Bava Batra 93a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara proves:

the first clause,

in which the slave was found to be a thief or a dice-player,

what is the reason?

Why is the sale not void? Is there not a greater defect than this—that he is a thief or a dice-player!?

Is it not

the case that

because this is how most of them are?

For most slaves are thus, and he bought him with this understanding!? And it is proven that even with regard to money one follows the majority, and this is difficult for Shmuel, for according to his words, that with regard to money one does not follow the majority, it is as though the buyer did not know that the slave was a thief; and if so, why is it not a mistaken transaction!?

And we answer: No,

not that most slaves are thieves or dice-players, but

all of them are thus.

all of them are like this.

They are all thus, and Shmuel too agrees that there is no mistaken transaction here, for this buyer knows of this; and it is as though the seller explicitly said to him that the slave is a thief or a dice-player.

Come and hear

a proof for Shmuel’s words from that which we learned in Bava Kamma [46a]:

an ox

that is innocuous

that gored a cow

that was pregnant,

and its fetus was found

dead, lying

beside it, and it is not known whether, before it gored her,

before the ox gored her,

she gave birth

[the cow miscarried it], and the owner of the ox is not liable to pay for the offspring.

Or

if after it gored her,

only after the goring,

she gave birth,

for because of the goring the cow miscarried it. And the owner of the ox is liable to pay also for the death of the offspring. The owner of the ox

pays half the damage for the cow,

for the cow, since he certainly damaged it, according to the law of an innocuous ox, which pays only half the damage.

And

he likewise pays

a quarter of the damage for the offspring,

for since the matter is uncertain whether he is liable to pay half the damage for the offspring, according to the law of an innocuous ox, or perhaps he is entirely exempt, this is money placed in doubt, and they divide it. And the owner of the ox pays for the offspring only a quarter of the damage, that is, half of the money placed in doubt.

And the Gemara proves:

But why

does he pay only a quarter of the damage for the offspring?

Let us say: Follow the majority of cows

in the world,

and the majority of cows become pregnant and give birth

to a viable offspring, and do not miscarry.

And this one,

this cow too is among the majority, and it was destined to give birth to a viable offspring. And what she miscarried,

she certainly miscarried because of the goring.

And if so, the owner of the ox must pay the entire half-damage also for the offspring, for there is no uncertainty here at all that his ox caused the miscarriage of the offspring!?

Rather, certainly, with regard to money one does not follow the majority. Rather, the matter remains a balanced uncertainty, and therefore they divide the doubtful money between them. And this is difficult for Rav, who holds that even with regard to money one follows the majority.

And we answer: One always follows the majority with regard to money, but

there, because it is uncertain for us,

for even if we follow the majority and decide that indeed the cow miscarried its offspring because of the ox’s goring, we still have uncertainty whether to obligate the owner of the ox for this:

For it can be said:

on the one hand,

it came from in front of her,

it is possible that the ox came toward the cow,

and because of fright,

because of fear of the ox that came toward it to gore it,

she miscarried,

even before the goring. And if so, the owner of the ox is exempt, for even a person who frightens his fellow and causes him damage is exempt from paying, because this is only indirect causation, and one is exempt for indirect causation in damages under human law, though liable only under the laws of Heaven. And all the more so when a person’s animal frightens another animal, the owner of the animal is exempt.

And it can be said

on the other hand,

it came from behind her,

it is possible that the ox came from behind the cow, and she did not see it before the goring, so as to be frightened by it,

and it gored her and she miscarried.

And she miscarried only because of the goring, and the owner of the ox is liable to pay for the offspring.

And therefore,

it is money placed in doubt. And every money placed in doubt, they divide.

The Gemara now discusses:

Shall we say that this is a dispute between tannaim!?

Shall we say that Rav and Shmuel disputed the same dispute as the tannaim?

For it was taught:

An ox that was grazing

in a field together with other oxen belonging to other people,

and a dead ox was found beside it,

through goring or biting, and it is not known who killed it,

even though this one was gored, and this one is accustomed to gore,

for the ox found beside the dead ox is an ox accustomed to gore, or

this one was bitten, and this one is accustomed to bite,

nevertheless

we do not say “‘

It is known that this one gored it and this one bit it,’”

and obligate its owner for the damage. Rather, the matter is uncertain, perhaps another ox killed it, for with regard to money one does not follow an assessment.

Rabbi Aḥa says:

If there was

a camel that was engaged in intercourse among camels,

engaged in mating [whose manner of intercourse is rear to rear, and it is the way of animals during intercourse to become frenzied and strike the animals around them],

and a dead camel was found beside it, it is known that this one killed it.

And this means that Rabbi Aḥa disputes the first tanna, and holds that one follows the presumption, for presumably the camel engaged in intercourse was the one that killed it. And all the more so in the case of an ox accustomed to gore, which has already gored three times, it is presumed that it was the one that killed the ox beside it.

They thought,

the members of the academy thought,

that a majority and a presumption are equivalent to one another.

For they have one law: if with regard to money one follows the presumption, one likewise follows the majority.

And if so,

let us say: Rav stated his view in accordance with Rabbi Aḥa,

for with regard to money one follows the presumption, and the same applies that one follows the majority.

And Shmuel stated his view in accordance with the first tanna,

for with regard to money one does not follow the presumption, nor does one follow the majority.

And we reject this:

Rav could say to you: I state my view even in accordance with the first tanna.

For

the first tanna stated his view there only because we do not follow a presumption, but with regard to a majority

we do

follow it,

for a majority is superior to a presumption. And the first tanna would agree that in monetary law one follows the majority, despite the fact that there one does not follow the presumption.

And Shmuel could say to you: I state my view even in accordance with Rabbi Aḥa.

For

Rabbi Aḥa stated his view there only because we follow a presumption,

because

it itself is established,

the camel itself is established as one that kills during intercourse, and therefore we attribute it to the fact that presumably it was the one that killed it.

But with regard to a majority,

which is something that is not in the body of the ox, but by force of the majority of oxen in the world we wish to adjudicate also with regard to it,

we do not follow it.

Come and hear

a proof for Shmuel from that which we learned in our Mishna:

One who sells produce to another, and he sowed it and it did not sprout, and even if it was flaxseed,

he is not liable for it.

What, is it not

the case that the Mishna comes to say that

even flaxseed, which the majority buy for sowing,

for most flax purchased in the world is intended for sowing,

and even so, we do not follow the majority

to void the sale because the flax was not fit for sowing.

And this is difficult for Rav!?

And we answer:

It is a dispute between tannaim,

we find that tannaim disputed this, whether with regard to money one follows the majority, and Rav will hold like that tanna who holds that with regard to money one follows the majority.

For it was taught: One who sells produce to another and he sowed it and it did not sprout.

If that produce was

garden seed

that is not eaten

at all,

he is liable for it.

And if it was

flaxseed,

which is also fit for eating, three opinions were stated concerning this:

1.

He is not liable for it,

the words of the first tanna.