Bava Batra 88a — the Talmud in English

And this is speaking

in a case where he took

the shopkeeper the small flask that the father sent with the child, in order

to measure with it

for the buyer.

For if he had been measuring into the vessel while it was in the hand of the minor, he would have been exempt, since it is a consciously abandoned lost object on the part of the father. However, once the shopkeeper took it into his hand one time in order to use it, he became liable for accidents.

And in accordance with Rabbah, for Rabbah said:

One who finds a lost animal—the law is that even in a case in which he is exempt from tending to it and returning it to its owners [such as an elderly person for whom this is not in keeping with his dignity], nevertheless, if he

struck it

[struck the animal] in order to direct it onto the road—he

became liable for it

to tend to its return, because the very fact that he performed an act upon it imposes upon him responsibility to return it to its owners.

And for this reason, here too, according to the Sages, the shopkeeper who used the small flask became responsible for it, and is liable when it broke. And the words of the Mishna at its conclusion are also understood: the Sages concede to Rabbi Judah when the small flask is in the child’s hand and the shopkeeper measured into it—that the shopkeeper is exempt. Since he did not acquire it so as to become liable for it.

And we challenge this:

Say that Rabbah said

that he acquired the lost object and became liable to tend to it specifically

with living creatures, for he caused them to take an external course,

as he taught them steps outward, that is, he caused them to go out and deviate even farther from their path, and therefore became liable for returning it.

But

in such a case

where he took the small flask in order to measure oil with it,

did

Rabbah say that in this manner he acquires the small flask so as to become responsible for it? For taking the small flask does not cause it to break any more than it was liable to break at the outset!

Rather, Rava said: I and the lion of the company expounded it,

we explained it,

and who is he,

and who is this great man?

Rabbi Zeira,

and this is how we explained it:

What are we dealing with here,

we are dealing here

in a case where he took

the shopkeeper this small flask from the child’s hand in order

to measure with it for others.

And the child’s father, who owns the small flask, does not know of this; therefore the shopkeeper is considered an unknowing borrower.

And they disagree concerning an unknowing borrower

—Rabbi Judah and the Sages.

One master,

Rabbi Judah,

holds: he is a borrower,

and since he returned it to the place from which he borrowed it, namely, to the child, he is no longer responsible for the small flask.

And one master holds,

the Sages hold: an unknowing borrower

is a robber,

and he is liable for a complete return to the owners themselves, as it is stated: “And he shall return the robbed item”; and returning it to the child is not considered a return, since the owners’ awareness is required, and handing it to the child is not considered returning it with the owners’ awareness, and therefore he is liable for the small flask that broke in the child’s hand before it reached his father’s hand.

The essential matter,

we learned above:

Shmuel said: One who takes a vessel from an artisan, to examine it, and it is seized by accident while in his hand—

is liable.

And we explain:

And this matter applies

that he is liable only in a case

where its price is fixed,

and there are also many buyers for the vessel, so that the seller does not benefit from this particular buyer taking the vessel, because even if this buyer does not buy the vessel, he will easily find another buyer; and since the benefit belongs to the purchaser, who can acquire this object, when he takes the vessel to examine it he is considered a complete purchaser, or like a borrower, for all the benefit is his, and he becomes liable for accidents involving the vessel.

And the Gemara brings an incident:

A certain man entered the butcher’s shop and lifted a thigh of meat,

a certain man entered the butcher’s shop in order to buy meat, and lifted a thigh of meat in his hand in order to examine whether it was suitable for him.

While he was lifting it, a horseman came and snatched it from him.

While he was lifting it to examine it, a horseman came and snatched it from him. And now it must be considered whether the purchaser is liable for the thigh that was stolen.

He came before

the purchaser came before

Rav Yeimar, and he made him pay its value,

he made him pay its value to the meat seller, because he had lifted it, and it had been taken from the seller’s domain.

And the Gemara adds:

And this matter applies

that the purchaser is liable only in a case

where its price is fixed,

for the price of the thigh is fixed, in which case his intention was to buy it if it proved suitable, and immediately when he lifted it in order to examine it, it was in his domain. But if its price is not fixed, he does not set his mind to buy it when he lifts it in order to examine it; therefore, if it is stolen, it is stolen from the seller’s domain.

And the Gemara brings another incident concerning such a matter:

A certain man brought pumpkins to Pum Nahara,

a certain man brought pumpkins to the city of Pum Nahara.

Everyone came and took a pumpkin each,

everyone came and took a pumpkin each in order to buy them, but they had still not paid.

Since the seller did not know from whom to demand his money, he wanted to prohibit them to the people,

he said to them: Behold, they are consecrated to Heaven!

They came before Rav Kahana,

to determine whether these pumpkins were consecrated to Heaven or not.

He said to them:

His words did not succeed in consecrating the pumpkins, because

a person cannot consecrate something that is not his,

and those pumpkins that the purchasers had taken were no longer his.

And this matter applies

that the purchasers acquired the pumpkins

when their prices were fixed,

for the prices of the pumpkins were fixed.

But

if

their prices were not fixed—

they remain in the domain of their owners.

They are still in the seller’s domain,

and he properly consecrated them,

and what he consecrated them accomplished its purpose.

And we do not say that the law of the pumpkins is like the law of robbery, in which neither the robber nor the robbed person can consecrate: the robbed person cannot consecrate because it is not in his domain, and the robber cannot consecrate because it is not his. For here the customers did not take the pumpkins in order to rob them, but in order to buy them; and since their prices were not fixed, they did not set their minds to buy them, because perhaps the seller would want more than the amount they were interested in paying for them, and their intention was to return them. Therefore, the pumpkins are considered to be in the seller’s domain.

The Sages taught: One who purchases vegetables from the market,

from an am ha-aretz seller who is not trustworthy concerning tithes,

and examined

the purchaser sorted among the inferior and superior vegetables,

and set aside

the superior ones to the side, and did not make up his mind to buy them,

even

if he did so

the entire day—

he did not acquire

the vegetables,

and did not become liable

for them

with regard to tithe,

since he intended only to examine the attractive ones.

But if

the purchaser resolved

the purchaser

in his heart to buy it—

he acquired

the vegetables,

and became liable

immediately

with regard to tithe

of demai. And if he wishes to retract from his purchase,

to return it

without separating tithe,

it is impossible—

for he has already become liable for tithe,

and a chaver who is careful concerning tithes is forbidden to send out from his possession something that is not prepared.

And to tithe it

and afterward return it to the seller,

it is impossible—

for he has already reduced its value,

for he reduces the vegetables by the measure of the tithe.

How then

shall he act?

He tithes it,

and gives the tithe to a Levite,

and gives him

to the seller the remaining vegetables with the addition of

the value of the tithe.

And we challenge this:

Is it so

that

because he resolved in his heart to buy, he acquired and became liable for tithe?

For he said nothing and performed no act of acquisition; and even if their prices had been fixed, he could have returned them and thereby been exempt from tithe!

Rav Hoshaya said: Here

we are dealing with a purchaser

who is God-fearing,

for the God-fearing person obligates himself in matters of buying and selling only according to his inner consent, even when he has said nothing and done nothing; and such a person acquires the purchase and becomes liable for tithe from the moment he resolves in his heart to buy.

Such as Rav Safra, who fulfilled in himself [

Psalms 15:2]:

“And speaks truth in his heart,”

for once he was reciting the Shema, and a man said to him, “Give me your merchandise for such-and-such coins.” Rav Safra thought that because he had offered too small an amount, Rav Safra was silent, and the man increased the amount of his offer substantially. After Rav Safra finished his prayer, he wished to accept from the purchaser only the amount that he had initially offered, because he had already agreed in his heart to sell it to him for that amount.

Mishna:

It is written in the Torah [Leviticus 19:36]: “Just balances, just weights, a just ephah, and a just hin shall you have.”

“Just weights”—these are the weights against which one weighs. “Ephah”—this is a measure of dry [substances]. “Hin”—this is a measure of liquids. From here, there is a positive mitzva to make the balances, weights, and measures thoroughly just, and to be exact in their calculation when making them. And our Mishna comes to teach that one who sells wine or oil and the like must clean the measures from time to time of the remnants adhering to their walls and bottoms, because through these remnants the measures become reduced. And there is a difference in this between the types of sellers:

The wholesaler,

who is a large shopkeeper who purchases much at once and sells to small shopkeepers,

cleans his measures,

the measures with which he measures liquids, such as wine or oil and the like,

once every thirty days,

because the measure becomes reduced by the remnants that solidify and adhere to the walls and bottom of the measuring vessel.

And the householder

who sells to the wholesaler, and uses his measures only infrequently, cleans his measures

once every twelve months.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The reversal of the matters,

the wholesaler cleans his measures once every twelve months, since he sells constantly and the liquid does not solidify on the walls of the measure; but the householder cleans once every thirty days, since he does not sell constantly, and the remnants of the liquid solidify and dry inside the measure.

A shopkeeper cleans his measures twice on Shabbat—

twice a week, since he is not required to leave the measure over the purchaser’s vessels until the last three drops have dripped from it, as we learned above [87a]. Therefore, much becomes solidified and adheres to the walls of the measure, and even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes in this matter.

And he wipes

the shopkeeper wipes and cleans

his weights,

the weighing stones with which he weighs liquids and meat,

once on Shabbat—

once a week.

And he wipes

the shopkeeper the pan of the

balances for every weighing,

each time that he weighs with them, since they have a receptacle and much adheres to them.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: When are these words said

—that they must wipe the measures and the weights?

With liquids—

when measuring and weighing liquids, such as wine, oil, or meat.

But with dry substances—

when measuring and weighing dry substances, such as fruits, cumin, and peppers,

he does not need

to wipe them, since nothing adheres from them.