Bava Kamma 104b — the Talmud in English

Money is not sent by means of a diukni, even if witnesses are signed upon it,

that is to say: even if the owner of the deposit gave his agent identifying marks, or wrote his seal for him in a letter and gave it to him, and said to him: “Go and show it to so-and-so, and he will give you money that he has in his possession belonging to me”—nevertheless, the money is not sent into his hand; and if he gave it and it was forcibly taken from him while in his possession, the sender is not released from his debt.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: If witnesses are signed upon it, it may be sent.

They said,

the members of the academy:

According to Shmuel, what is the remedy

[that is, how is there a possibility that he may give it to an agent and be released]?

And they said: If he makes him

in this manner,

as in the following incident:

For Rabbi Abba had money outstanding

with Rav Yosef bar Hama

[he was claiming money from Rav Yosef bar Hama],

Rabbi Abba said

Rabbi Abba

to Rav Safra:

“When you come, bring them to me”

[when you come from there, bring my money with you.]”

When

Rav Safra

went there, his son said to him

[Rava, the son of Rav Yosef]:

“Who wrote you “

I have received”?

That is to say: Did Rabbi Abba give you a document in which he writes that through your receiving the money it is as though he himself received it?

Rav Safra said

Rav Safra said to Rava:

“No,”

he did not write me “I have received”!

He said to him:

“If so, go first and have him write you “

I have received”

[go first and bring a document in which he writes this], and then we will give you the money, for otherwise, if the money is forcibly taken from you while in your possession, we will again become obligated to pay.

In the end, Rava said to him,

Rava said to Rav Safra:

“Even if he also writes you “

I have received”

[even if he writes you, “I have received”],

it is nothing;

for

perhaps, by the time you come, Rabbi Abba will have died, and the money will have fallen before the orphans, and “

I have received”

of Rabbi Abba is nothing,

that is to say: perhaps between Rabbi Abba’s writing and your arrival here, Rabbi Abba will have died, and the heirs are the ones claiming the money from us, and their father’s agency is not effective to release us from liability for forcible loss when we deliver the money into your hand.

Rav Safra said

Rav Safra said to Rava:

“Then what is the remedy,

what is the way to make me an agent?”

Rava said to him:

“Go, let him acquire them for you through land,”

[go back to Rabbi Abba, so that he will acquire for you the money that is in our possession through an acquisition accompanying land],

“and come and write for us” “

I have received”

[and you come to us and write for us, “I have received”], and

in this manner,

as in the following incident:

Rav Pappa,

who

had twelve thousand zuz outstanding with the people of Huzai

[he was owed twelve thousand zuz by them],

acquired them for Rav Shmuel bar Abba through the threshold of his house

[Rav Pappa acquired his money for Rav Shmuel bar Abba through a threshold, of the house],

when he came, he went out to greet him as far as Toakh

[and when Rav Shmuel returned with the money, Rav Pappa went out to meet him as far as the place called Toakh], because he was happy that he had brought him his money.

We learned in the Mishna:

“He gave him the principal

but did not give him the fifth … he need not pursue him”:

And the Gemara infers:

Evidently,

it is proven from the fact that the tanna needed to teach us that he need not pursue him in order to give him the fifth:

For the

fifth—

which the one who swore must pay to the owner of the money—

is monetary property,

and since the robbed party has money with the robber, I would say that he must pursue him in order to give it to him—

And

the practical difference in the fact that the fifth is monetary property is that

if he dies,

the father who became obligated in the fifth,

the heirs pay it

from the landed property that he left in their possession—

and we also learned,

and we learned that the fifth is monetary property as well from what we learned in our Mishna: “

He gave the principal

for which he became obligated through his oath, and afterward

swore

falsely

concerning the fifth

for which he became obligated, saying that he had already paid it, and admitted that the oath had been false,

behold,

this

adds a fifth

because of his second oath

upon

the

fifth

for which he became obligated through the first oath—

Evidently,

it is proven from here as well that

the fifth is monetary property,

and one becomes liable for his oath denying it with a principal and a fifth, like other money that he denied owing him.

And it was taught

in a beraita

also as follows,

that the fifth is monetary property—

As it was taught:

One who robs his fellow and swears to him

falsely concerning the robbery,

and dies,

the one who swore, his

heirs

of his

pay the principal and the fifth

from his property,

and are exempt from the guilt-offering,

it is proven from this beraita as well that the fifth is monetary property.

And we raise an objection against the beraita:

And

for

are heirs sons obligated to pay their father’s fifth

[and are the heirs indeed obligated to pay the fifth to which their father became obligated]!?

And we juxtapose

a contradiction to this from a beraita in which we learned:

If Scripture had said—in the passage of the oath concerning a deposit—only, “And he shall restore the robbery that he robbed,” teaching that the son does not pay a fifth for his father’s robbery, which he did not commit,

I would still say: When does he not pay a fifth for his father’s robbery? When neither he swore

[the son]

nor his father,

or even if

he

swore and

his father did not swear—

but if

his father swore and

even

did not

swear

he,

or even if

he and

also

his father swore, from where

is it known that even in these circumstances the son does not pay a fifth—

Therefore

the verse states: “

That which he robbed and that which he extorted

[that is to say: “And he shall restore the robbery that he robbed or the extortion that he extorted”],”

and he

—the son—

did not rob and did not extort.

We have learned that even if the father swore, the son does not pay a fifth, and he is not obligated to pay it from the property his father left him; and this is difficult in light of what is explained in the beraita, that the heirs pay their father’s fifth!?

Rav Nahman said: It is not difficult,

the contradiction between the beraitot, for:

Here—

the beraita that obligates the heirs to pay the fifth—deals with a case in which

he admitted,

the father admitted during his lifetime that he had sworn falsely, and the heirs are obligated to pay, since the father had already become obligated in the fifth during his lifetime.

Here—

the beraita that exempts the son from paying a fifth for his father’s false oath—deals with a case in which

he did not admit,

the father did not admit during his lifetime that he had sworn falsely, and did not become obligated in the fifth while he was alive.

The Gemara had thought that the exemption is in a case in which the father did not admit, and the son also did not admit, and therefore we ask:

If he did not admit,

then how do we know that he swore falsely, and

even the principal he does not pay!?

And if you would say

[perhaps you will say]:

Indeed, he does not pay,

[it is indeed true that he does not even pay the principal], this cannot be said, for:

But since he turns specifically to the fifth, it follows that he pays the principal

[since the tanna mentioned only that the son is exempt from the fifth, it implies that he does pay the principal]; and the question returns to its place: if the beraita deals with a case in which he did not admit, why does he pay the principal!?

And furthermore,

there is proof that he pays the principal at the beginning from the fact that

it was taught

in the conclusion of that beraita that he pays the principal, implying that he also pays the principal at the beginning:

As it was taught in the conclusion of that beraita:

“I would still say:

When does he pay the principal for his father’s robbery? When he and his father swore—

but if

his father and not he swore,

or even if

he and not his father swore,

or even if

neither he nor his father—

from where

is it known that the son is liable for the principal for his father’s robbery—

Therefore

the verse states: ‘Robbery, extortion, a lost item, and a deposit’

[these are all those enumerated in the passage of the oath concerning a deposit, which he denied and concerning which he swore]: “

there is a teaching”

[and he proceeds to interpret it].

And Rav Huna sat and stated this teaching,

that is to say: Rav Huna taught the aforementioned beraita to his son:

He said,

he asked

his son Rabba

[his son Rabba said to him]:

Does “

there is a teaching”

is the Master saying,

meaning, do you intend to say that it is learned from Scripture, from the fact that the Torah mentioned all these circumstances,

or

perhaps, “

they will be paid”

is the Master saying

by reasoning?

He said to him,

Rav Huna said to his son: “

There is a teaching”

is what I am saying, and I say it from an amplification of the verses

[my intention was to learn from the verse to impose liability in this case as well].

Thus, in the conclusion he pays the principal, and the same is true in the beginning, and necessarily the son admitted at least; for otherwise he does not pay the principal, and how did you say that the beraita deals with a case in which he did not admit!?

Rather,

the Gemara explains Rav Nahman’s words, who explained the beraita as referring to “he did not admit”:

What “

did not admit”

did Rav Nahman say?

His father did not admit

and did not become obligated in a fifth, and therefore the son does not pay a fifth,

but

however

his son admitted,

and therefore he pays the principal.

And we raise an objection against what we learned in the beraita: “He and his father [who swore]—from where is it known that the son does not pay a fifth—the verse states …”:

Then let us obligate his son in a fifth for his own oath

[let the son become obligated in a fifth because of his own oath], for he himself denied money belonging to his fellow that he possessed from his inheritance from his father!?

They said,

the members of the academy, to explain the beraita:

What are we dealing with here?

With a case in which the robbery no longer exists

in the son’s possession; and even if they “inherited” the robbery from their father, they are not liable for it, since they are not the robbers, and therefore, even though they swore, saying, “We did not inherit your object from our father,” and this is false, it is only an oath of utterance, for which they are not liable for a principal and a fifth.

And we ask:

If

the beraita deals

with a case in which the robbery no longer exists, the son does not even pay the principal,

yet it was already explained that the son is liable for the principal!?

And we answer:

No, it is necessary: There is liability attached to property,

that is to say: the beraita deals with a case in which their father left property liable for his debts, namely, that they inherited land from him; and in such a case, if their father bequeathed the robbery to them and it was subsequently lost, they are obligated to pay their father’s debt from those lands.

Therefore, they are indeed liable for the principal, but they are not liable for the fifth, as the reason will be explained and proceed.