,

which contained the stolen item,

and it had been deposited with others;

therefore:

he pays the principal,

the son,

for it is present, [הרי הגזילה קיימת]

but

he does not pay a fifth,

the son,

for when he swore

that his father had not stolen,

he swore truthfully [באמת],

he took a true oath,

for he did not know

that the stolen item was present in that pouch.

We learned in the Mishna:

he forgave him ...

except for less than the value of a peruta of the principal,

he need not go after him:

Rav Pappa said:

They taught

in our Mishna that he need not go after him to return to him less than the value of a peruta

only

in a case

where the stolen item no longer exists,

and he owes him money worth less than a peruta—

But

if

the stolen item

itself still

exists, he must go after him

to return it to him even if less than a peruta of it remains, because

we are concerned that it may increase in value

and become worth a peruta.

There are those who say [יש אומרים]

this is what

Rav Pappa said:

It makes no difference whether the stolen item exists, and it makes no difference whether it does not exist; he need not go after him,

because

as for the possibility that it may

increase in value, we are not concerned.

Rava said:

one who steals a bundle of vegetables worth a peruta, and it decreases in value until it is worth less than a peruta, must return it if it still exists, and if it no longer exists, he must pay its value as it was at the time of the theft. And furthermore, if

he stole three bundles worth three perutot, and they decreased in value until they were worth two,

even

if he already returned to him

already

two bundles,

and has already fulfilled the mitzva of returning with respect to those two bundles, nevertheless

he must return another one to him,

that is, the bundle itself if it exists, or its value at the time of the theft if it no longer exists.

And our tanna likewise teaches,

and our tanna [in the Mishna above, chapter 9, page 96b] supports Rava’s statement that one who steals an item worth a peruta must return its value even if it decreases in value and is no longer worth a peruta; for we learned:

If one stole leavened bread and Passover passed over it, he says to him, “

Here is

your property before you,”

and it follows:

but

if

it is not present,

the leavened bread

as it was,

he must return its value, for it follows that if he cannot say to the robbed party, “Here is your property before you,” and the leavened bread was lost through circumstances beyond his control, he is not exempt from paying for the stolen item. We learn:

Although now,

during Passover,

it is not money,

for it is not worth a peruta, nevertheless

since originally,

at the time of the theft,

it was money, he must pay [צריך הוא לשלם]—

Here too,

when he stole a bundle worth a peruta,

although now it is not worth a peruta, since originally,

at the time of the theft,

the bundle was

the bundle

worth a peruta, he must pay [צריך הוא לשלם].

Rava raised a dilemma: If one stole two bundles worth one peruta and returned only one of them to him, what is the law?

Does he still bear the obligation to return the second bundle, even though it is not worth a peruta?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Do we say that now,

for now, once he has returned one bundle,

there is no stolen property with him,

for he no longer has in his possession the requisite measure of stolen property, namely, a peruta, and he is exempt from returning the second bundle?

Or perhaps, he has not returned

for he has still not returned the

stolen property that had been with him.

For the stolen property as a whole was worth a peruta, and he returned only one bundle worth half a peruta; consequently, the stolen property still remains with him, and he must also return the second bundle.

Rava then

resolved

his dilemma, and said:

There is no stolen property here,

since the remaining bundle is not worth a peruta, and therefore

there is no obligation of returning here.

The Gemara is puzzled by the meaning of his words:

If there is no stolen property here,

then

there is an obligation of returning here.

For he returned one bundle, and according to Rava he is not obligated to return anything further. Why, then, did Rava say that there is no obligation of returning here?!

And the Gemara explains that

this is what

Rava

although there is no stolen property here,

and although he is not obligated to return the bundle remaining in his possession, nevertheless, the fulfillment of

the mitzva of returning is not here,

for he returned only one bundle of the two that he stole.

The Gemara presents additional matters, concerning a nazir and concerning impurity conveyed by a tent, in which Rava raised a dilemma and resolved it in a similar manner.

And Rava said: They said that if a nazir shaves

all the hair of his head when completing his naziriteship, at which time he is obligated to shave all the hair of his head,

but left two hairs, he has accomplished nothing.

For leaving two hairs causes him to be considered as one who has not shaved.

Rava raised a dilemma:

If

the nazir shaved

a hair the nazir

one

of the two hairs he left,

and

afterward

one hair fell out

a hair

one

by itself,

what is the law?

Is he still obligated to shave [when his hair grows], since shaving is not considered shaving with fewer than two hairs? Or did he fulfill his obligation by shaving one of the two hairs, since when he shaved it there were two hairs on his head, and once he shaved it, there no longer remained a measure of two hairs, so he is no longer considered one who has not shaved?

He said to him,

astonished,

Rav Aḥa of Difti to Ravina,

concerning Rava’s dilemma: Is it possible that

the nazir who shaved

his hairs

one at a time—is that what Rava is asking—whether his shaving was effective because he did not shave two hairs at once? Surely it is obvious that this is called shaving. Therefore, when he came to shave the last two hairs one at a time, there was a measure of shaving present. Consequently, when he shaved one of the two hairs, he thereby performed the shaving, and now, once one hair remained, which does not prevent the shaving, it does not matter to us if it fell out by itself.

He said to him,

Ravina:

It is not necessary—

Rava’s dilemma was in a case

such that

first

one hair fell out

the hair

of them,

of the two that remained,

and

afterward

he shaved

the

one

that remained.

The dilemma is:

Do we say that now,

now, when he shaved the last hair remaining on his head from the shaving,

at least, there is no longer a measure

of hair on his head, and by shaving the last one he fulfilled the shaving?

Or perhaps, this—

the shaving of the last hair—

is not shaving, since originally,

when he stopped shaving,

he had left two hairs,

and at that point he had not fulfilled the shaving,

and now, when he shaved, there were not two hairs,

and this is not shaving the hair!

Rava then resolved

and returned to resolve his dilemma: since he shaved the last hair,

there is no hair here,

and therefore

there is no shaving here.

The Gemara is puzzled:

If there is no hair here,

then

there is shaving here!

And it explains:

this is what

Rava

although there is no hair here,

for he shaved the last hair, nevertheless, the fulfillment of

the mitzva of shaving is not here,

.since he did not shave hair on his head amounting to a measure of two hairs.

The Gemara now presents Rava’s dilemma in a similar manner concerning impurity conveyed by a tent over a corpse.

The impurity of a corpse located inside a house spreads throughout every place in the house, except for a place separated from the corpse by a partition. Therefore, if a house has an upper story and there is a hole [called an opening] from the house to the upper story above it, the impurity of the corpse in the house passes through the hole to the upper story, unless the hole is sealed, as will be explained.

If they sealed the hole [the opening] with a vessel, then, if it is a vessel susceptible to impurity, it does not serve as a barrier against the impurity. Only if it is a broken vessel, which is not susceptible to impurity, can it serve as a barrier against the impurity.

And Rava said: They said that if a barrel became perforated,

in such a manner that it is no longer susceptible to impurity,

and they sealed it,

the hole,

with sediment

of wine, so that the barrel was sealed [although, by virtue of the sediment’s sealing, it is not considered a complete vessel susceptible to impurity], and they placed the barrel over the opening and smeared material around the entire hole so that no open space remained between the house and the upper story,

they thereby protected

the upper story from the impurity of the corpse in the house beneath it. For the vessel itself serves as a barrier against the impurity, and the sediment sealing the hole in the vessel is also considered a seal preventing the impurity from passing through.

Rava raised a dilemma:

If

he sealed

the hole in the barrel with

what is the law?

That is, is sealing half the hole sufficient to make it a vessel susceptible to impurity, since from this point the vessel no longer has a hole of the requisite size, and the vessel placed over the opening can no longer serve as a barrier against the impurity in the house? Or is sealing half a hole not considered sealing, since he did not seal most of it?

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi:

Is it possible that

this is not our Mishna, as we learned: “A barrel that became perforated, and they sealed it with sediment, protects”?

But if there is no sediment there, rather,

he plugged

the hole in the barrel

with a branch,

a tree branch, the barrel does not serve as a barrier against the impurity, because the hole is not completely sealed when a branch is placed in it,

until he smears

clay around the branch, completely sealing the airspace.

If there were

in the hole of the barrel

two

branches, the sealing is not effective as a barrier against the impurity,

until he smears

and seals the airspaces

on the sides

of the branches,

and

also

between one branch and the other.

Rav Yeimar infers:

The reason

that the sealing is effective is

that he smeared.

But if he did not smear, it is not

effective—the branch’s sealing of the hole in the barrel.

And why

is the branch’s sealing of the hole in the barrel not effective even without any smearing at all?

And

behold,

let

the branch’s sealing of the hole

be like one who sealed

just as one sealed with clay

half of it

of the hole in the barrel—a case about which you raised the possibility of considering it a sealing of the hole for purposes of restoring its susceptibility to impurity. Likewise, the branch’s sealing of the hole should be considered sufficient to serve as a barrier against impurity, even if the branch does not seal the entire hole.

Rather, necessarily, the entire hole must be sealed in order for it to be considered sealed.

The Gemara rejects this:

They said: Can the cases really be compared?!

What is the comparison?!

There,

in the case of the branch,

if he does not smear

around it,

it does not remain standing,

the branch’s sealing will not remain at all; it will fall, and this is not a sealing.

But if

he sealed

plugging

half of it

with clay,

with something that remains standing,

in the place where he put the clay,

it remains standing,

the clay sealing remains fixed, and therefore Rava raised the question whether such a sealing of half the hole is sufficient.

And

further

Rava said:

They said

in the Mishna below, on page 96b: “

If one stole leavened bread and Passover passed over it, he says to him, ‘Here is your property before you’,”

and if he cannot say, “Here is your property before you,” for example, because it was lost through circumstances beyond his control, he must pay its value as it was at the time of the theft, as explained above.

And if so,

Rava raised a dilemma [נסתפק]

Rava: